Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
3-1-2008
CFDP Number
1641
CFDP Revision Date
2009-06-01
CFDP Pages
17
Abstract
We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing allocation (i.e., in the interior of the core). Highlighting group dynamics, we demonstrate that behaviors which appear destructive can themselves lead to beneficial and strictly self-enforcing cooperation.
Recommended Citation
Rozen, Kareen, "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining" (2008). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1941.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1941