THE BANALITY OF ORGANIZATION: Mass Killings as a Coordination Problem in the Shadow of War
Date of Award
Spring 2023
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Political Science
First Advisor
Wood, Elisabeth
Abstract
How and why do local subordinates carry out leaders’ policies for mass killings, and when and where do they do so? What accounts for the onset of and participation in mass killings? While existing studies mostly focus on the causes of genocide (on ideology or national leaders’ decision-making), my study explores a neglected issue—how organizational dynamics impact the implementation of mass killings. I address these questions through a study of the political organization of mass killings in Southeast Asia. I make the case that across genocides initial orders are “ambiguous.” Yet local commanders in certain areas interpret this ambiguity towards mass violence, whereas those in other localities participate only after the killings have spread. My theory predicts that when central leaders’ orders are ambiguous and where center-local coordination is low, ambitious local commanders initiate entrepreneurial violence to implement the goals of higher-ups and to thereby advance their own individual interests, generating a cascade of mass killings. I combine archival work, computational content analysis of orders, and interviews with local commanders to test my theory using Cambodia (1975–79). My findings contribute to debates on conflict and the use of violence by militaries and armed groups by showing that not all violence can be reduced to intergroup cleavages and that local instances of mass killings can often be understood in terms of local commanders’ opportunistic responses to leaders’ ambiguous orders.
Recommended Citation
Kwok, William, "THE BANALITY OF ORGANIZATION: Mass Killings as a Coordination Problem in the Shadow of War" (2023). Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations. 903.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations/903
