Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
8-1-2019
CFDP Number
2190R2
CFDP Revision Date
March 1, 2020
CFDP Pages
43
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Code(s)
C72, D44
Abstract
This paper presents new results on the existence of pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria in specified functional forms. These results broaden the scope of methods developed by Reny (2011) well beyond monotone pure strategies. Applications include natural models of first-price and all-pay auctions not covered by previous existence results. To illustrate the scope of our results, we provide an analysis of three auctions: (i) a first-price auction of objects that are heterogeneous and imperfect substitutes; (ii) a first-price auction in which bidders’ payoffs have a very general interdependence structure; and (iii) an all-pay auction with non-monotone equilibrium.
Recommended Citation
Meneghel, Idione and Tourky, Rabee, "On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities" (2019). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 62.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/62