Date of Award
Fall 2023
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Psychology
First Advisor
Bloom, Paul
Abstract
Humans face a series of moral puzzles. We have to determine who (or what) matters, morally speaking. Of all the potential creatures we could care about, who should we care about? Some such judgments come easily: Babies and young children, for example, seem obvious candidates for having moral rights and deserving our protection from harm. Family and friends also seem to enjoy special moral value. Yet other determinations seem less obvious. Does an unborn fetus have the same value as a two-year-old? Does the family dog count just as much as a human relative—or is it true that humans always matter more than non-humans? There are also puzzles concerning the nature of moral cognition itself. On its face, it seems like all moral transgressions involve some kind of harm. Assault is morally wrong, one might suppose, because assault causes harm. But do all moral transgressions share this structure? In this thesis, I explore these puzzles of moral cognition. I examine when people draw on specific aspects of mental life, like agency and experience, when evaluating suffering (Chapter 2), whether people think attempted transgressions cause harm (Chapter 3), and how children’s beliefs about moral standing develop (within the context of artificial intelligence, Chapter 4). Together, this thesis showcases the importance of mind perception in moral judgment.
Recommended Citation
Reinecke, Madeline G., "Mind perception in moral judgment" (2023). Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations. 1130.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations/1130
