Date of Award

Spring 1-1-2025

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Engineering and Applied Science

First Advisor

Szefer, Jakub

Abstract

The rapid advancement in the field of quantum computing promises groundbreaking developments across various fields. While quantum computing possesses unparalleled capabilities in solving complex mathematical problems, it also undermines the very foundation of our current pre-quantum classical cryptographic systems. The quantum algorithm known as Shor's algorithm has the potential to efficiently break widely used public-key encryption algorithms such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), rendering sensitive information vulnerable to compromise. Examples of such sensitive information include, but are not limited to, biometric data and encryption keys. Consequently, there is an imminent need to migrate to quantum-safe alternatives to safeguard our sensitive information before it is too late. To counter this threat, post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms have emerged as a vital solution, offering algorithms believed to be resistant to quantum attacks. Organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and others across the world are making efforts to standardize the PQC algorithms. An essential aspect of these standardization processes is hardware implementation and evaluation of these algorithms. To enable a better understanding of the PQC algorithms and how to implement them in hardware most effectively, this dissertation explores the practical realization of PQC algorithms by detailing the hardware implementation and performance analysis of six distinct algorithms. These include three key encapsulation mechanism schemes and three digital signature schemes drawn from four unique cryptographic families. Complementing the research effort to safeguard classical data against quantum attacks through the implementation and analysis of PQC algorithms, this dissertation also investigates some of the security risks that today's cloud-based quantum computers face. The dissertation explores in latter parts how quantum computers themselves could be susceptible to low-level vulnerabilities and proposes novel protection methods. Combined, the dissertation takes a holistic approach to securing classical data against quantum attacks and securing quantum computers from classical attacks. The dissertation is structured into three parts: addressing post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (PQ-KEM), post-quantum digital signature schemes (PQ-DSS), and quantum computer security. The first part presents hardware implementations and performance evaluations of three PQ-KEM algorithms: Classic McEliece and Hamming Quasi-Cyclic, both code-based, and FrodoKEM, a lattice-based scheme. The second part details hardware implementations of three PQ-DSS: SPHINCS+, a hash-based scheme; Syndrome Decoding in-the-Head, a multi-party computation in-the-head based scheme; and MEDS, a code-based scheme. To ensure adaptability, all hardware implementations are designed with synthesis-time parameterization, enabling adjustments to different security levels and scaling of area and timing for target FPGAs. Notably, FrodoKEM and MEDS also provide runtime security level configuration. The final part investigates security vulnerabilities in cloud-based quantum computing environments. Specifically, it demonstrates the feasibility of crosstalk-based attacks that can manipulate computation results in multi-tenant systems. To address this threat, a novel quantum computer antivirus is proposed, representing a pioneering defense mechanism against malicious interference targeting quantum hardware. This dissertation offers insight into the practicality of building and deploying various complex post-quantum cryptography algorithms in real-world applications and contributes to the advancement of quantum computer security.

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