Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
11-1-2009
CFDP Number
1739
CFDP Pages
70
Abstract
We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N > 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
Recommended Citation
Hörner, Johannes; Lovo, Stefano; and Tomala, Tristan, "Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence" (2009). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2063.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2063
Supplemental material