Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
11-1-2001
CFDP Number
1336
CFDP Pages
62
Abstract
We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.
Recommended Citation
Frankel, David M.; Morris, Stephen; and Pauzner, Ady, "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities" (2001). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1598.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1598