Document Type

Discussion Paper

Publication Date

6-24-2020

CFDP Number

2239

CFDP Pages

83

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Code(s)

D24, Q15, Q56, O13

Abstract

Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use, in the context of agricultural groundwater use in Rajasthan, India. We find that rationing binds on input use, such that farmers, despite trivial prices for water extraction, use roughly the socially optimal amount of water on average. The rationing regime is still grossly inefficient, because it misallocates water across farmers, lowering productivity. Pigouvian reform would increase agricultural surplus by 12% of household income, yet fall well short of a Pareto improvement over rationing.

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Economics Commons

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