Identifier
1115
Document Type
Discussion Paper
Date of Paper
Spring 4-22-2025
Abstract
Poor implementation frequently impedes social protection delivery in low-state-capacity settings. In such environments, reducing managers’ information acquisition costs may improve their grasp of frontline issues and program performance. However, in the presence of managerial rent-seeking, increasing the principal’s information may be key, and doing so just for managers can backfire. To assess this trade-off and implications for program performance, we collaborated with two Indian states to randomly vary bureaucrat access to PayDash, a digital platform for real-time tracking of worker payment processing for the national rural workfare program. In treated districts, PayDash expedited bureaucrat processing of workfare payments by 17%, and increased available worksites and participating household work days by 23% and 10%, respectively. Work provision rose relatively more during the agricultural lean season. PayDash has the same impact when offered to principals as to managers, and no further gains when offered to both, indicating that manager effort to acquire information constrains implementation. Consistent with information allowing principals to better condition performance incentives on managerial effort, PayDash for principals reduced manager posting transfers by 24%. PayDash strengthened state capacity at a considerably lower cost than hiring staff, while benefiting rural Indians by more than 170 times the costs.
Acknowledgements
We thank Shan Aman-Rana, Lydia Assouad, James Choy, Devis Decet, Nils Enevoldsen, Fred Finan, François Gerard, Sergei Guriev, Syeda ShahBano Ijaz, and seminar participants for comments. We thank numerous Indian rural development officials for their collaboration and advice, J-PAL South Asia and Inclusion Economics India Center (formerly, EPoD India) for field implementation, and Jenna Allard, Kartikeya Batra, Geet Chawla, Parth Chawla, Raúl Duarte Gonzalez, Fikremariam Gedefaw, Akshat Goel, Michelle Hyun, Prachi Jadhav, Anuska Jain, Siddharth Jain, Mahreen Khan, Annanya Mahajan, Sitanshu Mishra, Sayantan Mitra, Sitaram Mukherjee, Sophie Ochmann, Prakhar Saxena, Aparna Singh, Shreya Singh, Sam Solomon, and Ramita Taneja. Thank you to Naman Dwivedi, Prempal Singh, and Ravi Suhag for software development. We thank the Economic Growth Center and Inclusion Economics Yale, Economic Development and Institutions Program, Gates Foundation, J-PAL Governance Initiative, and National Science Foundation for financial support. AEA RCT Registry is AEARCTR-0001292. Author affiliation: IDinsight (Dodge), University of Michigan (Neggers), Yale University (Pande), and The Ohio State University (Troyer Moore).
Recommended Citation
Dodge, Eric, Yusuf Neggers, Rohini Pande, and Charity Troyer Moore. 2025. "From Delay to Payday: Easing Bureaucrat Access to Implementation Information Strengthens Social Protection Delivery." EGC Discussion Papers 1115.