A Strategic Market Game with Active Bankruptcy
We construct stationary Markov equilibria for an economy with ﬁat money, one non-durable commodity, countably-many time periods, and a continuum of agents. The total production of commodity remains constant, but individual agents’ endowments fluctuate in a random fashion, from period to period. In order to hedge against these random fluctuations, agents ﬁnd it useful to hold ﬁat money which they can borrow or deposit at appropriate rates of interest; such activity may take place either at a central bank (which ﬁxes interest rates judiciously) or through a money-market (in which interest rates are determined endogenously). We carry out an equilibrium analysis, based on a careful study of Dynamic Programming equations and on properties of the Invariant Measures for associated optimally-controlled Markov chains. This analysis yields the stationary distribution of wealth across agents, as well as the stationary price (for the commodity) and interest rates (for the borrowing and lending of ﬁat money). A distinctive feature of our analysis is the incorporation of bankruptcy, both as a real possibility in an individual agent’s optimization problem, as well as a determinant of interest rates through appropriate balance equations. These allow a central bank (respectively, a money-market) to announce (respectively, to determine endogenously) interest rates in a way that conserves the total money-supply and controls inflation. General results are provided for the existence of such stationary equilibria, and several explicitly solvable examples are treated in detail.
Geanakoplos, John; Karatzas, Ioannis; Shubik, Martin; and Sudderth, William D., "A Strategic Market Game with Active Bankruptcy" (1998). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1431.