Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
8-1-2012
CFDP Number
1869
CFDP Pages
28
Abstract
The basic two-noncooperative-equilibrium-point model of Diamond and Dybvig is considered along with the work of Morris and Shin utilizing the possibility of outside noise to select a unique equilibrium point. Both of these approaches are essentially nondynamic. We add an explicit replicator dynamic from evolutionary game theory to provide for a sensitivity analysis that encompasses both models and contains the results of both depending on parameter settings.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Eric and Shubik, Martin, "Runs, Panics and Bubbles: Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin Reconsidered" (2012). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2233.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2233