Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoﬀ subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With correlated types, results from mechanism design apply, yielding a folk theorem. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the punishment level; if players withhold their information during punishment-like phases, a “folk” theorem obtains also.
Hörner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; and Vieille, Nicolas, "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games" (2013). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2331.