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How Liberal Korean and Taiwanese Textbooks Portray their Countries’ “Economic Miracles”

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4 April 2016
In July 2015, dozens of Taiwanese high school students broke into the office of the Ministry of Education. The issue at hand was the newly-released high school curriculum guidelines for social studies and language arts, the most controversial being the guidelines for the teaching of Taiwanese history. While supporters argued that the new guidelines would improve word choice and enrich the contents,\(^1\) opponents accused the administration for the non-transparent manner of the revision process as well as what they saw as an attempt by the ruling party to whitewash its nearly four-decade-long dictatorship.\(^2\)

Three months after the protests in Taiwan, South Korea’s Ministry of Education announced that starting from 2017, the production of all middle and high school history textbooks would be put under government control.\(^3\) This dictum sparked an equally divisive response from the Korean public. Supporters asserted that the new textbook would correct factual errors and ideological biases, while critics feared that it would airbrush the Japanese occupation and the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee, the father of the current president.\(^4\)

The events in Taiwan and South Korea (hereafter referred to as “Korea”) share striking similarities. For one, both societies are acrimoniously split over this issue, with no clear majority

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\(^1\) In 2014, Taiwan’s Ministry of Education rolled out its 12-Year Compulsory Education System, which extended compulsory education from nine to twelve years, making senior high school mandatory in addition to elementary and junior high school. In preparation for the new system, the Ministry of Education instructed the National Academy for Educational Research to evaluate the high school course guidelines. The Ministry calls the resultant changes “a fine-tuning of the course guidelines.” See the Ministry’s official press release here: See “Putong gaoji zhongxue guowen yu shehui lingyu kecheng gangyao weitiao zhi shuoming,” Ministry of Education, January 27, 2014.


for or against the changes in history education.\textsuperscript{5,6,7} This division is a result of the two countries’ democratization, which has led to the formation of a “conservative camp” and a “liberal camp.” Conservatives in this context do not correspond to fiscal and social conservatives in the U.S.; they represent those who see their camp as having led the country through decades of strong economic growth despite (or even owing to) their heavyhanded tactics. Liberals, on the other hand, led or participated in pro-democracy movements, and see themselves as safeguards of democracy against their opponents’ autocratic impulses. Thus, conservatives, tend to whitewash their predecessors’ authoritarian legacies, whereas liberals tend to glorify the democratic struggle. The two countries’ history textbook wars must be seen in light of this rivalry.

While the conservatives enjoyed a monopoly over history education in the past, it is liberals, now, lead in the competition over the minds of the youth.\textsuperscript{8} In Korea, those currently 40 years of age or younger are wary of the right’s dictatorial track record and its preference for

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{5}According to a survey by Gallup Poll of 1004 Koreans, 36% of those surveyed support the proposed nationalization of the textbooks while 53% oppose them. See “Gyogwaseo gukjeonghwa, han-ir Jeongsang hoedam, 4-daegang sa’eop 교과서 국정화, 한일 정상회담, 4 대강 사업 [Nationalization of Textbooks, Korea-Japan summit, Four-Rivers Project]” \textit{Gallup Korea}, November 5, 2015, accessed Dec 15, 2015, http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=700.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{6}According to a poll conducted by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of over 900 individuals in Taiwan, about 40% of respondents believe that it is not necessary to revise the high school curriculum guidelines while 23.7% believe there it is. See “Mindiao chaoguo liucheng minzhong fandui jiaoyu buzhang tigao minjindaig: jiaoyubu ying chegao bing chehui kegang,” \textit{Democratic Progressive Party}, July 30, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?kw=&m1=11&y1=2015&menu_sn=&sub_menu=43&show_title=%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E&one_page=10&page=37&start_p=31&act=&sn=8057.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{7}In the absence of a reliable third-party poll, I chose to cite the poll conducted by the opposition party. While the incumbent Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) conducted a poll of over 800 individuals, it asked respondents how they felt about the actions of the students but not how they viewed the curriculum guidelines. The party’s caucus secretary admitted that more research is necessary to understand public opinion of the curriculum changes themselves. See “Xuesheng baowei jiaoyubu mindiao guoban buzhichi,” \textit{Central News Agency}, August 3, 2015, http://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/201508030152-1.aspx.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{8}In Taiwan, history textbook production was privatized in 1999. In Korea, the privatization of history textbook production began in 2003 with contemporary Korean history textbooks. Privatization expanded to textbooks covering the entirety of Korean history in 2011, when contemporary history was merged with national history into one textbook, Korean history. See Alisa Jones, “Toward Pluralism? The Politics of History Textbooks in South Korea, Taiwan, and China,” in \textit{History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories}, ed. Gi-wook Shin et al. (London: Routledge, 2011).
stability over reform, having grown up in a time of relative stability and political freedom. In Taiwan, the conservatives, who project an ethnic Sino-centric national identity, are largely perceived as being out of touch with the youth, who instead embrace a civic Taiwan-centric national identity. It is thus not surprising that recent attempts by conservatives to revise textbooks have riled youth in both countries.

This paper seeks to how liberals’ political views affect their views of the past. The focus will be on high school history textbooks, as they have been the subject of recent controversies and serve as one of the most direct means to understand what views of the past liberals hope to transmit to future generations. A previous study by Michael Hsiao examined the differences between liberal textbooks’ portrayals of their respective Japanese colonial periods. This study is therefore a sort of follow-up in that it examines the era after the Japanese left, focusing specifically on post-war economic trajectories. However, in contrast to the Hsiao study, which argues that differences in the two countries’ textbooks shed light on how national history has been re-conceptualized, this paper contends that it is too early to characterize liberal narratives of history as “national history.” Thus, the respective history textbook narratives will be analyzed

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primarily through the histories of liberalism in the two countries and only secondarily through the forms of nationalism they entail.

As demonstrated by the diverse range of comparative studies on the two countries, their post-war histories are very similar.\textsuperscript{14} Japanese colonial rule had bequeathed to both societies various benefits—however unintended—that remained intact after the Second World War: literacy rates above 20%, modern infrastructure, effective agricultural practices, and a partially industrialized economy. After the war, reconstruction efforts in both countries were set back by the departure of Japanese capitalists and military conflicts with Communist rivals: the Korean War and the Chinese Civil War.\textsuperscript{15,16} The Korean War (and Communist China’s involvement) sealed the fates of Taiwan and Korea to decades of American involvement. Fears of communism convinced the United States of the need to prop up the two countries as Free World allies. Finally, both countries achieved economic “miracles” by relying not on natural resources, but on strong developmental states; foreign economic aid, trade, and investment; abundant supplies of cheap labor; among other things. Therefore, one would assume that the textbooks portray the two countries’ economic trajectories in similar fashions.

To test this hypothesis, I analyzed how the textbooks depicted various factors of economic development and have presented below my findings on portrayals of the state, private enterprise, the people, foreign aid, and foreign trade. While portrayals of other factors, such as agriculture and foreign investment, were analyzed, they did not yield any insights that were not

\textsuperscript{14} Tun-ji\-en Cheng, Chu Yun-han, Karl Fields, Leng Tze-Kang, Moon Chung-In, and Shin Gi-wook are monumental figures in Taiwanese-Korean comparative studies.

\textsuperscript{15} While the reconstruction of South Korea began immediately after liberation, it was interrupted by the Korean War (1950-53), which devastated industry and reversed results of many earlier reconstruction efforts.

\textsuperscript{16} Likewise, the reconstruction of Taiwan was delayed until after the Chinese Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan in 1949 upon losing the Chinese Civil War (1946-50). See Samuel PS Ho, \textit{Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 103.
already covered by the ones presented in this paper. Before launching into this discussion, however, it is necessary to introduce the textbooks and the pedagogical attitudes of their authors.

**Introducing the Textbooks**

The main analysis in this paper focuses on one Taiwanese history textbook and one Korean history textbook, which will be referred to as the “liberal Taiwanese textbook” and the “liberal Korean textbook.” The textbooks chosen are supported by liberals and criticized by conservatives, and thus can be taken to broadly represent the views of liberals in both countries. More specifically, the Taiwanese textbook follows curriculum guidelines that are considered more liberal, and the Korean textbook is published by a more liberal publisher. The main difference between the textbook markets of the two countries is that in Korea, the contents of textbooks vary depending on the publishing company whereas, in Taiwan, the contents vary based on the curriculum guidelines. In Taiwan, the Ministry of Education sets uniform guidelines dictating how history textbooks should be written in order to be approved for use. This means that Taiwanese textbooks do not vary widely between publishing companies. In Korea, the Ministry of Education is also responsible for approving the textbooks and can request publishers to revise the textbooks, but does not set guidelines for their contents. This means that Korean textbooks do differ depending on the publishing company. It is therefore necessary to understand

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17 For the purposes of this piece, it made the most sense to refer descriptively to textbooks by referencing their country name rather than the name of their publishers, titles, or the authors, as the textbooks are authored by a large group of scholars, the titles are extremely similar, and the names of the publishers are not highly illuminating.

the curriculum guidelines that the Taiwanese textbook adhered to and the company that published the Korean textbook.  

The Taiwanese history textbook is called History: Volume 1 and was published in 2012 by Sanmin Book Company, one of the major high school Taiwanese history textbook publishers. Senior high schools in Taiwan consist of three years of study, spanning grades 10 to 12. Students are required to take four semesters of history class, the first of which is Taiwanese history. Sanmin’s History: Volume 1 is commonly used during the semester of Taiwanese history. This edition follows the 2012 Curriculum Guidelines, which largely adhered to the guidelines set by the more liberal regimes of Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui. Currently, textbooks from both the more Taiwan-centric 2012 Guidelines and the more ROC-centric 2015

19 Readers who have are familiar with Michael Hsiao’s study may question my observation that Taiwanese textbooks are more homogenous than the Korean. It should be noted that Hsiao’s study analyzes textbooks from the early 2000s, whereas mine analyzes those from the early 2010s.

20 While there is no data on the current market share of each publisher, there are currently nine publishers who high school Taiwanese history textbooks have been approved for use, and Sanmin’s is known to be one of the major publishers of high school history textbooks in Taiwan. Sanmin’s history textbooks were also used in Hsiao’s study on Taiwanese and Korean textbooks.

21 The rest of the semesters are spent on Chinese and world history. Regular Senior Secondary Schools divide students into a “social studies group” and “sciences group” after their first year of study, the former of which can elect to study more history in addition to the mandatory four semesters.

22 Known in Chinese as the 一0一課綱 “101 Curriculum Guidelines” or simply the 舊課綱 “the old curriculum guidelines.” 101 here stands for the 101st year of the Republic of China.

23 History education in Taiwan had been focused on teaching Chinese history, especially after the ROC began losing its international standing to the PRC in the 1970s. During the presidency of Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000), high school “national history” was divided into “Chinese history” and “Taiwanese history,” making Taiwanese history a separate subject for the first time. This was in 1999, so the next set of guidelines would be implemented in 2009. In preparation, the Ministry of Education under the pro-independence president Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) developed new guidelines, which were released during President Ma Ying-jeou’s term (2008-present). Dissatisfied with the 2012 Curriculum Guidelines, pro-unification groups—chief among which the Chinese Integration Society 两岸統合學會 pushed for more revisions, resulting in the 2015 Curriculum Guidelines, which set off heated protests over what critics believed to be a Sinification of the high school subjects of history, civics, and literature. As a compromise, the Ministry of Education agreed to allow schools to use textbooks from both the 2012 and 2015 Curriculum Guidelines.
Guidelines are in use. In response to student protests, roughly half of the public high schools in Taiwan announced that they would revert to textbooks from the 2012 Guidelines. The Taiwanese textbook used here is thus representative of more liberal views of Taiwanese history.

The Korean history textbook used is called *Korean History* and was published by Kumsung Publishing in 2013. In Korea, senior high school spans three years. Under the 2011 Revised School Education Curriculum, high school students are required to take Korean History as freshman. As second- and third-year students, they can elect to take East Asian History or World History. Kumsung Publishing’s book is currently used by 7.1% of all high schools, making it the 4th most commonly used out of eight high school history textbooks. These numbers however do not do justice to Kumsung’s influence and reputation. Before the consolidation of Modern History and National History (which focused on ancient history) into Korean History, Kumsung’s *Contemporary Korean History* was used by the majority of schools that offered Modern History courses. Its prominence in the textbook market necessarily attracted widespread criticism from conservative groups, who petitioned the Ministry of Education to

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24 While views differ even among the ROC and Taiwan camps themselves, their main point of contention is their differing definitions of the nation. Proponents of Taiwan-centric historiography see Taiwan as the nation and define the “Taiwanese people” as those who live in the current territories of the ROC. They support teaching Taiwanese history as its own standalone course and teaching it before teaching Chinese history. Proponents of ROC-centric historiography see the ROC as the nation and thus do not believe in separating Taiwanese history into its own class, let alone teaching it before Chinese history. Their views are best summarized in this piece by Zhong-ya Zhang, “yihua de shiguan rentong: cong wozhe dao tazhe,” May 3, 2015, accessed October 15, 2015, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1020/6/2/6/102062669.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102062669&mdate=0511114342.


demand revisions from the publisher.\textsuperscript{27} Therefore, although it is no longer the market leader, Kumsung’s textbook is still useful in understanding how Korean liberals view the past.

As comparisons with more conservative textbooks help illuminate what makes the liberal textbooks liberal, this study will also reference the more recent 2015 edition of Sanmin Book Co’s \textit{History: Volume I} and Kyohaksa Publishing’s 2013 \textit{Korean History}. Both textbooks were harshly denounced by liberal opponents, so they can be assumed to have conservative tendencies.\textsuperscript{28} The rise of liberalism in both countries has, however, has forced conservatives to adopt some liberal platforms to stay relevant. Conservative textbooks now are, therefore, much more muted versions of what they were under authoritarian regimes. At times when comparisons with modern-day conservative textbooks are insufficient, this paper will also consult studies on history education during the post-war period.

For reference, here are the table of contents for each liberal textbook, with contents of the final chapters expanded:

### Organization of the Korean Textbook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit #</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Formation of Our History and the Development of the Ancient Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Formation of and Changes in Goryeo Korean Aristocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Establishment of and Changes in Confucian Society in Joseon Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Changes in the International Order and the Movement to Establish a Modern Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Forcible Occupation by the Japanese Empire and the Unfolding of National Movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{27} The writers refused, but the publishers made the changes anyways. See Chang, 63.
Organization of the Taiwanese Textbook*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit #</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Early Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Taiwan under Qing Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Taiwan under Japanese Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Taiwan under the Rule of the Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Politics: From the Onset to the Lifting of Martial Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Economics: Growth and Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-1</td>
<td>The Pioneering of the Taiwan Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>Economic Development and Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Society: Changes and Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Culture: Education and Multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In the Taiwanese textbook, Units 1, 2 and 3 encompass Chapters 1 through 8.

Most important to this analysis are those chapters that focus on post-war economic growth up to the 1980s (italicized and bolded above). They are Chapter 6-4-1, “Overcoming Poverty and Achieving Economic Growth,” in the Korean textbook and Chapter 10, “The Pioneering of the Taiwan Experience,” in the Taiwanese textbook.

**Textbook authors’ pedagogical approaches**

The Korean and Taiwanese textbook authors’ pedagogical approaches are very different. While they both fall short of inviting students to think about different perspectives on the past, the
Korean one tries harder to establish its narrative as the truth. In the final paragraph of the foreword, the authors write that history education exists “not simply to transmit historical knowledge and lessons,” but to allow students to “through a correct understanding of the past, correctly understand the present and deal with the uncertain future” (p. 3, emphasis added). The original phrase in Korean uses the word olbareuda—which translates to “correct” but verges on meaning “morally correct. Olbareuda is often used by Korean scholars and politicians to moralistically accuse one another (and the Japanese government) of distorting history.29

The forceful tone of the liberal Korean textbook’s authors has roots in the militant activist nature of Korea’s liberal camp in the 1970s and 1980s. Beginning in the late 1970s, progressive scholars criticized their mainstream counterparts for their neutral view of history, arguing that history must reflect the needs of contemporary society—demonetization and unification—needs, which called for revolutionary struggle against the authoritarian anti-North Korea regime.30 Thousands of university students and intellectuals at this time defied the law to “[plunge] into the world of the factory worker, forgoing university diplomas, job prospects, and middle-class lives in the hope of bringing about ‘revolution.’”31 Former students of this generation of activist scholars remain dominant, giving historical academia the left-nationalist tendencies it has today.

Perhaps because they lacked this period of violent struggle, the authors of the Taiwanese textbook seem to recognize the existence of different but valid perspectives on history. This

29 That the current conservative administration plans on overhauling the history curriculum also in the name of “a correct understanding of history” is no coincidence. See “Olbareun yeoksagwan hwakribeul wihan gyogwaseoreul mendeulgessseupnida.” Also note that the webpage on the Ministry of Education’s website dedicated to their new history textbook is titled “the correct history textbook”: “Olbareun yeoksa gyogwaseo,” Ministry of Education, Accessed December 15, 2015, http://www.moe.go.kr/history/index.jsp.
understanding is manifested in the foreword, where the reasons for publishing this edition are listed:

- to incorporate the latest products of research that have been agreed upon in the field of history, to discuss in accordance with historical facts, and to avoid one school of thought.\textsuperscript{32}

That this note on “avoid[ing] one school of thought” (一家之言 yijiazhiyan) is present in both the conservative and liberal versions of the textbook demonstrates that the textbook authors recognize the importance of viewing the past from more than one perspective. Further, in contrast with their Korean counterparts, the Taiwanese textbook authors conclude their foreword with an apology for any errors or omissions in the book:

Due to space limitations, omissions were inevitable. We sincerely ask classroom teachers, senior academics, and fellow lovers of history to point out errors so that they can be rectified.\textsuperscript{33}

This author’s note, which is also present in the conservative version of the textbook, shows that the authors recognize that their textbooks are not the end all be all. Again, the Taiwanese textbooks seems to be more diplomatic than its Korean counterpart.

This conciliatory attitude among liberal academics today mirrors those of their predecessors in 1990s, when for the first time, the Ministry of Education debated plans to make history and social studies curricula more Taiwan-centric. At the time proposals for the new textbooks worked up a whirlwind of criticism from the conservative camp. Rather than dismissing their opponents’ views, however, the reformers chose to compromise. They acceded to the notion that “there existed ‘a Chinese perception of Taiwan’ and a ‘Taiwanese perception

\textsuperscript{32} No page number given.
\textsuperscript{33} Also no page number given.
of Taiwan,’” and called for the alteration of certain passages to “respect their sensitivities.”

Some advocates who did not directly partake in the reforms even adopted the “strategy of
toning down the revolutionary aspect of the new textbooks” to avoid unnecessarily provoking the
opposition.

It should also be noted that, at the time, the winds of change were in favor of
“Taiwanization” or “nativization” (bentuhua). That the president at the time, Lee Teng-hui, fully
supported these changes, probably made reformers less desperate. Further, advocates of
Taiwanization were calling for a new paradigm of nation that included all residents of Taiwan.
Thus, while they were still radical for their time, liberals were at least calling for a more
inclusive nation-based identity, as opposed to their Korean counterparts who privileged class
over nation. These factors are most likely what allows liberal Taiwanese academics to be more
accepting of different perspectives.

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34 Stephane Corcuff, “History Textbooks, Identity Politics, and Ethnic Introspection in Taiwan: The June 1997
Knowing Taiwan Textbooks Controversy and the Questions it Raised on the Various Approaches to ‘Han’ Identity,”
35 Ibid, 149.
36 Jones, 217.
The attitudes of the textbook writers can also be seen from the kinds of activities they incorporate into the text. The activities are shown below:

**Activities in the Economic Growth Sections of the Liberal Textbooks**

2. "Secrets Hidden in the Numbers" – activity in Chapter 10-1, "The Pioneering of the Taiwan Experience," from the Taiwanese textbook

The two activities in the chapters on economic growth in the Taiwanese textbook ask readers to look at a timeline and explain why GDP dropped during certain years (p. 201) and to put the economic policies discussed in the chapter in the context of the history of a famous
Taiwanese company (p. 207). These activities ask students to apply what they learned and do not ask them to make normative judgements. The activity in the Korean half-chapter, on the other hand, asks students to pass judgment—specifically one kind of judgment. The activity includes a passage that first explains reasons for neo-liberal economic policies, but quickly turns into a tirade on their failings. The paragraph concludes by listing the many countries that have witnessed anti-free trade policies, and the accompanying photograph displays anti-WTO protesters in the Philippines wielding “JUNK WTO!” signs—a clear indication of the message that authors wanted to send (p. 400). Therefore, while the activity asks students to discuss how neo-liberal economic policies influence “our everyday lives,” it is obvious that the authors are not looking for a balanced response.\(^7\)

From this analysis of pedagogical approaches, it is clear that while neither textbook invites students to think for themselves, the liberal Korean textbook more aggressively imposes its views on the reader. The liberal Taiwanese textbook’s more diplomatic approach to history is most likely a product of the less desperate history of liberalism in Taiwan as well as the more socially inclusive nature of its ideology. Keeping this difference in mind, the discussion will now turn to the textbooks’ portrayals of various factors in the two countries’ post-war economic miracles.

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\(^7\) This aversion to neo-liberal economic policies, such as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, is characteristic of the New Left in Korea, whose ideology is rooted in the 1980s minjung movements. In fact, the People’s Solidarity for Social Progress (PSSP), a prominent New Left organization, was founded when two groups merged in order to “join forces against neoliberal policies in South Korea under the IMF regime and [their] detrimental effects on labor and the poor.” See Alice S. Kim, “Left Out: People’s Solidarity for Social Progress and the evolution of minjung after authoritarianism,” in South Korean Social Movements – From Democracy to Civil Society, ed. Gi-Wook Shin et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011).
The contents of the chapters that discuss this topic are shown below for reference:

Organization of the Post-War Economic Growth Sections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Chapter</th>
<th>Korean Textbook</th>
<th>Taiwanese Textbook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit 6-Chapter 4 Economic Development and Sociocultural Changes</td>
<td>Chapter 10 Economics: Growth and Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>6-4-1 Overcoming Poverty and Achieving Economic Growth</td>
<td>10-1 The Pioneering of the Taiwan Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Economic Conditions in the 1950s and American Economic Aid</td>
<td>A. Economic Recovery after the Second World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. The Park Administration which Began Industrialization in Earnest</td>
<td>B. Import Substitution Era (1950s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Features of Park’s Economic Development Policies</td>
<td>C. Export Expansion Era (1960s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Korea’s Economic Situation Since the 1980s</td>
<td>D. The Second Import Substitution Era (1970s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Economic Growth</td>
<td>E. Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Economic Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-2 Economic Development and Challenges</td>
<td>10-2 Economic Development and Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Liberalization and Globalization (1980s and onwards)</td>
<td>A. Liberalization and Globalization (1980s and onwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Challenges and Responses</td>
<td>B. Challenges and Responses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The State

While all states are involved in their economy, heavy state intervention has been an especially prominent characteristic of the economies of Taiwan and South Korea since the end of World War II. Called the “developmental state” model, this system involves a state that actively manages the economy while suppressing political resistance. The developmental state not only adopts indirect measures to support the economy, such as investments in infrastructure and education, but also directly controls it by setting national economic goals and establishing bureaucratic agencies to oversee their implementation, identifying high-potential industries and
allocating resources to support them, prioritizing exports and setting up export-processing zones to facilitate them, among other measures.\textsuperscript{38} A former Chief Economist of the World Bank even argued that “The real miracle of East Asia may be more political than economic.”\textsuperscript{39}

How do the liberal textbooks discuss the developmental state? While both textbooks provide a systematic treatment of government policies, they also question the results of the developmental state—unsurprising given that liberals in both countries oppose the state-centric narrative of development advanced by their conservative counterparts. However, the textbooks challenge the conservative accounts in different ways.

Whereas the liberal Korean textbook directly states the negative ramifications of the developmental state model, its Taiwanese counterpart takes a much more discreet approach. A passage from the Korean textbook is shown below:

Unlike the developmental policies of advanced capitalist countries, those of the Park administration in the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by their reliance on state leadership. As the state-managed economic development policies had the advantage of being able to produce satisfactory results in a short period of time, they have greatly influenced the economic policies of other under-developed countries. However, the government’s excessive interference in the economy led to such problems as a decline in spontaneous non-governmental economic activities and cozy relationships between the government and corporations…. While foreign capital-driven economic development and export-oriented growth policies yielded great results, they came saddled with side effects just as great in magnitude. The over-influx of capital came with the hefty responsibility of repayment and hindered the stable operation of enterprises. Further, because policies focused more on expanding exports than on generating domestic demand, Korea became over dependent on the outside world, especially the U.S. and Japan (p. 399).

This portion of text begins by describing state leadership as the defining feature of the administration’s policies and praising a merit of state-led economic growth: its ability to get

\textsuperscript{38} Zhiqun Zhu, \textit{Understanding East Asia’s economic “miracles”} (Ann Arbor, Mich: Association for Asian Studies, 2009).
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 68.
results fast. However, the rest of the passage details the many unfortunate consequences of the developmental state model and even characterizes government interference as “excessive.” It should also be noted that this text is taken from the section entitled “Features of the Economic Development Policies under the Park Administration,” which concludes the discussion of economic policies. It is thus clear that the textbook authors intended for students to walk away questioning the wisdom of the developmental state—and questioning it in a way that textbook authors saw fit. The direct criticisms can be interpreted as a refusal to glorify the heavy-handed developmental state.

Nonetheless, the liberal Taiwanese textbook also calls into question the argument that the country’s dictatorial government “did it all”—albeit indirectly. A comparison of the new and old versions of the textbook show that few changes were made to this chapter, but that the changes made predominantly affected portrayals of the state. For one, the newer, more conservative textbook omits the italicized section in the following passage—a reference to the financial weakness of the ROC government in the 1950s:

At a time when the government was short on finances and struggling to reconstruct facilities damaged during the war, the U.S. also provided much-needed assistance in repairing and rebuilding infrastructure involving electricity, transportation and shipping, and irrigation (“Economic Recovery after the Second World War,” p. 195).

The decision to omit a clause highlighting the state’s inability to rebuild the country on its own seems to reveal a desire to project a more dignified image of the state.
Further, the conservative textbook adds a nearly page-sized visual (shown below) depicting the “Ten Major Construction Projects” (十大建設; shi da jianshe), a national infrastructure project the government undertook in the 1970s. This addition is significant, because in post-war Taiwan, the KMT regime used its development of Taiwan to legitimize its regime. Until the 1990s, there was only one section in history textbooks that discussed Taiwan: “The Achievements and Development of the Base for Recovery [of the mainland]”—the “base of recovery” being what Taiwan was officially called in textbooks. Incidentally, this was also the one section that was significantly updated from one edition to the next in order to impress upon students the state’s latest contributions to the island:

This section focused on the triumphs of the ROC regime in constructing Taiwan’s infrastructure; building schools, universities, and hospitals; promoting economic development; and generally improving the quality of life for Chinese citizens on Taiwan.  

The Ten Major Constructions Projects would thus have featured largely in textbooks. Its upgrade to nearly a full-page visual harkens back to the history textbook narratives during the party-state era.

Finally, the revision that seems to most directly emphasize the role of the developmental state is the inclusion of the following activity called “the Visible Hand,” which asks students to fill in rows labeled “what the government did” and “the results”:

**“Visible Hand” Activity in the Conservative Textbook**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Period</strong></td>
<td>Import Sub.</td>
<td>Export Exp.</td>
<td>2nd Import Sub.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
<td>1. using agriculture to cultivate industry</td>
<td>Saturation of domestic market, surplus in industrial production</td>
<td>1. Insufficient infrastructure 2. Downturn in global economy 3. Inflation made raw materials expensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What the Government Did</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The title, “visible hand,” and the description above the chart make it clear that government intervention was key to Taiwan’s economic miracle. The description begins by explaining Adam Smith’s “the invisible hand” as a theory postulating that an economy will, by dint of free market mechanisms, grow without need for government intervention.41 The sentence that follows then refutes this explanation: “Nevertheless, from the 1950s to the present, the visible hand of the government-formulated policies has propelled Taiwan’s industrial development” (p. 199). This

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41 Interestingly, the term, “visible hand,” was actually used by Alfred D. Chandler in 1977 to refer not to the role of governments but to those of managers in keeping an economy afloat. It is not clear whether the textbook authors appropriated this term for their own purposes or simply thought of it on their own.
statement seems to imply that Taiwan’s benevolent government was able to disprove a theory of a world-renowned economic thinker. After this description that touts the role of the developmental state, the activity invites readers to fill in the chart that directly links the country’s economic successes to the actions of the government by filling in the chart. Taken together, all of these examples—the omitted text, the added visual, and the added activity—signal the authors’ intention to play up the role of the state in the newer edition of the textbook, most likely to meet more conservative textbook authorization guidelines. Thus, it is clear that the liberal counterpart is much less pro-developmental state than its conservative counterpart. This comparison shows how the liberal Taiwanese textbook also challenges the conservative state-centric narrative of economic development, but does so indirectly.

Thus, while authors of both liberal textbooks question state-centric narratives, they do so in different ways. The liberal Taiwanese textbook subtly downplays the role of the government, whereas its Korean counterpart openly broadcasts the negative consequences of government decisions. This difference in approaches most likely stems from the Korean textbook authors’ desire to once again establish their view as “the proper understanding of history” and the Taiwanese textbook authors’ sensitivity to opposing views.

2. Private Enterprise

Along with the state, private enterprise was essential to the two economies’ meteoric rise. Given that liberals in both countries are inclined to play down the role of the state, it would be in their interests to tout private sector achievements. This is certainly true of the liberal Taiwanese textbook. In Korea, however, liberals face the additional problem of a private sector that
depended on the state and, in their eyes, oppressed its workers. Crony capitalism and difficult management-labor relations thus makes Korean liberals less enthusiastic about private enterprise than they otherwise would be. Therefore, while both liberal textbooks look favorably upon the public sector, they do not celebrate them to equal extents.

The liberal Taiwanese textbook waxes lyrical about the country’s private sector, as shown in the passage below:

In the 1960s and 1970s, SMEs were an important driving force behind the growth of exports. As Taiwan relied considerably strongly on foreign trade, export-oriented SMEs flourished at that time, becoming the engine of Taiwan’s economic growth…. SMEs pooled foreign capital, imported machinery, technology, raw materials, and semi-finished products, and used Taiwan’s abundant supply of cheap labor to mass-export their products to foreign markets, mainly the U.S. Electrical machinery, electrical appliances, ready-to-wear clothing, and plastics were the most notable industries in this regard. The impact of SMEs on economic growth can be seen from the fact that in the mid-1970s, SMEs with at most 100 employees employed around 60% of Taiwan’s labor supply and until the 1980s, SMEs accounted for two-thirds of total exports (p. 200).

This passage highlights the many contributions of small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)—the symbol of Taiwan’s private sector—and even calls them the “engine of Taiwan’s economic growth.” This highly positive assessment of the private sector is reflected in the fact that the textbook dedicates an entire section of the chapter to discussing the role of SMEs: “SMEs and Economic Growth.” This appraisal of SMEs seems to be one means to challenge conservative narratives that aggrandize the importance of the developmental state. In fact, in the conservative 2015 edition of this textbook, the section titled “SMEs and Economic Development” is renamed to “The Taiwan Experience,” signaling a shift back to the ROC narrative that downplays private
enterprise. The liberal emphasis on private enterprise is also most likely a challenge to the Chinese Nationalist Party’s ideological and political preference for a state-controlled economy. From its founding in mainland China, the Party advocated strong control over the economy, believing that, if left to themselves, capitalists would only exploit the people. In Taiwan, the Party faced an additional problem: it was a minority ruling ethnicity (waishengren) hesitant to share political power with the majority ethnicity (benshengren) that dominated the private sector. The fact that a possibly hostile ethnic group controlled the private sector naturally “raised concerns among political leaders that this economic power could be translated to political power.” Hence the Party continued to exert heavy influence over the economy: from the 1950s to the 1980s, Taiwan “had one of the biggest public enterprise sectors outside the communist bloc and Sub-Saharan Africa… In Asia, only India and Burma [were] of the same magnitude” Samuel PS Ho and

42 The decision to change the title could also be justified by the fact that the section includes two sub-sections, named “Path-breaking SMEs” and “Four Asian Tigers.” Thus, the authors may have simply changed the title to “The Taiwan Experience,” because they felt that it more appropriately encompassed its two sub-sections. However, as discussed in the Developmental State section of this paper, most of the revisions between the 2013 and 2015 editions involved aggrandizements of state contributions. Further, the entire textbook was revised to appease a more conservative Ministry of Education. Thus, it is highly likely that the decision to remove SMEs from the limelight was also way to demonstrate allegiance to historical narratives favored by conservatives.

43 While the KMT is often thought of as capitalist and the CCP as communist, in reality its economic ideology combines elements from both systems. In the 1924 Manifesto of the First National Convention of the Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen argued that “big industries such as banks, railways, and steamship lines which can be favorably operated by a monopoly or are of such dimensions as to exceed the power of individual investment, should be managed by the state. In this way, the private capitalists can have no power to interfere with the normal economic life of the people.”

44 Journals associated with the nationalists at the time often lambasted the capitalists as selfish and exploitative. See Park M. Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1980) 263. After consolidating power over China in 1927, the KMT put economic development and companies in key sectors under state control. The KMT’s control over the economy only increased after the Japanese left China following World War II, leaving behind companies and capital for it to confiscate. As a result, the government “controlled 80 per cent of total industrial capital and monopolized the banking system.” See Yuwa Wei, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Chinese Perspective (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 88.

45 Karl Fields, Enterprise and the state in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 86.

Neil H. Jacoby argue that it was U.S. aid, and thus U.S. pressure, that moved the ROC government on Taiwan towards more private sector-friendly policies. Therefore, the liberal Taiwanese textbook’s emphasis on private enterprise was most likely motivated by a desire to challenge the statist narrative of the Chinese Nationalist Party.

The Taiwanese textbook’s indirect approach to challenging the developmental state narrative, however, contrasts with the Korean textbook’s direct approach, evident in the passage below (emphasis added):

The government’s excessive interference in the economy led to such problems as a decline in spontaneous non-governmental economic activities and cozy relationships between the government and corporations (p. 399).

The assertion that an overly heavy-handed state suppressed “spontaneous non-governmental economic activities,” a vague phrase that most likely refers to smaller-scale private enterprise, is certainly not false. Although SMEs had dominated the country’s manufacturing scene until the early 1960s, by the mid-1970s they had become overshadowed by large establishments (LEs). These enjoyed easier access to credit as well as the support of a government that favored capital-intensive industries. Thus inhabiting the lowest rung of the industrial food chain, SMEs in the 1960s and 1970s languished, not to see rebounds in employment and gross production until the 1980s and 1990s.

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47 Jacoby wrote that, “U.S. aid helped to create a booming private sector of Taiwan’s economy indirectly, by inducing favorable Chinese economic policies and by making available increased power, transportation, efficient labor, and low-priced raw materials. Unless AID had used its influence actively, the private sector would have languished.” See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. aid to Taiwan; a study of foreign aid, self-help, and development (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967), 51. Ho wrote that, “AID... was strongly committed to the growth of the private sector and used its influences and resources to improve the climate for private enterprises. Without AID’s influence and active intervention, the private sector would not have become Taiwan’s foremost source of economic growth. AID helped to create a more conducive atmosphere for economic growth, particularly for the expansion of private industries, by (1) financing government projects with strong external economies, (2) inducing the government to liberalize its economic policies, and (3) laying a constraining hand on military expenditures. (p. 117)”

The assessment of the Park administration’s treatment of SMEs as neglectful is thus accurate, but what of its assessment of the LEs—the Samsungs and Hyundais that arguably thrust the country onto the world stage? Called chaebol, these famous family-owned business conglomerates contributed significantly to pulling the country out of poverty and making it globally competitive. Despite their important role in the post-war Korean economy, they are nowhere to be found in the section that details the Park administration’s economic policies. And even when the textbook hints at chaebol, it is in the context of “cozy relations between the government and big corporations” (p. 399). The original Korean is jeonggyeong yuchak 정경유착, a well-known phrase that invokes the image of businessmen colluding with government officials behind closed doors, as shown in the following image:

![Jeonggyeong Yuchak Comic](http://jhsct2.tistory.com/entry/정경유착_권언유착)

Why does the Korean textbook not only fail to discuss the role of the chaebol in the country’s economic development, but also dwell on the negative consequences of their relationship with the government? Here, a comparison with passages from an equivalent section in the conservative textbook, “The Park Administration’s Compressed Development Policies and their Successes” is illustrative:
The government provided low-interest rate loans to exporting firms. With such policies, exports broke US$100 million for the first time in 1964. In 1973, Park announced his Plan for the Cultivation of Heavy Industry and decided to cultivate the steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, and chemical industries, with the goal of achieving a per capita GNP of US$1,000 and an export volume of US$10 billion. This goal was achieved four years early, in 1971. The rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s greatly improved the people’s quality of life. However, wealth became concentrated in the chaebol, leading to social problems such as a widening wealth gap, which in turn increased the need for welfare policies (p. 332).

While the last sentence laments unfortunate side effects of Park’s chaebol-focused policy, the majority of the passage describes how the government helped big business and how successful this collaboration was, thus linking strong government-big business relations to economic triumph. The liberal textbook authors were most certainly responding to this sort of narrative that places not only the government, but also government-backed chaebol, at the heart of Korea’s economic success story. In order to show their disapproval of the state, liberals shunned its junior partners—the chaebol.

Korean liberals’ aversion to the state-and-chaebol-centric narrative must also be seen in the context of minjung thought, which became central to South Korea’s liberal movements in the 1970s and 1980s.\(^4\) Fundamentally, minjung ideology sees the minjung or the “common people” as the main agents in history. To understand what is meant by “common people,” it is useful to understand what it is not. The minjung is not “elites and leaders or even the educated or cultured”; instead, minjung designates those who were historically oppressed and marginalized from traditional institutions of power.\(^5\) In the context of capitalist production relations, this

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\(^4\) The issue of workers’ rights surfaced continuously during the democracy protests. Accounting for nearly 30% of all issues raised during protest events in the 1980s, workers’ rights were second only to anti-repression in the protest demands. See Gi-Wook Shin et al, “The Korean democracy movement,” in *South Korean Social Movements – From Democracy to Civil Society*, eds. Gi-Wook Shin et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 29-30.

meant blue collar workers, farmers, and the poor. An enemy of the minjung was, therefore, the chaebol that, in their eyes, oppressed the workers.\textsuperscript{51}

While the concept of the minjung has fallen out of favor since the country’s democratization, it continues to color liberal thinking to this day. For instance, a prominent labor activist argued in 2006 that the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement would only benefit the state and the conglomerates, implying that it would not benefit the “common people”:

There is no benefit to workers and minjung in the ruling class strategy of relying on and supporting the minority of chaebols through financial expansion, rather than expanding growth in production or employment, trying to insert itself in the world economy that is only postponing capital crises.\textsuperscript{52}

The legacy of minjung thought is thus an important reason why the liberal Korean textbook authors did not see fit to depict the chaebol as symbols of their country’s private sector. In sum, Korean liberals detest the chaebol for their cozy relationships with the state and also for their oppression of the minjung. These factors give Korean liberals an ambivalence towards private enterprise that their Taiwanese counterparts do not have.

This divergence in the two forms of liberalism stems from divergent government policies towards the private sector that would result in differences in labor-management relations. Karl Fields provides an illustrative metaphor of the how government-big business relations differed in the two countries: whereas in Taiwan “local capitalists and government officials have coexisted in a relationship of commensalism, that is, living together but with largely independent roles,” in Korea, they have enjoyed “a relationship of symbiosis, or living together and acting as an

\textsuperscript{51} Secondly, minjung it is not the standard term for “the people”; that would be gukmin or literally “national people.” Subscribers to minjung thought thus harbored a certain disdain towards the “military dictatorship, corporate conglomerates, and foreign powers,” which had, in their eyes, betrayed the “common people” in the name of the nation. Ibid, 42.

\textsuperscript{52} Ryu Mi-gyung, KORUS-FTA: Already a Failed Future, quoted in Alice S. Kim, “Left Out.”
integral unit.” Thus, whereas the ROC government did not support (and at times even limited) growth of the country's private enterprises, the Korean government took the opposite approach: it offered generous financial incentives to leading companies, causing capital to become concentrated in the hands of a few conglomerates. Further, the government responded to the shock of the 1973 oil crisis by promoting capital-intensive heavy-and-chemical industries. It thus concentrated even more wealth in the chaebol.

The government’s decision to focus on large firms in select regions inadvertently exacerbated life for the working class and helped incubate a working class identity. Firstly, as factories in Korea were concentrated in the Seoul-Incheon and Busan-Masan regions, Korean workers had to uproot themselves entirely from their homes in the countryside. Thus, in contrast to their Taiwanese counterparts who could fall back on agricultural work in their hometowns nearby, Korean workers had no such recourse. Secondly, the concentration of workers also afforded Korean laborers more opportunities to meet one another, facilitating the development of class consciousness. In Taiwan, on the other hand, the scattered nature of factories hampered the formation of a working class identity. Thirdly, Taiwanese workers often saw their jobs at small- and medium-sized factories as launch pads to future entrepreneurial careers, whereas the gargantuan nature of Korean factories precluded their workers from harboring such fantasies. As Yin-Wah Chu writes, “[w]ith neither the buffer of the agricultural economy nor the prospect of opening their own business, workers in South Korea have been more likely to appreciate collective action and realistic option to better their life chances.” Thus, although it is not

53 Fields, 68.
55 Ibid.
known if Taiwanese enterprises were less exploitative, it is the case that Korean workers were more likely to mobilize against their large employers and the authoritarian state that backed them. The more vocal nature of the Korean working class as well as its already antagonistic relations vis-a-vis the state ensured that the minjung would become central to the Korean democracy movement and remain relevant to the Korean left today.

Therefore, the difference in how the liberal textbooks in the two countries depict the role of private enterprise results from the divergent needs of liberalism. In Taiwan, the liberal textbook highlighted the role of private enterprise as a counterbalance to the conservative state-centric narrative. In Korea, however, minjung liberals’ detest for the oppressive chaebols, and their crony capitalism, dampened textbook writers enthusiasm for the private sector.

3. The People

Times of economic hardship often motivate states to mobilize their people by appealing to their sense of patriotism. During the Second World War, for instance, American propaganda posters featured Rosie the Riveter, who left her comfortable home to serve her country in factories. In a similar vein, for much of the postwar period, the governments of South Korea and Taiwan actively impressed upon their citizens the need to make personal sacrifices for the economic wellbeing of their nation. This policy thus necessitated accompanying policies to foster in youth a love of their country, an objective that influenced how history was taught.

In the past few decades however, the relaxing of Cold War tensions, shifts in pedagogical goals, and the growth of diverse civil societies in both countries have made history curricula
today much less dogmatic. In all four textbooks analyzed, there are no portrayals of citizens patriotically serving their country in the work force. By contrast, the textbooks do depict them as active agents in social movements, reflecting the dramatic shift in political priorities since democratization.

Nevertheless, the textbooks’ lack of concern for the agency of the “normal people” in the economy does not mean that they portray them in the same way. Whereas the Taiwanese textbook focuses on official policies and their macroeconomic effects, the Korean textbook, most likely influenced by the minjung focus on the “common people,” also shows how macroeconomics filtered down to lower social strata. This means that the Taiwanese textbook considers people insofar as they relate to the economic policies and industries under discussion, whereas the Korean textbook focuses more on discussing how economic conditions shaped the lives of average people. This difference is clear from the titles of the chapter/half-chapter and the section headings. The title of the chapter Taiwanese textbook, for instance, is “The Pioneering of the Taiwan Experience,” which foreshadows the chapter’s focus on the government and private enterprise—those actors responsible for “pioneering” the Taiwan Miracle. On the other hand, the half-chapter in the Korean textbook is titled “Overcoming Poverty and Achieving Economic Growth,” demonstrating a prioritization of the people’s lives (“overcoming poverty”) over economic results (“economic growth”).

In addition, the difference in the two textbooks’ foci can be seen from their charts and pictures. Whereas the main chart in the Korean discussion of this topic is a large timeline that

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56 Jones, “Toward Pluralism? The Politics of History Textbooks in South Korea, Taiwan, and China.”
57 In each textbook, preceding the economic development chapter/half-chapter is a chapter/half-chapter on democratization and social movements. In the Korean textbook, it is called “The Growth of Liberal Democracy and the Basic Rights of the People and in Taiwan it is called “Politics: From the Onset to the Lifting of Martial Law.” It should be noted that the conservative textbooks also discuss political changes before economic changes.
tracks GDP per capita, the main chart in the Taiwanese textbook correlates changes in economic growth rates to government policies and changes in external economic conditions. In South Korea, the rise in GDP per capita has become a symbol of the country’s economic miracle. That the main chart in this section displays improvements in GDP per capita most likely speaks to the authors’ desire to show how life improved for the average Korean.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ In the Korean textbook we used in Korea University, GDP per capita was one of the phrases we learned in the “Industrialization and Democratization” unit. It was included along with other phrases that were usually used in discussing Korea’s economic successes, such as “became a developed countries.”
The textbooks’ different agenda are also clear from the pictures used in the textbooks. While both textbooks show images of impressive industrial complexes and highways—symbols of economic growth—their images differ when they involve the “common people.” The first and last sections of the half-chapter on this topic in the Korean textbook include photographs of impoverished urbanites, whereas the Taiwanese textbook shows pictures of people in the context of economic policies. All the average Taiwanese portrayed are factory workers.
While images from both textbooks portray average people in the context of economic forces beyond their control, the Korean textbook’s images of the urban poor are more likely to solicit compassion whereas the Taiwanese textbook’s images of factory workers being supervised are
more distant. The Taiwanese images also seem to present a view of economics from above, an approach that is driven home by the last sentence of the chapter on economic growth (emphasis added):

Taiwan’s economic growth needs the wisdom and efforts of the government and enterprises. Only with them, can Taiwan’s economy be sustainably managed and flourish. (p. 207)

Thus, liberal textbooks show average people in the context of economic forces beyond their control. However, their approach differs in that the Taiwanese textbook mentions commoners in relation to macroeconomic policies whereas the Korean textbook, most likely motivated by minjung ideology, takes a greater interest in their plight.

4. Foreign aid

Any discussion of postwar economic development in South Korea and Taiwan would be incomplete without mentioning the role of foreign aid. To Korea, “the United States alone supplied $12.6 billion in economic and military assistance between 1946 and 1976,” a magnitude of aid exceeded only by South Vietnam and Israel.59 Taiwan received $4.1 billion in U.S. aid from 1949 to 1967, making it one of the largest aid recipients for a non-combat zone country.60

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59 Edward S. Mason, The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 165. Korea also received aid from other sources, but 95% of aid in the decade after the Korean War was from the United States (Mason, 189).
60 See Ho, 110-111.
Aid of course came with strings attached; it gave the U.S. leverage over its two Free World allies—leverage that they did not always welcome.\textsuperscript{61}

From an economic standpoint, however, aid was highly valuable. While military aid relieves the burden of remarkably high military expenditures in both countries, economic aid relaxed important constraints on economic growth. In the aftermath of the Second World War and the two countries’ civil wars, the dearth of domestic savings and foreign exchange reserves limited the countries’ abilities to invest in their economies and import materials needed for production. In the 1950s, grant aid respectively financed 70\% and 40\% of Korea and Taiwan’s imports while foreign savings—almost entirely U.S. aid—financed 80\% and 40\% of gross domestic capital formation in Korea and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{62} U.S. aid thus served as what economists would call a “gap filler” before exports took off in the mid-1960s and 1970s. Finally, U.S. aid meant that by the 1960s when both countries’ economies were ready for export-promotion, they had very little debt.\textsuperscript{63} This meant that, unlike many developing countries, their economies would not be burdened by the repayment of debt; they could simply take off.

It would seem that emphasizing foreign aid would be an ideal way to challenge the statist (and in Korea’s case corporatist) narrative of economic development. This is true in the Taiwanese case, but not of the Korean one. Once again, the Taiwanese textbook focuses on the

\textsuperscript{61} It should be noted that influence was not one-directional. As Mason writes, “as in so many recorded instances of USAID relationships, it was the weaker power that held the whip hand” (15). American fears of what South Korea might do if U.S. aid decreased actually gave the aid recipient the upper hand at the negotiating table sometimes. It seems that American engagement was received with less resistance in Taiwan. Jacoby writes that the loss of the Chinese mainland, the “face” of the ROC, made the Chinese more “responsive to the economic counsels of the U.S.—partly because they realized they could not afford to fail again” (116).

\textsuperscript{62} Mason 188-189. Ho, 114-15.

\textsuperscript{63} In Taiwan, around 82.5\% of aid was delivered as grants and in Korea, aid was exclusively grant until 1963. Even loans tended to be “soft” loans, which meant that they charged a below-market rate of interest. In Korea aid foreign assistance bankrolled close to 70\% of imports between 1953 and 1962. See Jacoby, 46 and Mason, 182-185.
effects of foreign aid on the government and the economy, whereas the Korean textbook draws attention to their social consequences. For instance, the Korean textbook says that “the U.S. began providing Korea with relief after Restoration and further expanded aid to the country after the Korean War, helping to ease social anxiety.” It is noteworthy that the textbook authors deemed an easing of “social anxiety” (사회 불안, sahoe buran) the most important effect of the relief. In contrast, the Taiwanese textbook highlights the effects on the economy: “After the Korean War erupted in 1951, the U.S. restored economic aid to Taiwan. This aid became the most important external factor in stabilizing the economy at that time.” While we can assume that a stabilized economy lessened social anxiety, it is noteworthy that the Korean textbook emphasizes the effects on society over those on the economy.

The difference in focus is also clear from the types of early American aid listed. The Korean textbook focuses on consumer necessities: “Relief materials [after the Korean War] mainly took the form of consumer goods, mostly food products, as well as raw materials for consumer goods industries such as cotton, sugar, and flour.” On the other hand, the Taiwanese textbook provides a fuller list of aid, only a part of which hint at how American aid might have impacted the average person:

American aid included surplus *agricultural products, material imports, and loans, which helped Taiwan alleviate its shortage of daily necessities*, stabilizing inflation and supplying raw materials necessary for industrial development. At a time when the government was short on finances and struggling to reconstruct facilities damaged during the war, the U.S. also provided much-needed assistance in repairing and rebuilding infrastructure involving electricity, transportation and shipping, and irrigation (p. 195).

The difference in the two portrayals of aid cannot merely be attributed to differences in the nature of U.S. aid to its two allies, since U.S. aid provided much assistance beyond supplying consumer goods and raw materials for the production thereof. The liberal Korean textbook’s
emphasis on such goods is therefore most likely a result of its minjung focus on the “common people.”

However, minjung concerns for the common people cannot explain the other discrepancies between the liberal Korean textbook’s narrative and those of scholars, as the passage below demonstrates:

The Syngman Rhee administration also imported American surplus agricultural goods, which it sold off to the public to form a counterpart fund. This fund was in turn used to finance the national treasury and political funds. Surplus agricultural goods played a big role in alleviating food shortages, but they also depressed prices of locally-produced agricultural products, decreasing the incomes of farmers (p. 397).

Like its Taiwanese counterpart, the Korean textbook discusses the effects of American food aid on the government (“national treasury and political funds”) and mentions that food aid alleviated food shortages. However, unlike its Taiwanese counterpart, it points out a negative consequence of the aid: the decrease in farmers’ incomes. While the decision to mention both the pros and cons of American aid make it seem more balanced, it is actually unfair to hold American aid solely responsible for the plummet in farming incomes, as it was the policy of the Rhee administration to depress rice prices to control inflation.64 American food aid merely abetted a policy that was already in place. The portrayal of American aid as the one cause of agricultural misfortune is therefore misguided, raising the question of whether the textbook authors were intentionally misrepresenting American aid instead of simply abiding to its focus on the lives of the minjung.

Further analysis of the half-chapter reveals that this misleading depiction of U.S. aid is most likely the result of anti-American sentiment. For instance, the textbook does not mention

64 Mason, 11.
the many ways in which the U.S. assistance contributed to the livelihoods of normal people. After all, the three main goals of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) were to prevent starvation, disease, and unrest, which it had sufficiently achieved by 1948.\(^65\) The USAMGIK also made impressive strides in the realm of public education and land reforms in the 1950s, in addition to contributing to increased agricultural and industrial output.\(^66\) Further, after the Korean War, U.S. aid financed much of the country’s reconstruction and stabilization efforts.\(^67\) Clearly, U.S. aid had much more positive effects on normal people’s lives than the textbook is willing to admit.

The textbook’s neglect of the positive consequences of American assistance is perhaps most evident in that it ends the section on American economic aid, “Economic Conditions in the 1950s and American Economic Aid,” on an entirely negative note (emphasis added):

> The continued slowdown of the American economy in the late 1950s led the U.S. to gradually scale down aid to Korea. What the U.S. previously provided free of charge, it now provided on loans or at a fee. *The shrinking of U.S. aid immediately precipitated an economic downturn in Korea* (p. 397).

The assertion that cuts in U.S. grant aid helped weaken the Korean economy is true, but is hardly the only consequence of this change in aid policy. As previously discussed, generous grant aid prior to this point had left Korea basically debt-free.\(^68\) Equipped with this positive “credit score,” Korea could easily borrow money from foreign countries. The effects of the reductions in grant aid were thus not as dire as the passage makes them seem. In addition, the decrease of grant aid

\(^{65}\) The American decision to not focus on industrialization was also motivated by concerns that the South would unite with the North.
\(^{66}\) Attendance in primary and secondary schools doubled and tripled during the USAMGIK period, and land reforms redistributed more than 96% of land formerly owned by the Japanese (Mason, 169-171).
\(^{67}\) Mason, 93.
\(^{68}\) Mason, 14.
to Korea had the effect of weening the country off aid-dependent import substitution policies and pushing it towards more independent export-oriented ones. In fact, this is precisely the point that the conservative textbook makes with regards to the reduction of U.S. aid: “After 1959, grant aid decreased, and aid continued in the form of loans. The Republic of Korea now needed plans for economic independence” (Kyohaksa, p. 332). In sum, the liberal Korean textbook blames U.S. aid policy for depressing agricultural incomes and for precipitating an economic downturn, while largely neglecting the myriad ways in which U.S. aid helped the country recover from war.

Like their discussions of foreign aid in economic recovery, the textbooks’ discussions of foreign aid in economic development also reveal different attitudes. Whereas the Korean textbook does not mention how foreign aid contributed to economic development at all, the Taiwanese textbook mentions multiple times how U.S. economic aid helped Taiwanese industries. All the passages below from the Taiwanese textbook mention aid (emphasized in italics), even just in passing:

With American aid, infrastructure left over from the Japanese colonial era, and skilled personnel who came to Taiwan after the war, the government actively promoted industrial import substitution, in hopes of replacing imported products with domestically produced ones in order to reduce reliance on foreign countries.... On the one hand the government fostered domestic industry, subsidized raw materials, and utilized American material and foreign exchange aid, helping industry players to import raw materials and facilities. On the other hand, the government employed measures such as high tariffs and import restrictions to protect the domestic market, promoting domestic industrial progress.... The most important industries that achieved import substitution were the textile and concrete industries. In the case of the prioritized textiles industry, the government used an advantageous exchange rate to supply factories with cheap American cotton from the aid program, lowering production costs (195-96).

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69 Mason writes that “prior to 1960, the Korean government had undertaken no borrowing abroad, except for a small amount from the Development Loan Fund” (200).
70 The liberal Korean textbook mentions foreign loans and investment, but does not specify what is aid.
From the passages above, readers get the sense that without “American aid,” the Taiwanese government would not have been able to promote its policy of import substitution as effectively—that without access to “American material and foreign exchange aid,” industries would have had a more difficult time developing, and without “American cotton,” the textile industry, a main industry at the time, would not have developed so smoothly. Clearly, the textbook authors wanted to drive home the link between American economic aid and the successful development of industry in Taiwan in the 1950s. This emphasis is most likely the result of Taiwanese nationalist historiography, which highlights the various non-Chinese influences on Taiwan’s development.

It is thus clear that the Taiwanese textbook mentions foreign aid more frequently and also portrays it in a far more positive light than its Korean counterpart. While the liberal Korean textbook’s aversion for the state and big corporations could be understood in terms of minjung historiography, this analysis of foreign aid showed the need to also see the Korean textbook’s attitude in light of left-nationalism, or the leftists’ response to rightist or bourgeois nationalism. As Korean leftists, they were most likely reluctant to credit American aid, because they viewed the Americans as being in collusion with Korean dictatorships to oppress the “people.” On the other hand, Taiwanese liberals enthusiastically appropriated foreign aid to challenge statist explanations of Taiwan’s economic growth and Sino-centric narratives of Taiwanese history.

5. Foreign Trade

After World War II, both countries traded extensively with the U.S. and Japan. As resource-poor countries with small markets, Korea and Taiwan relied heavily on foreign trade to acquire raw
materials, capital goods, and access to consumers.\textsuperscript{71} It is, therefore, no surprise that, in both countries, the share of foreign trade to GNP ballooned alongside their economic miracles, albeit alongside an increasing reliance on foreign trade.\textsuperscript{72, 73} Suffice it to say that the economic miracles in Taiwan and South Korea did not unfold in a vacuum.

Once again, we would expect both liberal textbooks to use foreign trade to challenge conservative state-centric narratives of economic growth. However, just as in the case of foreign aid, there is a need to consider another aspect of liberalism: nationalism. That the Taiwanese textbook waxes lyrical on trade with the U.S. and Japan is therefore less an indication that liberal Taiwanese are free market advocates as an indication of their desire to distance Taiwan from China. That the Korean textbook characterizes trade with U.S. and Japan as over-dependence must also be seen in light of the liberal nationalists’ negative experiences with the two countries.

At first, it would seem that the Taiwanese textbook portrays foreign trade positively, reflecting liberals’ desire to challenge conservative narratives of economic growth. The Taiwanese textbook’s first mention of trade occurs in the context of economic recovery: “In 1950, rice and sugar exports to mostly Japan brought in around $100 million USD of foreign exchange” (p. 195). This sentence highlights how trade with Japan contributed to economic recovery. The textbook’s second mention of trade occurs in the context of economic growth:

While Taiwan received American aid, the U.S. was its largest source of imports and Japan its largest destination for exports. As Taiwanese exports gradually transitioned from processed agricultural goods to industrial products, the nature of this trade triangle changed…. Taiwan experienced a trade surplus with the U.S. and deficit with Japan. By the mid-1960s, the U.S. became Taiwan’s largest

\textsuperscript{71} Mason, 125. Ho, 133.
\textsuperscript{72} Mason, 133. The share of gross exports in GNP from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s grew from 2% to 30%.
\textsuperscript{73} Ho, 133. In Taiwan, between the early 1950s and early 1970s, the ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GNP increased from 23% to 83%.
export destination, and Japan its second. On the other hand, Japan became Taiwan’s largest source of imports and the U.S. its second (p. 198).

While not as affirmative as the first mention of trade, this passage strongly emphasizes the degree to which Taiwan traded with the U.S. and Japan. A diagram illustrating the country’s changing trade relations is included, underscoring the importance of foreign trade in the section on economic growth. Taken together, the two passages seem to be motivated by a desire to challenge conservative state-centric narratives.

Analysis of how the textbook discusses trade with China, however, shows that this is not the only motivation liberal Taiwanese have. The textbook’s positive treatment of trade with the U.S. and Japan may actually be a move to distance Taiwan from conservative Sinocentric views of Taiwan’s history. In fact, Taiwanese liberals see economic hegemony from China as a serious threat to the country’s sovereignty and liberal politicians in Taiwan today stress the importance of diversifying Taiwan’s trade relations, code for “decreasing the country’s reliance on China.” Therefore, the only way to determine whether or not the Taiwanese textbook authors also share their Korean equivalents’ ambivalence towards trade is to see how trade with China is portrayed. It turns out that there is indeed evidence that the textbook authors are concerned with over-reliance on China. In the following chapter on economic growth after the Taiwan Miracle, the section, “Trade with China,” concludes with the assertion, “it is worth paying attention to the pros and cons of promoting cross-strait economic liberalization” (204). While not explicitly characterizing trade with China as a threat, this statement points out that there are cons of trade with China, unlike the rest of the chapter on economic growth that discusses only the pros of trade with the U.S. and Japan. This difference subtly hints at the liberal textbook authors’

74 This is a valid concern, given that it has been China’s recent policy to woo Taiwan with economic incentives.
ambivalence towards Chinese economic hegemony. Thus liberal Taiwanese textbook authors portray trade with the U.S. and Japan positively is more a reflection of their desire to challenge Sino-centric narratives of Taiwanese history than a desire to downplay the role of the state.

The liberal Korean textbook on the other hand paints a negative portrait of trade with the U.S. and Japan; it mentions trade once, and emphasizes its effect of making Korea dependent on these hegemons (emphasis added):

Further, because policies focused more on expanding exports than on generating domestic demand, Korea became over dependent on the outside world, especially the U.S. and Japan (p. 399).

To understand this view of foreign trade, it is necessary to understand how the rhetoric of self-reliance is used in Korean politics. Simply put, it is not merely a phenomenon on the left, as can be seen from this quote from Park Chung-hee (emphasis added):

Economic resurgence is an integral part of a nationalistic vision of a more independent Korea to come—more independent of the United States aid and control and, as an economically stronger and independent entity, more able to deal with North Korea.75

The link between economic strength and political independence cannot be clearer. Conservatives today also use the rhetoric of economic independence to justify neo-liberal economic policies. For instance, “pro-business think tanks and lobby groups for national or transnational corporations, argue that ‘the race to free trade agreements’ is both inevitable and irreversible,” contending that Korea needs to open up to trade liberalization in order to remain competitive and independent.76

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It is thus clear that both conservatives and liberals agree on the need for self-reliance. This agreement stems from Korean nationalism, which “during the modernisation period became a powerful unifying ideology regardless of whether one was allied with the North or South, conservative or progressive, or the rulers or the ruled.”  

The difference between left-nationalism and right-nationalism lies in their political concerns. As opposed to their conservative counterparts who emphasized national unity against North Korea at the expense of political liberties, liberals stressed the primacy of the minjung or the common people against encroachments from the authoritarian regime and business elite.

But how does minjung ideology lead to an insistence on economic sovereignty? The answer to this question lies in both the historic roots of the ideology and in its modern-day implications. After 1979, Korean liberals began to see the liberation of their country from foreign hegemony as a prerequisite to achieving democratization and unification. Liberals’ faith in U.S. as a beacon of democracy and human rights was shattered when American troops were rumored to have deployed military units to help quash the Gwangju Uprising in 1980.  

Their suspicions seemed to be confirmed when Ronald Reagan invited to the White House President Chun Doo-hwan, the general who had seized power in 1979 and was ultimately responsible for the bloody crackdown in Gwangju City. By the mid-1980s, the majority of liberals were convinced that the U.S. was behind the authoritarian regime itself, and student activists launched protests at local

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78 The rise of anti-American sentiment in Korea was especially surprising seeing as Koreans had, in general, harbored feelings of amity towards the U.S., which they thanked for defending them in the Korean War and for providing generous economic aid.
American government offices, going so far as to commit arson in broad daylight. As a result of this sense of betrayal, Korean liberals developed a distaste for foreign intervention in their country’s economy.

An irony of the minjung movement today is that although activists join hands with groups around the world to oppose neo-liberal economic policies, they appropriate nationalist rhetoric in doing so. For instance, anti-FTA groups in Korea “framed the [Korea-US] FTA not in terms of conflicting class interests between capital and labor but in terms of conflicting national interests between the US and South Korea.” One activist even declared that the day of the signing of the FTA was “the second most shameful day after the day of Japan’s annexation of Korea” The KORUS-FTA, critics contended, would lead to the loss of Korean economic sovereignty, which would then lead to a host of social problems, such as the loss of livelihood of Korean farmers who would not be able to compete with American agribusiness. National sovereignty, as opposed to proletarian revolution, thus became the rallying cry. Therefore, the liberal Korean textbook’s insistence that trade equals over-reliance must be understood in the need of minjung liberalism to counter foreign economic hegemony.

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79 It did not help that top U.S. officials in South Korea also reportedly said South Korea was “not ready for democracy” and called the student protesters “spoiled brats.” While the verity of the second statement is questionable, both statements became widely circulated among dissident groups. For more information on the arson and these statements, see Henry Scott Stokes, “Anti-US Sentiment is Seen in Korea,” New York Times, March 28, 1982, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/28/world/anti-us-sentiment-is-seen-in-korea.html.

80 It should be noted that nationalist historians were already not fans of colonial modernism theory, and had already been searching for ways to disprove the notion that Japan modernized Korea by showing that there were already signs of modernity during the late Joseon period. Betrayal by the U.S. simply added to Korean historians’ arguments that foreign powers obstructed Korean development. See Min, 18-22.

81 Mi Park, 459.

82 Anti-neoliberalism and anti-FTA groups and minjung activists are not always the same, but for there is a lot of overlap. As Mi Park writes, “the key organizational forces that make up the anti-FTA coalition greatly overlap with the major actors that are the driving force behind the anti-[neoliberal] globalization movement in South Korea” (Park 2009).
In sum, the Taiwanese textbook takes a more positive approach to discussing trade with the U.S. and Japan whereas the Korean textbook dwells on its negative ramifications: over-reliance on those two countries. The different approaches taken reflect liberals’ desires to distance their country from those they have had negative experiences with. In the case of Taiwan, that is China and in the case of Korean, that is the U.S. and Japan.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to shed light on how liberals in South Korea and Taiwan compare and contrast in their understandings of their countries’ economic miracles. The preceding analysis has shown that liberals in the two countries, influenced by their political beliefs, indeed have different understandings of this past.

The liberal Korean textbook’s views reflect the legacy of liberal Korean historiography, whereas those of the liberal Taiwanese textbook reflect the influence of liberal Taiwanese historiography. The Korean textbook’s more assertive tone and its open criticism of the state and the chaebol echoes the desire of minjung scholars in the 1980s to liberate the people from an oppressive government-big business complex. The Taiwanese textbook’s more diplomatic tone and its appropriation of achievements of private enterprise, foreign aid, and trade to indirectly challenge that of the state, on the other hand, harken back to the conciliation practiced by liberal reformers in the 1990s, when the tide had already turned in their favor. In addition, the primacy of the minjung in liberal movements in Korea has meant that the textbook pays attention to the plight of the bottom rungs of society, whereas the Taiwanese textbook has a more paternalistic

83 Alisa Jones, “Toward Pluralism” 217
approach, focusing on the agency of government and business leaders. In addition, liberal
Korean suspicions of foreign aid and trade have roots in their difficult past with the U.S., where
as Taiwanese liberals’ enthusiasm for foreign aid and trade are motivated by their desire to
extract Taiwan from conservative Sino-centric narratives. Therefore, the differences in the two
liberal textbooks reflect the two countries’ different histories of liberalism.

A final point that deserves to be made is that while neither textbook explicitly asks
readers to contemplate different perspectives on history, it seems that the liberal Taiwanese
history textbook points in this direction. Rather than asserting that theirs is the “correct view of
history” as their Korean counterparts do, the Taiwanese textbook authors acknowledge that
different perspectives exist and can be equally valid. It remains to be seen whether this attitude
towards historical pedagogy will change as conservatives in Taiwan lose ground, or if in Korea,
a younger generation of historians will be able to bring more dispassionate perspectives to their
country’s history textbooks.

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Textbooks


------------------------------------------, 2015.

Other Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


This project began with a dialogue I came across in a Korean language textbook. Thanks to the generosity of the Light Fellowship, I had the opportunity to study Korean in Seoul from 2014 to 2015 at the Korean Language Center of Korea University. In my third term, I took Level 6, which focused on training students to speak formally about a wide array of topics from educational policy to the unification of the Two Koreas. In one of the chapters, titled “Industrialization and Democratization,” the opening dialogue featured a Korean teacher and his students, presumably Americans, discussing the shipbuilding industry. The shipbuilding sector in South Korea has been central to the country’s economy since the 1970s.

The dialogue is based in Busan, where much of the industry is located. A student expresses amazement at Korean ships. His teacher responds by crediting former President Park Chung-hee and his economic policies for supporting the development of such industries that spurred on the country’s economic growth. The student then expresses his admiration for the Korean government, which prompts his teacher to remind him that it was ultimately the “Korean people who came together to rebuild their country.”

The reference to the unity of the Korean people did not surprise me. There had been a unit earlier in the textbook on Korean culture that stressed unity and cohesion as a key aspect of Korean society. The nod to the Park regime should have been surprising, given that my young Korean friends had often stressed that he was a dictator and accused his daughter, current president Park Geun-hye, of being the same. However, I reasoned that even Koreans who do not remember Park fondly, concede that he contributed to Korea’s economic growth. Further, foreign language textbooks often simplify the cultures and countries from which they originate to convey more important things like grammar, vocabulary, and sentence structure.
So there is no reason to be surprised that this dialogue oversimplifies the realities of Korea’s economic growth. However, I was surprised by the lack of mention of foreign assistance, which from my understanding played a big role in Korea’s post-war economic growth. While it is essential to have a government that prioritizes economic development, it is highly unlikely that one of the poorest countries in the world after the Korean War could become a G20 member in just half a century without assistance or involvement from developed countries.

Was the author’s omission of foreign aid indicative of a larger gap in collective memory? It made me wonder how foreign aid is portrayed to Korean students in their history classes. I had read an online review of Daniel C. Sneider and Gi-Wook Shin’s History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia, a compilation of papers about how the wars in East Asia are portrayed in history textbooks across the region. There is a piece that compares Korean and Taiwanese textbooks’ portrayals of Japanese colonization, which sparked my interest in conducting a similar study of their portrayals’ of post-war economic growth. Both countries received massive amounts of aid and investment during the Cold War. Do the textbooks mention the role of such external factors played in their country’s respective success? Or do they portray the economic miracles portrayed solely as fruits of the nation’s labor?

My hypothesis was that because Korean nationalism is largely ethnic in nature, Korean textbooks would omit discussions of foreign assistance. On the other hand, Taiwanese nationalism, which defines itself in contrast to an ethnic Chinese nationalism, and therefore embraces diversity as a central tenet, would speak highly of the foreign assistance.

To study this hypothesis, I originally purchased two history textbooks from each country that are used in mandatory high school history classes. What I soon realized, however, was that
the Taiwanese textbook I had purchased was a more conservative one whereas the Korean one I had was more liberal-leaning. This made me realize that I could not simply draw conclusions on Taiwanese or Korean nationalism from two textbooks alone, so I asked friends and family who visited Taiwan and Korea purchase a more liberal Taiwanese textbook and a more conservative Korean textbook for me. (They kindly obliged!) Over the course of my research, I also discovered how divided each society was regarding the textbook controversies, and by extension, the past. In addition, in Professor Steven Pincus’ class on the British Empire, I learned about the need to understand the Empire through political divisions within England. This lesson helped lead me to realize the need to understand Taiwan and South Korea through the lens of political factions instead of merely focusing on nationalism. I decided to shift my focus to exploring how liberals view the past.

As I honed the subject of my study down to liberals, however, I realized I needed to expand the scope of my study to analyze depictions of post-war economic growth in general. I had noticed interesting differences in the two textbooks besides portrayals of foreign aid, trade, and investment. For instance, the Taiwanese textbook emphasized more the relationship of foreign aid to government policy and industry, whereas its Korean counterpart highlighted the experiences of “common people.” These different historiographical approaches manifested themselves in many ways in the same chapters, making me realize that I could not do justice to the differences in the textbooks by focusing narrowly on foreign influences on the economy. Thus, in order to better illustrate the different approaches the textbooks’ authors took to history, I decided to expand my thesis to include how each textbook depicts the following ingredients of economic growth: the state, private enterprise, the people, foreign aid, and foreign trade. I also added a section discussing the pedagogical motives of the textbooks as ascertained from the
forewords and activities incorporated into the chapters. I would have liked to also discuss how the agricultural sector, foreign investment, and foreign events (such as the Vietnam War) are portrayed, but my analyses of these factors did not yield any insights not covered in by my discussions of other factors.

Having thus decided on the focus of my study, I began the process of research. In the fall semester, I concentrated my efforts on understanding history education in the two countries, including past controversies surrounding the textbooks and current textbook approval processes. History education in any country is bound to raise someone’s eyebrows, but this seems to be especially the case in Taiwan and South Korea, most likely because their recent democratization has generated public and academic interest in reevaluating the past. There was thus a wealth of secondary sources to work from. A comparative study naturally lends itself to heavy use of secondary material, so I cannot describe all of them here, but I will note the ones that aided my understanding of the two countries’ history education the most. Alisa Jones’ “Toward Pluralism? The Politics of History Textbooks in South Korea, Taiwan, and China” tracks the history of curricular changes in South Korea and Taiwan to broader shifts in pedagogical concerns, tempering my belief that political ideology was the sole source of education reforms. Michael Hsiao’s “One colonialism, two memories: Representing Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and South Korea,” helped me understand differences in textbook portrayals of another period of history.

In the spring semester, I focused my attention on analyzing the contents of the textbook themselves. I therefore had to study the two countries’ post-war economic trajectories. For this, I consulted Zhiqun Zhu’s primer on East Asian post-war economies, Understanding East Asia’s Economic “Miracles,” as well as two “textbooks” of the countries’ economic histories: Samuel
PS Ho’s *Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970* and Edward Mason’s *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea*. As the two countries’ post-war situations shared many parallels, I also had other comparative studies at my disposal, including Karl Field’s *Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan*.

However, while learning about economic history allowed me to see where the textbooks diverged from scholarly sources, it did not help me understand why that was. I then turned to Gi-Wook Shin’s *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea*, which discusses the history of Korean nationalism. From this book, I learned about the *minjung* movement, which aimed to empower the “common people,” defined as the urban poor, laborers, and farmers. I realized that the Korean textbook focused on exactly these people much more than its Taiwanese counterpart did and that the existence of *minjung* ideology is probably the reason why.

Learning about the *minjung* movement thus helped me put in context not only the textbook contents, but also my understandings of Korean politics: previously, I had noticed that labor groups in Korea played a far larger role in anti-government protests than those in Taiwan. I was closer to understanding why. From further research, I noticed many other similarities between the textbook and *minjung* historiography. For instance, from Hyonku Min’s “Trends in the Study of Modern Korean History, 1945-2000,” I learned that the *minjung* academics, many of whom participated in democratization movements, believed that their predecessors—the nationalist scholars—focused too much on the past and advocated a more activist approach to history. From Namhee Lee’s *Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea*, I learned how intellectuals had joined hands with factory workers in their struggle for democracy. These new understandings helped me contextualize the views and the more opinionated nature of the liberal Korean textbook.
This made me realize how wrong I was initially to characterize the dialogue in the Korean language textbook as “nationalistic.” Email exchanges with Professor Owen Miller at SOAS helped me understand that Korean nationalism can be roughly divided into “left-nationalism,” which is sympathetic to North Korea and the lower socioeconomic classes, and “right nationalism,” which demonizes the North and focuses on the bourgeois. Thus, I realized that the specific kind of nationalism exhibited in the Korea University language textbook was more of the bourgeois nationalism advocated by Park Chung-hee, in which the working class was demanded to subordinate their interests to those of the nation.

Although the conclusions I draw are probably not surprising to experts on Taiwan and Korea, this was my first time embarking on a study of these two countries in depth. I had few opportunities to systematically learn about their histories during my time at Yale, since we do not have courses specifically dedicated to them. However, more in-depth exploration of the countries came only when I chose to write about them in the context of other courses, ranging from the history of Western medicine to East Asian food history. My senior project therefore became a directed study in the two countries’ recent histories, and the discoveries I made had huge significance for my personal interest in Taiwan and South Korea. It has also made me realize what scholarship the field still lacks; for instance, while there are tentative conclusions on why views of the Japanese colonial periods vary so much between the two countries, there is surprisingly no comprehensive study on how these views developed. I am not sure if I will ever pursue graduate studies in history, but if I do, this topic is definitely something I would want to work on.

In conclusion, I would like to thank many people for help with my project. Firstly, it has been very helpful to bounce ideas off of my advisor, Peter Perdue, who has a wealth of
knowledge about the history of East Asia in general. For more country-specific knowledge, I reached out to friends and professors around the world. I owe Michael Turton, a frequent commentator on Taiwanese politics and history, many beers for his help; he not only pointed me to crucial secondary literature on Taiwan’s post-war developments, but has also patiently answered my many questions on this subject. For knowledge on Korea, I reached out to Sunwoo Ryu, a former Yale student now pursuing medical studies at Korea University. When I got stuck, he kindly pointed me in the right direction. Professor Namhee Lee at UCLA graciously sent me an unpublished paper to give me insights on popular memory of the 1980s. Professor Owen Miller at SOAS kindly answered sent me a paper of his on Korean historiography and answered my questions on the subject. Finally, I must thank my friends and family for mentally supporting me through this process.