Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
12-1-2009
CFDP Number
1743R
CFDP Revision Date
2011-08-01
CFDP Pages
58
Abstract
We characterize optimal selling protocols/equilibria of a game in which an Agent first puts hidden effort to acquire information and then transacts with a Firm that uses this information to take a decision. We determine the equilibrium payoffs that maximize incentives to acquire information. Our analysis is similar to finding ex ante optimal self-enforcing contracts since information sharing, outcomes and transfers cannot be contracted upon. We show when and how selling and transmitting information gradually helps. We also show how mixing/side bets increases the Agent’s incentives.
Recommended Citation
Hörner, Johannes and Skrzypacz, Andrzej, "Selling Information" (2009). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2068.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2068