Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
12-1-2013
CFDP Number
1933R
CFDP Revision Date
2015-01-01
CFDP Pages
75
Abstract
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the punishment level; if players withhold their information during punishment-like phases, a folk theorem obtains.
Recommended Citation
Hörner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; and Vieille, Nicolas, "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games" (2013). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2332.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2332