Title

Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt

Document Type

Discussion Paper

Publication Date

12-1-1999

CFDP Number

1241R

CFDP Revision Date

2002-02-01

CFDP Pages

28

Abstract

Creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem. Even if the fundamentals are sound, fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre-emptive action, undermining the project. Recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world, and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises, but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing. Without common knowledge of fundamentals, the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough. This affords a way to price the coordination failure. Comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation.

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS