Document Type
Discussion Paper
Publication Date
8-1-2010
CFDP Number
1764R2
CFDP Revision Date
2017-09-01
CFDP Pages
59
Abstract
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation is efficient and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner’s bids are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists.
Recommended Citation
Bergemann, Dirk and Hörner, Johannes, "Should Auctions be Transparent?" (2010). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2101.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2101