Identifier

1110

Document Type

Discussion Paper

Date of Paper

Fall 11-2-2024

Abstract

We partner with Ecuador’s government to implement a centralized school choice system using a Deferred Acceptance algorithm in Manta. Our study evaluates the welfare impact of transitioning from a distance-based assignment system to one that incorporates families’ preferences. Results show that accounting for preferences yields substantial welfare gains. Counterfactual analyses suggest that alternative mechanisms offer limited improvements compared to the benefits of preference inclusion and coordinated assignments. Household survey data on beliefs and satisfaction support these findings, indicating that centralized school choice systems can deliver significant welfare effects in developing countries.

Comments

This research paper is the result of a collaboration between the Ecuadorian Ministry of Education, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the implementing partner tech NGO Consiliumbots. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. We appreciate the collaboration from Ecuadorian Ministry of Education throughout this project. We thank the implementation team of data scientists and developers at ConsiliumBots for their help throughout the project. Gregory Elacqua and Carolina Méndez at the Inter-American Development Bank, Christopher A. Neilson at Yale University and Isabel Jacas and Thomas Krussig formerly at ConsiliumBots and now at Econsult. Corresponding author: christopher.neilson@yale.edu

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