Document Type

Discussion Paper

Publication Date

8-15-2021

CFDP Number

2298

CFDP Pages

23

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Code(s)

D81, D82, D83

Abstract

We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an alternative regime in which Sender can commit to garble the outcome of the experiment. Our model includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is feasible; however, our analysis does not require concavification. Since we focus on experiments rather than beliefs, we can accommodate general preferences including costly experiments and non-Bayesian inference.

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