Date of Award
Fall 2022
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Political Science
First Advisor
Svolik, Milan
Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three research articles that analyze how informal factors impact the effectiveness and stability of a subset of political institutions. In the first chapter, I examine how social norms within government agencies impact state capacity. In the second chapter, I consider how norms that operate among citizens augment the survival of democratic institutions. Finally, the third chapter considers how crises affect checks-and-balances in separation-of-powers systems as well as the effectiveness of electoral institutions. Reversals of State Capacity: Norms and Political Disruption State capacity research generally focuses on improvements to a government's ability to deliver on its policy-goals. Yet, in recent years, leaders in a number of nations have undermined high-functioning public sectors. To understand reversals of state capacity, it is necessary to examine the formal and informal dynamics at play within a nation's bureaucracy. A formal model highlights the three trajectories a bureaucratic agency may follow in response to disruption by a political leader: temporary capture, erosion, and resistance. By prioritizing policy that is captured by special interests rather than one aligning with an agency's legally-codified mission, leaders may undermine state capacity. Bureaucrats who care deeply about an agency's mission can be driven to leave the public sector, thereby eroding underlying bureaucratic capacity and durably reversing high-levels of state capacity. However, agency culture may coalesce to form a norm that bolsters mission-compliance, facilitating resistance to extreme shifts and stabilizing long-term capacity. The Social Foundations of Democratic Norms Recent instances of democratic backsliding across consolidated democracies have led leading scholars to decry the harm to democratic norms. But what exactly is a democratic norm? Despite their central role in the trend of backsliding, democratic norms remain vague and under-theorized phenomena. This study aims to provide theoretical and empirical foundations for democratic norms. It also serves to evaluate how norms may impact the willingness of citizens to electorally punish politicians who advocate for policies that erode democratic institutions. I first present a formal model of political competition that integrates social norms. Notably, the model demonstrates that norms may push citizens who can be classified as holding `undemocratic values' to nonetheless punish undemocratic candidates for office. This occurs due to the threat of social sanctions associated with violating democratic norms. I then present an online experiment that allows me to test the model’s empirical predictions. I first elicit two types of norms from respondents regarding a politician supporting an undemocratic policy stance. Respondents are then randomly exposed to information on previously elicited norms, which is intended to shift perceptions over democratic norms. Following this manipulation, respondents take part in a candidate-choice conjoint experiment to examine how norms shift support for undemocratic politicians. Finally, respondents engage in an augmented dictator game to examine how norms are enforced among citizens. The experiment finds partial support for the theory. Overall, the study outlines the mechanisms by which democratic norms operate and underscores their importance for the long-term stability of democracy. Under the Cover of Crisis: Electoral Accountability and Policy License I present a legislative and electoral formal model that examines how crises impact the efficacy of democratic institutions. The model demonstrates that crises may undermine legislative checks-and-balances by incentivizing a veto-player to support a policy that counters their ideological preferences. As a result, an agenda-setter is provided greater license to implement their preferred policy. Yet, eased legislative passage may either benefit citizen welfare or come at the cost of decreasing the likelihood that the optimal policy is enacted. Moreover, the model details the counter-intuitive finding that crises may also improve the selection of `good' politicians through elections. While crises lead veto-players to more often acquiesce to agenda-setters, it also serves to reveal a veto-player's willingness to compromise when it matters. Hence, crises allow citizens to remove particularly obstinate, obstructionist politicians. Thus, crises produce a trade-off between improved accountability via better electoral selection and potentially undermined policy fit. Overall, I find that crises hold significant consequences for democratic institutions, and I consider the implications of the model for several recent policies passed following a crisis.
Recommended Citation
Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick, "Institutional Fault Lines: Crises, Norms, and the Informal Foundations of the State" (2022). Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations. 855.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations/855
