Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
12-1-2009
CFDP Number
1743
CFDP Revision Date
2010-08-01
CFDP Pages
55
Abstract
We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and why the seller can appropriate a substantial fraction of the value through gradual revelation, and how the entire value can be extracted with the help of a mediator.
Recommended Citation
Hörner, Johannes and Skrzypacz, Andrzej, "Selling Information" (2009). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2067.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2067