Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
10-1-2011
CFDP Number
1822
CFDP Pages
61
Abstract
We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
Recommended Citation
Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen, "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information" (2011). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2173.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2173