Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in n-Person Games

Authors

Imelda Yeung Powers

Document Type

Discussion Paper

Publication Date

8-1-1986

CFDP Number

799

CFDP Pages

43

Abstract

In this paper, we study the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a “random” n -person non-cooperative game in which all players have a countable number of strategies. We provide explicit expressions for the expected number of pure strategy Nash Equilibria, and show that the distribution of the number of pure strategy Nash Equilibria approaches the Poisson distribution with mean 1 as the numbers of strategies of two or more players go to infinity.

Recommended Citation

Powers, Imelda Yeung, "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in n-Person Games" (1986). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1042.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1042