Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
10-9-2024
CFDP Number
2408
CFDP Pages
54
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Code(s)
J12, J16, D31, I3
Abstract
Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference in which parents desire a male heir and daughter aversion in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing micro-foundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.
Recommended Citation
Borker, Girija; Eeckhout, Jan; Luke, Nancy; Minz, Shantidani; Munshi, Kaivan; and Swaminathan, Soumya, "Wealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection" (2024). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2814.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2814