Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
8-1-1988
CFDP Number
884R
CFDP Revision Date
1989-08-01
CFDP Pages
21
Abstract
We study the “generalized correlated equilibria” of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of “subjectivity” (i.e., differences between the players’ priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.
Recommended Citation
Brandenburger, Adam; Dekel, Eddie; and Geanakoplos, John, "Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures" (1988). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1128.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1128