Date of Award
Fall 2022
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Knobe, Joshua
Abstract
This dissertation explores the possibility that moral obligation involves not only what we do to others but also how we think and feel about them. We are often angry with people close to us not because of what they did, but rather on account of their feelings. We blame their lack of gratitude, their unjustified jealousy, their indifference. The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical significance of this kind of responses: responses that seem to hold others accountable for their emotions and other mental states. My view is that our practices of accountability show that we have obligations of feeling. At first glance, though, these obligations appear peculiar. In particular, they appear to differ from other obligations in that we are unable to claim or demand that they be fulfilled. You can claim the money I owe you. You can demand that I respect a promise. But can you have a claim to my gratitude? Can you demand that I feel happy for you? It seems that you cannot: you cannot demand the very thing whose absence you can blame me for. Does this pose a problem for the view that we have obligations of feeling? I argue that it does not. On the contrary, what seems at first peculiar is in fact a pervasive aspect of our moral life. The standing to blame and the standing to demand come apart, that is, not only when it comes to our emotions but across all kinds of simple, ordinary actions. I argue that this has significant implications for thinking about the nature and scope of moral obligation. In other words, I argue that careful exploration of the moral status of mental states reveals something important about directed obligation more generally. It reveals that while our obligations to others cast a very wide net, what we can demand of them is rather limited. Morality is thus spacious in one sense and constricted in another.
Recommended Citation
Attie Picker, Mario, "Essays on Obligation and the Moral Status of Mental States" (2022). Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations. 713.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations/713
