Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
2-9-2024
CFDP Number
2375R1
CFDP Revision Date
February 2024
CFDP Pages
72
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Code(s)
D44, D47, D83, D84
Abstract
We characterize the bidders' surplus maximizing information structure in an optimal auction for a single unit good and related extensions to multi-unit and multi-good problems. The bidders seek to find a balance between participation (and the avoidance of exclusion) and efficiency. The information structure that maximizes the bidders' surplus is given by a generalized Pareto distribution at the center of demand distribution, and displays complete information disclosure at either end of the Pareto distribution.
Recommended Citation
Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; and Morris, Stephen, "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions" (2024). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2789.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2789