Two Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Authors

John Geanakoplos

Document Type

Discussion Paper

Publication Date

4-1-1996

CFDP Number

1123R

CFDP Pages

6

Abstract

The first proof shows that Arrow’s axioms guarantee neutrality: every social choice must be made in exactly the same way, which quickly leads to dictatorship. The second proof clarifies the last step, and also confirms the intimate connection between Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and the Condorcet triple. The second proof shows that a doubly pivotal agent must be a dictator; the Condorcet triple guarantees the existence of a doubly pivotal agent. Neutrality guarantees the existence of a (symmetrically) doubly pivotal agent.

Recommended Citation

Geanakoplos, John, "Two Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" (1996). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1366.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1366