Myopic Economic Agents
An economic agent is said to be weakly myopic if he prefers a time-contingent consumption plan x bar to a time-contingent consumption plan y bar, then he prefers x bar x to y bar augmented by any stationary consumption plan which begins suﬀiciently far in the future. An economic agent is said to be monotonically myopic if when he prefers a state-contingent consumption plan x bar to a state-contingent consumption plan y bar, then he prefers any suﬀiciently large ﬁnite truncation of y bar. A topology on the space of time (state)-contingent consumption plans is said to be weakly (monotonically) myopic if every complete preference relation which is continuous in this topology is weakly (monotonically) myopic. A characterization of weakly (monotonically) myopic Hausdorﬀ locally convex linear topologies and their dual spaces is given.
Brown, Donald J. and Lewis, Lucinda M., "Myopic Economic Agents" (1978). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 714.