Date of Award
Fall 2023
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Franks, Paul
Abstract
Critics agree that ‘Force and Understanding’ in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is of crucial importance for understanding Hegel’s considered position; but the interpretation of the content of the chapter remains highly controversial. In this dissertation, I adopt a reading of ‘Force and Understanding’ on which Hegel is introducing his idiosyncratic notions of atemporal change and identity-in-opposition. Readings that take this approach enjoy prima facie textual support, but have up to now suffered because the views they attribute to Hegel appear obviously philosophically confused. The purpose of the dissertation, therefore, is to argue that Hegel’s use of atemporal change and identity-in-opposition in ‘Force and Understanding’ is not obviously confused at all and is in fact philosophically fascinating.I do so by borrowing from Elia Zardini’s recent work on the liar paradox (2011, 2019). In the introduction, I explain and clarify Zardini’s notion of atemporal instability and supplement it with the idea of logical succession. In chapter 1, I argue that Hegel’s discussion of laws of nature in ‘Force and Understanding’ raises the humean problem of necessary connection. This allows me to show, in chapter 2, how Hegel’s solution to the humean problem of necessary connection make use of atemporal change and identity-in-opposition, and so can be made sense of using the notions of atemporal instability and logical succession. In chapter 3, I turn to the infamous ‘Inverted World’ passage. I argue that Hegel is best interpreted here as trying to give us concrete examples of, and ward off misunderstandings about, his views on identity-in-opposition and atemporal change. In chapter 4, I argue that Hegel’s focus on these themes continues into the next chapter ‘Self-Consciousness’. I look at Hegel’s treatment of life there, arguing that Hegel is treating the Kantian problem of backwards causation in biological phenomena. His solution, I argue, again involves his notions of atemporal change and identity-in-opposition, and so can again be made sense of using the apparatus of instability and logical succession. In the conclusion, I consider how my work contributes to the debate between metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings that has dominated Hegel literature for the past forty years. I argue that my reading of ‘Force and Understanding’ provides considerable support for the metaphysical reading of Hegel and against anti-metaphysical readings. Moreover, I argue, it helps to extend existing metaphysical readings in a fruitful way, making them more sensitive to Hegel’s dynamic language.
Recommended Citation
Havranek, Hugo William, "'Force and Understanding' and Instability" (2023). Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations. 1166.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations/1166
