Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
5-1-1985
CFDP Number
752
CFDP Pages
32
Abstract
A mass-economy is one with many, many agents where each agent is negligible and each trading group is also negligible with respect to the mass-economy. Feasible allocations are those which are virtually attainable by trades only among members of coalitions contained in feasible (“measure-consistent”) partitions of the agent set. A feasible allocation is in the core, called the f -core, if it cannot be improved upon by any finite coalition. We show that in a private goods economy with indivisibilities and without externalities, the f -core, the A -core (Aumann’s core concept) and the Walrasian allocations coincide. In the presence of widespread externalities, the f -core and the Walrasian allocations coincide but the definition of the A -core is problematic. The conceptual significance of these results will be discussed.
Recommended Citation
Hammond, Peter J.; Kaneko, Mamoru; and Wooders, Myrna Holtz, "Mass Economies with Vital Small Coalitions; The f-Core Approach" (1985). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 993.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/993