Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
1-1-2012
CFDP Number
1846
CFDP Pages
14
Abstract
We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between “payoff types” and “belief types” and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types — developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) — applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type — belief type language.
Recommended Citation
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; and Takahashi, Satoru, "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types" (2012). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2205.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2205