Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
8-2021
CFDP Number
2299R2
CFDP Revision Date
7-22-2022
CFDP Pages
50
Abstract
We study which multi-agent information structures are more effective at eliminating both first-order and higher-order uncertainty, and hence at facilitating efficient play in incomplete-information coordination games. We consider a learning setting à la Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson (2008) where players have access to many private signal draws from an information structure. First, we characterize the rate at which players achieve approximate common knowledge of the state, based on a simple learning efficiency index. Notably, this coincides with the rate at which players’ first-order uncertainty vanishes, as higher-order uncertainty becomes negligible relative to first-order uncertainty after enough signal draws. Based on this, we show that information structures with higher learning efficiency induce more efficient equilibrium outcomes in coordination games that are played after sufficiently many signal draws. We highlight some robust implications for information design in games played in data-rich environments.
Recommended Citation
Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; and Ishii, Yuhta, "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures" (2021). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2703.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2703