Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
6-1-2008
CFDP Number
1666
CFDP Pages
51
Abstract
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.
Recommended Citation
Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen, "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms" (2008). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1972.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1972