The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism, and Globalism on the Center Stage of World Sports

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The Olympics in East Asia

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Council on East Asian Studies
Yale University
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Preface
William W. Kelly

For over a century, the Olympic Games have stood at the apex of what is now a global sportsworld, marking the world sports calendar in a quadrennial rhythm. They summon the largest single gatherings of humans on the planet to a host city and host nation for several weeks of what the distinguished Olympics scholar John MacAloon reminds us are sporting games, festivals, rituals, and grand spectacle—all wrapped up in one intense, colorful, and often controversial extravaganza. On the auspicious day of 8/8/2008, the Games of the XXIXth Olympiad opened in Beijing, the fifth Asian venue in Olympic history, and these Games in their East Asian context are the subject of this collaborative volume.

When our group of authors first met in March of 2008 in Hong Kong, looking ahead to what might unfold later that year, I was sure that the 2008 Beijing Olympics would be an apt instance of what Gary Whannel (1992) so strikingly identified as “vortextuality.” By this clever neologism, he meant the power of certain events to so dominate media coverage and public focus as to preempt our attention to other developments. Whannel coined the term to signify not only the intensity of coverage and the hyperbole of reporting and commentary. He also identified a “feed-off” effect by which the media (and public commentary and scholarship) are drawn into a self-referencing maelstrom of mutual attraction and competitive influence. In a frenzy of rivalry, media follow one another in coverage, and the coverage itself becomes a topic of further coverage. Major natural disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, public events like the death of Princess Di, and global economic events like the 2008 financial crisis can monopolize media and suck the air out of coverage and concern for other events. Global sporting extravagances like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics can also become vortextual, and in 2008, as events moved towards the Beijing Games themselves, Olympics-related issues again dominated many national and international media-scapes by the journalistic and scholarly scrutiny of the protests, the publicity, and the propaganda.

From the vantage point of 2010, did the Beijing Games generate such intense vortextuality? The Olympics certainly consumed a lot of air time and commercial resources and popular consumption. From the lighting of the Olympic Torch to the street clashes in Lhasa to the fireworks over the Bird’s Nest Stadium at the Opening Ceremony to the extinguishing of the Olympic Flame to close the Games, the events of the Olympic year garnered continual, broad media coverage and public attention. We Americans heard more about Michael Phelps, the poster child, and his physique and his mother and the most famous photo finish in Olympic history than about much else that was going on in the sportsworld or elsewhere during August (e.g. Dyreson 2010; Min & Zhen 2010.)
Media saturation (and, some argued, management) was even more complete in China, but attention was remarkably widespread through the globe. The most comprehensive analysis to date has been the 26 articles in the special issue edited by Luo (2010), reporting on an IOC-sponsored international research project that coordinated 13 research teams around the world, analyzing media coverage of the Torch Relay, the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, and the Games themselves in 10 countries on four continents. This project also demonstrates the academic scrutiny as well as media exposure garnered by the 2008 Games. The run-up and aftermath of the Games has produced an outpouring of conferences, special journal issues, and books (see particularly Brownell 2008, Caffrey 2009, Cha 2009, Close et al. 2007, Hong and Mangan 2010, Jarvie et al. 2008, Mangan 2008, Martinez 2010, Price and Dayan 2008, Qing 2010, and Xu 2008). These studies manifest multiple ways of analyzing the Beijing Games and of assessing their consequences for China and for the Olympic Movement, and they constitute an invaluable archive for the contemporary Olympic Movement.

The particular contribution of our volume lies in assembling a group of East Asian sports scholars to place the Beijing Olympics in an East Asian context. The Olympics are indeed “Games,” but these Games are as much about economics and politics as about play, and they are as much about patriotism and profit as about sportsmanship. The Beijing Olympics were a potent opportunity for China to bring an Asian dimension to the Olympics and for the world community to cosmopolitanize China. They were a means by which Beijing could claim its place as a global city, and they were a stage on which regional political and economic rivalries could be played out or played up or played down in a sporting idiom. Because they took place in multiple geopolitical and historical contexts, any assessment of their effects must appreciate them as the fifth such Games held in Asia, held after a century of Asian connections to the worldwide Olympic Movement. That is what we seek to emphasize in bringing together scholarship on the Olympic experience in five East Asian settings.

This project began with a conversation that I had in early 2007 with my fellow anthropologist, Susan Brownell, who is well-known for her writings on sport in China and on the Olympic Movement and who was then preparing for a year as a Fulbright Senior Researcher at Beijing Sport University in the run-up to the 2008 Games. Together, we sought out as diverse a group of scholars as we could, both to represent the academic traditions of the East Asian countries, Europe, and the US, and to bring together multiple social science disciplinary perspectives. We were delighted with the response, and we are deeply grateful to the scholars who agreed to participate.

We came together as a group together on two occasions. The first conference was held in March of 2008, as popular disturbances were taking place in Tibet and on the eve of the Olympic Torch Relay. We met at the University of Hong Kong under the sponsorship of the Hong Kong Institute for Humanities and So-
cial Sciences. We are deeply appreciative to the director of the Institute, Professor Helen Siu, for the Institute’s generous funding and to Ms. Emily Ip and the entire Institute staff for their impeccable arrangements. At these meetings, we all benefitted greatly from the commentaries of two invited discussants, Ms. Dong Qian, a reporter, commentator, and host on CCTV (and former World Fellow at Yale) and Mr. Yu Bu, an executive editor for CCTV Sports, then working for the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee. We also thank several local scholars, who offered astute and supportive feedback, especially Dean Kam Louie and Professors Paul Abernethy, Frank Dikötter, and Ng Chun Hung of the University of Hong Kong and Professor Leung Mee-Lee of Hong Kong Baptist University.

The second workshop was held at Yale University in October of 2008, in the aftermath of the Games. This was funded through the extraordinary generosity of the Council on East Asian Studies and its Sumitomo Fund. The Council staff of Abbey Newman, Melissa Keeler, Anne Letterman, and Alan Baubonis collaborated to provide a very hospitable venue for our public presentations and working group meetings. Mr. Yu joined us again and our colleague, Deborah Davis, in the Department of Sociology, offered support and wise commentary.

After the group’s papers from the second workshop were revised and edited, the Council accepted the finished collection for publication in its Occasional Monograph Series, and we are very grateful that its publication was made possible by a special subvention grant from the Sumitomo Endowment Fund. In producing the volume, it has been a pleasure to work with Jason Driscoll of New Haven’s Phoenix Press, a family company which is dedicated to being a national leader in environmentally-sound business practices among commercial printers in the United States.

A note on orthography and proper name order. The contributors to this volume are from East Asia, Europe, and the United States, and we are referring to authors and works in multiple languages. For consistency, we have adopted American English spelling throughout, and we use the American Anthropological Association citation conventions of in-text and endnote bibliographies. In displaying and alphabetizing personal names, we follow the East Asian convention of “FAMILY NAME First name” and the Western convention of “First name FAMILY NAME.”
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Beijing 2008 and the Limits of Exceptionalism

William W. Kelly

For over a half-century, the nations of East Asia have been as crucial to the Olympic Movement as the Olympics have been significant to those East Asian nations. This volume analyzes this mutual interaction at multiple levels—within these nations, among these nations, and for the global Olympic movement itself. The recent Beijing Olympics have been the starting point for our collective endeavor, but the volume seeks to place this Olympiad within the long East Asian presence in the Olympic Movement.

Through the long endeavors of the Frenchman, Baron de Coubertin, an Olympic Games festival was convened in Athens in 1896, marking the beginning of the modern Olympic movement. By the late 20th century, the Games (which from 1924 were divided into quadrennial Summer and Winter Games) had become the largest regular sports gathering in the world. The massing of athletes, spectators, media, and commercial interests makes the Olympics a true “mega-event,” a vortex of individual effort, civic pride, national sentiment, and global fellowship.

The first Olympic Games scheduled for Asia were those planned for Tokyo in 1940 (with Winter Games to be held that year in Sapporo). The outbreak of World War II forced the cancellation of what Sandra Collins (2007) has characterized as the “missing Olympics,” and it was not until 1964 that the Olympics came to the region, when the Summer Games were hosted in Tokyo. Since then, the Winter Games have been held twice in Japan (in Sapporo in 1972 and in Nagano in 1998), and the Summer Games were held in Seoul in 1988 and now in Beijing in 2008. Worth noting too have been the many unsuccessful bids by Asian cities in recent decades. Most recently, Tokyo mounted a strenuous bid to bring the Games back to that city in 2016; it lost out to Rio de Janeiro, but the Tokyo mayor vowed to continue his efforts. Pyeongchang, South Korea is bidding for a third time to host the Winter Olympics, this time for the 2018 Games.

Each time the Games have returned to Asia, the region has loomed larger on the world stage, and the Olympics themselves have vastly increased in magnitude. For the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, the degree of planning, the level of investment, the scale of the events, and the extent of media coverage exceeded even those of the previous Games in 2004 in Athens. In the buildup to the Beijing Games, public and scholarly interest focused on two major questions. In what ways and to what extent was Beijing 2008 changing the Olympic Movement as a global sports governance and the Olympic Games as a world mega-
event, and, conversely, in what ways was the experience of hosting the Olympics changing China?

It is not surprising that these questions should have so engaged the world’s attention. The critical significance of East Asia for the Olympics and the Olympics for East Asia comes from two paradoxes that have been at the heart of the modern Olympics for over a century. The first is the paradox of a movement with very particularistic origins in late nineteenth-century Western Europe whose philosophy nonetheless aspires to universal values. Is Olympism simply a Western spiritual athleticism that claims a global salience, or have Asian athletes and Asian host nations been able to expand Olympism to a truly global vision?

Secondly, the Olympic movement contains a fundamental tension between the joy of participation and the drive for competition and between the athletes as individuals and as representatives of nations. Cities and countries vie fiercely for the right to host the Games and attempt to add their own special flavor and themes to their venue. National sport federations and national media always threaten to turn the Games into contests for national prestige. Are the Olympics a joyous gathering of world athletes or a fierce tournament of national squads? In what ways have the various Asian-site Olympic Games played roles in the capital-city development, national politics, and regional relations of Japan, South and North Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan?

All of the contributors to this volume address dimensions of these questions, and in this opening chapter, I want to focus on one issue that underlay much of the coverage of the Beijing Olympic year and is still with us as the post-Games legacy-making continues. Were these 2008 Olympics special and unique, or did they fit within the normal range in the history of other Olympics Games?

Overwhelmingly, media coverage and public commentary have emphasized the uniqueness of the Beijing Olympics. Examples abound. For instance, Nicolai Ouroussoff, the noted architecture critic for the New York Times, arrived in Beijing a month before the Games to assess the new Olympic buildings and began a long and lavishly illustrated article that appeared on the front page of the paper on Sunday, July 13, with rather breathless prose:

BEIJING — If Westerners feel dazed and confused upon exiting the plane at the new international airport here, it’s understandable. It’s not just the grandeur of the space. It’s the inescapable feeling that you’re passing through a portal to another world, one whose fierce embrace of change has left Western nations in the dust. [Ouroussoff 2008: A-1]

Such a sensationalist tone was not at all uncommon in the pages and airwaves of the world media as “8/8/2008” approached, and it worked to create an aura of unique significance and suspense. Indeed, it produced a strong the-
matic of difference. These were unlike all previous Games, we were told and shown, and the repetition of this thematic, from the Opening Ceremony to the Closing Ceremony, from so many angles and with so much vertiginous spin, came to provide its own self-referential support.

The uniqueness of Beijing 2008 was, for some, a radical difference of culture—the radical alterity of Asian-ness, or the effect of “…passing through the portal of another world…” as Ourousoff put it. But beyond such casual journalism, there is also serious scholarship that proposed that from Greece, the font of Western civilization (Athens 2004), to China, the cradle of Asian civilization in 2008, the Olympics were finally transiting from the parochialism of its Eurocentric philosophy to a more truly global philosophical foundation.

To others, the uniqueness of Beijing 2008 was a difference of politics, not culture. Politics have permeated the Olympics from the very first Games in 1896, as Mandell (1976), Smith (2004), and other scholars have detailed. However, many commentators have argued that Beijing 2008 represented an altogether new level of politicization and national social engineering. The crackdown in Tibet and in Ürümchi, the arrests of domestic Olympic critics, the rather heavy-handed marginalizing of protesters to obscure park zones, the traffic and factory restrictions, the preemptory razing of old city blocks to make way for Olympic construction, the widespread blocking of internet sites—these and more were evidence to many that the efforts of the Chinese government to manage the events, to dictate the reporting, and to control the internal and world reception of the Olympics qualitatively exceeded any similar efforts in past Olympic history. As the sharply contested peregrinations of the Olympic Torch Relay showed, the greedy propaganda ambitions of the Chinese state met the equally determined and strategically savvy oppositional protests from many quarters of the world on an unprecedented scale.

However, in hindsight, I think it is valuable to revisit this question of exceptionalism and to reflect again on whether the XXIXth Olympiad really was so divergent from the previous twenty-eight, culturally or politically. Did the Beijing Olympics prove to be a radical departure from and thus a transformative moment in the historical trajectory of the Olympic movement? Were the levels of official abuses and popular protests through the year so far beyond previous Olympic experiences? Were the possibilities of a new Asian sports vision that drove the programming of the Chinese hosts sufficient to reframe the structure and the meanings of the Olympics? What did the Olympics do to and for China, and what have the Beijing Olympics done for the Olympic Movement?

My own view is that the Games are not likely to prove such an exceptional and transformational moment in Olympic history, and I believe that because I see four factors that have operated to normalize and to routinize this Olympiad and its Games.
First are the ways that participation in the Olympic Movement and its constituent elements have become regularized over a century of procedural refinement.

Second are the constraining effects of what I call Olympic temporality.

A third element is the rather long and under-appreciated history of East Asian involvement in the Olympic movement, into which Beijing 2008 must be placed and which should make us skeptical about the current claims of novelty and the prospects of transformation.

And finally, there are the multiple, intersecting paradoxes upon which the Olympic Movement is built and from which even the excesses of Beijing 2008 will not likely escape.

In this chapter, I will expand upon these points in order to question the claims of exceptionalism and to situate the Beijing Olympiad within the larger institutional world of the Olympic Movement and the longer historical trajectory of East Asian involvement in this Movement. I hasten to note at the outset, however, that characterizing the Beijing Olympics as “normal” may seem odd, even perverse, to some readers. In part, this is because the Olympic Games themselves are far from normal sporting events and the Olympic Movement is unlike any other sporting organization in the world. The Olympics may be at the center of our global sports consciousness, but as a multi-sport extravaganza of global scope mounted by a supra-national governance body, they are a most unusual sports phenomenon to have such a hold on us. Unlike the FIFA World Cup or the American football Super Bowl or Wimbledon or the World Figure Skating Championships or the Cricket World Cup, the Olympics are the only such “mega-event” that is a multi-sport gathering. And unlike these other world sports championships, it is as much a festivity as a competition, and it is as much about the assembly of participants as the crowning of winners.

The power of the Olympics comes from the fact that it is so different from the usual modern sports events that have such popular appeal and commercial interest. And the complex articulation of a self-replicating International Olympic Committee (its board and Commissions) with international sports federations, national Olympic committees, and local host organizing committees is a unique pattern of global governance. In fact, I will argue, it is the very abnormality of the Olympics that makes it so difficult for anyone and anything that comes within its orbit to escape its force field. In these terms, Beijing 2008 was not an exceptional Olympics; it had many distinctive—and disturbing—elements but because of four features of modern Olympic history that I now turn to, it was far less exceptional than many believe.
“Olympic participation”: A normalizing trajectory

The Beijing Olympics demonstrate what we may appreciate, retrospectively, as a common pathway by which countries (and world regions) now move from the periphery of the Olympic Movement to its center. We may schematize the gradient of commitment and standing as following a common sequence:

a. A country’s initial ambition is simply to participate in the Olympic Games and in the IOC governance, symbolized by having a delegation that can march in the Opening Ceremony and by organizing a National Olympic Committee and gaining a vote in the IOC assembly. Media coverage of the Ceremony will inevitably include shots of one or several athletes marching behind the flag bearer and name placard holder of a new or marginal IOC country that has scraped together just enough resources to send a minimal representation. By 2008, there were 205 National Olympic Committees, exceeding in number the 192 United Nation member states.

b. Initial participation usually brings both the incentive and the pressure to begin winning medals at the Games. Competitive success becomes the benchmark of countries with increasingly robust participation, and joining the rivalries for top medal totals is a measure of becoming a leading Olympic power.

c. A further sign of rising status in the Olympic Movement is having a national sport accepted as a demonstration sport and, even better, as an official Olympic Games sport. For the 1964 Tokyo Games, judo was given demonstration event status and in 1972 was granted official status (women in 1992). For the 1988 Seoul Games, Taekwondo was given demonstration event status and in 2000 became an official Olympic sport. Proposals to introduce wushu (a derivative of Chinese martial arts) as a recognized sport or even as a demonstration sport at the 2008 Olympics were turned back by the IOC, although the Beijing organizing committee was allowed to present an unofficial tournament.

da. Of even greater prestige, of course, is hosting the Games, and the host countries form a very select set of IOC member nations. The 30 Summer Games (through 2012 London Games) have been held in only 18 countries, and 22 Winter Games (through 2014 Sochi Games) have been hosted by a total of 10 countries, seven of whom have also hosted the Summer Games.

e. Finally, as several chapters in this volume discuss, the issues surrounding the Beijing Games bring into focus what is perhaps the highest form of IOC standing, which is the capacity to influence Olympism philosophy itself. To casual spectators, the mottos and
slogans generated by each Olympics and the Olympic Education campaigns that host countries must organize seem like rhetorical dressing for the athletic competitions on the field, but within the IOC movement, they have come to be taken with utmost seriousness. The strenuous efforts by China in promoting its mascots and its slogans and its version of Olympic Education and in funding scholarly conferences and other initiatives are part of an important campaign to get the Olympic Movement to embrace a more “multicultural” sports humanism.

This trajectory has been followed as successfully by the Asian nations of Japan, Korea, and China as by the major Euroamerican nations at the center of the Movement. That is, participation in the Games and OM governance, competitive success, national sports promotion, Games hosting, and philosophical influence is a trajectory of deepening involvement and acceptance that China, like Japan, Korea, and many other Olympic core nations, has now largely completed. To put it differently, however, seeking status in the OM also has severe standardizing effects on a nation’s sports development as it must conform to the organizational, financial, and ideological demands of the IOC.

“Olympic time”: A normalizing temporal process

Time organizes the Olympic experience in other ways as well, and of equal importance are the implications of its unique quadrennial unit that it calls the Olympiad. The IOC formalized this in the 1930s and imposes it upon its organizational process, its sporting agenda, and its commercial promotions. It is both a cyclical four-year interval between Summer Games and also a linear chronology, which began with the 1896 Athens Games as the Ist Olympiad (always rendered in classical Roman numerals!). The 2008 Beijing Olympics were the Summer Games of the XXIXth Olympiad, which, in accordance with the Bye Law to Rule 6 of the Olympic Charter, began on January 1, 2008.

However, the calendar of requirements and responsibilities for every Summer Games and Winter Games has created a far longer and more elaborate temporality than the four-year Olympiad itself; in fact, the Beijing Games began many years before that Games’ Olympiad and they continue long afterwards. The effect is to engage countries that aim for Olympic hosting in an extended process of standardizing requirements, which we may briefly characterize as the following.

First, there is the bidding period. Winning the opportunity to host an Olympic Games can take years of local mobilizing and IOC lobbying. Successful bids often follow unsuccessful campaigns, and the initial failures provide valuable learning experiences and image-building credentials. Japan began its postwar effort in the early 1950s, a dozen years before its eventual Summer
Games. China lobbied hard but unsuccessfully in the 1990s before winning the 2008 Games. Every Games now requires a long campaign to create a rationale, construct a persuasive narrative about the virtues of one’s bid, and develop a detailed economic and construction plan. The campaign must be waged domestically, to gather local political, economic, and civic support, and internationally, to persuade the IOC membership.

Once a bid is accepted and a host city designated, real preparations begin as cities and a country are mobilized for massive and intensive infrastructure development, broadcasting and other commercial rights and forms are negotiated, and a Games aesthetics and merchandising plan are developed. The Games are now awarded about seven years in advance, but a second time cycle is marked formally as the four-year run-up from extinguishing the flame at the Closing Ceremony of one Games to the Opening Ceremony of the next Games.

The Games themselves constitute a third Olympic temporal unit. In recent decades, the Games have been held during a two-to-three week period; one of Beijing’s slogans was “The world gives us 16 days; we give the world 5,000 years.” Formally, they extend from Opening Ceremony to Closing Ceremony—even more precisely, from the declaration of opening by the host nation leader to the extinguishing of the Olympic flame. However, the Movement’s embrace of the Paralympics and the ever-closer scheduling of the Paralympics to follow the Olympics are extending “Games time” to about six weeks. For instance, the Beijing Olympics were held on August 8-24 and were soon followed by the Paralympics, using the same facilities on September 6-17. It is now required of bidding cities that they include commitments and plans for staging the Paralympics so there has in effect been a lengthening of Games temporality.

The contests and celebrations of the Games may conclude at the Closing Ceremony, but extinguishing the flame only begins the open-ended time of writing the histories and building the legacies of those Games. There is the required work of completing and publishing official and unofficial records of the Olympiad (reports, documentaries, financial accounts, etc.), but there are also the many subsequent efforts to fashion a retrospective theme and narrative, to protect and burnish the public memories, to locate the Games within the larger sweep of Olympic and national history, and so forth.

These four time cycles constitute a generic chronology, and of course the rhythm, the intensity, and the content of each Games have varied significantly. In part, such variations depend on the historical moment and in part there are differences because each Olympiad is connected to and influenced by the trajectory of its preceding Olympiads. Nonetheless, as we are well into the fourth phase of the Beijing Games, the second phase of the 2012 London Games, and the first stage of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Games, it is clear that the Beijing Games have followed a fairly predictable temporal format, normalized by the constraints of the frame.
Asia and the Olympics: A century of mutual involvement

In the run-up to and aftermath of the Beijing Games, there were many claims by the Chinese organizers themselves and in both the popular and scholarly literature about the novelty of this Asian Olympics. This was, many felt, the occasion when the Olympic Movement had to acknowledge, finally and fully, the East Asian world region and to embrace East Asian tenets within its Olympic philosophy. It was a moment when the East Asia region itself could at last become a regular participant in the Olympic Movement.

There is, however, a healthy dose of historical amnesia in such a perspective because Asian nations and athletes have been involved in the Olympic Movement for close to a century, well before much of the rest of the non-Euro-American world was drawn in. This is clear from many of the contributions to this volume (and from a wider literature of East Asian Olympics), and even a brief timeline of Asian involvement demonstrates the region’s longstanding familiarity and engagement with Olympic organizations and Games.

1908-1910: Early on, Baron de Coubertin and the IOC made contact with Chinese and Japanese individuals about participation. The Japanese educator and founder of judo, Kanō Jigorō, became the first Asian member of the IOC in 1908, serving until 1938 and leading most Japanese delegations to the Games during those decades. YMCA sports educators and missionaries in East and Southeast Asia also encouraged Western sports and knowledge and enthusiasm for the Olympic Games.

1913-1934: The Far Eastern Championship Games were originally sponsored by the YMCA to foster sports competitions among Japan, the Philippines and the Republic of China, three countries in which the YMCA was active. The American E. S. Brown, who had the original idea, christened them the Far Eastern Olympic Games, but the nascent IOC objected and the name was changed to the Far Eastern Championship Games. The Games were held every two years (and later, every four years), rotating among the three countries, until Japan’s 1937 invasion of China brought them to an end, and they provided regular experience in organizing multi-sport international competitions.

1936-1940: Japan was the first non-Western country to be awarded the Games, when its bid for the 1940 Games was accepted in 1936. Two years later, Japan cancelled its hosting following the outbreak of war with China. Nevertheless, the nation had already made extensive plans and held its own national games to celebrate what it considered the country’s 2,600th anniversary. The “lost” Tokyo Olympics are integral to the 1930s history of the IOC (Collins 2007).
1951 to present: The Asian Games are a regional, quadrennial multi-sport gathering sanctioned and supervised by the IOC. The first Asian Games were in New Delhi in 1951, and they have broad Asian membership, more sports-inclusive than the Olympic Games themselves and used by countries and sports federations for a variety of national purposes. It was from the 1950s, too, that the “two China” question (the status of Taiwan and the mainland PRC) created several decades of debate about the politics of representation to the IOC and its deliberative bodies.

1964-2008: The Summer Games in Tokyo in September of 1964 marked the first actual Asian Olympics, the lobbying and planning for which had begun in the previous decade. This was followed by a series of Asian hosts—at least once in every decade since: the 1972 Winter Olympics in Sapporo, the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, the 1998 Winter Olympics back in Japan in Nagano, and finally a decade later, the 2008 Beijing Games.

2001-2009: Tokyo began a spirited bid to host the 2016 Summer Games from 2001. In 2007, the IOC designated it as an Applicant City, and in 2008, Tokyo was chosen as one of four Candidate Cities, vying with Chicago, Rio de Janeiro, and Madrid. In 2009, Rio was selected as the host, although Tokyo may reinstate its bid for the 2020 Summer Games, along with several other Asian cities.

A number of the chapters that follow will elaborate on aspects of this history. The point of this timeline for me is to make clear that the Beijing Olympics were not the occasion when Asia burst onto the Olympic center stage. They took place precisely one hundred years after Kanō Jigorō joined the IOC. Over that century, the East Asian countries, separately and regionally, sometimes in concert and sometimes contentiously, have made their way to the forefront of the Olympic Movement—as member nations, as athletic powers, as Games hosts, as instigators of political issues, and as a powerful audience of television viewers and lucrative market for Olympic merchandise. What has been the weight of this regional history and how did it bear upon the Beijing Olympics? This is one of the principal themes running through many of the volume chapters—the significance of this long but under-recognized East Asian involvement in the Olympic Movement for the shaping of the Beijing Games as design, as performance, and as legacy.

Olympic contests are not only about who wins but about what is at stake

A fourth way in which the Beijing Olympics fall within the “normal” trajectory of the Olympic Movement takes us to the heart of the Olympic Move-
ment, where there has always been far more at stake than determining athletic champions. I do not underplay or condone the serious actions of the Chinese government associated with the Olympic year, including human rights abuses, press censorship, environmental pollution, repression in Tibet, support for oppressive regimes like Sudan, and so on. Nor do I deny the profoundly important debate about whether and how such disturbing policies and practices should be addressed by the Olympic Movement and by the participating (or, it seemed earlier in 2008, boycotting) national teams and individual athletes. But it is important to appreciate these actions within more than a century of international and national Olympic politics.

There are many who view this Olympic history as a long and ultimately losing struggle in which de Coubertin’s visionary ideals of amateur effort and global fellowship were gradually but inexorably tarnished by partisan nationalism and crass commercialism. This, I believe, is a serious misreading. While the scale of controversies surrounding the Beijing Games may have exceeded those of many earlier Olympics, political and economic controversies have been part and parcel of the modern Olympics since arguments about Greek funding of the 1896 Games and debates shortly after 1896 between moving Olympic venues or remaining in Athens. The expulsions of Taiwan and of the apartheid regime of South Africa, boycotts led by the US in 1980 and the USSR in 1984, terrorist killings of Israeli Olympians in 1972, mass student demonstrations and police killings at Mexico City, Hitler’s ostentatious politicization of the Berlin Olympics, the corruption and kickbacks leading up to the Salt Lake City Olympics—these and many more render moot any attempt to locate an earlier period when the Olympic Movement existed beyond politics. Avery Brundage, during his long term as IOC president, often loudly insisted that “The cardinal rule of the Olympics is no politics,” prompting the incisive sportswriter David Zirin to respond irreverently, “…which is like saying the cardinal rule of boxing is no punching” (Zirin 2007)!

The Olympics never had a pristine past. We accord them center stage among world sports not because the message of Olympism is so clear and so unambiguous but precisely it is unclear, so contestable to rival interpretations, so convenient to multiple purposes and agendas. We value the Olympics not for their purity but for their imperfections, not because they are above the fray but because they constantly confront us with fundamental debates about politics, economics, and culture that agitate individuals and nations. Are the Olympics a field of play or a battleground of nations? Should the Olympics foreground individual achievement or national prestige? Who is being exhorted to run faster, to jump higher, and to be stronger? That is, do the Olympics showcase the strongest individuals or the most powerful nations? Certainly the medal race among national teams would suggest how often the scale has tipped to the side of patriotic fervor and nationalist competition.

And have the powerful commercial interests—both inside the IOC (one of
the most vigilant holders of lucrative intellectual property rights), among the
world’s biggest media and largest corporations, and from the local and national
host interests themselves—now completely overwhelmed the spirit of sports-
manship and captured the organization and the ethos of the Games? However,
there is as little that is new about commercial pressures as there is about political
ambitions. The Olympics are not threatened by an ever-widening gap between
lofty ideals and crass realities. They have always been suspended between the
two, and striving for purity, pride, and profit has given a perpetual instability
to the rhetoric and actions of the Olympic Movement.

Politics and economics have been the core controversies in the Olympic
Movement, to be sure, but we must not forget that the Olympics have also been
the most important world platform for the most intractable and perpetually un-
resolved debates about the nature of modern sport itself. Of these, the most en-
during has been question of amateurism and the fraught boundary with
professionalism. Elite performance at the highest levels of competition always
tests whatever measures of amateurism are designed and enforced. This conun-
drum preceded the Olympics themselves—soccer, rugby, cricket, baseball, and
American football all were wracked with controversies about amateurism in
the nineteenth century. But throughout the twentieth century and up to the pres-
ent, it has been the Olympics that have brought together the most elite amateurs
in such a range of team and individual sports across the spectrum of spectator
interest and commercial potential. Thus it is the Games that have been the high-
est profile venue for defining what has been a constantly shifting line, often
drawn quite differently among the Olympic sports and their international fed-
erations. From athletes barely above recreational skills to NBA basketball pro-
fessionals, the 2008 Games juxtaposed the full spectrum of sports, from leisure
to livelihood.

Other questions, too, have put sports at the center of fundamental questions.
For a half century, determination of athletes’ sex type, specifically female sex,
roiled the Olympics. It will never end because the male-female dichotomy that
modern sport imposes upon what is really a cline of human physiology and end-
crinology forces constant reconsideration of the meaning of sex identity.

Similarly, with the IOC embrace of the Paralympics, the Olympic Move-
ment more and more dramatizes the arbitrariness of our efforts to distinguish
the “able” and the “disabled.” In 2008, we saw several efforts of athletes to
qualify for both the Olympics and the Paralympics, and the most prominent
case, the South African runner Oscar Pistorius, raised for scientists, lawyers,
and sports administrators alike the fundamental divide between humans and
cyborgs. Running so fast with his “Cheetah” prosthetic legs, he posed dramat-
ically what many sports face on a routine basis: where does human end and ma-
chine begin? How do we distinguish between fair and unfair technology in skis,
blades, racquets, balls, and all the other accoutrements of sports?

Yet other conundrums are showcased across the range of Olympic sports.
What is an appropriate minimum age for elite sports competition, a question that has generated rancorous argument in sports like gymnastics, tennis, and ice skating? And when does medical rehabilitation and pharmacological assistance become unfair performance enhancement? Substance abuse and doping have been tragedies and scandals from the earliest Games; what is new is not the fact of looking for any competitive edge but the ever more intense struggle between deceit and detection. In this too, the Beijing Games were only the latest chapter.

What the Olympics bring to global attention is not just a politics of the sporting body but also of the sporting spirit. Indeed, they present us with perhaps the most fundamental paradox of all modern sports. Do we play to win or do we play to participate? No other major sports gathering on the world stage juxtaposes these fundamentally different human dispositions towards physical games. FIFA, Wimbledon, the Super Bowl, whatever the event—it is all about winning. Only the Olympics offer equal time and equal worth to the many who come not for medals of victory but for memories of fellowship. Despite the elitism of the Olympic motto (“Faster, Stronger, Higher”), the Games always draw out our empathy for “the slower, the weaker, and the shorter.” Let us not forget that almost half of the 222 nations which have competed at the Games since 1890 have never won a single medal. The sternly formal processional of nations in the Opening Ceremony contrasts markedly with scenes of the athletes relaxing together in the Olympic Village and their friendly, chaotic mingling at the Closing Ceremony. These are the two faces of the Olympics and they are the two faces of modern sports, and no other sporting event in the world so vividly dramatizes the pressures of competition and the pleasures of participation.

An equally fundamental philosophical tension—and that which has been most on display in the three East Asian Summer Games—is the apparent contradiction between the pronounced and proud Western classical inspirations for the modern Olympics and their equally insistent claims to represent universal aspirations and values. If the “Olympic spirit” is one of “friendship, solidarity, and fair play,” is that just a Western parochial value, or is it a universal humanism? As we will see in a number of the chapters to follow, this perplexed Coubertin himself, who envisioned participation from all the nations of the world, and has motivated the East Asian nations, at least since Japan’s plans for the 1940 Games.

In sum, sports as play or as politics, as festival or as competition, as individual accomplishment or as national pride, as amateur or professional, human achievement and the limits of enhancement, the shifting divide between the able and the disabled, and the universalist claims of Olympic values—all of these have been both divisive fault lines and constitutive elements of every recent Olympics.

The Olympics are so popular and powerful and profitable precisely they have always been a stage where some of our most important tensions and strug-
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gles—about sports, about politics, about diplomacy, about business, about race and gender, about what it is to be human—are displayed and dramatized—and only precariously resolved—from Olympiad to Olympiad. They are a lightening rod for controversy and a touchstone for our deepest anxieties as well as our soaring hopes.

It is precisely the un-resolvability of these conundrums that perpetuates what we might a “permanent instability” at the heart of the Olympic Movement and that returns me to my central claim in this chapter. The year of the Beijing Games certainly had breath-taking moments of grandeur (e.g., the Opening Ceremony) and troubling incidents of state repression and popular protest (e.g., the actions in western China and the multi-continent demonstrations against the Torch Relay); the Games themselves broke records for broadcast rights, media attention, commercial revenues, construction costs, local volunteers staffing, and other production elements. And of course, the sporting events themselves produced athletic accomplishments that continued to push the limits of human physical endurance and achievement. The extent and intensity of media and scholarly coverage were surely justified by the dimensions of this mega-event. Nonetheless, it was in fact an Olympic Games, the forty-seventh such Games (counting Winter and Summer venues), and the persistent claims that 2008 was a year of Olympic exceptionalism, that the Games would transform the Olympic Movement, and that its excesses exceeded even Olympian proportions have proved to be misleading. For all of the reasons that I have outlined here, it is crucial to appreciate the distinctiveness of the Beijing Olympics within the modern Olympic Movement and as the latest testimony to the continuing importance of East Asian nations in shaping our most global sporting experience. This is what the chapters that follow seek to provide.
Collins, Sandra 2007 The 1940 Tokyo Games, the missing Olympics: Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement. London and New York: Routledge.


In the summer of 2008, China attracted the undivided attention of the entire sports world for the first time. In over 100 years of modern Olympic history, this was only the third occasion that the Summer Games had been staged in East Asia. In recent decades, however, East Asian nations have become much more involved in staging large-scale sports events of international significance, such as the Olympic Winter Games (Sapporo 1972, Nagano 1998), the IAAF World Championships (Tokyo 1991; Osaka 2007), the IAAF World Junior Championships (Seoul 1992; Beijing 2006) in athletics, and the Women’s Football World Cup (China 1991 and 2007). The region has also become firmly entrenched in the annual circuits of such major sports as the Formula 1 Grand Prix, the Davis Cup and various international golf tours.

Notwithstanding the far-reaching appeal and importance these sports events have for athletes and spectators alike, they inevitably pale in significance when compared with actual sports “mega-events.” In terms of global reach, followership, cultural significance and economic power, only the men’s Football World Cup can draw even with the Olympic Summer Games to qualify as a sports mega-event. In 2002 the FIFA World Cup was staged in Asia for the first time—and also for the first time was co-hosted by two nations, Korea and Japan. Watched by 2.7 million spectators, who followed the performances of 32 national teams within Japan’s and Korea’s twenty brand-new stadiums, and nearly 30 billion TV viewers across the world, football proved its unrivalled status as a truly global sport and entertainment. Addressing the Asian Football Confederation at its fiftieth anniversary in 2004, FIFA president Sepp Blatter flattered Asia’s regional representatives of football by saying “the future of football is Asia.” However, he did not propose that Asia will be hosting the World Cup more often in the future.

The Western-centered mentality in the sports world seems to be a main reason for the unbalanced representation of host cities and host countries among the continents. The Olympic Summer Games have been held 15 times in Europe, six times in North America and twice in Australia; the men’s Football World Cup has been staged 10 times in Europe, four times in South America and three times in North America. Africa so far has never been granted any of these flagship events. The regional bias and the genealogy of sport mega-events
indicate the status differences that the principal rights owners of the events, the IOC and the FIFA, have assigned to the respective regions throughout their history.

Repercussions of the twentieth-century global political economy, which saw China, Japan and Korea positioned at the fringes of a world order dominated by the West, are not only responsible for East Asia’s underrepresentation among the host nations, but also for the varying messages that East Asian sports mega-events have conveyed to their local and global audiences. Even though the relationships between East Asia and the West changed considerably over the years, the dialectics between Western hegemony and East Asian subalternity continued to mar the relations between the center and peripheries of world sports. However, as I will demonstrate, factors beyond a presumed Western superiority — in economic as well as in political terms and in moral as well as in cultural dimensions — have shaped the different and sometimes contradictory self-representations of Asian nations at sports mega-events.

Questions of national identity, sport, and state imagination are often intertwined because modern sports provide a stage for the symbolic contest between states and for the public display of collective virtues and national achievements. Sports mega-events focus the world’s attention on a particular nation and its success in hosting and/or performing well at the event. With such concentrated media attention, it would be surprising if the host nation did not take advantage of this opportunity to assert its identity. It was the prospect of displaying their national accomplishments and cultural authority on an international stage that prompted East Asia to bid for the Olympic Games and later the Football World Cup. The various studies on East Asian experience with hosting the flagship sport events provide ample evidence of the significance sports mega-events, situated at the crossing of the universal and the particular, have acquired for “official” versions of public culture in this region of the world (cf. Niehaus and Seinsch 2007 on Japan’s Olympics; Tagsold 2002 on the Tokyo Olympics 1964, Ahn 1990 on the Seoul Olympics 1988, Horne and Manzenreiter 2002 on that year’s Football World Cup, Price and Dayan 2008 on the Beijing Games 2008). However, because the very notion of a “nation” is ambiguous, the conventional assertion that major media join with ruling elites to actively control the image of the nation needs rethinking. Particularly since sports turned into an important medium for globalizing media markets, sports mega-events have been co-opted not only by political elites but also by global capital and multinational corporations. New forces such as transnational civic movements and partisan interest groups that challenge political and economic elites have joined the circle of parties competing for access to the network of “primary definers,” whose material and ideological relevance to the sports mega-events has a direct bearing on the shaping of narratives as well as the production of the events and their regulation.
In this chapter, I argue that the national representations presented during these sports mega-events have become increasingly problematic to control due to the mounting diversity of actors involved in the process of signifying. While my analysis focuses on the 2002 Football World Cup in Japan and South Korea, I will also touch upon similarities and differences in comparison to East Asian encounters with the Olympic Games at various historical stages. It becomes evident that organizational particularities and the relational position of East Asia within the world system of sports are responsible for similarities, whereas differences are caused by the very essentials needed by these sport spectacles and the changing political economy in which they are embedded. From an anthropological point of view, the composite form of sports mega-events that John MacAlloon (1984) once described as “nested and ramified performance forms,” contributes to the inherent difficulty of streamlining and controlling the message they are about. Depending on the social roles of participants, which affect intimacy and distance, sports mega-events are experienced as bureaucratically managed “public events” (Handelman 1990), as spectacles (MacAlloon 1984; 2006), as celebratory festivals (Manning 1983), and as contests. The principal agents of these ramified categories and their respective contributions to national representation at sports mega-events constitute the structure of the following sections. My conclusion will comment on the appropriateness of sports mega-events for national representation in twenty-first century society.

Managing the nation: The World Cup as a public event

Sports mega-events create official points of reference because states and governments, usually in close cooperation with international non-governmental organizations, are playing an active role in their planning and management. Being directly involved in onstage and backstage operations, the state and its actors are to some degree capable of manipulating the image of the nation depicted at the sports event. Given the scale of these events, government involvement seems to be inevitable to insure the smooth running of the operation. For good reasons, both the IOC and FIFA explicitly require the public commitment of host governments before a bid is eventually accepted. Government officials often join the steering committee of bidding campaigns – of which the huge expenses are usually covered by public funds – and public employees are frequently assigned to work with the organization staff, giving the state a much tighter grip on the management of the event. South Korea’s bid was supported by a very strong political streak running through its bidding campaign. A vice prime minister, a party leader, foreign ministry officials, army generals and leaders from the business world joined forces in the campaign which heavily played on politically positioning the World Cup as a “catalyst for peace” (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998:118) on the Korean peninsula. By contrast, Japan’s
bidding committee was mainly staffed by football executives and, in response to the political heavyweights in Korea, by former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi as honorary chairman. Despite requesting government approval as early as 1992, Japan received it just a week before the deadline in February 1995, whereas Korea immediately obtained not only government approval upon request but also highly suggestive support by a president who met the executive members of FIFA and went jogging with a “2002 World Cup” T-shirt.

For the 2002 World Cup, however, both bidders had to come to terms with the unexpected co-hosting decision, which was triggered by the internal power struggles within FIFA as much as by an acrimonious bidding contest between Japan and South Korea (Butler 2002). Japan, having led the region economically for a long time, consequently wanted to lead their continent in hosting the first World Cup in Asia. For South Korea, on the pitch the stronger contender, this was hardly acceptable, given that football had been “a means of resistance to Japanese rule” (Lee 1997) during the Occupation.

If anything, the co-hosting thus pushed a renegotiation of Japan’s relations with her former colony Korea and, over the long term, it repositioned Japan’s image among Asian nations. Both objectives ultimately provoked an alliance, albeit fragile, between the two East Asian states and their people whose relationship is still determined by memories of the Japanese annexation of the Korean peninsula and the subsequent colonial oppression during the first half of the twentieth century. Major efforts on national and local levels were needed to cope with the technical difficulties of managing the several hundred-million dollar enterprise in two countries simultaneously. In his first press conference after being nominated general secretary of Japan World Cup Organizing Committee (JAWOC), Endō Yasuhiko stated that unless both nations succeeded, the World Cup could not be declared a success. Only close cooperation would reach this goal, and by way of working together, the interchange of the countries was expected to deepen (JAWOC 2003:48).

Since managing the tournament successfully is the minimum requirement to express reliability, capability, efficiency and other benchmarks of a modernized state towards the watching world, both Japan and South Korea were eager to present themselves as capable, well-organized, in-charge and well-mannered. The organizers could rely to some extent on the back-up sustained by a well-developed infrastructure, a traditional strong relationship between sports administration and the state bureaucracy, and a good working relationship of governments with the business sector. To some extent these resources were weakened by the aftermath of Japan’s bubble economy and the Asian currency crisis which hit South Korea’s public sector in 1998. Given that the IMF bailout for Korea has been dubbed the “Second National Shame Day” (Choi 2004:135), it is no surprise that rumors of Japanese credits needed to guarantee the completion of Korean World Cup venues could never be substantiated. Currency fluctuations against the dollar threatened to devaluate forecasted revenues. Stag-
nant business performance caused by the recession bit into corporate sponsorship and severely cut into government revenue streams. To make ends meet, national consent was enforced by stressing the importance of the operation: the Office for 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan in the Sports Bureau of the Ministry of Education put it as follows: “As with the Olympics, the understanding and cooperation of the people of Japan is vital to assuring the success of the tournament, an event of national importance.” In other words, the World Cup desperately needed the Japanese taxpayers’ money, while the corporate business sector fulfilled its national duties in Korea.

Governments also monitored the progress of tournament preparation through meetings with the Vice Ministers World Cup Council and the relevant liaison council established under it with JAWOC representatives. Ministries provided additional support through conferring directly with relevant regional bodies on administrative issues of immigration, travel, disaster prevention, security and similar issues that had become of increasing significance in a post 9/11 world. Meetings between the two national organizing committees were held once every other month from January 1999 onwards. Similarly, on a working group level, the staff in charge of particular areas met frequently at the respective secretariat offices in Tokyo and Seoul. Governors and mayors from the host cities in Japan and Korea attended two conferences in 1999 and 2000. On this occasion, they adopted a joint communiqué encouraging increased solidarity, closer cooperation and intercultural exchange.

Bilateral relations between the states improved after South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung’s “sunshine policy” de-iced the frosty partnership. South Korea opened its doors to some aspects of Japanese popular culture, and both countries sported a modest rapprochement policy at the diplomatic level. An increasing number of Japanese and Korean local governments started exchanges. By the end of March 2000, seven prefectures and 75 municipalities in Japan had signed sister city agreements with South Korean regions. Tourist flows between the countries intensified, reaching all-time highs in the years prior to the World Cup. In 2000, the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications started a three-year subsidy program for exchange activities. Among others, it subsidized exhibitions of fine arts, kendo and demonstrations of traditional Japanese culture in Korea and Korean festivals in Otsu and other Japanese cities. In a joint statement issued at the eve of the finals in Tokyo, the organizing committees of Japan and Korea and their national football associations expressed their satisfaction with the results:

_Both Korea and Japan, more than merely representing the countries of Asia in hosting the FIFA World Cup, have been able to fulfill their responsibilities and produce results as the host countries. These results are something that will remain in Asia as a whole and will, without doubt, provide a significant incentive for other Asian countries to par-


ticipate actively in future FIFA World Cup tournaments. We are proud to be members of Asia.

For official Japan, seeing itself as being part of Asia was quite an accomplishment, given that “Out of Asia” has been a key term for Japan’s modernization since the nineteenth century. Promoting an Asian identity could certainly enhance, if not strengthen, Japan’s options for negotiating its position among the Asian states. However, the circumstances of co-hosting with another East Asian country may have limited Japan’s prospects for promoting its own distinctive image. The regional spread of football venues limits the suitability of the World Cup for displaying a unified image of the host nation. This situation turns into a dilemma if two nations are involved, unless they want to be drawn into a competitive hosting conflict. However, seeing the benefits of using the World Cup as moral leverage in diplomatic relations, both parties understood that arguing was not an option. In Japan and Korea, where the states were struggling with the repercussions of economic globalization and its neoliberal solutions, the success of staging the World Cup was emphasized and presented as an impressive model for effective collective action. By comparison, national imaging strategies face a different problem in the case of the Olympic Games, an event granted only to a host city. National stereotyping usually facilitates the crafting of a coherent image of the nation, but this requires a suitable city to be taken as a token for the nation in combination with the compliance of alternative regional identities. In the case of FIFA, which awards the hosting rights for the World Cup to a country, the local organizing committee is forced to factor varying regional images and interests into the production of the host’s national image.

Sports mega-events are also public events because they are specifically employed to induce larger transformations of the social order. Even before the rise of neoliberalism intensified the competition for global city status and the flow of international tourists and investments from abroad, these mega-events were seen as opportunities for urban development agendas. Similar to the Tokyo Olympics, which showcased the made-in-Japan modern architecture and high technology of the 1960s, the Seoul Olympics and the Beijing Olympics were leveraged into larger urban planning initiatives in order to demonstrate modernity and advanced development. The sports stadiums were only the pinnacle protruding from the larger redevelopment sites. In a positive way, these highly suggestive edifices featured the iconic architecture that powerfully signifies the privileged position of dominant actors and their ideologies within the social order. However, on the other hand, the construction of these massive buildings forcefully evicted hundreds of thousands of people from their residential areas. In all of these incidents, homeless people were either expelled from the area or taken into custody by city authorities since they would most likely be a detriment to the positive responses the organizers were seeking. The ideological
charging of place in accordance with the politics of place-marketing and investment has been accompanied by the redefinition of moral probity and the state-controlled reinforcement of appropriate behavior in the public. Within the medium-term range of mega-events, the ruling elites have therefore used the event as an occasion to educate their people in standards of behavior that comply with norms imported from abroad. Part of the moral campaigns leading up to the Tokyo 1964 Games was the instruction of the public about refraining from urinating at waysides or against trees, which itself was a small part of an ongoing process of disciplining and managing the human body as clean and proper in line with Japan’s modernization politics (Otomo 2007:117). The issue of sanitization standards was also high on the agenda for the National Council’s Better Korea Movement, which forged a comprehensive strategy to revitalize a South Korean society still suffering from the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s (Choi 2004). Early in 2008 I came across a newspaper report heralding the world city status of Beijing in terms of the number of public restrooms; it had bypassed contenders like New York and Tokyo. Similarly, in the context of changing body politics, spitting in public has increasingly become an object of critical surveillance throughout East Asia. In the case of China there were also attempts to ban the excessive use of swearwords from the social context of sports events where, to some degree, verbal abuse is usually tolerated. But there is a clear trend towards the strict control of behavior, even in those spaces that corporatist forms of urban governance try to market as “spontaneous” and “carnivalesque” in a careful projection of “ordered disorder” (Featherstone 1991:82).

**Staging the nation: The World Cup as a spectacle**

The problem of simultaneously emphasizing and downplaying national particularities is usually at the core of the staged productions that are the most-highlighted elements of the sports mega-event. Its opening and closing ceremonies are meticulously planned and professionally operated cultural productions that typically combine timeless rituals of Olympic philosophy or the international spirit of the occasion with a place-bound celebration of the hosting nation. While the latter allows the host to shape its own representation by means of various creative and imaginative technologies, the former usually follows a strict protocol. The script-play for the Olympic ceremonial therefore is more elaborated than the Olympic Charter; similarly, FIFA’s mandatory guidelines for contracted World Cup hosts are much more voluminous than the rulebook of the game. Apparently the ceremonies do not leave much space for local color, though host countries actually employ a variety of strategies to “absorb the global in an arrogating process of remoulding” (Tomlinson 1996:590). Speaking to audiences at home and abroad, these elaborately staged and commercialized narratives of the host nation serve as an affirmation of national
identity as well as an extended advertisement for the host nation (Hogan 2003). Spectacles in general aspire for grandeur and acknowledgement as unique, exclusive and extraordinary, and they use ritual symbolism, awe-inspiring performances and breath-taking staging techniques in order to achieve these goals, though they are often a means for the host’s own ends. As the whole spectacle adapts itself around its own sensual, audiovisual potentials, it is the sensually stimulating, dynamic and exciting facade that diverts mass attention away from the cleavages and fissures that lie behind the surface of the spectacle. Particularly in modern times, where the success or failure of grand spectacles is counted in millions of TV spectators, the distributional channels of national and international media networks play a leading role in the spectacularization of sports mega-events. Even though the event was staged in their country, most Japanese experienced the spectacle only in mediated form.

The ceremonial aspect of the World Cup is less elaborated and of minor significance in comparison with the Olympic Games but still large enough to draw major attention from the media. Since the Opening Ceremony significantly raises media awareness, both countries competed for the right to open the sports mega-event with a spectacular show. Ultimately, it was Seoul where the ceremony took place, while Yokohama staged the closing, which took place prior to the actual highlight of the day, the final match between Brazil and Germany. Both events were simply the culminating climax of a much longer series of cultural events held in conjunction with the World Cup, but without the same amount of media exposure as these spectacles. The Opening Ceremony at the Seoul World Cup Stadium consisted of a four-part drama around the keywords of welcome, communication, harmony and sharing. The 40 minute event, framed by the ubiquitous speeches and fireworks, featured traditional Korean dancers and musicians, children of different nationalities, drums from all over the world, a multi-media installation from Korea’s most famous video artist Paik Nam-jun, symbolic references to Asian philosophy, to Korea’s glorious past and to the recent achievements of the country’s sophisticated high-end communication and entertainment industries. Compared to the Opening Ceremony of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, which aimed at explaining a largely unknown Korea to the watching world, the narrative of the 2002 ceremony had a more international and integrative mood, showing the world “the Asian spirit of coexistence and … the soul and grace of the East.”

By contrast, the no less spectacular Closing Ceremony in Yokohama International Stadium utilized the well-known rich cultural tradition of presenting a “Baedeker” tourist guide image of Japan. The show, in front of an estimated 1.5 billion television viewers worldwide, featured Japanese *taiko*-drummers, kimono-clad geisha performers, *mikoshi*-shrines decorated with the national flag of the 32 participating countries, and a giant replica of Mount Fuji. The dramatic climax following Brazil’s victory in the final against Germany featured 2.7 million “dream origami cranes” pouring down into the arena from the roof
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of the Yokohama stadium. According to the local organizing committee, the “Wings of a Dream project” was selected because it enabled many Japanese “to participate in an event unique to Japan that would remain in the memories of people throughout the world. At the same time, it embodied a message of hope for humankind and an image of Japan as a peaceful nation” (JAWOC 2003). Thousands of children from fifty elementary and junior high schools, together with boys and girls scouting organizations, the youth hostel association and the general public, under the guidance of the Ministry of Education, participated in folding the paper cranes, which are understood as a universal sign of goodwill and nowadays also as a symbol of peace. It is likely that the ministry was also aware that the Shinto Association of Japan, which counts many school principals among its members, was going to provide all the seats in the stadiums staging Japan’s matches with patriotic hinomaru flags, hand-drawn by the pupils.

The peace motif was one instance in which international politics explicitly appeared on the agenda. But in the background, quite opposed to the sports event’s public message, the state that was soon going to join the US invasion of Iraq used the World Cup to communicate its image as a strong and capable partner in security issues. Emphasizing stadium and venue security concerns allowed the Japanese police to openly introduce strict security acts under the pretext of “hooligan control” at airports, public venues and amusement quarters in metropolitan Tokyo. Authorities not only extended the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Shutsunyûkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei ho) to enable the deportation of “hooligans” (Asahi Shinbun, 13 September 2001), but also considered exercising control over “violent foreign NGOs” (Asahi Shinbun, 14 September 2001) in the name of anti-terrorism. In Korea, where Prime Minister Lee Han-dong promised this to be the World Cup of Safety, some 420,000 police were on guard, anti-aircraft missiles were deployed near the stadiums and fighter jets ready to scour the skies.

As these examples indicate, spectacular ceremonies not only bridge the tension between the universal and the particular, but also serve to present their very own interpretation of social life. Hence spectacles are a tool of repression, as they show spectators only what they want to see.

This disposition is obtained by the overpowering element of make-believe which mediates between front-stage presentations (e.g. hospitable/peaceful Japan) and backstage programs (fortified/forceful Japan; cf. Manzenreiter 2006). In comparing the signifying practices of the East Asian hosts of past Olympics, Sandra Collins (2008:185) points out that the East-West dichotomy is a common trope of their ceremonial scripts. While Western host cities tend to present themselves as world class cities, Asian hosts play on modern hybridity, juxtaposing cutting edge technology with rich cultural heritage and exotic civilization. This familiar narrative, which seems to be rooted in the lingering anxieties of participating in the Western hegemony of the Olympics, can alter-
natively be read as a careful suggestion that modernization is not synonymous with Westernization, or as a more assertive claim for the moral right of hosting the Games in order to prove the global spread and universalism of the Olympic Games (Collins 2008:186). At the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games references to traditional elements of Japanese culture were understated, since the producers of the spectacle were more concerned with demonstrating a new and largely westernized variant of the nation. Japan fully embraced the opportunity to put on stage its return to the international community of nation-states and to celebrate its rebirth as a peace-loving nation and democratic state. This message was highlighted by the final scene of the torch run that had seen the Olympic fire carried through all of the regions of Japan. At last it was brought to light the cauldron towering above the National Stadium by the hands of Sakai Yoshinori, an 18 year-old athlete from Hiroshima who had seen the light of the world on the day the atomic bomb devastated his home city. The public presentation of the Emperor as a symbol of the state, who fulfilled the honorary role of opening the Games coupled with the mass display of the controversial symbols kimagayo and hinomaru, the national anthem and flag, simultaneously pleased conservative nationalists while providing a sense of unity for the Japanese spectators (cf. Tagsold 2000). In a similar fashion, the ceremony opening the Seoul Olympics in 1988 offered the South Koreans an opportunity to come to terms with a tragic past of colonial oppression under Japanese imperial rule, a bloody civil war and years of military dictatorship in a divided country. The Olympic fire was lighted by a young female athlete who had received the torch from the Gold medal winner of the 1936 Olympic marathon, Sohn Kee-chung, who had participated in the 1936 Olympics as a subject of the Japanese Empire and thus been forced to endure the moment of his greatest triumph under a flag that was not his own and a national anthem of an oppressive empire. These dramatic moments of the opening ceremony powerfully condensed a series of contrasting pairs: East vs. West; past/present and present/future, senior/junior, male/female, colonialized/liberated, and suffering/rejoicing.

Since the attention the host receives is highly concentrated within a brief time-span, crafting the ceremonial protocol, as well as the designation of event spaces and the rules for appropriate on-site behavior, demands careful planning and preparation. One of the principal problems that the organizers of these sports mega-event spectacles have to manage is the limited repository of signs and signifiers they can employ for the representation of the self vis-à-vis the Western gaze. The quest for authenticity is hampered by a play-script, stage technologies and an apparatus of signifiers that corresponds to the reading abilities of the Western audience. How can a fair and balanced presentation be achieved when even the act of presentation is a cultural import? Even though the bilateral relations between the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese may have had a much larger significance on the construction of collective identities in the past and present, the reoccurrence of the binary codes of old and new, tradition
Producing Sports Mega-Events and Imagining the Nation in East Asia

and modernity, rural and urban, spiritual and technological at the ceremonies clearly hints at the geopolitical location of the main audiences their producers had in mind.

The narrative of the Opening Ceremony at the Beijing Olympic Games, however, seemed to have turned this cultural hierarchy upside down. Rather than trying to explain itself to a largely uninformed world, like the organizers of Tokyo’s 1940 Games, or the meta-physique of South Korea’s coming-out party in 1988, the most spectacular Olympic drama ever showed the world how much Western modernization was actually indebted to Chinese civilization. A key message was that although ancient China had commanded the technological, material, and military resources to explore the far reaches of the world, it decided against external expansion, preferring aesthetic, intellectual and cultural refinement. Twentieth-century history was suspiciously absent from the elaborate show of a Disney-China. A century ago such a spectacle demonstration may have sufficed to explain the ruling elites’ claim for power. At the present, however, it hardly convinces those who do not want to believe.

Celebrating the nation: The World Cup as a festival

Grasping sports mega-events purely as state-governed, bureaucratically planned and economically exploitative tools of repression does injustice to their more complex reality. As the 2002 Football World Cup has shown, both host countries experienced an unexpected ardor about football during the World Cup. Every time the Korean team appeared in a match, millions of “Korligans” took to the streets, all dressed in the color of the Red Devils, the official fan club of the national team. As a journalist of the Asia Times (June 25, 2002) noted, Mao Zedong himself may never have seen anything like the Sea of Red that engulfed South Korea, even during the Cultural Revolution. In Japan, the massive display of the hinomaru, Japan’s long time de facto and since 1999 de jure national flag, was a similarly unprecedented incident. In the stadia, the image of a “blue heaven,” consisting of Japan supporters dressed in some kind of replica uniform of the national team’s blue jersey, dominated the grand stands which seemed to tremble every time the chants of “Nip-pon! Nip-pon!” roared through the arena. The colorful revelation of a collective identity rooted in a seemingly new nationalism attracted the attention of the mass media and academic writers alike (e.g. Mōri 2003; Ueno 2003; Ushiki and Kuroda 2003; Whang 2004).

However, the new football nationalism certainly has not been sparked by a sudden awakening of patriotic sentiments for one’s country. I propose, rather, to view the act of mass identification with symbols of the state as a response to the desire for communal experience. In that sense, sports-mega events can be a modern temporal-spatial correlative to the social framework of spontaneous experiences within the community and of encounters with the charismatic. Their
popularity and seemingly universal appeal are partially caused by the predictable appearance (and, ironically, also the bureaucratic control) of charisma and aura in a modern world that is often experienced as excessively rationalized and as lacking any dimensions beyond the mundane (Roche 2000:7). In a secularized world, traditional festivals and popular celebrations have lost much of their authoritative meaning and communal importance, leaving a gap of unfulfilled desire for belonging. The dramatic decrease of charismatic moments in religious life is opposed by a concomitant growth in demand for “magical moments” – the truly special and spectacular – within the mundane world of life. What was once a special occurrence out of the ordinary, normal course of life, with strong religious and mythical undertones, has thereby turned into a normative principle of consumer culture and late-modern lifestyle patterns. Sport contests provide a rare opportunity to observe history in progress. There is always the promise of witnessing truly heroic moments and the aura emanating from sports heroes. Taking the interplay of desire and lack into consideration, events therefore are carefully designed and planned to suspend particularized realities for an exactly defined, aesthetically and emotionally condensed timespace (Gebhardt 2000:20). Since the Olympics appropriated the basic law of the economy of attention, Tomlinson argued that the Olympic experience can be compared to the theme park or Disneyland experience (Tomlinson 2005:62). Like these “experiential commodities,” events can offer to their participants highly esteemed resources for the reflective work of constructing subjectivity, personhood and identity.

The desire for experiencing community bonds fuelled both the demand for official volunteers as well as the foundation of numerous grassroots organizations of football lovers. “Salon 2002” was founded in 1997 as an information exchange network in Tokyo. “Spirit of Niigata” was established in the same year as a volunteer group to support the local football team Albirex. This group initiated the foundation of “Alliance 2002” which unified five other groups of supporters. In their own words, “Alliance 2002 was a movement that was organized to raise enthusiasm for the World Cup among people in Niigata through grass roots activities.” Other member groups included “Ultra Niigata,” whose primary concern is giving support to the National team; Niigata Shūyūkai (“Niigata Soccer Friend Club”), which plays in the Amateur Football League; and “Mokuhachi” (“Thursday 8 o’clock”), an open group of ever-changing people that meets every Thursday at 8 p.m. for a game of indoor football (futsal). Said one of the masterminds behind Alliance 2002 who works for a national financial company: “I don’t want to be a mere ‘behind the goal’ fan, but a supporter who plays and enjoys soccer as sporting culture. We actively participate in it. And I wish for such concepts and practices to establish roots in Niigata after the World Cup, even if my company moves me to another prefecture.” Supporters’ Support Sendai was established by a group of students particularly for the purpose of giving foreigners a memorable time while in town. Activities of these organi-
organizations included lecture series, discussion groups and networking with other groups. During the World Cup they initiated mini-football matches, a face-painting service, amateur stage presentations, and intercultural exchange events like Karaoke or Niigata’s legendary Samurai Night, which attracted large crowds for a late-night post-match techno dance club. While JAWOC made excessive use of its own 16,500 official volunteers, it balked at the idea of close cooperation with the fan networks. Ogura Junji, deputy general secretary of JAWOC, once said that “network members can support some small areas that JAWOC volunteers can’t cover, such as interpreting at convenience stores. I expect the official volunteers and the network volunteers to cooperate with each other.” But the strict organizational structure of JAWOC’s official volunteers forestalled the integration of the network members’ know-how.

**Games of contest: The World Cup as sports**

Reflecting upon previous research on the larger backgrounds of the first football World Cup hosted on Asian soil (Horne and Manzenreiter 2004; Manzenreiter 2004; Manzenreiter 2008; Manzenreiter and Horne 2004), we argued that the burgeoning popularity of the People’s Game in East Asia indicated both the successful integration of the “football periphery” into global commodity markets as well as changing relations of consumption in areas that were previously not governed by market relations (Manzenreiter and Horne 2007). This is another common feature of the world’s game (football) and the (Olympic) world games beyond the structural features of the sports mega-event, while there may be many more that have not been discussed yet.

In general, a comparison of the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games yields more differences than similarities. The World Cup is mono-thematic; the Olympic Games are a multi-sports event. Football invites much faster stereotyping and simplified associations of national characteristics with playing styles (Ogasawara 2004). The game also attracts much larger audiences throughout the year than all of its international flagship events. Football for many supporters is a way of life; in the Olympic system this is hardly the case for anyone beyond the national and international sports organizations themselves. Football often resonates with assertions of male supremacy, cultural patriarchy, parochial identity and sometimes xenophobic jingoism, while the Olympic ideas tend to suppress such affections. Football has always retained a love-hate relationship with its working class origins, whereas Olympic sports tend to ignore their plain roots. Even though FIFA copies the IOC in highlighting aesthetic and educational aspects of football, football does not claim a transcendent ideology. FIFA-ism is certainly not linked with the sport itself. By contrast, the Olympic sports are more closely tied into a larger narrative of humanity that is problematic in itself. The Olympic Games are celebrations of modernity, but their version of modernity is parochial because it is based on Western rationalism, Western ideas
of the nation-state, and the Western conceptualization of society and the individual as an autonomous self. Such an idea of modernity hardly fits with idealized conceptions of the state, society and the individual in Asian societies.

Representations of East Asia at sports mega-events

In concluding, I return to the struggle of East Asian nations to control their representation at global sports events. The susceptibility of these particular cultural productions to meeting the social demand for spontaneous communities and charismatic encounters only partly explains their popular appeal. As I have shown, any non-critical celebration of sports as universal cultural property disguises the political economy of sports in contemporary society and the baser partisan interests behind their global spread. The transformation of sports mega-events into global spectacles of mediated consumption has amplified their reliance on the financial and technological clout of multinational corporations. Pursuing their own interests, these agents devised the “domesticating techniques” of the media, which deliver tailor-made media productions of the global event to national audiences and localized consumer markets. As a result, media representations are extremely difficult to control. Another problem is the necessarily abstracted representation employed by the event producers, which leaves culturally uninitiated audiences wondering what the flurry of music, dance, costumes and personalities might all be about, particularly if the sports commentators are badly briefed or mildly disinterested in the flamboyant packaging of the real sports contest. As an extensive body of media research demonstrates, hosting in general produces scarce amounts of new knowledge about the place in question. However, the mediated correlation of a place with a significant event promotes lasting impressions and associations that audiences make with cities and nations (Rivenburgh 2004:6).

The narratives of a mega-event are inexorably linked with the specific historic constellations in which it is embedded, and I have tried to show how representations of East Asia changed at distinctive historic constellations in conjunction with both global political economy and the generic qualities of sports events. Nevertheless, questions of representation and the representational are ultimately bound to the geography of social relations that constitute the world system of sports. In this regard, markers of “advanced,” “developing,” and “under-developed” are significant for the relative positioning of nations. Within this expanded spatial context, which has been stubbornly resistant to change, East Asian notions of body culture and humanist thought are underrepresented and often misrepresented by the anachronistic design of the international non-governmental organizations in charge of sports.

There are two main pillars of these organizations and both are increasingly problematic. On the one hand, the power of representation, in the guise of mem-
membership rights, is based on an axiomatic equation of place, state and culture with a people that are exclusively associated with both the spatial representation of culture and the cultural appropriation of the space. This reference to the idealized notion of the nation-state and state sovereignty is rooted in the political landscape of the late nineteenth century, as well as the retro-futuristic design of the sports spectacles. Since then, this basis of representation has accompanied more than a century of world sports without any changes that would have assigned agency, voice and representation to ethnic or cultural minorities or stateless nations.

On the other hand, the appeal of internationalism and universal humanism at the heart of the Olympic philosophy has contributed to much of the worldwide spread of modern sports and their mega-events. In particular, the insistence on a morality based on sports as “idealized make-believe versions of the real world” (Cheska 1979:61) and the belief that sports transcend ordinary politics continue to captivate the world’s imagination. Yet these claims of universalism and moral superiority are challenged by the ease with which the Olympic Movement has been co-opted by authoritarian regimes and paired with exploitative capitalist corporations. As in the case of its membership regulations, the illusion of separating itself from mundane power is another symbolic relic from the political context of nineteenth century Europe, while Olympic universalism is actually deeply entrenched within Eurocentric appropriations of fundamental human rights.

All these inherent contradictions, which have further been aggravated by the hypocritical politics of some Western states, have undermined much of the moral legitimacy of the Olympic Movement to speak on behalf of universal human rights issues. The particular internationalism of the Olympic spirit is not based on a broad dialogue among world body cultures and cultural traditions. Rather it is a parochial Western signification process that interpolates the bodies, athletes and nations at the periphery. In this way, the Olympic philosophy actually consolidates the privileges and prerogatives of those agents that have taken a leading role in developing its agendas. Within the social geography of dominant ideologies and the politics of identity, mega-events continue to be framed by discourses founded on established relationships of signification. Unless the international organizations of world sports escape from their own fallacy, they will remain stuck within the Orientalist binary logic of Self and Other as pairing identities conceding to the narcissism of the West and its desire for docile objects of difference, without which the illusion of sameness cannot be sustained (Wei 1997:457).
Endnote

This formulation is basically a variation on Radhakrishnan’s critical stance on globalization as extension of the regime of uneven development between developed and developing nations (Radhakrishnan 2001).
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On August 13, 2004, the day of the Opening Ceremony of the Athens Olympics, a large U.S. military transport helicopter crashed and burst into flames on the campus of Okinawa International University in a densely populated area adjacent to Futenma Air Base, which was operated by the U.S. Marine Corps and occupied a quarter of the total area of Ginowan City. The local newspaper, *The Okinawa Times*, ignored the national news and instead featured the accident across its entire front page. It and other local papers kept the focus on the accident and its aftermath, even as the national press, day after day, reported the Olympic events. Clearly, local concerns diverged sharply from national priorities. Medoruma Shyun, an Okinawan novelist, later commented:

*The U.S. military bases, part of whose operational expenses Japan is obliged to shoulder under the Japan-U.S. Security Pact, are talked about as if they constitute a problem peculiar to Okinawa. Just like Internet searching, people will select only what they want to see, and will not select what they don’t want to see. Are the Japanese such people?* (Medoruma: 2005)

Mainland Japanese have strong images of Okinawa as a “refreshing paradise” of “blue sea and sky,” which further provoked Medoruma:

*Okinawa has been commercialized as a place to represent the diversity and multiracial aspects of Japan, and accordingly, is taken lightly. Its unique popular entertainment, music, and cuisine are much sought after, but its complicated history and politics have been forgotten. Only pleasant images are woven together.* (Medoruma 2004)

What do the Japanese people and the Japan nation mean for Medoruma? Was Japan conceived differently among the “Japanese” Olympic athletes and among the Japanese Olympic viewers and spectators? What do mainland Japanese feel in visiting Okinawa to enjoy its refreshing paradise? Moreover, how did the 1964 Olympics help the Japanese to re-fashion a national identity, and where does Okinawa fit into this national community? The 1964 Tokyo Olympics was the first Olympics held in Asia, and themes of “peace and friendship,” the splendors of Tokyo, and the vigor of Japanese economic growth were
broadcasted to the world. However, this festive atmosphere was built upon a foundation where political conflicts between nations and the memories of invasion and colonization were conveniently forgotten. Furthermore, what significance did the Tokyo Olympics and its torch relay have for Okinawa before its return to Japan on May 15, 1972? These are the questions I will address in this chapter after considering the broader issue of how the Olympics have been mobilized to advance the project of the modern nation-state.

The modern Olympics and the modern nation-state

The modern Olympics have been held under the auspices of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for more than a century, but the Games themselves have changed continuously and the meaning of each Games has been shaped by distinctive historical circumstances and networks of power relationships. We tend to remember the Olympics as a history of discrepant experiences by virtue of the “discrepant politics” of each Games, in terms of race, gender, nationality and political economy (MacAlloon 1984, Tomlinson and Whannel 1984, Allison 1986, Hoberman 1986, Guttmann 1994, Eichberg 1998, Riordan and Krüger 1999, Senn 1999, Roche 2000, Shimizu 2004a, Jarvie 2006).

The Olympics have always thrived on international competition, and their symbolic internationalism has been embodied in national flags, national anthems, and the tables of national medal totals (Allison 2002: 345-346). The Olympic Games have been such an effective vehicle for expressing national sentiment that they continually attract state authorities who wish to use them to claim and assert a national power. They use the Games to inculcate a national sentiment among a people.

What does the “nation” mean? It is derived from the Latin word *natio*, the verb of which is *nascor* principally meaning to be born and by extension a group united by common origin. This has precipitated many discussions of how to define such “origins”—whether their basis is geographical, biological, linguistic, or cultural. Moreover, modern nations are always conceived in political terms, supporting a distinctively modern hybrid, the nation-state. For instance, in a speech in Berlin under the Napoleonic occupation (1807-1808), Johann G. Fichte spoke of the nation as an organic body united by racial elements, a common language, a shared territory, and a distinct history (Fichte 1978). In contrast, the Frenchman J. Ernest Renan lectured at the Sorbonne in 1882 that the essence of the nation is *solidarité* and a *conscience morale*, comprised of the collective memories of a common heritage and sentiment of individual sacrifice to communal goals (Renan 1882). In other words, Renan saw “nation” as an intentional and selective body, not defined by any specific race or language.

Thus, the nation is a modern conception, constructed *a posteriori* from narratives, myths, and “invented” and “selected” traditions. To Benedict An-
Anderson, the nation is an imagined political community, and it was early modern print capitalism that aroused the collective self-awareness and attachments that initiated this imagined unit; the mass publication and distribution of newspapers and novels spread collective memories through the Vulgate language of the time. Furthermore, he argues that from the mid-19th century technologies such as censuses, maps and museums became important in legitimizing state territories and colonial projects (Anderson 1983, 1991). His formulation has been very important in analyzing the identities and cultural politics of the visualization of space and the force of collective memories.

For Ernest Gellner (1982), too, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, originating in early industrialization, which brings ethnic and political boundaries in alignment. Because modern industrial states require mobility and often preach equality, state-directed education must be systematically developed (see also Hobsbawm 1983 and A. Smith 1986 for other influential analyses of nationalism that add further dimensions to the dynamics of collectivizing sentiment and mobilizing ethnicity).

A number of sports scholars have recognized the critical and often complicated role that sports have played in the formation of modern nationalisms. Sports have proven capable of mobilizing and expressing powerful national patriotism, but they have been equally effective in widening divisions within nation-states on the basis of race, gender, class, and other axes (e.g. Sugden and Bairner 2000, Mangan 1996, Cronin and Mayall 1998). As John Hoberman states, “sportive nationalism is not a single generic phenomenon; on the contrary, it is a complicated sociopolitical response to challenges and events, both sportive and non-sportive, that must be understood in terms of the varying national context in which it appears” (Hoberman 1993:18). Thus, the nature of sporting nationalism is a matter of empirical determination, requiring careful archival and/or ethnographic research (Shimizu 2002, 2004b).

This is what brings me to the question of how the Olympics construct images of nation-states and the particular case of Japan and the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. These were the first Olympics held in Asia, in which athletes from around the world (except those from China and North Korea) participated, where themes of “peace and friendship” and images of the capital city and of Japanese economic growth were broadcasted to the world. But this festive atmosphere was built on a foundation where political conflicts between nations and the memories of invasion and colonization were forgotten. What significance did the Tokyo Olympics and its torch relay have for Okinawa before its later return to Japan on May 15, 1972? My focus here, diagnostically, will be on the handling of the national flag and anthem and on assessing what the Olympics brought to people in Tokyo and Okinawa.
The 1964 Tokyo Olympics and urbanization and economic growth

Preparations for the 1964 Olympics included massive infrastructure reforms across the Tokyo metropolitan region, such as construction of the bullet train and major improvements in roads, highways, water supply, drainage, and waste disposal. Tokyo was seemingly transformed into a clean and hygienic city (Ishiwata 2004). The changes in the Tokyo image during the 1960s were visible indicators of the country’s “rapid economic growth.”

Nakade Kazuo, a resident of Shibuya Ward, recollected his youthful memories of the Tokyo Olympics as follows.

Yoyogi Park, one of the sites of the Tokyo Olympics, was known as “Washington Heights” because it was used for housing US armed forces after the war, a place where Japanese were prohibited from entering. In June 1964, a letter from the Shibuya Ward Office was delivered to my house near Washington Heights, informing us of that. The letter informed me that “the Shibuya Ward Office is ready to make a loan to me to change my privy to a flush toilet.” I guessed the reason was that we Japanese should be ashamed of using a privy, especially if a foreigner happened to visit. I now realize that there was no possibility of any foreigner visiting my home. But at that time, my mother immediately agreed and changed our house’s privy to a flush toilet. My father worked for the railways. He learned English at his own expense to be prepared for foreigners visiting his station. People living around our house also were always stressed, saying, “The foreigners are coming anyway.” In the summer of 1964, we had less rain. When I sprinkled water on the street in front of my house, a neighbor got angry with me, saying, “Save water for the foreigners,” as if he regarded me as an unpatriotic man. (Nakade 2006)

His comments can be taken as a revealing example of a new type of nationalism, by which people infused daily lives with a keen awareness that “foreigners are coming” (again).

The developments completed included areas such as Meiji Jingu Gaien, Yoyogi and Komazawa, and improvements and maintenance to roads connecting those areas signified the advent of a new age and a new metropolitan Tokyo. More importantly, the completion of Aoyama-dōri made it possible not only to connect those areas, but also connect them with central parts of Tokyo (e.g., Tokyo Station, Ginza, Diet Building, etc.). Concerning Aoyama-dōri, which connected the center and outlying areas (Shinjuku, Shibuya and Yoyogi) of the metropolis, Kurokawa Kishō, an architect working in the Tange Kenzō Research Laboratory at that time, commented:
Aoyama-dōri is one of the primary factors that changed Tokyo at the time of the Tokyo Olympics. Its completion changed the structure of Tokyo drastically. (Kurokawa 2004:60)

However, it is questionable if a vision of city planning was discussed deeply when organizing the Tokyo Olympics, the cost of which was an enormous one billion yen. This included costs for the Organizing Committee, the construction and improvement of Olympic competition facilities and businesses related to highways, parks, water supply and drainage, the Tokaido Shinkansen, Tokyo International Airport (Haneda), hotels, ryokans (Japanese-style inns), communication facilities like the NHK Broadcast Center, and the removal of the Washington Heights barracks. Kurokawa continued to comment as follows:

At the time, master designer Tange studied the types of structures that should be built in a given area of Yoyogi, and the other master designer, Ashihara Yoshinobu, concentrated on what types of structures to build in Komazawa. That is to say, the architects were not concerned with city planning. This is a characteristic peculiar to Japan. The governor at the time as well expressed no specific intentions and did not provide any input. City planning was a job to be entrusted to government officials and not studied by politicians. This is an issue for the whole country, not only for Tokyo. (Kurokawa 2004: 61)

As Kurokawa commented, in those days, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government did not hold deep discussions about overall city development or future city planning. The city development planned and implemented at that time was evaluated based on the comments of then-governor Azuma Ryūtarō:

We have succeeded in building a firm foundation to promote future redevelopment business. (Azuma 1965: 4)

In sum, it can be said that the 1964 Tokyo Olympics was organized and held utilizing sites and facilities belonging to the Imperial Family and locations designated for military use, including those previously occupied by the GHQ, and this is shown in the history of the Olympic facilities. The Olympics was seized upon as an opportunity to transform the city from an imperialistic city to a normal peacetime city, leading towards an era of new post-war nationalism. Therefore, having identified Tokyo as the capital, additional construction was further promoted although processes were falling behind due to insufficient financial resources. Even so, many facilities in the Yamanote area and western suburbs of Tokyo that either belonged to the Imperial Family or were designated for military use were diverted to the city infrastruc-
ture (Author’s note: even hotels including the Prince Hotels). As city development in the above-mentioned areas advanced, disparity between the downtown area and infrastructure in the eastern area increased. (Machimura 2007: 13)

By virtue of the Olympics, Tokyo came to be visualized as a city of continuous growth, rising from the depths of destruction like the rising sun. Various aspects made this clearly notable. Nevertheless, understanding that many of the sites and facilities were owned by the Imperial Family or were designated for military use, it can be said that this wave of new nationalism led to helping forget memories of the past, especially amidst the development going on in metropolitan Tokyo.

Athletes from around the world (but not from China and North Korea) participated in the Olympic competitions. These contestants witnessed the transformation of Tokyo with their own eyes via impressive presentations such as the Tokyo Olympic posters and the torch relay. But how did these people really view those events? Azuma Ryūtarō, the Tokyo governor at the time and a member of both the IOC and Tokyo Olympics Organization Committee, wrote in an essay on “The Significance of Holding the Tokyo Olympics,”

One of the intangible legacies of the Tokyo Olympics is that it gave Japanese people the opportunity to be united for the first time since World War II. Additionally, the Tokyo Olympics succeeded in playing a vital role in connecting the East and West in terms of worldwide peace and sports. As a result, “the world began to show greater respect for Japan and its people.” Another intangible legacy was that sportsmanship, commonly only advocated in words or on the field, truly grew through the virtue of the Tokyo Olympics. As IOC Chairman Brundage commented: “When thinking of sportsmanship, what other excellent amateur sport can bring human beings to this point? It is clearly imprinted on the minds of everyone, and a contribution of the Tokyo Olympics.”

In Tokyo, significant importance was placed on ensuring the success of the Olympics. Tokyo made every possible effort to construct new roads and facilities. Combined with the cooperation of the people, Tokyo succeeded in achieving the anticipated results and establishing a future redevelopment program. (Azuma 1965:4)

“World peace and Japanese citizens’ decision to focus on the host” and “visualizing sportsmanship” during the Olympics were expressed in various media. Kawamoto Nobumasa commented in an essay on “remembering the impressive festival”: 

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As time goes by, I feel that I have gradually come to understand the depth and real greatness of the Olympics. Those 15 days, from the brilliant opening ceremony through the impressive closing ceremony, fascinated people throughout Japan; they were something I would describe as “100 million people in ecstasy.”

As I sat in the stadium, I sometimes hallucinated as if I were floating somewhere in outer space, far away from Tokyo, Japan and Earth. It was an amazing feeling to be in such a state! Something anyone can seldom experience in his or her life. During the period of the Olympics, there were few people on the streets as many stayed inside to watch competitions on TV. It’s beyond imagination when such a situation will occur again.

In thinking of previous Olympics, there was no other choice except to go abroad to enjoy it. But the Tokyo Olympics brought the world to Japan for the first time. Everybody could see the world in Japan, and found Japan in the world. In an international atmosphere, the national flag, national anthem and patriotism created a sense of harmony among people. It was an exceptional experience that most Japanese people had forgotten since the visit of foreign ships to Japan around the end of the Edo period. (Kawamoto 1965: 30)

The hinomaru flag and modernization: The posters of Kamekura Yūsaku

To most Japanese at the time, the Tokyo Olympics, bringing to Japan so many athletes from around the world, had an ethereal presence. There was a collective state of excitement, for it was held in Japan’s capital, Tokyo, showcasing its remarkable progress and restored presence in the international community.²

In this context, it is significant that the “Hinomaru (Rising Sun)” was the image of the first poster that was adopted symbol for the Tokyo Olympics in a design competition held in June 1960 as a “very simple and powerful image easily reminding people of ‘Japan’” (Maemura 2006a: 58). This was quite different from the symbolic logos of previous Olympic Games, and it garnered a very positive response at home and abroad. However, Kamekura Yūsaku, the designer of the symbol mark, claims he had a very different motivation.

I drew a large red circle on top of the Olympic logo. People may have considered that this large red circle represented the hinomaru, but my actual intention was to express the sun. I wanted to create a fresh and vivid image through a balance between the large red circle and the five-ring Olympic mark. I thought that it would make the hinomaru look like a modern design. (Kamekura 1966)
According to Kamekura, the logo was designed as a modern form represented by a simple and powerful red circle rather than as the *hinomaru*, with the intention of expressing the power of Japan during its rapid growth and the dynamism of sports. It was the dynamism of historical and cultural senses derived from the conflicting two aesthetic senses in terms of tradition and modernism that made the poster a masterpiece. This was the primary characteristic of Kamekura’s design (Maemura 2006b: 100).

Beginning with this first poster in 1961, Kamekura designed one poster each year until the Tokyo Olympics, totaling four posters in all. The layouts of the second and third posters were entirely different, with lively images of track-and-field athletes and swimmers. An important point is that Kamekura had taken into consideration the display method of the posters during the production stage. Immediately following the completion of the second poster, he envisioned that displaying it on both the left and right sides of the first poster would have a stronger appeal. He also discussed the plan of displaying the third poster on the right side of the first poster, with the second poster on the left. Furthermore, he commented that the amusement and appeal of displaying the posters in such a manner would be attractive elements unique to them, making them different from other artistic genres. This comment demonstrated his sincere self-confidence as a graphics designer (Maemura 2006a: 58).

Kamekura’s opinion was that “visual design is a common language of all human beings, and designers should keep this in mind when designing forms.” On the other hand, he also advocated that designers should make the most of tradition as something spiritual, not merely as a pattern or technique; this should be done while accepting “what Japanese attempted to express” in standardizing their work at the global level. For instance, he advocated that designers should pursue the modern and geometrical beauty of traditional Japanese crests, connecting them with the “trademarks” of modern industries.

*Tradition is one of the problems Japanese designers must work with. For designers, it is a burden that must be born and there is no means of refusing it. It is our duty to break down our tradition into pieces once and then reassemble those pieces as new tradition.*

(Kamekura 1961: 31)

After the Tokyo Olympics, Kamekura produced posters for mega-events such as the 1970 Osaka Expo and the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics. The aim of his visual designs was to present a globally common genre through a new design that eliminated the confrontation between the traditional and the modern. As mentioned above, it was also true that the “simple and powerful image that reminded people of Japan at first glance,” and easily articulated images of the Olympics and nationalism to all people.
The 1964 Olympics Torch Relay

In terms of reminding people of Japan at first glance, the Olympic torch relay contributed to making people around the world aware of the actual geographical conditions of the Japanese Islands. The torch relay tradition had begun with the 1936 Berlin Olympics, and for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the torch was carried through 12 countries over a distance of 7,484 kilometers, taking 51 days to complete the journey. A total of 100,743 people participated in the torch relay, including 870 official torch carriers, revealing that the number of people who ran alongside of the official torch carriers was surprisingly large (Mainichi Shimbun 1964a: front page 1).

The Olympic Flame was lit at Olympia on August 21 and reached Naha on September 7 after transiting Istanbul, Beirut, Teheran, Lahore, New Delhi, Katmandu, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Hong Kong and Taipei. A number of these countries had been invaded and occupied by Japanese forces before and during the Pacific War. In reaching Okinawa, it bypassed China and the Korean Peninsula. It was transported by air from Naha to Kagoshima and then made its way to Tokyo via four different courses over a month from September 9 to October 9, arriving the day before the opening ceremony. The four separate flames were recombined as the Olympic Flame in front of the Metropolitan Government Office and then placed in a torch holder in the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace grounds. The road from the Palace Plaza to Jingu Gaien via Aoyama was a new trunk road representing “new urban Tokyo.” This torch relay route demonstrated the Japanese had forgotten the nation’s aggressive wartime past and viewed “Tokyo, at the core of the Japanese Islands, as the center of Japan’s economic development” (Mainichi Shimbun 1964: front page 2).

Furthermore, the anchor torch carrier was 19-year-old Sakai Yoshinori, who was known as genbaku-ko, the “Atom Boy” because he had been born on August 6, 1945 in Miyoshi, Hiroshima Prefecture, 70 kilometers from ground zero, only one-and-a-half hours after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima. Having been designated as a candidate runner for the 400-meter and 1,600-meter relays in the Olympics, he lost his chance to represent Japan in the final qualifying race. Even so, having been born on the day of the nuclear attack on Hiroshima, he was designated as the anchor torch carrier. Afterwards he commented, “Thinking back on the past, I ran toward the future, looking for a flash of hope.”

*The Tokyo Olympics was a festival to demonstrate to the world the brilliancy of Japan being at the gateway of rapid growth. We were messengers to transmit the spiritual uplift of Japanese throughout the country.* (Nishi Nippon Shimbun 2005)
The Olympic torch relay was a dramatic presentation by means of which people could remember erased memories. The geo-politics in terms of the geography ranging from Olympia to Tokyo worked to show only events desired for remembering, presenting the effects anticipated by the Japanese. Even if those events were to have people focus their future hopes on metropolitan Tokyo, they were based on the premise of allowing the Japanese to forget the historical memories concerning the East Asian countries Japan had invaded and colonized.

The Olympic Torch Relay and the Hinomaru flag in Okinawa

At the general meeting of the IOC held in Munich in May 1959, it was decided that the 1964 Olympics would be hosted by Tokyo. Okinawa appealed strongly to the Tokyo Olympics Organization Committee (established on September 30, 1959) and other related organizations to have the torch relay pass through Okinawa as well. At that time, Okinawa was under the administration of the United States and a territory over which Japan only had residual sovereignty. Nevertheless, mainly owing to the fact that the Okinawa Athletic Association had already been recognized as a branch of the Japan Athletic Association, the Torch Relay Special Committee decided on July 4, 1962 that the torch relay in Japan would be carried out in all prefectures, torch carriers would be young people, and the first landing place of the Olympic Flame would be Okinawa.

It is not certain if the government intended, with this decision, to take advantage of the torch relay to arouse public opinion for the return of Okinawa (Tomiyama 2007b: 28). The stance of Japan on the return of Okinawa at that time is represented by the following comment that then-Foreign Minister Kosaka made when he spoke with State Secretary Harter and Ambassador Reischauer:

*The Japanese government will not demand the return of Okinawa, and yet, to keep down public opinion on the return, it is decisively important to improve the living standard in Ryukyu...Japan has no intention to infringe upon or nibble away the administration right of America.*

(Miyazato 2000: 203)

Irrespective of the government’s policy on the right of administration, in Japan there was public opinion demanding the return of Okinawa, as well as that on the issue of the northern territories between Japan and the Soviet Union. It may be said that securing and expanding Japan’s presence—that is to say the, “Hinomaru”—in Okinawa was an important tactic for the Liberal Democratic Party as the ruling party (Tomiyama 2007b: 29).
Foreign Minister Kosaka had repeatedly demanded that the U.S. allow schools to freely fly the *hinomaru* (i.e., U.S. armed forces prohibited this activity in Okinawa). However, High Commissioner Booth rejected Kosaka’s demand, stating as follows:

> We are not ruling Ryukyu in terms of the partnership with and confidence in Japan. ... Any national flags can be absolute political symbols, which let all people have strong national sentiments as to what is justifiable. (External Affairs Office of the U.S. Local Government, 1960)

The torch relay was a valuable experience for Okinawa in taking part in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The Okinawa Torch Relay Committee was established in March 1964. The Subcommittee for Beautification appealed to people to beautify the course of the torch relay, tying up with the New Life Movement Promotion Council and municipalities along the course. Public health centers prepared cleaning guidelines and all the people of the Ryūkyūs developed cleaning activities in concert. People considered that even though occupied by the U.S. armed forces, Okinawa was recognized as a Japanese territory, and that having been chosen as the first place for the Olympic Flame to land meant that their nature as “good Japanese” was to be verified (Tomiyama 2007b: 29).

In a practice torch relay carried out on August 9, one month prior to the arrival of the Olympic Flame, however, there were a considerable number of absentees and dropouts among accompanying runners. Some runners put on their leather shoes and ran, but could not run the course within the scheduled time. A local newspaper ran an article expressing apprehension, stating:

> Unless studied and examined repeatedly, the torch relay will be thrown into confusion, and not only Okinawa, but also Japan will lose face with the world. (The Ryukyu Shimpo, August 10, 1964: “Practice Torch Relay As Observed”)

As a result, 3,473 young people including official runners, substitute runners and accompanying runners came under great pressure.

The Olympic Torch, carried onboard a plane named “City of Tokyo,” which was delayed one day due to a typhoon, arrived at Naha Airport from Taipei at noon on September 7, 1964. Yosano Shigeru, the general secretary of the Tokyo Olympics Organization Committee came to Okinawa to greet the Olympic Torch and stated,

> Being Japanese territory, Okinawa is the first place for the Olympic Flame to land in Japan. In terms of administration, however, it is inappropriate to regard everything the same as on the mainland. So, Ok-
inawa is the terminal point of the overseas course of the Olympic Flame. (The Okinawa Times, September 4, 1964: “Delegation To Greet Olympic Flame Coming Tomorrow”)

On the other hand, the media in Okinawa focused on reports that “Okinawa is the starting point of the Olympic Torch in Japan.” All media covered the arrival of the Olympic Flame as if the people of Okinawa were longing for a narrative of the Olympic Flame landing in Japan’s Okinawa. In a festival of peace and friendship, it would be delivered to the mainland by the people of Okinawa, “the Japanese living under the occupation of the U.S. armed forces” (The Okinawa Times, September 8, 1964, “Joyful as if to Celebrate ‘the Return’ to Japan, Olympic Flame Has Arrived”, etc.).

After the greeting ceremony held at Naha Airport, the torch carried by the first runner left the premises at 12:40 and reached the Ounoyama Athletic Stadium at 1:00 p.m. The stadium, which had a place to hold the torch, the main site of the greeting ceremony, was filled with over 40,000 spectators, “whose applause and shouts made it difficult to hear the fanfare being performed under the torch holder” (Information Services Section 1964: 6). Following the lighting of the Olympic Flame, a “hinomaru” flag was hoisted up the main pole while the national anthem “kimigayo” was being played. Nagamine Akio, the speaker of the legislative council, commented,

The domestic torch relay for the Olympic Games held for the first time in Asia is to start from our native land, the place where the Second World War ended. Therefore, the relay is the most significant event leading to world peace, and I wish for its success from the bottom of my heart. (Omission) I earnestly hope that under the Olympic Flame, the greatest festival and its competition will be developed brilliantly, leading to the achievement of the purpose of peace. (Information Service Section 1964: 8)

For five days, the torch relay in Okinawa made its way southward from Naha, then northward along the east coastline, then to the west coast via Shioya, before finally returning to Naha again via Futenma, Urazoe, Nishihara, and Shuri. After traveling a 247.1 kilometer circuit across the main island of Okinawa, the Olympic Torch left Naha Airport at 3:50 p.m. on September 11, carried on a U.S. armed forces aircraft bound for a receiving ceremony in Kyushu.

During this period, the course of the torch relay was fully lined with hinomaru flags. All the runners wore the same uniforms, with a red circle and the five-ring Olympic emblem (a simple design by Kamekura Yusaku) drawn and the words “Tokyo 1964” printed on the chest of the uniform. The red circle was especially striking in the design, expressing to everyone the image of the hinomaru.

The Ryukyu Shimpo proposed developing a “movement to greet the
Olympic Flame with *hinomaru,*” and shop owners and others agreed to the proposal. It was decided that the national flag would be put up at relay points, and in front of every school and home. Villages, schools, women’s associations and young men’s associations participated in the movement. People had small *hinomaru* flags in their hands and waved them continuously.

Right after landing in Okinawa in 1945, the U.S. armed forces prohibited the flying of the national flag of Japan, and performing and singing of the Japanese national anthem in groups. In 1949, they further prohibited the flying of all other national flags in Okinawa, leaving it permissible to fly only that of the United States. However, when the peace treaty with Japan came into effect in 1952, the U.S. armed forces came to permit the flying of the *hinomaru* at private houses and private meetings for non-political purposes. And then, in light of the talks between Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy in 1961, it came to be allowed that *hinomaru* could be flown at public buildings only on legal holidays. (All of these regulations were abolished in 1969.)

Around 1964, the “Let’s Fly the *hinomaru*” movement began. Although flying the *hinomaru* on days except for legal holidays was not permitted, the U.S. armed forces tacitly permitted the *hinomaru* being displayed along the relay course and at the ceremonal site.

Following the hoisting of the *hinomaru* and the singing of the national anthem in unison at the greeting ceremony, the torch relay reached another climax when the Olympic Flame approached the south battlefield’s ruins. In front of the Himeyuri Monument, members of the Himeyuri Senior Women’s Association and bereaved wives holding the pictures of their husbands who had been killed in action were watching the torch relay together with 500 children holding small *hinomaru* flags in their hands. The torch carrier running on the Mabuni Hill was a child of a person killed in action. The grand figure of the torch carrier holding the torch was recognized by people as the best memorial service to the dead who had fought for the sake of the *hinomaru* in the past (Tomiyama 2007b: 32).

The torch relay was not Okinawa’s only experience of participating in the Tokyo Olympics. In addition to the arrival of the Olympic Flame at Okinawa, a microwave line between Japan and Ryukyu, in which a huge amount of money was invested, opened as one of the Japanese government’s projects to assist Okinawa. There was only a single one-way TV line from the mainland to Okinawa, and the microwave line made it possible to relay-broadcast the Tokyo Olympics simultaneously (Tomiyama 2007a: 229). Thus, the people of Okinawa were able to enjoy the athletic performances in Tokyo, and visually experience and memorize the gold medals won by the “Witches of the Orient” and other events.
Reconsidering the significance of the hinomaru flag: The 1987 National Athletic Meet

In commemoration of the return of Okinawa to Japan on May 15, 1972, the Okinawa Special National Athletic Meet, Wakanatsu Kokutai, was held from May 3 to 6, 1973. The meet, unlike regular national athletic meets, was held without preliminarily contests, selecting equal numbers of participants from each prefecture.

After that, in 1987, the 42nd National Athletic Meet, Kaihō Kokutai, was the final national athletic meet held successively in circuit around the country every year and also in commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the return of Okinawa. However, the hinomaru had come to have a completely different significance to the people of Okinawa. In March 1987, at the village assembly of Yomitan, where softball games were played, the then-village mayor spoke publically against the compulsory guidelines on hinomaru and kimigayo.

The legislation concerning hinomaru and kimigayo reminds us of the movement that prevailed in 1935 when Japan began its path of militarism and imperialism… The movement is a return to the idea of “Loyalty to the Emperor and Devotion to the Country,” in other words, a return to prewar days. This would be deeply regrettable, and I fear that it will allow the government to control the most fundamental human rights.

And the following was resolved at the village assembly.

Sports and education must be free from any despotism whatsoever. In looking back on the histories of wars, we realize that politics always controlled and subordinated sports and education. We must not forget that is why humans went to war with one another.

In addition to the Yomitan movement, the “Kokutai Liberalization” movement spread widely in Okinawa, led by labor unions, which strongly criticized the hinomaru flag, the kimigayo anthem, the Emperor, and the Self-Defense Forces. However, the Ministry of Education and the Japan Amateur Sports Association ignored those popular feelings in Okinawa, and they ordered official national flag raising in the Standards for Holding National Athletic Festivals.

For the Tokyo Olympics, the course and ceremonial sites for the torch relay in Okinawa were lined with hinomaru, which was used to promote the “Return-to-the-Motherland Movement.” However, in 1987, 23 years after the return of Okinawa in 1972, most residents had little interest in displaying the hinomaru. In a celebrated incident, it was pulled down from the flagpole at Okinawa’s National Sports Festival.
Conclusion: Nation building and the Olympics in East Asia

In the aftermath of World War II, the Japanese people and their leaders eagerly and earnestly hoped for the opportunity to host an Olympic Games. The Games were viewed as an expression of civilized accomplishment, based on the spirit of sportsmanship and fair play originating from Europe. Hosting the Olympics was considered to be a magnificent achievement, through which the world would recognize the modernization of the host city, Tokyo, by virtue of the country’s rapid postwar economic growth. Founded in European notions of human dignity, the Olympics were to be relived in 1964 in modern Asia.

In this chapter, I have mainly discussed Japanese nation-building in terms of its internal problems in the 1960s and against the backdrop of its historical relationships with America and East Asia. Through the staging of the Olympic Torch Relay, Japan attempted to cover up its history of invasion and colonization in Asia, while staging a performance that highlighted the memories of the final torch carrier, who was a victim of nuclear attack.

Japan therefore planned the 1964 Olympic Torch relay to pass through Okinawa, occupied by the U.S. armed forces since the end of the World War II. It encouraged the reversion movement by displaying the hinomaru and promoted a beautification movement as a means of modernization. As is clear from the history of Okinawa as a geo-political region, the nation-building process is never simple or easy. And as the national athletic meets show, the significance of the hinomaru and kimigayo has also changed in diverse ways.

This chapter has highlighted how a collective social identity emerges in the midst of cultural politics, especially sports, using the case of Tokyo and Okinawa in the 1960s. In these incidents, we can see the reformation of the nation and its people. How is “nation” defined in Japan and East Asia? In the European and American contexts, the emphasis is on the relationship between nation, nationalism and sports. For East Asian countries, we must consider their regional relationships of anti-western imperialism, Asian colonization, and modernization. For Japan in this context, the status and symbolism of the emperor are crucial. The Olympics as sporting mega-event must be understood as a political drama of actual nation-building.
SHIMIZU Satoshi

Endnotes

1 Okinawa is an archipelago stretching from the Amami Islands to the Yaeyama Islands. It is a geo-political keystone for East Asia and Southeast Asia. Much of its history is a history of occupation by other powers. The name “Ryukyu” was used from 1429 to 1879, having been bestowed by the Emperor of Ming dynasty China. The country prospered as a transit point for trade between Korea, China, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Spain. While its suzerain was Ming (and later, Ch’ing) China, Ryukyu was invaded by the Satsuma clan in 1609, and was then controlled by both Japan and China. From 1872 to 1879, it was colonized by Japan and became to be known as Okinawa Prefecture. During the Second World War, Okinawa was the only major Asian land mass invaded by the American armed forces, and over 200,000 people died in offensive and defensive battles. After the war, the United States established the “Ryukyu Government” and placed Okinawa under military administration. In 1953, the Amami Islands were returned to Kagoshima Prefecture and became Okinawa Prefecture on May 15, 1972. In 2008, Okinawa Prefecture had a population of 1,374,189. The five major American armed force bases in Okinawa represent 75% of the total American bases in Japan. The number of American military and support personnel in Okinawa totaled 46,497, just under half of all U.S. troops in Japan. On June 30, 1959, a U.S. Air Force jet fighter crashed and burst into flames on the grounds of Miyamori Elementary School (present-day Uruma City), killing 17 people, including 11 children, and injuring 156 people. During the Vietnam War, B-52 strategic bombers were stationed at Kadena Air Base on a regular basis from 1968, and emergency take-offs and landings at night were common. In one instance, a B-52 crashed and burst into flames immediately after take-off; the cause was determined to be poor maintenance. Additionally, there have been a series of tragic cases of girls being raped by U.S. soldiers and numerous accidents involving military vehicles.

2 Olympism proclaims that world peace and the spirit of sportsmanship are realized through the body of the athletes. But how can that be, for example, when considering Japan’s 1964 Olympic volleyball team, the self-labeled “Oriental Witches”? They were factory workers and subsidized players. They had no choice but to train hard under their manager, Daimatsu, and their volleyball bodies expressed that disciplined regime. They retired after the Olympics and all married. This is an instructive case of how gender, sexuality, class and nationalism are deeply inscribed in the body of athlete (Arata 2004).

3 The 1936 Berlin Olympics torch relay – 7 countries, 12 days, 2,075km, 3,075 carriers; the 1948 London Olympics torch relay – 7 countries, 17 days, 3,160km; the 1952 Helsinki Olympics torch relay – 5 countries, 24 days, 3,300km, 3,042 carriers; the 1956 Melbourne Olympics torch relay – 5 coun-
tries, 20 days, 3,520km, 3,180 carriers; the 1960 Rome Olympics torch relay – 2 countries, 13 days, 2,250km, 1,883 carriers.

4 In the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Azuma Fumiko participated in women’s archery, and three persons were registered as judges.

5 For the Wakanatsu Kokutai, a torch relay was run through in the prefecture; the flame was lit on Hateruma Island located at the southernmost end of the archipelago. The Kaihō Kokutai in Hiroshima in 1987 also featured a torch relay, with the flame being lit at the “Fire of Peace” in the Peace Memorial Park.
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Rebuilding the Japanese Nation at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics


SHIMIZU Satoshi


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Shimizu Satoshi 2004b Football, Nationalism and Celebrity Culture: Reflections on the Impact of Different Discourses on Japanese Identity since


The Tokyo Olympics: Politics and Aftermath
Christian Tagsold

Over the last half-century Japan has been an eager host for mega-events. Since 1964, the nation has hosted three Olympic Games, two World Expos and most recently the FIFA World Cup. However, it has become more and more difficult to justify such sponsorship to an increasingly skeptical Japanese public. This can be seen in Tokyo’s campaign to bid for the 2016 Summer Games, after its successful bids for the 1940 Olympics (ultimately canceled due to the outbreak of World War II) and the very successful 1964 Summer Olympics. One of the obstacles to broad public backing for the bid was the obvious connection between Tokyo’s efforts and the political fate of mayor Ishihara Shintarō. Critics like Nagao Toshihiko (2008), who wrote an influential article about the “Ishihara Olympics” in the popular intellectual journal Sekai, denounced the Games as a simple vehicle for the mayor to fulfill his political ambitions.

This widespread public discussion about the political dimensions of hosting the Games is a new phenomenon in Tokyo, and it is surprising in light of Japan’s earlier experiences with the 1940 and 1964 Games. It seems obvious that the Olympics of 1940 would have served to legitimize the ultra-nationalist politics of the times, just as the 1936 Berlin Olympics helped the National Socialists to gain international acceptance. Placing the 1964 Olympics with the 1960 Rome Games and the 1972 Munich Games also demonstrates that those Games were intended as a political message of reintegrating Japan fully into the ranks of peaceful nations following World War II. Still, neither the 1940 Games nor the 1964 Games were deemed political by contemporaries.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the 1964 Tokyo Olympics were legitimized and how these Games acted as political events, despite not being recognized as such by contemporaries. The Tokyo Olympics received broad public support and symbolized for the Japanese people that the immediate post-war era was over and that they could again be proud of their nation. Within this context it was easy to use the Olympics as a stage for symbolic politics. National symbols like the Japanese emperor – the tennō – or the hinomaru national flag could be given a fresh polish of legitimacy by integrating them into the symbolism of the Olympic movement, which conveyed a compelling message of peace. These symbolic politics were not recognized as such by the Japanese public or even intellectuals. Instead, they were taken at face value because the overall narrative of the Olympics was so very compelling.

Yet, the artificial distinction between the Olympics and politics in Japan did not last long. By the time of Nagoya’s bid to host the 1988 Summer
Olympics, an imaginative and persuasive anti-Olympics movement had emerged that picked up the political character of the Olympic Games as a central topic. Since then, the Japanese public has become increasingly skeptical toward plans to stage mega-events. The legitimizing narratives for sports mega-events such as the Olympic Games have collapsed in the last few decades, and the political dimensions and implications have been discussed openly, leading to a much more balanced view.

**The 1964 Olympic Games as rite of passage**

In 1964, general opinion held the Tokyo Olympics to be a highly legitimate and at the same time apolitical event. Though the public opinion polls that are today ubiquitous were not performed prior to the Games, various other factors made it clear that the Games were very much welcomed by the Japanese populace. National media, commentary by well regarded intellectuals and polls taken during the Games themselves show that the Tokyo Olympics had almost universal support by the time they began.

Earlier in the process, however, criticism was much more widespread. Although the general attitude of the media was very positive during the early stages of the campaign to bring the Olympics to Tokyo, a more skeptical tone emerged soon after the city’s bid was accepted over those of rivals such as Detroit, Brussels and Vienna at the 1959 meeting of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in Munich. National newspapers began to question the ability of the Japanese capital to host an event on such a massive scale. The nation’s leading liberal newspaper, the *Asahi Shinbun*, printed a series of articles entitled “The Olympics are coming, but,” in which the deficiencies of the city were enumerated. Especially emphasized was a lack of sufficient accommodations for foreign guests (*Asahi* 5-1959:342); shortly after Tokyo won the bidding race, hotel reservations from abroad were already pouring in (*Nikkei* 8-1959:477), deepening the fear that Japan’s infrastructure, from the aforementioned hotels, to transportation, to the sports stadiums themselves, would be unable to handle the masses that would throng to the Games. The general ability of Japan to finance the necessary infrastructural improvements was called into question, and some opponents in this early planning phase argued that the money could be better invested elsewhere (*NHK* 1967:9f.).

These critical viewpoints became less and less common the further planning and implementation went on. A year before the opening ceremonies, it was no longer being called into question whether Japan would be able to successfully stage the Games or it was worthwhile to do so. The national media praised the endeavor and critics of Tokyo’s infrastructure were silenced by the capital city’s rapid transformation. When the Games finally opened in October 1964, the Japanese citizens reacted euphorically. With the cheering nation at their back, the Japanese Olympic team brought home 16 gold medals, including one
for women’s volleyball, which followed a tense decisive match watched live on television by about 90% of the population. The public also tuned in to the ceremonies accompanying the Games in large numbers, with some 85% watching the opening ceremonies, of which 97% indicated their satisfaction with the show (NHK 1967:238).

Finally, intellectuals added their voices to those of the national media and the general public. Famed left-wing author and later Nobel laureate Ōe Kenzaburō (1964) attended the opening ceremony in the national stadium and would even pardon the heavy presence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the performance - about 10,000 Japanese soldiers in total were involved in the Games. The right-wing author Mishima Yukio (1964) praised the Opening Ceremony’s healing effects on the wounds afflicted on Japanese souls by recent history. Almost all intellectuals pointed out that the Games changed international attitudes toward Japan, lending credence to the officials who had given this very effect as a major argument for staging the Olympics in the first place (Noma 1964). Indeed, the world – and especially the West – was deeply impressed by the Japanese ability to organize and stage an event of such scale and prestige.

Obviously, the narrative that was built up to legitimize and carry the 1964 Olympic Games was a very powerful one. Taking place 24 years after the failure of the 1940 Olympics, the new Games served as a compelling symbol for the end of the post-war era, a time in which Japan’s role in waging war and committing countless atrocities led to its prohibition from participating in international matters – including the London Olympics of 1948, which especially deprived Japan’s male swimmers of likely medals. Of course it was not the Olympics themselves which were responsible for Japan’s return to the community of nations; Japan was legally readmitted to the United Nations and various international sports associations in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Economically as well, the country had largely emerged from the ashes of its defeat within a decade of the end of the Second World War, largely driven by the demand triggered by the Korean War in the beginning of the 1950s. But the Olympics were the rite of passage that returned Japan to a place of international acceptance and economic wellbeing in the eyes of the Japanese public, as well as those of the world.

Additionally, the Olympics eased the tensions created by the so-called Anpō-Crisis, which began in the late 1950s and culminated in 1960. Millions of Japanese citizens took to the streets to protest the revision of the 1951 security treaty between Japan and the US, which would have put Japan in a much more active position with regard to its defense. This crisis posed the biggest risk for the stability of Japan in the post-war era, and led to the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. The new Prime Minister, Ikeda Hayato, introduced a whole new vocabulary into politics, refocusing political discussions in Japan (Tsurumi 1991:15). He promised to double the incomes of citizens in the near future in order to expand private consumption. The Tokyo Olympics were
a symbol that marked this shift in economic politics. Instead of focusing on reinvesting economic surpluses and strengthening business, private households were now able to buy goods like color television sets to enjoy the Games.

The narrative told by and through the 1964 Olympic Games was highly credible because it was clearly linked to Japan’s own sense of itself in that era. Very few would have questioned the necessity and logic of performing rituals to symbolize the rebirth of the nation, especially when those rituals were embedded into such a well-established and accepted context as the Olympic Games. This is clearly shown by the results of the NHK opinion polls cited earlier in this chapter. Thus, those voices that were critical of the Games did not principally criticize the rationale for staging the Games themselves, but rather questioned whether Japan was up to the task of playing host to such an event. The significant issue was Japan’s ability to upgrade its infrastructure to accommodate the great number of people who would come to Tokyo. Accomplishing this task was required to legitimize the Games in the eyes of the Japanese public.

**The symbolic politics of the Games**

The restoration of national pride that was staged in 1964 involved the de-liberate rehabilitation of classical national symbols, especially the tennō himself (the emperor), the hinomaru (or Rising Sun) flag, the kimigayo (“His Majesty’s Reign”) anthem, and the army. The method of their revival was to free them of their wartime associations and present them instead as symbols of peace. This was made possible by embedding them in the Olympic Games’ own narrative and by introducing new national symbols. The latter were mostly associated with the technical achievements of postwar Japan, such as the Shinkansen bullet train, which ran for the first time just a few days prior to the opening of the Games and was at the time the fastest train in the world. Also, the world-wide broadcast of the Games in color and via satellite demonstrated the high technological standards of the Games, although Japan in fact relied heavily on assistance from America to make this possible.

The most powerful example of the repossessing of classical national symbols is the emperor (tennō) himself, who made the official proclamation to begin the Games at the opening ceremony on October 10. The IOC requires that this role be performed by the head of state, in which capacity the tennō was clearly acting. Legally though, this was a very complicated situation. The first article of the Japanese constitution of 1946 states clearly that “the Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people.” In Article 7, he is given many duties that are normally the privilege of heads of state, but nowhere does the constitution explicitly state that this is his role. Even now, it remains unclear whether the emperor or the prime minister is the head of state (Yokota 1992:27). Yet in the 1964 ceremony, the tennō was formally presented not as the head of
state but rather as the patron of the Tokyo Olympics. This had been determined in 1962 by the Organizing Committee and, behind it, the Ministry of Education (and no doubt after discussions with the Imperial Household Agency), in order to forestall any public debate about the emperor’s status as head of state (Organizing Committee for the XVIII Olympiad 1966:39). It is certain, though, that this subtle difference was not clearly understood by the Japanese public and the rest of the world. After the tennō had arrived at the Olympic stadium on October 10 for the opening ceremony, the national *kimigayo* anthem was played for the first time. Nearly an hour later, the tennō delivered the opening speech declaring the start of the Games. Before he left 20 minutes later, doves of peace were released, *kimigayo* played once again, and a squad of tactical jets painted the Olympic rings in the sky above the Olympic stadium. The whole opening ceremony was broadcast live all over the globe for the first time in Olympic history. Only 19 years after he had been narrowly spared from being tried as a war criminal, the tennō appeared not only in the capacity as head of state but also as a symbol of peace before the eyes of the audience in the Olympic stadium, and on TV screens in Japan and worldwide.

A very similar story can be told about the *hinomaru* flag, which was not officially sanctioned as Japan’s national flag until 1999. Even though the flag had been in public use throughout postwar Japan, serving as Japan’s official flag in the Olympics, its status was disputed hotly in the public for its strong connections to the country’s imperial past. Thus, as the 1964 Games approached, an attempt was made to recreate the flag as a symbol of shared beliefs. A commission was set up to redesign the flag, whose colors and proportions had not been defined since 1945, and a number of variations had appeared (Fukui 1995:96). The commission decided to use the Olympic standard for the flag size, which is a vertical to horizontal ratio of 2:3. This ratio diverged from the proclamation of 1870, which had set the ratio to 7:10. For the color of the sun disk (the literal meaning of *hinomaru*), the commission distributed a public questionnaire that asked respondents to choose the most apt shade from a scale of reds. The resulting flag could be seen as a product of democracy and internationalism. It was presented to the public in March, 1964, half a year before the start of the Games. The particular design process was obviously crucial in altering the flag’s image and perception; however, its prominent display before and during the Olympics was even more important. To see the *hinomaru* flying along with other national flags and the Olympic banner of peace was an impressive demonstration of its new status. Could there be anything nefarious with using the *hinomaru* as a national symbol when it complied with international standards in the most peaceful of world arenas?

The ultimate demonstration of this flag’s image shift was in its appearance on the uniform of Sakai Yoshinori, the final runner in the Olympic torch relay. Sakai had been born in Hiroshima prefecture on August 6, 1945, the day the first atomic bomb was dropped on the prefecture’s capital. To be precise, it was
not actually the hinomaru that shone bright on Sakai’s white t-shirt but rather the logo of the 1964 Games. However, that logo was the red sun (albeit in a slightly different shade), together with the five Olympic rings and the phrase “Tokyo 1964” below it.

**Keeping politics and sports apart**

Even into the 1980s, the Olympics were widely seen in Japan as a realm separate from politics, and there were very few questions raised against the constant insistence by the IOC and the Japan Olympic Committee that the Olympic Movement was apolitical. For instance, the 62nd session of the IOC, which was held in Tokyo shortly before the Games themselves, addressed the need to resist “political interference,” by which the IOC meant the threat of politics intruding into the Olympic Movement. As hosts of the immanent Games, the Japanese were of course eager to embrace this pretense. Such claims, of course, required an enormous suspension of disbelief—or perhaps a Lewis Carol notion of politics, it being clear that the Games were awarded to Japan for the (apolitical?) act of welcoming it back to normal nationhood! But if that was not political, then how could anyone see the flag, the anthem, and the emperor in anything but a benign light? This was due to the fact that the realm of ritual and symbolism was not widely regarded as political in the mid-1960s.

The political scientist Murray Edelman (1964) formulated his theory of “the symbolic uses of politics” the very year that the Olympics took place, although it took another decade before this idea of symbolic politics found its way into Olympic studies. He argued that politics not only proceed as rational discourses but also legitimize themselves with rituals and symbols. The first and most obvious example of Edelman’s model was the 1936 Berlin Olympics, but the first critical analysis of the symbols and rituals of these Games was Mandell (1971). In 1964, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces still used the role of the German army in 1936 as a model for their involvement in the Tokyo Games. The Self-Defense Force’s report (Bōeichō 1965: Preface) admitted qualms about the persecution of Jews in Germany and the political abuse of the Games, but along the general lines of the IOC, only as political interference, not as something inherent in the logic of the Games themselves. Who could blame the Self-Defense Forces for this if even the influential German Olympic theorist Hans Lenk (1964:162f.) denied any political interference by the National-Socialists in the Berlin Olympics in his book *Werte, Ziele, Wirklichkeit der Modernen Olympischen Spiele* [Values, Aims and Reality of the Modern Olympic Games] the very same year?

If even the Olympic Games of 1936 were seen as non-political, it was certainly difficult for contemporaries to understand how important the role of symbolic politics was during the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. No one complained, for example, about Sakai performing the sacred torch runner as a political gesture
towards Japan’s imagined wartime victimization. Rather, his final round through the Olympic stadium and the lighting of the Olympic flame were understood as a powerful statement by the peaceful youth of the world against nuclear dangers. This fit well in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which had brought the world to the brink of a devastating nuclear war, a terror still fresh in the public mind. It also proved that the Olympics were beyond the daily quarrels of politics and promised a road to universal peace, reconciling, especially, the antagonism of the Cold War.

In that sense, the fiction of the Olympic Games as non-political was highly important in the second half of the twentieth century. Whenever there was reason to believe that the Olympics served political reasons or was not completely free of political undertones, as in the case of the Moscow Games of 1980, the event did not function anymore as an arena where athletes from the West and East could meet one another. In the same vein, any efforts to deliberately politicize sports were condemned harshly as political interference by the sports world. When Sukarno’s Indonesia tried to assemble the “new emerging forces” with its GANEFO movement, the IOC reacted quickly and ejected the country from the Tokyo Olympics (Kanin 1981:85; Lutan and Hong 2005). Setting sport apart from politics was the premise for establishing it as a field on which to meet each other, though this reading was ambiguous on both sides since the sportive competitions were seen as a metaphor for the general competition of political systems.

Against the tide of anti-government protests that rose again in the late 1960s, these re-nationalized symbols retained much of their legitimacy because of their deployment during the Olympics. It would still take another three decades for the flag and the hymn to be granted formal legal legitimacy, and the status of the *tennō* as head of state remains ambiguous—or rather is deliberately left ambiguous by conservative politicians and the Imperial Household Agency as the best strategy for preserving imperial prerogatives. Hence, the emperor opened the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games and the 1998 Nagano Winter Games again in the capacity of patron.

### Revealing the political side of olympics

In the 1960s, there were almost no critical voices raised against the Olympics and its uses by the Japanese state. But the Olympic truce in Japan did not last forever. During Nagoya’s bid for the 1988 Summer Olympics, broad-based citizens’ groups emerged in protest against their city’s bid, arguing that the Games would be a wasteful expenditure of public money and would cause ecological problems. They even called into question the ideals of the Olympic Games themselves. This was probably the first popular anti-Olympic movement in Asia.

Prefectural mayor Nakaya Yoshiaki had initiated the bid in 1977 to gain
nation- and worldwide recognition for Japan’s fourth largest city. After the Olympics were held in the capital city, Japan’s other major urban center, Osaka, had organized the World Expo in 1970, thereby restoring balance to the ever competitive relationship between the eastern and western halves of Japan’s main island of Honshū. The far north got its share with the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics. Nagoya’s politicians were eager to burnish the image of their city, situated between the Tokyo/Yokohama urban area to the east and the Osaka/Kobe/Kyoto to the west, which had not yet had its own day in the sun.

The anti-Olympic movement in Nagoya was not the main reason for the failure of the bid. While Nagoya’s efforts were technically superior to those of Seoul, the sole other competitor, the Korean side did a better job of lobbying and playing the political power games within the Olympic movement (Ikei 1992:196ff.). Furthermore, allowing Korea to host the Games allowed the IOC to avoid the perceptions of Japanese dominance that would have arisen if the third Olympic Games hosted in Asia had again taken place in Japan. Given Japan’s colonial history, this would have been quite problematic for the Olympic Movement. Despite this, Nagoya was considered the clear favorite going into the race, but in the end, Seoul received about two thirds of the votes, shocking the Japanese supporters. Prefectural Mayor Nakaya did not run for a second term after this perceived disaster, and about a month and a half after the closing ceremony of the 1988 Seoul Games, committed suicide, most likely because he could not do away with this black mark on his career.

Even though it did not play the decisive role in Nagoya’s loss, the anti-Olympic movement formed in reaction to the city’s bid was the grounds for some of the principles used in arguments against staging mega-events ever since, whether Olympics, World Cups or World Expos. The most common argument, and the one also seen during the preparations for the Tokyo Olympics, was the depiction of the costs of the event and the necessary infrastructure as wasteful (Yamada 1981). But while the emphasis in the late 1950s was on the question of whether Japan could afford to stage such an event, in the late 1970s criticism questioned whether Nagoya should do so. Many citizens were no longer prepared to sacrifice their own wellbeing for the lofty plans and international ambitions of politicians without at least engaging in a thorough debate about the environmental and economical burdens of staging the Olympics. They organized a campaign against the Games, including demonstrations, as well as distributed informational material and held public discussions.

But the criticism went much further than simply questioning the direct effects of the Olympics on the city. The protesters questioned the very aims and ideals of the Olympic Games. Kageyama Ken, Okasaki Masaru and Mizuta Hiroshi (1981), three leading intellectuals of the anti-Olympics movement, released an “Anti-Olympic Manifesto,” challenging the image of the Olympic Games as a catalyst of peace and mutual understanding as well as attempting to deconstruct the internal logic of the Olympic movement itself. In their eyes,
the modern Olympics served to strengthen nationalist sentiments, encouraged the public to take a passive spectator role rather than participating in the sports themselves, and cost a great deal of money, more to the benefit of large concerns than to those of ordinary citizens.

For those within the anti-Olympic movement, the Olympic idea was caught up in aristocratic ideals from the very beginning, and thus was of no use to the normal citizens living at the end of the twentieth century. As an alternative, the anti-Olympic movement proposed the concept of “trops,” a neologism which is the reverse spelling of “sport” and was intended to bring into public discussion a substitute for the consumerist, sports-industry driven Olympics. The goal of “trops” was to encourage ordinary citizens to playfully engage in cooperative games (Kageyama/Okasaki 1984). The proposed games did not emphasize antagonistic competition and produced no winners. Instead, they were designed to keep the players constantly moving while working together to achieve common goals.

The anti-Olympic movement and “trops” were politically rooted in the upheavals of 1968 that shook Japan as much as the nations of the West; the Tokyo University riots of 1968/69 were possibly the most ferocious worldwide. It took inspiration from French Situationism, wanting to free sports from the grasp of capitalism and return them to a playful and universally accessible realm in order to again create authentic situations, instead of passive consumption. They also adopted the extremely critical stance taken by the German Left against the 1972 Munich Olympics (Henschchen and Wetter 1972; Prokop 1971), although the concept of “trops” went further than this negativism as it proposed games for all. Further foundations for the concept of “trops” can be found in the criticisms of competition and antagonism in the peace movement and alternative pedagogies. The anti-capitalist standpoint gained justification from the economic slowdown of the 1970s and the drawbacks of industrial development that became more and more obvious during that time, leading to a reevaluation of priorities by ever increasing numbers of Japanese citizens. The “trops” movement was thus closely related to the non-sports festivals and civil-society games that were gaining momentum worldwide in the 1980s, as observed by Henning Eichberg (2004:77). It distinguished itself, however, in that it did not simply abandon Olympism but attempted to transcend it by flipping it upside down.

Under the critical barrage of the anti-Olympic movement, the legitimizing narrative of the 1964 Olympics began to crumble. The emperor’s acting as head of state in opening the Olympics – a role unjustified by the Japanese constitution – was shown to be simple revisionist nationalism. The peaceful aura of the Games was disputed; they were portrayed instead as antagonistic and therefore rooted in the logic of international relations, which, in the ultimate logical extension, propagated war. Also, economic development and a blind faith in technological progress were shown to be anti-humanist instead of advancing the common welfare. Admittedly not all citizens of Nagoya, most likely not even
a majority, agreed with the arguments of the anti-Olympic movement. It is clear enough, though, that a consensus as to the meaning of the Olympics in general and their meaning for Japan in particular, could no longer be easily reached and had to be discussed in the political arena.

Interestingly, trops has spread to other countries in Asia, though it has not sparked an anti-Olympic movement in itself. While the Beijing Olympics seem to have served as a rite of passage for China as the Tokyo Olympics did for Japan in the 1960s, the anti-Olympic voices in this case overwhelmingly came from outside and did not lead the Chinese people to a more critical view of their Games. Instead, opposition to the international critical narratives strengthened the convictions of Chinese people for their cause. Given that even the most heated discussions have not helped to form a visible anti-Olympic movement in China, which, under the political circumstances, may be a risky undertaking, the quite remarkable reception of trops in China is surprising. Wu and Gao (2002), two of the advocates of trops in China, argue the term represents a good way to bring sports to and increase the health of the Chinese masses, who face lifestyle-related health problems, such as cardiovascular disease, similar to those common in the United States. Wu and Gao’s discussion does not completely disregard the critical potential of trops, but it is certainly pushed to the background. Instead, they argue that trops would promote a better knowledge of sports to the population, which has been misled by Falun Gong and its controversial teachings that embody exercise and healing experiments (Wu and Gao 2002:10).

**Regaining political grounds**

In this chapter I have tried to show how the 1964 Tokyo Olympics served as a rite of passage from the immediate post-war era into a period of economic affluence and renewed national pride. Symbolic politics were intensively used during the Games to instill a new sense of national belonging and also prove to the world that Japan had rejoined the ranks of peaceful nations. The symbolic complex surrounding the *tennō* was especially central to this. But the highly political character of the Games was more or less ignored in contemporary discussions. There are three reasons for this. First of all, the narrative of the Tokyo Olympics as a rite of passage was highly credible. Because of this, political discussions about the Olympics were limited to the question of whether the city could host the Games, not whether it should do so. Additionally, the Olympic framework, with its message of peace, lent credibility to the assumption of non-political games. It was easy to present national symbols, which had been tarnished by their use during WW II, as natural devices denoting Japan. Finally, due to the Cold War it was necessary for the IOC, but also for the powers of each side, to keep up the fiction of non-political games in order to secure a common ground for sportive competitions. Only two decades later, the trops move-
ment against Nagoya’s bid to host Olympics in 1988 unveiled the inherent political character of the Olympic movement and questioned the legitimacy of the 1964 Games.

Since that time, Olympic matters have come to be seen as political issues in Japan when new bids have been undertaken. This is also true for Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Olympics, which sparked heated debates with its proponent mayor Ishihara Shintarō, a renowned populist leaning strongly to the right. These debates had a very international dimension, since Ishihara on more than one occasion had voiced opinions playing down the wounds inflicted by Japan on Asian nations in WWII. Tokyo’s ultimately unsuccessful bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games was openly political (Kelly 2010) and stood in direct opposition to dynamics of the 1964 Games.
References cited


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Spreading Olympism and the Olympic Movement in Japan:
Interpreting “Universal” Values

Andreas NIEHAUS

The act of translation thus hypothesizes an exchange of equivalent signs and makes up that equivalence where there is none perceived as such. (Liu 1999: 21)

“One World, One Dream,” the slogan of the Beijing Olympics of 2008, reflects the established narrative that the Olympic Games are held in the spirit of global unity and peace. Nevertheless, contrary to this internationalism, the modern Olympics have bolstered patriotism and nationalism since the very first Games of 1896. This inherent contradiction is exemplified by the root concept of “Olympism,” which is defined as “a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.”1 This definition allows the extraction of certain core values like internationalism, universalism, continuity, rhythm, independence, and neutrality (Höfer 1994:56.). However, the German philosopher Hans Lenk (1972) in his influential work on the modern Olympic Games has already shown that there is no standardized, distinctly defined fundamental term that characterizes the “Olympic idea, “which ultimately remains vague.”2 The observed vagueness that results in a manifold and ambiguous interpretability as well as an all-embracing compatibility is a crucial element in the Olympic Movement’s attraction for cultures and peoples around the world, as the semantic gaps can be filled with whatever is constructed to be one’s own.

Early on, Coubertin stated that “Olympism is not a system; it is a state of mind. It can accommodate the most widely divergent approaches, and no race or time can hold an exclusive monopoly” (Müller 2000:548). And John MacAlloon (1987) acknowledges, with reference to Émile Durkheim, that “the more plural the social groups attempting to make common cause, the more abstract must become the collective representations by which they identify” (MacAlloon 1987:25, 36). As a set of values, Olympism communicates meaning, even though meaning is historically as well as culturally constructed. Olympism’s values are stated explicitly, but the meanings that different individuals, different countries, and different eras give to those values frequently vary. Using the example of Japan, I will ask whether its encounter with the Olympic Movement leads to a particularistic interpretation of Olympism. Or is the cultural di-
versity and difference that Japan represents absorbed in the Olympic Movement? Is Liu correct that “[u]niversalism thrives on difference. It does not reject difference but translates and absorbs it into its own orbit of antithesis and dialect” (1999:1)?

This chapter will discuss Japan’s encounter with the Olympic Movement from four different perspectives. First I will analyze what the inclusion of judo into the Olympic program in 1964 meant for the interpretation of this “traditional Japanese martial art” and for the Western hegemonic outlook on sports in the Olympic Movement. Next I show how Olympic internationalism and universalism served to strengthen national identity as well as the feeling of uniqueness in Japan. Following this I look at the translation of Olympic values and the challenge of Olympic universalism on an ideological level within Japan. And to conclude I will focus on the question of how knowledge about Olympism is communicated through Olympic education in Japan. There it will be argued that official Olympic education in Japan follows the cycles of Olympic time and focuses on presenting national or local communities rather than advocating internationalism.

**Did judo challenge Olympic Eurocentrism?**

Judo was integrated into the Olympic program for the first time in 1964 and since then it has generally been accepted that this occasion marked the first time a “traditional” Eastern sport was included as an Olympic event. However, the question that has to be asked is whether judo could be considered a “traditional” Japanese sport in 1964?

When the prospect of recognizing judo as an Olympic sport was discussed by the IOC it was clear that many sports officials did not see Japanese judo as a sport. During the 1950s, at least two international judo bodies had emerged, the International Judo Federation (IJF) and the International World Judo Federation (IWJF), and there was rift between them (see especially Manzenreiter and Frühstück 2001:69-93). When the IJF under the guidance of the Kōdōkan Headquarters applied for recognition as an Olympic sport, the IWJF argued that the “Japanese” judo trained in the IJF must be viewed as a form of religious imperialism: “Judo for the Japanese [sic] and their followers is not alone a sport, but a ‘bodily way’ for working with Zen-Buddhism (Buddhism of Samurai etc.) and the codex of Bushidō” (IOC Archives, Lausanne, letter from Knud Janson to Otto Mayer, August 5, 1955). On the other hand, judo as it was practiced in the West was seen as a pure sport in the Western YMCA sporting tradition that needed to be protected: “We in IWJF like Judo as a fine sport, therefore we are trying to save it from the grip of mysticism and aggressive Budhism [sic] missionary work” (IOC Archives, Lausanne, letter from Knud Janson to Otto Mayer, January 21, 1956). This identification of judo with Zen-Buddhism must be a result of the diffusion of judo into the West. When judo spread into Western
countries in the early 20th century, it encountered a society which, as Uta Schaffers (2006) has shown, considered Japan to be a space of spirituality and mystery—a paradise long lost to the “technicized” and rationalized West. The notion of a Far Eastern paradise implies eternal stereotypes of geisha, architecture, samurai, and also martial arts, not in the least initiated by Japan’s military victory over Russia in 1905, which became the eternal icons of this Eastern paradise. The Western interpretation of judo as eternal thus became a serious obstacle in the attempt to include it in the Olympic program. The observation is quite surprising since the Japanese form of judo was in fact a rationalized sporting system in its approach to the body, as well as its philosophical and ideological framework.

Kanō Jigorō developed judo in the second half of the nineteenth century as a “sportified” martial art for physical education in order to gain acceptance in the Japanese educational system. He based its fighting techniques on traditional Japanese styles of jūjutsu and Western physical education philosophy, without referring to or basing the martial art on any religious values. From its very beginning, Judo was educational in its essence, aiming to strengthen the Japanese nation physically as well as morally. Nonetheless, despite being created as a modern sport, for the West judo retained a sense of spirituality that hindered its successful induction into the Olympic program. Thus, when Charles Palmer became president of the International Judo Federation (IJF) in 1965, the sportification of judo gained momentum through his introduction of additional weight classes, additional scoring points (yuko and koka in 1974) and the emphasis on negative judo penalties to encourage fighting techniques. The “regulating” connection between IJF and the Olympic Movement became clear in article 1.4 of the IJF-statutes, where it is stated: “All provisions of the IJF Statutes, Bye-Laws, Rules and other Regulations must be in conformity with the Olympic Charter” (quoted here are the rules of 2004 at http://www.ijf.org). Today, by IJF rules, judo is explicitly considered to be a sport and not a martial art. The Minutes of the IJF Moscow Congress (1980) state under the category proposals: “Judo is an Olympic Programme sport and is not, nor should it be referred to as a Martial Art.” This distinct definition by the IJF can be interpreted as the completion of a process of globalization and sportification that transformed judo into a “pure” sport, leaving behind philosophical teachings by Kanō Jigorō.

Using Allen Guttmann’s modernization theory as reference, Kevin Grey Carr presented the sportification of judo in terms of secularism (philosophical teachings disappear), equality (open to all classes, gender), specialization (limitation of techniques applied), rationalization (scientific training methods), bureaucratization (IJF, national bodies), quantification (point divisions), as well as a quest for records, concluding that judo “is becoming more and more a simple variant of wrestling” (Carr 1993:184-185). Although the names of techniques, commands, points, and penalties are still given in Japanese, and the
jūdōgi equally adds to a superficial Occidental atmosphere in the audience, the (sporting) values of Olympism are neither altered nor challenged. Judo as an Olympic sport has ultimately followed a process of homogenization along the lines of Western/Olympic sporting traditions, losing its own specific cultural markers. However, the Japanese audience still regards judo as an expression of its national character and the media still covers judo athletes and events with special interest. Todd Holden and Itō Rie (2007), by analyzing studio interviews of Olympic athletes, showed that the Athens Olympics served to “simulate national community, with normative, emotionally binding effects” (191). Interviews with judo athletes like Inoue Kōsei, Tsukada Maki, and Tani Ryōko certainly played a crucial role in personalizing the emotional bonds of judo with the Japanese public. From this standpoint, it can be argued that judo does not support the spread of Olympism in Japan but rather serves as a tool to present the Japanese nation to itself and the world. The case of judo shows that it served as a space for national identity, despite its absorption into the framework of Olympic sports. This particularistic interpretation of the Olympics, from a national perspective, characterizes Japan’s early encounter with the Olympic Movement.

The particularistic interpretation of Olympism in Japan

The year 1909, when Kanō Jigorō became the first Japanese (and Asian) IOC member, is generally seen as the beginning of Japan’s Olympic history. However, the first chapters in Japan’s contact with the Olympic Movement were written years earlier. In 1896 the Japanese government sent firearms for an exhibition at the Athens Games; in 1900 Japanese physical educators participated in the Congress of Physical Education in Paris; in 1904 Ainu participated in the St. Louis Anthropological Games; and the first invitation for Japanese athletes to participate in the Olympics was sent for the Games of 1906.

Consequently, knowledge about the existence of the Olympic Games as well as the modern Olympic Movement can be found in Japan before the year 1909. In the early years the terms Olympia or Olympic were written in the syllabic alphabet katakana as “Orimipiya,” “Orimupia,” “Orinpia,” or even in rōmaji as “Jeux Olympiques,” all of which actually imply and format the foreignness of the Games.3 The national newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun (November 15, 1887) features an athletic school meeting award-giving ceremony that imitated the ancient Olympic Games’ ceremony. The first mention of the ancient Olympic Games’ revival (Orinpikku undōkai) can, according to Wada Kōichi, be traced back to the magazine Bunbu Sōshi (Literary and Martial Arts Magazine) of March 1896 (Wada 2007:21). These and other early writings focus on characterizing the modern Olympics as a revival of the ancient Olympic Games. This notion is important in so far as the Hellenistic or classicist revival in the
19th century served in the West as a powerful tool to ideologically unify Western nations and also construct and legitimize Western cultural and political supremacy from an ancient past. In Japan’s ambition to join the imperialistic world powers, participation in Western sporting traditions and symbolism was a powerful ideological tool.

Japan’s encounter with the Olympic Movement falls within a period of intensive contact with Western nations, beginning with the Meiji Restoration of 1868 after a period of approximately 250 years of partial seclusion. Only one year before the first modern Games were celebrated in Athens (1896), Japan had gained a major victory in the Sino-Japanese War 1894-5, claiming for the first time its place among the colonial powers of the West. Just as Japan was able to utilize international expositions as a stage to neutralize some of the exclusionary politics of the West, Japan’s interest and involvement in the Olympic Movement helped the nation negotiate its place among the Western powers as an equal (Roche 2000:73). This aspiration of becoming a world power was also mirrored in the fact that the wish to host the Games in Tokyo could already be found in the magazine, *Sekai no Nihon* (Japan in the World) in 1897 (vol. 12:46-49).

Though the term “Olympism” cannot be found in the early Japanese texts on the Olympics, this should not be interpreted as a lack in the understanding of Coubertin’s Olympic philosophy on the Japanese side. It can instead be explained by the fact that Coubertin only began working on his concept of “Olympism” after 1911, when the organization of the Games had become less important to him (see Müller 2000:44). And it was only in 1935 that the term *Orinpizumu* was used in an article entitled *Orinpizumu no yonjū nen 1894-1934* (Forty years of Olympism 1894-1934) in the periodical *Orinpikku* (13:3, 1935, pp. 2-6).4 *Orinpizumu*, however, is even nowadays not widely used but translated as *Orinpikku no gainen* (Olympic idea), *Orinpikku no shisō* (Olympic idea), or *Orinpikku no seishin* (Olympic spirit). Although the translation *Orinpizumu* acknowledges that the suffix -ism refers to an abstract idea, it doesn’t actually distinguish between “Olympism” and the “Olympic idea.”5

What was recognized immediately, however, by early writers on the Olympic Games like Tōyabe Shuntei (1865-1908), Ōmori Hyōzo (1876-1913), and later Kanō Jigorō was the significance of the Games for the education of the youth, especially their potential to strengthen the Japanese physically as well as morally. Moral education as a primary objective of the “education for the nation” (*kokka no tame no kyōiku*) in the school curriculum had been implanted in Japanese schools since Mori Arinori (1847-1889) became education minister in 1885. Physical educators tried hard after that to demonstrate that physical education and sports foster moral education. The example of the Olympic Movement, which was in its core intended to strengthen the French youth, proved to be very useful to the arguments of the Japanese physical educators.
Looking at the early texts, we may conclude that writers up until 1909 placed the national aspect of the Olympic Movement above the international dimension. Here, yet another aspect comes into focus: since the Japanese encounter with the West and the Black Ships of Commodore Perry, the “weakness” of the Japanese body, first as part of a hetero-stereotypical exotification and then as a auto-stereotype, became a topic of national concern. Bodies are embedded in a specific cultural and historical context and reflect the political discourses of modernity (Foucault 1977:187; see also Sarasin 2003:102-3). Moreover, the discursive language about the body cannot be separated from politics. The extent to which political metaphors refer to the body is striking both in Western languages and in Japanese; for instance, dantai (organization) and kokutai (body of the nation) were both crucial terms of political discourse in the early 20th century. The Olympic Movement with its quasi-religious adoration for the strong male body could thus be utilized to (re)construct a modern and strong Japanese body, individually as well as nationally.

The observed tendencies of particularism and nationalism can also be found in the interpretation of the Olympic value of internationalism. The encounters of pre-war “multiethnic” Japan and post-war “monoethnic” Japan, with the Olympic Movement as a “multiethnic event,” show how Japan dealt with internationalism. Before World War II, politicians and ideologists propagated the theory of the multiethnic origin of the Japanese nation, which “lent itself to the claim that the Japanese nation embodied the unification of Asia and that the peoples of neighbouring regions could be assimilated into the Japanese nation and their lands annexed by the Great Japanese Empire” (Oguma 2002:xxii). The fact that the medals of Sohn Kee-chung (Son Kitei in Japan) and Nam Sung-yong (Nan Shōryū in Japan), who won gold and bronze in the 1936 Berlin Games marathon, are claimed today on both the homepages of the Japanese Olympic Committee (as they were at that time subjects of the Japanese empire) as well as of the Korean Olympic Committee (since the champions were of Korean origin) can be seen as a lasting legacy of these policies. After the war, Japanese thinkers claimed their nation was in fact a harmonious and homogenous society without minorities. This redefinition of the Japanese nation was already part of a national reconstruction that ultimately relied on the unification of its populace. Members of such ethnic minorities, who did not fit the proscribed stereotype, came to be either ignored or characterized as “foreigners,” implying that any kind of contribution to Japanese society and culture by these minorities should be ignored.

Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu states that “[t]he monoethnic myth is a patriotic hymn dissonant with the often heard romantic rhapsodies of internationalization and globalism, the realization of which demand both a tolerance for differences and an understanding of shared humanity” (1993:78). It is a condition that Matsumoto Sannosuke (1971) says is a result of the Western nations’ common Christian background. According to him, they have always shared an
ideal of universalism and internationalism, which Japan was never able to encompass, even though the Western nations forced them to construct a nation-state that both adhered and contrast to them (49-56). The result was a nation-state that existed only for self-perpetuation: “The Japanese nation-state never possessed a universal ideal that transcended itself. The ultimate end-value of this national state was nothing other than the preservation of its own national polity (kokutai)... In a nutshell, Japan’s national mission was the self-perpetuation and self-expansion of the nation-state itself” (Matsumoto 1971:53). The Japanese solution to problems of multi-ethnicity and internationalism was thus to erase it: “Japan is all for internationalism, as long as it means the convergence of international opinion on the Japanese point of view” (Niehaus and Seinsch 2007:12). For the Japanese, learning about the Olympic Movement and thus about other countries, paradoxically meant not only strengthening the notion of a mono-ethnic nation, but also Japan’s feeling of “uniqueness.”

**Translating Olympic values**

Following his election as an IOC member in 1909, Kano’s commitment to the Olympic Movement compelled him to develop two key values that were to become the very essence of his sport—as well as his life-philosophy. These two principles, “most effective use of energy” (seiryoku zenyō) and “mutual welfare and benefit” (jita kyōei), clearly show analogies to the Olympic mottos, *citius, altius, fortius*, and respect mutuel. However, the differences in cultures made direct translation of these values difficult for the Japanese. Whereas the Olympic ideals often lean towards pragmatism and seem to be, in essence, utilitarian, Kanō’s principles favour a strong ethical approach based on Confucian ethics and on an altruism that relies on the Confucian *jin* (humanity or humanness).

Kanō translated *seiryoku zenyō* with several different phrasings: for instance, the “principle of the maximum-efficient use of mind and body” (at his speech given in 1932 at Southern California University), and “highest or the maximum efficient use of mental and physical energy” (at his lecture given in 1934 at the Parnassus Society in Athens). What all of his translations share in common is that they exclude the moral connotations associated with the term “Zen.” In this light, the Japanese character for zen should actually be translated as “good.” Therefore, *zenyō* is in fact not “maximum-efficiency” but “good efficiency” or “good use.” Kanō’s notion of goodness was clearly not based on religion but on Confucian ethics: “Zen is everything that supports the permanent development of society, while everything that obstructs this development is considered bad, or the opposite of Zen. Since ancient times, social life has been stimulated by loyalty towards the emperor, love towards our parents, and sincerity” (Kanō 1936:71). And so, in the Japanese tradition, moral “goodness” lies within the realm of society and state serving as an ideal that in modern language defines the realm of the nation-state.
The term *jita*, which means “oneself and others,” establishes a corporeal dichotomy that is dissolved by adding *kyōei* (mutual prosperity), in which self and other merge in the form of interpersonal dependence. The character for “prosperity” (*ei*) implies material prosperity (*eiga*), as well as idealistic prosperity as in glory or honour (*eiyo, eii, kōei*). Kanō himself used *ei* to express an ideal state of mental as well as corporeal contentment that can only be reached by the individual’s active participation in the betterment of a national as well as international society. Individuals are thus seen as social beings that can only exist and develop within the context of society; the Japanese term *ningen* (human being) literally means “being in-between humans” (see Niehaus 2003:165-185).

*Jita kyōei* (as well as *seiryoku zenyō*), in Kanō’s thinking gains the status of a universalistic value: “Is it not because this principle of mutual welfare and benefit has been recognized that we came to form the League of Nations and the Great Powers of the world came to meet for the decrease of naval and military armaments? These movements are also automatic acknowledgements of the crying need for efficiency and mutual welfare and benefit” (pamphlet from a speech given by Kanō Jigorō at the University of Southern California in 1932, 8). In this quote from 1932, Kanō touches upon the very sensitive topic of Japanese foreign politics. Japan had joined the League of Nations in 1926 and had signed the London Naval Treaty in 1930. But Japan left the League of Nations in 1933 — symbolically stepping out of a period of internationalism during the 1930s.

Kanō, however, preserved a strong international attitude during the 1930s, a time of increasing militarization in Japan. Yet, as for Coubertin, promoting patriotism and internationalism at the same time was no paradox for Kanō: “I think that they [the Olympics] benefit from the promotion of physical education, the cultivation of a sporting spirit (*undō seishin no kanyō*) and mutual friendship (*sōgo shinzen*)” (Kanō 1937:355). Whereas the promotion of physical education and sporting spirit were directed towards the nation, mutual friendship was certainly aimed at international exchange.

The forming of Kanō’s sport philosophy certainly has to be seen as reflective of a growing Japanese need for discursive participation in the Olympic Movement. For Japanese functionaries and representatives, “passive” participation on the sport fields did not match the nation’s relevance in the Olympic Movement and consequently they aimed to “actively” (co-) define its ideological framework. From the perspective of the Japanese representatives, there were at least three reasons why the Olympic Movement in those years could not be called international. First, Olympism or the Olympic idea was still a concept of exclusively Western symbols and Western interpretation of values. Moreover, the Olympics had never been held outside Europe or the United States; thus there was no geographical universalism. And finally only Western sports were included into the program, symbolizing the performative coloniza-
Spreading Olympism and the Olympic Movement in Japan

tion of Asia. Over time, all three aspects would be challenged.

In an article entitled *Waga Orinpikku hiroku* (My Secret Olympic Notes), published in the year 1938, Kanō underlined that Japan can actively contribute to the Olympic Movement: “Participation [in the Olympics] certainly stirs up the whole Japanese nation’s enthusiasm for physical education (*taiiku*). On the other hand we should not just imitate Western nations. I also want to blow Japanese spirit (*Nihon seishin*) into the Western Olympics and make them Olympics of the world (*sekai no Orinpikku*)” (Kanō 1938:370). The term “Japanese spirit” is not further explained and remains “vague” not only in the above quoted text but all throughout Kanō’s writings. But Kanō explicitly placed *Nihon no seishin* in a certain semantic field by asking: “Therefore, could we not think about […] flavouring (*kami*) the Olympics that developed in the West with the spirit of the warrior (*bushidō no seishin*)?” (Kanō 1938:369). His hope of harmoniously (*konzen*) unifying the Olympic spirit (*Orinpikku seishin*) and the spirit of the martial arts (*budō seishin*) raises the question of Kanō’s perception of *budō* (martial arts).

In the 1930s *budō* was placed in an antagonistic position towards Western sports, which were interpreted as a threat to a “pure” Japanese spirit since they were considered to encourage individualism and selfishness: “*Budō*, originally a modern hybrid typical of late Meiji culture, was redefined as ‘timeless’ and utilized to infuse Western-type sports with ‘pure’ Japanese spirit” (Inoue 1998:172). In 1936, Tokyo was chosen, despite international protest, to be the host city for the 1940 Games. Japanese military leaders intended to employ the Games to advertise and strengthen Japan’s position in the arena of world politics, but “[t]here was also the perceived threat of polluting Japanese culture as well: the national and spiritual culture of Japan had to be clearly demarcated from that which it was not, so as to retain its pureness and solemnity for the Japanese polity” (Kanō 1938:370). However, Kanō’s definition of *budō*, a term that was claimed by different ideological discourses, differed from contemporary propaganda in which it was semantically seen as an opposite force to Western sports, but Kanō saw them both as complementary. *Budō* and *bushidō* were not put into a nationalistic and imperialistic framework that reduced *bushidō* to the population’s willingness for self-sacrifice for the national body (*kokutai*); on the contrary, both remained in essence modern and international. For Kanō, the two martial arts that proto-typically represent the spirit of *budō* were kendō and judo and he consequently hoped to see both as Olympic sports.

“Peripheral” Olympic nations increasingly claim their right to discursive participation. Their contributions to the debate are not characterized by continuity, but follow “Olympic time and space” as they basically are limited to the occasions when the Games are given to Asian nations. Kanō wanted to see a Japanese presence in the Olympic Movement in 1938. When Tokyo was still slated to hold the 1940 Olympics, the first conference focusing on the problem of Asian, Arabic, and African marginalization in the Olympic Movement was
titled the First International Congress on the Olympics and Cultural Exchange in the World System held in Korea in 1987. This was the beginning of a trend continuing with the Seoul Olympics and the successful bid of Beijing that intensified Asians’ contributions to and their interpretations of Olympism. The Korean Shin-pyo Kang, for example, proposed the establishment of a second International Olympic Academy in Qufu (Shandong). The suggested location is the hometown of Confucius and in its vicinity lies Mount Tai, one of the five sacred mountains of Taoism. The establishment of an academy in Qufu would not only parallel but challenge the ideological and religious symbolism of the International Olympic Academy in Ancient Olympia that is situated on the flanks of Mount Kronos. At the Beijing conference on “Multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement” (August 2007), Sanada Hisashi (member of the board of directors of the Japan Olympic Academy) presented a paper entitled “‘Wa’ as a concept of multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement.” Here Sanada aimed to preserve multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement by including the “traditional” Japanese concept of wa (harmony, peace) as a value in Olympism: “The ‘wa’ of East and West, the ‘wa’ of Olympic sports and ethnic sports, and ‘wa’ in the sense of seeking harmony with foreign culture, without making any essential changes to your own culture, must certainly be seen as one beneficial approach that will assure the persistence of multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement in the future.” However, these contributions do not seem to be extensions of the Olympic framework, but translations of existing Olympic values based on a specific cultural and philosophical background. In this sense, these contributions merely seem to substitute “Occidental Olympic vagueness” with “Oriental Olympic vagueness.”

**Spreading Olympism in Japan**

Olympism is in its emergence, its goals, its practice, and effect, is pedagogical. Based on an initiative by Coubertin, a plan to establish an Olympic Study Center in Greece to educate young people in Olympism had been worked out by Carl Diem and Ioannis Ketseas as early as 1938. This initial proposal led to the foundation of the International Olympic Academy (IOA) in 1961. The aim, and in fact its “mission,” is “to create an international cultural centre in Olympia, to preserve and spread the Olympic Spirit, study and implement the educational and social principles of Olympism and consolidate the scientific basis of the Olympic ideal, in conformity with the principles laid down by the ancient Greeks and the revivers of the contemporary Olympic Movement, through Baron de Coubertin’s initiative” (see http://www.ioa.org.gr/the_mission.htm). In order to spread the Olympic idea on national levels, National Olympic Academies (NOA) had been established since the late 1960s while the IOA functions as an ideological training facility for their members. Far Eastern countries were among the first to establish academies: South Korea and Chinese
Taipei in 1977 and Japan in 1978. However, interest in Olympic education remained minimal outside as well as within the IOC, despite the pedagogic legacy of Pierre de Coubertin and the establishment of the IOA. A strengthening of Olympic education within the Olympic Movement can only be witnessed in the 1990s, most likely as a reaction to the growing criticism against the Olympic Movement’s commercialism and expansionism. The first official definition of Olympism was given in the Olympic Carter of 1991 and the Olympic Congress of 1994 stressed in its final declaration the educational value of Olympism. Between the years 1990 and 2000 a total number of 65 NOA’s have been established.

Japan, still under the influence of the positive economic and political effects of the 1964 Games, was one of the first countries to establish an Olympic Academy in 1978, even though Olympic education had already started in the 1960s as part of the preparation for the Tokyo Games (Matsumoto 2007:35). Christian Tagsold (2002) has shown that the Japanese government took control not only over the organization of the Tokyo Games but also over the Games’ symbolism, succeeding in connecting the positive image of the Olympic Movement with the Japanese nation-state and presenting to the world a nation that had learned from its nationalistic and militaristic past, a nation that was ready to join the international community again. During the early 1960s Olympic education became a “national project” and the Ministry of Education supervised an Olympic Exhibition Tour (1962-1964), the Citizen’s Olympic Games Movement (Orinpikku kokumin undō) and the publication of textbooks for Olympic education. The general contents of those textbooks is exemplified by the textbook Orinpikku to Gakkō: Orinpikku Gakushū no tebiki (The Olympics and School: Guidebook for Olympic Learning), which features four objectives: international understanding, national self-awareness, knowledge about the Olympic Movement, and raising participation in sports. The publication of textbooks was part of a national education program that “aimed at cultivating a social attitude and creating a social environment that would present the Japanese hosts in a positive light to the world” (Matsumoto 2007:36; Sanada 2004:68-72).

However, presenting a nation requires an audience and as soon as the audience returned to their home countries, the Olympic education program was terminated. Olympic education during the following Games in Sapporo (1972) and Nagano (1998) revolved around the same objectives. However, the focus of attention shifted from the national to the local. The importance of the local representing the national was, for example, mirrored in the “One Haiku for the Olympics” Program initiated for the Games. One of the haiku written by the citizens of Nagano prefecture reads:

Nagano Olympics
Resound all over the world,
The murmur of the snow!
Isshiki Miho, Mure Village

Through displaying haiku as a “unique” Japanese form of poetry, the prefecture of Nagano was able to present itself to the (nation/world?) as a representation of the traditional and “truly” Japanese identity.

The most recent example showing the international receiving attention (or even relevance) only in front of a national background was Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Summer Olympics, announced in September 2005. On the website of the Bid Committee (http://www.tokyo2016.or.jp/jp/), the 1964 Olympics were used as a frame of reference to evoke a nostalgia of hope that connected the past Tokyo Olympics with the present and the future, e.g., by a link titled “Legacy 1964” that featured interviews with former Olympic participants like Kasai Masae, Miyake Yoshinobu, Endō Yukio and others. The Olympic legacy was even more evident on the official bid website:

When we look back, on October tenth in 1964 the sky above the grove of the Meiji-shrine in Tokyo was of a transparent blue. [...] In these days, 40 years later, what is ruining not only Tokyo, but the whole country, is unfortunately a clouded sky, which is the feeling of a blockade (heiso kukan). It is said that the economy recovers more or less, but Japan has not yet wiped out the spiritlessness (jugainasa), with which it is aimlessly drifting around. (http://www.tokyo-2016.com/way.html)

This diffuse feeling of spiritlessness, which is a common allegation by Japan’s political rightists, refers to the absence of “Japanese spirit” (yamato damashi). It became a strong argument in Tokyo’s effort to create a semantic field in which the host city Tokyo would once again become the unifying force and symbol of a strong nation. With China becoming the dominant political and economic power in East Asia, Fukuda Tomiaki’s (chairman of the Sports Committee of the JOC) remark in an interview with Konō Ichirō (chairman of the Tokyo 2016 Olympic Bid Committee) that “Tokyo is also the center of Asia” seemed to express the hope to restore Tokyo’s glory that has slipped away with the times. In this context, the Games’ international arena is reduced to a stage for a purely national play.

The crucial shortcomings in terms of sustainability of the Olympic education for the 1964 Olympics still characterize the present situation. Even the establishment of a Japanese Olympic Academy in 1978 had no positive effect on the sustainability of Olympic education in Japan, which remains an isolated event around specific time clusters. A survey conducted at the Tokyo Metropolitan University showed that not even students who participated in a physical education theory class knew of the concept Olympism and only 7.2% were aware of the Olympic motto (Masumoto 2007:43). Another survey conducted by Saga Hitoshi, with students from a general course in Olympic studies,
showed that the students’ two most important points of interest were “episodes and dramas of great Olympians of the past (92.1%) and victories and results of Japanese athletes (90.8%)” (Saga 2004:82-84.).

The JOA’s official aim is “to embody and implement the ideals of the Olympics in Japan, which are described as Fundamental Principles in the Olympic Charter,” without propagating a Japanese or Asian form of Olympism. As a “branch” of the IOA, the Japanese Academy, as well as other national academies, is “ideologically supervised” and only functions “as transmitters and amplifiers of the [International] Academy’s ideas by means of the National Programs of Olympic Education” (http://www.ioa.org.gr/national_olympic_academies.htm, consulted August 2008). The International Academy, however, devotes itself to multiculturalism—not in the sense of multicultural diversity but as the concept of different cultures participating in a movement that remains Western-centric.

**Conclusion**

It has been stated that “Olympism” is characterized by the vagueness of its values, but this observed vagueness also raises the question of the meaning of values in global encounters. Coubertin spoke French, which was still the Western lingua franca in the 19th century. However, not only did French lose its predominant position in the following century, but globalization also called for translations into many different languages. Marx in the *Grundrisse* had already stated that “[i]deas do not exist separately from language. Ideas which have first to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign language in order to circulate, in order to become exchangeable, offer a somewhat better analogy; but the analogy then lies not in the language; but in the foreignness of language” (Elster [1903] 1986:53-54). What will be translated and how will it be translated? And in how far have functional and pragmatic factors been taken into consideration? It has been shown that these problems are as closely connected to the question of historicity and cultural space as they are to the subject and the translator, who himself is part of a certain time-space frame, with his individual background, education and socialization. I have argued that in the Japanese discourse, Olympic universalism and internationalism are answered by a particularistic standpoint stressing local and national identities. Using the examples of the ideological and educational framework of the Olympic Games and Movement in Japan, it has been shown that historical and cultural dynamics highly influenced the modes of the discourse. Yet, this discourse was never unanimous or static, but characterized by multi-vocal, fluid and different degrees of compliance, as well as resistance, to Western hegemony.

The need to overcome Olympic Euro-centrism or Western-centrism, which has also been described as an “undesirable form of neo-colonialism” (Liponski and Mickiewicz 1987:513), has been increasing thanks to the growing interna-
national influence of Japan as well as the strengthening of its national identity throughout its history with the Olympic Movement. However, the inclusion of Asian sports like judo into the Olympic program merely meant their assimilation into the existing Western sporting traditions. So far, attempts to overcome the West’s interpretative hegemony over the concept of Olympism by adding an “Asian flavor” have more or less been ignored.
Endnotes

1 The latest definition can be found on the IOC website: http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (consulted August 2008). The given definition is based on the extensive writings of Pierre de Coubertin. For Coubertin’s writings on Olympism, see Müller (ed.) 2000.


3 Only one term uses Chinese characters to refer the Olympic Games: Gorin (“Five Rings”). The terminology used in the early Japanese sources shows the lack of a regulating authority in the discourse, which would only appear with the creation of the Dai Nippon Taiiku Kyōkai in 1911.

4 In the same year also the Yomiuri Shimbun features the term Orinpizumu on 3.9.1935, p. 4.

5 Orinpikku, 13:3, 1935:2-6. This article is a translation of a lecture Coubertin gave in Lausanne. Quarante années d’Olympisme 1894-1934. (Allocution prononcée lors de la célébration du 40e anniversaire du rétablissement des Jeux Olympiques par le baron de Coubertin, le samedi 23 juin 1934 à l’Aula de l’université de Lausanne) in: Le Sport Suisse, no.1394 (4 juillet 1934). I thank Wada Kōichi for providing this information and the sources.

6 See the official homepages of the JOC and the KOC. Both athletes were forced to compete under their Japanese names, and Son is said to have wept out of chagrin when the Japanese flag was raised in his honor. In the official records of the IOC, Son’s nationality is still given as Japanese, while on the Olympic Marathon Memorial in California and in other Olympic records, his nationality is given as Korean. On the memorial in the Berlin Olympic Stadium, his nationality was once changed from Japanese to Korean but is today back to Japanese.

7 The non-celebrated Tokyo Games of 1940 showed that the antagonistic forces of Olympic universalism and Japanese particularism could only result in conflict. This became clear already in 1936, when the Japan Advertiser (November 17, 1936) announces that according to the Education Ministry the Organizing Committee should be so powerful that it could overrule decisions by the IOC “should it be found not fitting to the national characteristics of Japan” and further that “the sport activities are only of secondary importance to Japan, the primary object being to show the world the cultural development of Japan.” These statements invited strong criticism from the IOC. See the file Japon Correspondance 1936-1939 of the IOC Archives in Lausanne.

8 The article appeared posthumous in the magazine Kaizō (vol. 20, no. 7) and shows that Kanō at the end of his life did not have any illusions about his achievements: “In my lifetime I did not succeed, but in the following I will succeed.” (ibid.)

10 Unpublished manuscript of Sanada Hisashi, “‘Wa’ as a concept of multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement’ presented at the conference on “From Athens to Beijing = Multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement,” in Beijing, August, 2007, page 5.


12 The headline of the official webpage reads: Culture of Nagano “One Haiku for the Olympics” Program/ Greeting the people of the world through Japanese culture, see: http://www.threeweb.ad.jp/logos/saijiki/haiku100e.html (consulted August 2008).

13 I would like to thank Wolfram Manzenreiter for his careful reading of my manuscript and for his constructive comments.
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Beyond All Barriers: The Significance of the 1988 Seoul Olympics

OK Gwang and HA Nam-Gil

China successfully hosted the Beijing Olympic Games, demonstrating to the world its remarkable achievement in both national status and sport. It was the third Summer Games held in Asia, and for many Koreans it was a vivid reminder of the 1988 Summer Games in Seoul twenty years before. The 1988 Games made contributions to both modern Korean society and the world. The participation of almost all IOC member countries, including the USSR and the USA, resulted in the 1988 Seoul Olympics being remembered as the Games that demolished ideological conflicts. Its slogan, Beyond the Wall, represented harmony beyond Eastern and Western ideological barriers. The Games also helped Korea pave the way toward democracy and economic development. South Korea was propelled onto the global stage by means of sports performance and facilities, urban reformation, economic advancement, and environmental improvements. There are many hopes that this will also be true for China in the aftermath of its 2008 Games.

Modern sport was introduced to Korea over one hundred years ago by western Christian missionary groups. This western cultural convention was adopted to promote the modernization of Korean society, gradually becoming a “vehicle” of resistance in the struggle against Eastern imperial power in the first half of the 20th century (Jarvie 1985:64–67). Western sport offered Korean patriotism a Christian shield against Japanese imperialism and the result was a unique combination of sport, religion, and nationalism (Ha and Mangan 1994:351). After Korea obtained its independence in 1945, modern sport advanced the nation’s post-colonial modernization and nationalism. In conjunction with military political ambitions and considerable economic progress from the late 1960s to the 1980s, modern sport became an asset to the transformation of society.

The evolution of modern sport in Korea is closely linked to its national history. Sport has been linked to the transformation of education, culture, economics, and politics. Modern sport can also be regarded as the central mechanism in the evolution of modern Korean society. The important ideological issues related to the evolution of modern Korean sport are imperialism, nationalism, and modernization. These ideologies are the significant ingredients that have mingled to create both the history of Korean sport and Korean society.
The story of the Olympic Movement in Korea began with two marathoners, Un-bae Kim and Tae-ha Kwon, who took part in the 1932 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Kwon finished 9th in the 1932 marathon, running under the Japanese name, Taika Gon (Martin and Gynn 2000:145–161). Dyreson (2008) recently found an interesting story on Taika Gon in an American newspaper. The article stated, “He was severely beaten by Japanese police as the athlete returned by ferry from a visit to his homeland, in order to catch the ship scheduled to carry the Japanese Olympic team to Los Angeles” (Jefferson City Post-Tribune 1932:9). The story noted that Kwon hoped to recover from the injuries the Japanese police had inflicted in time for the Olympic marathon.

The third Korean athlete was Gi-jeong Son, often known by his Japanese name, Ki-tei Son. Son was the Korean marathon champion at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, although he was officially a member of the Japanese team. Gil-yong Lee, a sports reporter at Dong-a Daily, said that it was a courageous act on Son’s part. He paid the price with the loss of his job. The impact of the report was incalculable. The identification of Son as a Korean, in defiance of Japanese propaganda, was a source of great pride for the long-suffering Korean people and restored much-needed national self-respect. Son stated, “I felt desperate and ashamed when I stood on the victory stand, wearing a shirt with the Japanese ‘rising sun’ on the left chest.” In the photograph of Son in Gil-yong Lee’s report, the Japanese flag had been removed from Son’s uniform. As a result of this report, several executives and reporters were jailed, including Gil-yong Lee.

A Japanese journalist stated in his report that Son’s photo was not the first that went to press at Dong-a Daily with the Japanese flag removed. Un-bae Kim, who had finished sixth in the Los Angeles Olympics marathon four years earlier, was the first Korean athlete whose photograph had the Japanese flag re-
moved from his shirt. A women’s monthly, *New Home*, ran a photo that only showed Son’s legs, apparently in an attempt to avoid showing the Japanese national flag printed on his shirt.

All of this clarifies the fact that Korean sport played an important role in building assertions of independence during colonial times, representing for the Koreans much more than simply sport. Sport was a means of gaining revenge on the Japanese and added fuel to Korea’s struggle for independence. Three years after their independence from Japanese colonization, Koreans finally appeared under their own national flag at the 1948 London Games. However, their joy did not last long as the Korean War broke out two years later.

The Korean War and the severe dislocations and political tensions in its aftermath had very significant consequences for sports development in Korea. The annual National Sports Festivals were revived and in 1972, a National Youth Sports Festival was initiated, but it was not until the late 1970s before any significant state investment in vigorous policies and facilities could be put in place (for details, see Ok 2007: 300-319). It was the developments at the end of this decade that began South Korea’s march towards hosting the 1988 Games, although it was hardly clear at that point that such an opportunity was within the realm of the possible.

It began in August of 1978, when the 42nd World Shooting Championship was held in Seoul, the first international sports tournament to take place in South Korea since it had registered with the IOC in 1949. At the same time, the Korea Weightlifting Federation also won the bid for the World Weightlifting Championship, which was to be held in Seoul in August 1978. However, the government supported the former and the president of the Korea Shooting Federation, Jong-gyu Bak, carried out preparations for the championship event with governmental support. There were eight IOC members at the shooting championship, and they were impressed by the organization of the event, in which 1,518 athletes from 68 nations participated. Gi-ha Lee directed the opening ceremony of the event, utilizing Korean traditional culture and impressing both the participants and officials. As a result, he was selected to be the director for the 1988 Seoul Olympics’ Opening Ceremonies. After the World Shooting championship, Jong-gyu Bak and other leaders became more confident than ever about hosting international events. The IOC members congratulated the Korea Shooting Federation on its success and even proposed that Korea host the Olympic Games in the near future. The seed of a far-reaching idea was planted with the shooting championship (Kim 2000:20–22).

On October 8, 1979, President Bak officially announced that Seoul would pursue the host responsibilities of the Games with the following aims: 1) encouraging economic development and displaying national power; 2) promoting Korean sports at the international level; 3) promoting friendship with the world through sport; 4) establishing a diplomatic environment with communist and non-allied nations; 5) reconsidering national solidarity through an international
sports event (Department of Sport, Ministry of Education 1979). After the announcement, at a dinner party on October 26, 1979, President Jeong-hee Bak was murdered by Jae-gyu Kim, the Central Intelligence Agency Director (Ricquart 1988:14).

After the assassination of President Jeong-hee Bak, the Olympic plan initiative seemed to disappear from the scene. A military coup followed the assassination, and General Du-hwan Jeon (known to the world as Chun Doo Hwan) assumed power over South Korea. Jeon became the president and continued to pursue the Olympic bid, although his staff was concerned by the enormous expense and effort required to host the games (Ricquart 1988:15).

Olympic bid activity was seriously advanced after a meeting led by the Sports Department at the Ministry of Education on March 7, 1980. On September 29, 1980 the KOC (Korean Olympic Committee) organized a 10-member advisory meeting, which preceded an extended standing committee meeting on November 6, 1980. The KOC submitted an Olympic bid candidate application for the city of Seoul to the IOC on December 2, 1980. And on September 30, 1981, the host city decision was made with Seoul receiving 55 votes and Nagoya 27. Thus, Korea became the second Asian nation to host the Olympics since the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964 and the 16th country in the world to host the Games.

However, the political conditions were not favorable due to constant political protests and ideological confrontation with the North. In fact, the ideological confrontation with the North created various obstacles for the staging of the Olympics. On the international level, Seoul was not a perfectly peaceful place in which to hold the Games. There was a bitter historical relationship with Japan, Korea’s former colonial ruler, as well as troubled diplomatic relationships with the Communist nations, including the USSR and China. From a political perspective, the United States was the only nation close to Korea. To a certain extent, Seoul and the IOC gambled on sport as a mechanism to achieve harmony on the peninsula.

After the IOC announcement, the government revised the National Law for Sports Promotion so that it specifically focused on the exaltation of national prestige (Ministry of Education of Republic of Korea 1962). Through this, the Seoul Olympics were to be utilized as a means of expressing and demonstrating national power. Furthermore, the Sport Department was reconstructed in March 1982 to place a national sports promotion policy as the central goal. The Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee (SLOOC) and the Asian Games Organizing Committee were established to integrate policies for the promotion of sports and to prepare both international events. Once these organizations were rapidly and carefully established, the next stage was to build new sports facilities in which to host the Games. By 1985, 19,442 sports fields had been built or expanded, and 59 sports parks were newly built. These were for the use of the young and the general public.
Beyond All Barriers

Considering the political circumstances in the peninsula, there was due concern that North Korea would almost certainly interfere with the successful conduct of the Games. There were, in fact, several incidents, instigated by the North, to impede the holding of the Games in the South. On October 9, 1983, the North terrorized the Aung San National Cemetery in Rangoon, Burma during the six-nation round of visits by President Jeon Doohwan. Jeon and over thirty officials were at the site of the North Korean terror attack and 14 South Korean officials died in the incident (Chosun Ilbo 2007).

On November 11, 1987, in the year before the Games, a Korean Air 858 Boeing 707, which was on its way from Abu Dhabi to Bangkok, carrying 93 South Korean passengers, 2 foreigners, and 20 cabin crew members blew up, killing all aboard. It was later revealed that Kim Jong-il, the leader of North Korea, secretly ordered Kim Hyunhee (Mayumi Hachiya, using her Japanese name on boarding) to install a bomb in the plane (New York Times 1987).

North Korea also propagandized that the South would utilize the games to finalize the division of the peninsula. The North believed that holding the games in Seoul would be a disgraceful decision for the Olympic Movement. This propaganda incited South Koreans to develop an anti-governmental stance and to eventually produce an “anti-US” atmosphere (Senn 1999:220–221).

The selection of Seoul for the 24th Summer Olympic Games was considered a political time bomb by most of the world audience. The IOC had taken a determined initiative, even facing political danger between the two Koreas until the games were finalized (Pound 1994: xi–xii).

Richard W. Pound, a member of the IOC Executive Board from 1983 to 1991 and a former vice-president of the IOC, revealed his great relief and emotion after the closing ceremonies of the Seoul games in his book, Five Rings over Korea, as follows: “I had a lump in my throat and suspiciously watery eyes as the realization finally sank in that the Games had finished without incident. Not only had the Seoul Games taken place, but they had been the most successful in Olympic history” (Pound 1994: ix–x).

As Pound added, Korea had become a democratic nation in an unimaginably short period under the political pressures of North Korea, one of the most authoritarian states in the world. There were also pre-existing tensions between the superpowers left over from the Cold War. However, the Olympic Movement contributed to the success of the Seoul Olympic story. It was an unforgettable experience of joy for the world’s young generation (Pound 1994: x).

Among other things, the three major elements of the modern Olympic Games were successfully carried out during the event: the athletics themselves, academic activities, and cultural festivals. There were 159 NOC nations participating at the event and 8,391 athletes (2,194 women and 6,197 men) competed at 237 events. Baseball, taekwondo, and women’s judo were the demonstration events (Greenberg 1991:90). In modern Olympic history, there may never have been an event of this magnitude: 167 countries officially par-
ticipated, including about 40,000 athletes, officials, judges, and reporters and 11,331 media members (4,978 from the written press and 6,353 broadcasters). Unofficially 240,000 spectators attended the athletic, academic, and cultural events. The Seoul Olympics were also historically significant as the last Games to occur in the context of the Cold War.

The mascot of the Games was a baby tiger, “Hodori,” drawn from Korean legends and used extensively in the Games promotional literature. The emblem of the Games was *samtaeguk*, a traditional pattern that represented Korean national identity, meaning “harmony.” There was an official poster also representing the ideal of “harmony and progress.” The Organizing Committee produced 27 related poster styles to familiarize the public with the Games.

With a large contingent of 424 athletes in 23 events, Korea achieved its highest-ever place in the medal count. It finished fourth after the USSR, East Germany, and the US, winning 12 gold, 10 silver, and 11 bronze medals. For the first time, Korea beat Japan, which finished in 14th place, and indeed Korea would continue to best Japan through the 2008 Games (with the exception of 2004). Korean sports writer Too-hyun Koh stated that this historical achievement was the outcome of intensive training at the “Mecca of sports in Korea,” the Korea National Training Center, known as the Taeneung Athletic Village, which was built northeast of Seoul in 1966 by the Korea Sports Council (Koh 1990:33–44). The training regimen provided the technical foundation for Korea’s success, but equally important were their national spirit and societal factors. Indeed, the only incident to blemish the otherwise sterling Korean performances was caused by the boxer Byun Jong-Il and his coaching staff, who remained in the ring for over an hour after he lost his match in the bantamweight division against Alexandar Hristov of Bulgaria (Bang 2005:421–422).

**Economics, politics, and sport**

There are various factors that contributed to the hosting of the 1988 Games in Seoul, South Korea, but perhaps the most significant was the influence that the economic and political environment had on Korea’s decision to host this mega event. The emergence of the South Korean economy has often been called “Miracle on the River Han” by both external and internal communities. The 1988 Summer Olympic Games can be called the “Miracle at Jamsil” as Jamsil is where the main Olympic stadium was built, opening on September 29, 1984 in preparation for the prominent event. The construction occurred in the middle of a period of tremendous economic development for the Koreans, a result of the implementation of the Five-Year Economic Development Plan that aimed to restore the nation after the suffering caused by Japanese colonization from 1910 to 1945 and the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 (Bak 1999:67–301; National Unification Board, 1982: 39–34; Frank, Kim and Westpahl 1975).

This economic transformation caused an industrial development that even-
tually brought about a decline in the agricultural population from 46% of the total population in 1970, to 29% in 1980, and 17.5% by 1990. More women than men left rural areas for cities during this period (Nahm 1996:492). As a result of the sharp changes in Korean industry, the Gross National Product (GNP) increased quite substantially. According to Koreascope, Korean per-capita GNP in 1960 was US$ 79. It then increased to US$ 253 in 1970, US$ 1,597 in 1980, US$ 5,883 in 1990 and reached US$ 10,037 in 1995. This new economic drive influenced Koreans’ perception of sport and the Olympics since as their living standards improved, their leisure time increased accordingly.

The economic situation also produced a heated controversy between America and the IOC. The 1988 Summer Olympic Games were extremely profitable, not only for the Korean economy but also for the American media. The American media offered an astonishing amount of $750 million for all television rights only. They intended to televise final competitions in the American prime-time viewing periods. This was opposed by both the IAAF (International Association of Athletics Federations) and the IOC; however, an agreement was reached between the IOC and U.S. television executives. This agreement resulted in enormous profits for American television companies, including NBC. Richard Pound dealt with the frustrating negotiations for the sale of the U.S. television rights to the Seoul Olympics under the authorization of Samaranch. In the end, the broadcasting revenue for the Games was $403 million, of which Seoul received approximately 20% (Barney, Wenn and Martyn 2002:213–230).

In the 1980s, with the social and economic changes, professionalism in modern Korean sport also evolved. Previously, Koreans had developed professional sport for national purposes. For instance, it is often said that the government supported the promotion of professional boxing in 1962 and professional golf in 1968. However, their budget in the 1960s for professionalism was very limited. As a consequence, professional sports only became popular in the 1980s in conjunction with the Seoul Olympics and Asian Games. Professional baseball began in 1982, and both professional football and professional ssireum (Korean traditional wrestling) started in 1983. According to Son (2004), there were 8 professional teams and 1,655 players. Spectators for professional baseball and soccer numbered 3,095,077 in 1983 and by 2002 there were over 6 million (Son 2004:3–14).

Military and political power also played an important role in promoting the development of modern Korean sport. In the 1970s, three particular stimuli helped with the transformation: Bak’s government sports policies, the international sports movement, and socio-economic growth. The social foundations for youth sport were extended with curricular reinforcement, the establishment of youth halls, the holding of youth sports festivals, the promotion of international exchanges in youth sport, and the spread of recreation. This development and cultural diffusion were achieved with enormous government support. It should not be ignored that sport during this era accelerated social mobilization,
and the affluence of athletes and coaches. It was obvious that the newly-reformed government was using sport to control society, rather than to promote self-realization and to cultivate character through physical activity. In addition, the need for the development of national status in international arenas was often reflected in the government’s sport policy. Modern Korean sport, as a consequence, attached too much importance to elitism and the general public was not able to participate. The seed of “sport for all” could not be planted at this time due to this attitude of elitism (Ok 2007:320). However, the reformed government of Bak Jeong-hee (known to the world as Park Chung-hee) significantly influenced Korean sport through the initiative, “Physical Fitness is National Power.” Eventually, new foundations of modern sport were established, which in the 1980s resulted in prosperity in Korean sport history. As Mangan and Ha stated, “if the evolution of modern Korean sport is compared to the four seasons, then the 1960s was the spring when the seeds were sown, the 1970s was the summer when the roots took firm hold and the 1980s and 1990s were the autumn when the fruits ripened” (Ha and Mangan 2002:160–162; Kim 2001).

Not only was South Korea hosting the 24th Summer Olympic Games in 1988, but also the 1986 Asian Games and the Olympic Games for Handicapped People in 1988 were to be held in Seoul. However, while South Korea moved toward harmony, the North kept its door strongly closed to becoming part of the movement. North Korea did not agree to sports exchanges with the South. The possibility of forming a single Korean delegation to represent the nation at international meets was nowhere in sight. South Korea, with the assistance of the United Nations and the IOC, invited the North for sports exchange talks, including co-hosting the 1988 Games, which would have been permitted by the IOC, holding eight meetings from 1963 to 1990. North Korea, however, did not put forth the effort to make it reality.

**Olympic Education and the 1988 Seoul Olympics**

Olympic Education is also an important element when examining the Seoul Olympics because it has been closely linked to government policy from its beginning in the early 1980s. A historical trace can reach back to the mid-1960s to recognize South Korean participation in the Olympic Education movement through the IOA (International Olympic Academy) program, which started in 1960. Dr. Juho Jang was the first South Korean participant in the regular IOA program. The Korean Olympic Academy was founded on June 23, 1977 with Taeyoung Jang elected as its president. The South Korean Olympic Movement began with the KOA regulations and the Olympic Education Program promoting academic studies on Olympism in 1980. The KOA started organizing regular symposia, workshops, lecture meetings, and exhibitions after its regulations and programs evolved. After Seoul was selected as the host city for the XXIV
Summer Olympics in 1982, substantial government support enabled the KOA movement to hold academic symposia and meetings nine times between 1982 and 1988 with the following themes: *Olympic Movement and Social Development, People’s Olympics through Olympic Education, Tasks and Realization of the Ideology of the Seoul Olympic Games, Korean Olympic Movement and Vision in the age of 2000, and Role of the IOA for Global Harmonization and Peace.* At the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the Korean Olympic Education Movement hosted a reunion of over 200 IOA alumni.

The leading organization for the Olympic Movement in South Korea started a formal educational process, launching the first KOA Regular Session on September 18, 1989. The five days of the first session were held in order to promote the Olympic ideal in Seoul. Financial support for the session and the following courses were made by several supporters, though mainly by Dr. Un Yong Kim, a former IOC member, and Dr. Se Jik Park, the president of the SLOOC. Dr. Donghwan Kim (2008) summarized the most recent achievements of Olympic education of the Olympic Academy for the last 20 years as follows: 1) development of Olympic educational programs for schools; 2) extension of the 1988 Seoul Olympics’ spirit; 3) practice of the fair play movement with the Korean Fair Play Committee; 4) interchange of activities with other international Olympic academies; 5) holding of the Korea Olympic Congress; 6) unfolding of public relations for the Olympic Games (Kim 2008).

Since its inception in 1988, Olympic education in Korea has had three major roles. The first role is to help athletes and people to overcome the so-called “victory ideology.” The strong sense of competition and value associated with a winning ideology can cause various problems. Participants in sport consider the result rather than the process of the games if they are too oriented by victory ideology. The principle of sportsmanship may be able to help athletes break away from victory ideology. Olympism can play an important role in injecting sportsmanship into society through Olympic education. Secondly, Olympic education has played an important role in integrating people in South Korean society. The symbol of the five Olympic rings represents harmony and internationalism. Various social and ideological conflicts in the Korean peninsula can be resolved by the concept of internationalism cultivated through Olympic education. Lastly, Olympic education can contribute to world peace. There are numerous good examples of the world peace movement in South Korea, such NGOs as Peace Corps for African starvation, Pakistan earthquake relief, and WTF’s (World Taekwondo Federation) recent Peace Corps activities (Kim 2008).

An analysis of books and other sources on Olympic education, mostly published before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, shows that most of the material deals with Olympic history, world geography and history, physical education and sports, social issues, and the meaning of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Among the content of the sources, books for elementary schools were utilized
for the curriculum in order to make students aware of the meaning of the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement, the reason for international gathering at the Games, athletic events, and so on. The contents for middle school and high school are composed of important issues of the Games, discussions regarding the relationship between society and the Games, visiting the Korean Olympic Committee and observing Olympic affairs, the history of the Games, the meaning of the Seoul Olympics, and so forth. At the university level, professors whose specialty is sport history, teach and give students assignments to study Olympic history and the meaning of the Games. Some universities, including Yonsei University, offered specific classes for Olympism and relevant issues, such as politics, economy, and social changes. Every year, college students go to the IOA to learn about the Olympics, even though Olympic studies and education seemed to lessen after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Nevertheless, Olympic education has played an important part in providing improvements in South Korean education and society in general.

The significance of the 1988 Seoul Olympics: sport and cultural transformation

The 1988 Seoul Olympics were the high point of modern Korean sport. They were a product of the global sports movement, of national socio-cultural transformations, and of official and popular political intention. In several respects, the Seoul Games offer a model to any prospective host nation. First of all, the Seoul Olympics promoted political democracy and diplomacy. They hosted 13,304 athletic participants from 160 countries and could be regarded as a success, embodying harmony and peace. They are also remembered as the last event to occur within the Cold War era between world rivals. Furthermore, they contributed to political reform, finalizing democratically the military regime through continuous efforts, including the Declaration of June 29th (1988). After the event, for the first time in Korean presidential history, President No Tae-woo made a speech at the General Meeting of the United Nations. This showed that Korean politics and diplomacy had been promoted to a certain degree.

Secondly, profits from the occasion stood at US$ 490 million, which eventually contributed to the advancement of the Korean economy. The amount was higher than the profits of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, making the Seoul Olympics the surplus Games due to the efficient preparation by the Organizing Committee. The committee promoted various sources for financial income, including TV broadcasting rights, commemoration medals, lottery fund raising, and badge sales—all economically marketed. Olympics-related business contributed to the development of industries like tourism, leisure, and communications and the restoration of the deflated economy. Korea’s improved brand image helped to make economic advancement possible, with beneficial trade opportunities and a massive increase in foreign capital inflow.
Thirdly, the former IOC president, Juan Antonio Samaranch said, “This atmosphere not only helped the world peace, but also provided valuable aid for the sporting world through the Olympic Movement” (Opening Address at WACSO 1988). There were numerous changes in Korean sporting culture, including physical education and sports science, after its announcement as the host country. The Korean government started to promote physical education, creating the Ministry of Sport, which has now become the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Sports facilities were rapidly expanded to encourage people to perceive the significance of sport. The Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation was established in April 1989 to finance sport and physical education, and it continues to do this today. The Seoul Olympic Scientific Congress Organization held the Sports Science Congress, which was approved by IOC, and it eventually contributed to the success of the Seoul Olympics, possessing three important elements: games, culture, and scientific congress. The Scientific Congress hosted 1,670 international scholars from 58 countries, as well as Korean scholars, and 695 works were presented. It took six years to prepare for the Scientific Congress and 120 staff from 12 subdivisions of sports science in Korea actively put every effort into meeting the high standards of this caliber of academic conference. Sport and physical education sharply rose to a higher stage of development as a result.

Another effect of the Seoul Olympics on modern Korean society was social integration. There were concerns in preparing for the Games about whether Korea would be capable of hosting them. However, the Games were successfully held due to cooperation among the Korean people in regards to preparation, and national confidence which convinced Koreans that they could do anything if they had the courage to stick to their convictions.

Another significant legacy of the Seoul Olympics was the cultural interactions among the international visitors. About 500 cultural events were produced to illustrate international culture as well as Korea’s cultural heritage. Traditional Korean culture was introduced to the global audience throughout the festival of culture and arts, exhibitions, and the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, communicating to staff, athletes, and tourists an understanding of Korean cultural heritage.

The Seoul Olympics can certainly be regarded as one of the most successful victories for both Korea and the Olympic Movement, promoting world peace and harmony through the diligent partnership of the SLOOC and the IOC, as evaluated by Juan Antonio Samaranch. As previously mentioned, the Seoul Olympics contributed to stronger diplomatic relations between Korea and other countries, including communist and non-aligned nations, and a relaxation of tensions between North and South Korea. Sport proved to be a strong political tool to supplement national diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics not only brought global recognition to Korea through sport, but were a successful achievement in the promotion of globalization.
Endnotes

1 Two of the three marathon racers on the Japanese team were from Korea, Kwon and sixth-place finisher Kim Eun-bai, who ran under the Japanese name of Onbai Kin. Seiichiro Tsuda of Japan finished fifth, giving the “Japanese” team that was two-thirds Korean the unofficial national team victory in the race.

2 The First Five-Year Plan, from 1962 to 1966, reflected fundamental economic strategies and the annual economic growth target was 7.1 percent: 1) to develop energy supply, including electric power and coal; 2) to an increase agricultural production and farmers’ income; 3) to expand important industries and social overhead capital; 4) to improve the balance of payments by the expansion of internal trades 5) to promote utilization of manpower and national land conservation; 6) to support technological advancement. The South Korean government launched this economic development plan and achieved an annual average economic growth of 7.8 percent in the first five years, from 1962 to 1966, of 9.7 percent in the second, from 1967 to 1971, of 10.1 percent in the third, from 1972 to 1976, 5.6 percent in the fourth, from 1977 to 1981. The annual economic growth rate was 8 percent during the 20 years’ economic development.
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Olympism and East Asia: A Philosophical Reflection on Olympic Philosophy

HSU Li-Hong (Leo)

Olympic education has been the subject of many presentations at recent conferences, including those organized by the International Olympic Academy (IOA). With China’s hosting the third Summer Olympic Games in East Asia, the Olympic Movement is increasingly prominent in East Asia. Inevitably, Olympic education, as a part of the Olympic Movement, has also received greater attention. In the last seven years alone, four major international conferences have been held on this and related themes. The first was at the Japanese Olympic Academy in November of 2003 on the theme of “The Olympic Movement in Asia.” A second one was held in Beijing by the IOC in October of 2006, which devoted a whole session to the theme of “Olympic Academies for the Future.” The third was also held in Beijing in November of 2007 by the Beijing Municipal Education Commission on the theme “Olympic Education and the All-round Development of People.” And the fourth was again convened in Beijing in July of 2008, on the eve of the Games, by the Humanistic Olympic Studies Center of Renmin University. The conference theme was “Great Breakthrough: Olympic Theories and Practices in the East.” The results of all these pedagogical presentations, I believe, are fruitful and applicable to different regions in East Asia.

Having reviewed some of these conferences, it is still worthwhile to refer to the concluding remarks by IOC Director of International Cooperation and Development, Mr. Sithole, at the Eighth Session of the IOA in May of 2006, when he challenged the delegates to always consider what they can do for Olympic education in their home countries and how they can contribute to the enormous task of disseminating Olympic education in developing countries. These are particularly important for those of us who work as sports educators or at Olympic academies in the East Asian region.

From an East Asian perspective, the Olympic Games have long been associated with Western imperialism, Eurocentrism, and commercialization, but the present era of globalization is forcing a reappraisal of nationalism, regionalism, and globalism. Whether these “isms” are beneficial or detrimental for the sporting world depends upon their uses in the wider society. However, when they find expression in such exhortations as “winning is everything,” “winning at all costs,” “our nation above all,” and “ethnic superiority,” they pose a danger to sports development and to sports education systems.

Thus, there is concern about the direction of our efforts in Olympic educa-
tion. This applies especially to most East Asian nations, given their entangled histories of Western and local imperialism. The slogans of the Beijing Olympic Games like “One World, One Dream” and “The world gives us 16 days; we give the world 5000 years” send powerful, though mixed messages across East Asia from China. A critical, comparative, and philosophical approach is required.

In this chapter, I first want to emphasize especially to readers who are staff of NOCs, policy makers, and sports educators in East Asia, that there still exists a significant gap between the Games as sports events and the Olympic Educational Movement. One of the major problems for Olympic education in China, as Ren (2004) already addressed, is the mass media’s overemphasis on sporting performance. Mass media can play an indispensable role in the Olympic education of the general public, but they “also attempt to mislead the public and direct attention to athletic performances while neglecting the ethical and social values of the Olympism” (ibid.: 77). The Japanese scholar Sanada (2004: 88) also observed that in East Asia the Olympic Movement has been deployed as part of all the bids to host the Olympics, but in most cases up to the present, the educational programs did not continue after the Games. Korea’s Olympic Movement, for instance, had no continuing educational presence in the school physical education curriculum (Bahng 2004: 79).

If we believe that Olympic sports have significant educational value, this gap must be bridged as soon as possible. Therefore, my task in this chapter is to clarify two questions about East Asia’s encounter with Olympism. The first, about Olympism in East Asia, is whether the Western imperialism, Eurocentrism and commercialism that lie behind the Olympics can be addressed by the Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia. The second, about Olympism for East Asia, is how regionalism, nationalism and globalism fit into the Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia. I will begin with a discussion of the ideological background of the Olympics.

**Olympism in East Asia: The force of Western imperialism, Eurocentrism and commercialism**

There have been arguments and concerns from scholars that because the Olympic Games were developed in the cradle of Western civilization in ancient Greece, they are marked as Western imperialist or Eurocentric (cf. McNamee 2006). However, these two ideologies do not fit into the philosophy of the Olympic Educational Movement because imperialism is a structure of political and economic domination of one nation over others, and Eurocentrism is a parochial claim of ideological domination; neither corresponds to the universal values that Olympism entails.

I have argued elsewhere (Hsu 1999: 254) that although the ideals of
Olympism and East Asia

Olympism were derived and adapted from the ancient Olympic Games by the Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin, the philosophy need not be seen as alien to non-Western ethical traditions. Scholars such as Parry (1999) and Wigmore (1999) have delineated the values of Olympism as tolerance, solidarity, respect for others, fair play, equality, participation, non-discrimination, and character development. All of these are prominent values in a vast range of ethical traditions. Wigmore more recently (2007) proposes Olympism as a philosophy of citizenship, highlighting such values as co-operation, loyalty, honesty, team work, fair play, friendship, trust, and competition. These too are not limited to Western codes of citizenship.

Over the past century, there have been many interpretations of Olympism, but they have all tended to instill it with a deeper positive meaning. Different conceptions of Olympism will interpret the general philosophy in such a way as to bring it to life in a particular context. The fact that the Summer Games were again held in East Asia provided another opportunity to showcase not only Western-origin sports but also Asian traditional sporting practices. As the Japanese Olympic Movement pioneer Kanō Jigorō argued, traditional sports have deep communal value and to connect them with the values of Olympism can contribute importantly to the shape of the Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia.

Should the Olympic Educational Movement be seen as a purely commercial activity? Definitely not. John MacAloon has reminded us that “the worldwide professionalization of sport administration is a wonderful thing, but we must help to insure that Olympic officials preserve awareness that the pursuit of money and medals must always remain in the service of greater social, cultural, and humanistic ends. If it doesn’t, then such sport is no longer Olympic, even if it sends great athletes to the Olympic Games... the special role of university professors who participate in Olympic academies is to remind all participants of these real meanings of Olympism” (2004: 48). In sum, Western imperialism, Eurocentrism and commercialism have no necessary basis in the Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia.

Regionalism and Olympism for East Asia

Athletes and coaches/trainers play major roles in the Olympic Games. They may carry the values of Olympism throughout their life. However, often they are also affected by federation and commercial sponsors and other institutional pressures (see Macintyre 1981 on the more general problem of how institutions affect their internal practices). These institutions can be their governing bodies of their sports, from local schools and clubs through federations, NOCs, and governments, up to international organizations. In this sense, it is very important to analyze the relationship between athletes, coaches, and their relevant sponsors through these levels. This section explores whether the ethical values of
Olympism can be exhibited in those different levels in connection with their ideologies in East Asia. To do this, we must consider a matrix of relationships—those among athletes, those between coaches and athletes, and those of organizations and sponsors with both the athletes and the coaches.

At the regional level in the West, athletes generally belong to community-level clubs. These athletes develop strong bonds of solidarity and mutual concern, especially in team sports. They can easily build up companionship and sometimes even a long term, caring friendship. For example, in Europe, field hockey is often considered a very friendly sport on a community-based level. Some of my friends who live in the Netherlands have known each other since their childhood through their field hockey club, and they have stayed in touch and maintained a very good life-long friendship.

In East Asia, nations such as in Taiwan, the regional level of sport is developed not through this kind of community-based sport club but through the school system. Normally children are assigned to nearby schools and learn new sports skills through their physical education lessons. And if they show talent and interest in a certain sport, they may be chosen to continue on teams at higher levels of competition. Being on a sports team in school is a great honor in Taiwan, especially for young basketball or baseball players. Children often develop close bonds with their teammates during their sporting years and they remain life-long friends. Even at a high school or a collegiate level, those sports teammates often retain relationships into adulthood. The positive values of regional sports can therefore include friendship, trust, character development, respect for others, teamwork, and solidarity.

The relationship between coaches and athletes at this level of sport should not be underestimated either. Coaches in East Asian settings are often like players’ surrogate fathers. The traditional value of respecting one’s teacher in East Asia may be declining, but this kind of respect is still highly endorsed in the Taiwanese school sports system. On the regional sport level, coaches often spend extensive time in taking care of their athletes. A good coach in Taiwan often uses his time, energy and money not just to improve his/her players’ skills but also to promote the quality of their academic work and their daily life in general. Hence, in Taiwan, the bond between coaches and athletes is often much stronger than that between teachers and students.

There is less competitiveness in the relationships of organizations and sponsors with coaches, who seldom feel pressures from their sponsors. In Taiwan, regional coaches usually also work as school PE teachers, which provides secure employment. Therefore financial pressure from sponsors is not a real issue. The team itself is normally sponsored by its school, and the pressure to “win at all costs” is not so high compared with the national level and hence more easily manageable.

Athletes, too, at this level are less likely to be pressured directly by their sponsoring organizations. Although they do need certain sports equipment or
facilities, it is still quite affordable. Because travel for competition is within the regional level, travel costs are modest. Thus, conflicts of interest and tension between the two sides are still negligible.

In sum, it is relatively easy to manifest the ethical values of Olympism at the regional level because the drive to win is not excessive and friendship, respect for others, fair play, and trust can be easily maintained. Athletes, coaches and their sponsors/institutions can exhibit their regional spirit through participation. Certain sports such as field hockey or ice skating in the West do show these same ethical values, which remain even up to the Olympic Level. East Asia can learn from this.

**Nationalism and Olympism for East Asia**

When athletes train and compete at the national level, they receive more attention and more support, but they also face higher expectations from the pressure of winning. At this level, athletes can easily develop an excessive competitive drive, which can lead to unethical conduct like doping and violence. For example, in 1994 during a selection of the US national squad for the upcoming Olympics figure skating, the favorite, Nancy Kerrigan, was physically attacked in order to incapacitate her, so that her key rival, Tonya Harding, could win her place on the team.

Compared with coaches who work for the regional level, national coaches inevitably place more pressure on their athletes—often from the pressure they themselves feel in maintaining their own reputations and the pride of the nation. Therefore, the overall well-being of athletes is even more vulnerable. It is well-known that national coaches in East Asia have constrained their athletes’ freedoms, encouraged doping, and sometimes exacted corporal punishment.

On the national level, sponsors and institutions may be both businesses and governments. Clearly, sponsoring companies will always push coaches to win so that their logos and brands will get more favorable exposure, and these pressures are passed from coaches to players, directly or indirectly. In Taiwan, national level sports coaches do not have very stable incomes and status. Often if they lose major competitions, they will be forced from their position and must find another job. These pressures can certainly threaten the ethical values of Olympism, such as the tenet that “taking part is more important than winning”!

Athletes at this level are not only pressured by their coaches but also directly by their sponsoring institutions. At this level, athletes are chosen to represent their own country, and they bear the whole nation’s expectations. This can be a particular burden for East Asian athletes, since losing a game means the disgrace or humiliation of “losing face.” Often, there is a combination of an excessive competitive drive and a hyper-patriotism. In other words, the more gold medals, the higher national pride and the more money they receive.

Here is an example of this that runs counter to the Olympic Educational
Movement with respect to zealous patriotism. In the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, Taiwanese people were proud to see their athletes receive two gold medals in Taekwondo. The Taiwanese government was trying to demonstrate the pride of the nation and the Taiwanese identity by giving them parades, putting them on television, and giving them lots of money. Based on this success, in early 2008, the national Ministry of Education decided to combine two major sport colleges into one sports university by investing 3 billion NTD (about 10 million USD). Its major goal is to train more world class athletes (50 in each year) in order to obtain more gold medals in the future Olympics. The humanistic aspect of an educational curriculum in our PE/Sports Education has somehow been neglected and emphasis has been given to elite technical training. The athletes’ all-around development, not to mention the Olympic values of education, has been devalued.

Another manifestation of nationalism is in relations among nations, and here too one can find many examples that violate the mutual respect for the value of peace that Olympism entails. For instance, there was heated debate in Taiwan towards the end of 2007 about whether the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay should pass through Taiwan or not. Some Taiwanese were in favor of this, based on Olympic ideals of peace and harmony; in the end, refusal to participate was based on political demonstrations of national sovereignty. Further expressions of excessive patriotism have occurred in bidding and hosting mega-events like the Olympics (Sanada 2004).

In sum, patriotism is not intrinsically antithetical to Olympic values. It brings athletes from different nations closer together (in the spirit of friendship rather than animosity) and it enhances mutual understanding. However, in excessive forms, a strident nationalism can subvert the values that the Olympic Educational Movement represents.

**Globalism and Olympism for East Asia**

It is very common now to characterize our present era as one of globalization, referring to the increasing interdependency among societies and individuals at the economic, political, cultural, and social levels (Parry 2006: 189; cf. Maguire 1999). Whether the world is fully globalized is debatable, since some countries remain isolated from the rest of the world (including North Korea and Myanmar in Asia) and so far they are reluctant to engage with other national societies. It is fair to say, though, that many Olympic sports events receive global attention and that most of these events are practiced around the world. It is important to note, however, that “globalization” is not the same as “globalism.” The former stresses the emergence and global diffusion of sport, whereas the latter is a commitment to placing the interests of the entire world above those of individual nations.

The question here is whether globalism fits into the Olympic Educational
Movement in East Asia? I believe it should and does since it exhibits values of Olympism at an international level such as solidarity, respect for others (nations), international friendship, and non-discrimination. But perhaps before we measure globalism, we must consider another term that was proposed long ago by Coubertin (1935) and that is “internationalism.” As he and others idealistically hoped, internationalism could have strong positive meanings if it referred to cooperation and the promotion of common good among nations rather than the pursuit of individual national interests.

However, expectations for East Asia regional co-operation are not easy to fulfill (cf. Sanada 2004). The many tense bilateral and multilateral relationships exacerbate economic and political competition. Without a common language such as English, even linguistic barriers are considerable. This contrasts markedly with, for instance, the European Union countries, where barriers to movement are much lower and proximity allows for easy travel and multi-language learning.

Cultural differences may also be in play. Generally speaking, I believe that we East Asians have a harder time expressing ourselves openly. John MacAlloon (2004: 50) has already urged that we Olympic scholars must insure that our criticisms of current NOC policies are thoughtful and informed because “NOCs must behave like public service organizations and not like closed corporations. Such challenges are shared by all Olympic academies including those of East Asia.”

Fortunately there are grounds for optimism. Controls on sports doping, for example, offer a working model of East Asian regional co-operation. In addition, the peaceful initiatives between North Korea and South Korea during the 2000 and 2004 Olympic Games Ceremonies have demonstrated cooperation under even more strained circumstances. Some of this can be attributed to East Asian youth, who are now travelling more, learning to appreciate different cultures, and laying the foundation of mutual respect, which is one of the values of Olympism.

A similar measure can be used for our athletes. In Taiwan, many national athletes have opportunities to travel to other countries to compete, but often they go for the competition only. They do not socialize with local citizens or their athletic competitors and return with an empty experience except for the competition itself. This is a great loss for those of us who are concerned with Olympism.

One of my efforts for promoting Olympism in East Asia has been to deploy pop culture. As we know, there are some East Asian pop stars (such as F4, Jay Chou, Jackie Chan, and Bae Yong-jun) who are widely popular across the entire region and who have considerable influence on East Asian youth. It is of course difficult for educators, even sports educators, to mobilize such stars, but I do believe we can learn much from the success and the marketing strategies of such pop stars. Most importantly, it is clear that their popularity is not based on
any nationalistic ideology but rather on an appeal to common elements in East Asia.

By bringing these powerful pop-cultural phenomena to the attention of our leading policy makers, I hope to develop more sophisticated strategies for promoting Olympism and Olympic education programs in our region. In this chapter, I have shown that we must continue to work to bridge the gap that still exists between the sporting Games themselves and the Olympic Educational Movement that promotes the values that should be the foundation of the Games.

In furthering Olympism in and for East Asia, Western imperialism, Eurocentrism, and commercialism have no place in the Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia. From a Taiwanese perspective, I have shown that there are three levels of ideologies which might be able to fit into the same context of Olympism. Of the three, only regionalism and globalism should be endorsed because only they can exhibit the more positive values of Olympism, whereas nationalism too easily entails an excessive patriotism that undermines these ideals. Lowering nationalist fervor by increasing regional co-operation and educating against prejudices between East Asian nations is the proper way for all of us to work together. Without mutual understanding and international co-operation in our region, it is impossible to achieve true globalism and realize the full potential of Olympism as philosophy.
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According to Lin Chia-lung (2002: 224), “the awakening of Taiwanese consciousness among native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders’ deepening sense of crisis have made identity politics the most salient issue on Taiwan’s political agenda since the onset of democratization.” This chapter examines the extent to which sports have been implicated in these identity politics.

Over the last two decades, the relationship between sport and national identity has provoked much critical discussion (Bairner 2001, 2008; Caldwell 1982; Cronin 1999; Cronin and Mayall, 1998; Hargreaves 1992; Liang 1993; Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley 2002; Silk et al 2005; Smith and Porter 2004). It is a complex relationship in many parts of the world where identity is highlighted and reproduced through sporting rituals and competitive events. In most countries, sport is arguably a more consuming passion for the population than politics (Caldwell, 1982), and it is a main catalyst for arousing people’s emotions towards their political, social, cultural and national identities.

From the birth of modern sports, nationalism and its passions have been a major focus. Olympic athletes were organized into national teams for the first time in 1908 at the London Games (Kent 2008). By this time, ruling elites had infused sporting competitions with symbolic, emblematic, and ritualistic characteristics that were visible in formal ceremonies much like religious festivities. During international sporting competitions, particularly the Olympic Games, the iconography of national identity is at its most visible with victorious athletes standing on the awards podium, the colours of their nation in plain view. The gold medal is placed around the winner’s neck, whose national flag is raised and national anthem played. The winner stands as a victorious proxy warrior for the nation. In this way, events such as the Olympics allow sport to be used in the “national interest.” Sport becomes a political tool, not least in terms of securing political legitimacy, strengthening or even creating national identity, pursuing national independence or unification, and striving for political and social equality for a national, racial or ethnic group. Examples of this include Taiwan’s gold medal winning performance in taekwondo at the 2004 Olympics, and Wang Chien-ming’s pitching for the New York Yankees in Major League Baseball. Both of these became focal points for the Taiwanese people and imbued in them feelings of pride and, potentially, a sense of identity. This chapter examines the construction and reproduction of national identity or identities in Taiwan and considers in what ways sport, and in particular Olympic sport, has
been implicated in these processes.

This chapter begins with a brief commentary on the relationship between sport and national identity. This is followed by an outline of the development of modern sport in Taiwan. We then turn to the manner in which sport has been implicated in the “Two Chinas” debate, particularly in relation to Taiwan’s experiences at the hands of the Olympic movement. Finally, we examine the contemporary role of sport in relation to Taiwanese identity.

**Observations on sport and national identity**

Although many have accepted that sport and national identity are closely related, there remains a need to understand more fully how this relationship manifests itself in specific political contexts (Bairner 2001). Most countries have had to confront the national question, particularly when seeking to build unity out of tribal, racial, ethnic and religious diversity. National signifiers such as the flags, anthems, currency, food, value systems, acceptance by global organizations such as the United Nations, as well as membership in international sporting organizations, are all taken as proof that nations can offer their people a sense of identity and territorial integrity. What should be noted at the outset, however, is that all of this applies more explicitly to nation-states than to nations.

There are subtle differences between the English words, nation and state, which have spawned two very different political concepts: the nation-state and the nation. The word nation refers to a social group or community bound together by a common language, religion, race, history, tradition, customary rituals or common characteristics. Nation-state refers to a tangible political entity that possesses territory, citizens, a political structure, a legal system and constitutional sovereignty. Thus, the nation can be regarded as a psychological, cultural and social concept, albeit with material foundations, whereas the nation-state is a political and legal designation which may or may not equate to the existence of a nation with its own territorial integrity (Reijai and Enloe 1972). Shih Cheng-feng, a Taiwanese political scientist, argues that nationality pertains to the recognition of a state machine or political entity (Shih 2000). National identity, on the other hand, is more easily linked to the idea of the nation (Bairner 2008).

According to Norbert Elias, the development of modern sport and the progression of national sentiment seemed to be unique historical phenomena that emerged during the same period (Elias 1998). In other words, sport and national identity possessed a common, fundamental historical characteristic, namely “modernity” (Hobsbawm 1990). The relationship between sport and national identity in this regard can be explained in part by reference to Hobsbawm’s idea of “invented tradition” (ibid.). He notes, for example, that from as early as the 1870s and mid-1880s in Britain, association football was implicated in the con-
construction of what came to be seen as institutional and ritual characteristics, such as professionalism, the League, the Cup, routinely watching games on Saturdays, football club supporters and their passions, all of which were observable in industrial towns and major cities. Yet, in reality, at the outset football had been an amateur, private school sporting activity used to cultivate middle and upper class values. Only when partially separated from its class origins did it become professional.

Sport is undeniably conducive to encouraging national consciousness and national identity, both of which can be expressed politically in a variety of ways but refer to the existence of a national country with a national history, a national mythology and national traditions. Although national identity may be closely linked to what Benedict Anderson described as an “imagined community,” Anderson himself was quick to point out that “imagined” is not synonymous with “fabrication” or “falsity” (Anderson 2006: 6). Thus, national identity has real foundations. Nevertheless, creating myths, legends and traditions has continued to be a significant element of nation building. In this respect, the relevance of sport to national identity has often resided in its capacity to perform a myth-making function (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Before embarking on a discussion of the precise relationship between sport and national identity in Taiwan, it is necessary to begin by outlining the development of sport in that country.

**The development of sport in Taiwan**

Recent years have seen an impressive increase in Taiwan sports history (for instance, Tsai Jen-hsiung 1995; Hsu Pei-hsien 2006; Hsieh Shih-yuan, Shieh Jia-fen 2003; Hsieh Shih-yuan 2004). Most scholarly attention has focused on physical education in Taiwan’s schools during the Japanese era and on the role of the Japanese in the introduction of modern sport to Taiwan.

The Qing dynasty ruled Taiwan for more than two centuries, but initially put no emphasis on infrastructure and education. It was not until the late nineteenth century that the Qing Empire lifted its ban on subjects going out to sea (a ban originally put in place to curtail foreign invasion) and assigned Shen Pao-jen and Liu Ming-chuan to manage Taiwan as an imperial province. Prior to the Japanese occupation, Taiwan did come into contact with modern movements, as British tea merchant John Dodd documented in his “Chronicle of Closure in Northern Taiwan.” In this book, Dodd, who had relocated to Tamsui, Taiwan in 1864, describes a scene from 24 May 1885, when British gunship officers and soldiers who had been with him for nine months, engaged in a variety of sports, including lawn tennis, racing, cricket, high jumping, leaping, billiards and so forth (Chen Rou-jin 2005). It is also noteworthy that in 1882, Dr. George Leslie MacKay founded the Oxford Study Hall (the predecessor of today’s Taiwan Theology College), and later launched the Tamsui Girls High
School (the predecessor of today’s Tamsui High School). In 1885, the English Presbyterian Church established the Presbyterian Church High School (the predecessor of today’s Chang Rong High School). All of these schools were subsequently to enjoy an outstanding reputation for sporting excellence. The question of whether there had been a conscious effort on the part of schools to promote modern exercise and physical education prior to the Japanese occupation has prompted sports historians to conduct further research.

John King Fairbank (1989) emphasized that, in the late nineteenth century, Taiwan was an ideal colony, in that its residents did not possess a clear sense of ethnic belongingness. The Japanese began their occupation of Taiwan in 1895 and under Japanese colonial rule the sports curriculum played an important role in promoting (a Japanese) identity. Through a modernized education system, the colonial rulers introduced school sports and their own physical culture as well as Western sports to Taiwan, thereby marking the first occasion when a government actively promoted sport in Taiwan in a systematic way (Tsai Jen-hsiung 1995).

What can be deduced from Taiwan’s early sports history is that the Japanese colonial government unrelentingly promoted sport in schools of all levels and for all social strata. Superficially this appeared to be a benign policy. In reality, however, it was used to secure Taiwanese approval for Japanese colonial rule. In Taiwan, as elsewhere, as Stoddart (1982) observes, sport was often the major tool used by the dominant class to deliver its official ideas and values. During the Japanese occupation, sports meetings were regularly organized as important events in schools. At these meetings, the Japanese flag was raised, the Japanese national anthem and other military songs were sung, and speeches were addressed to the colonial subjects by various dignitaries. Additionally, military marches were played to showcase regimented sporting formations and uniforms during the opening and closing ceremonies. All of this sought to secure and reinforce respect for and obedience and loyalty to various national symbols, all the while presented as uncontroversial rituals associated with the sports meetings themselves. Moreover, the Japanese colonial government introduced Japan’s traditional sports of judo, fencing, sumo wrestling, archery and such into the physical education curriculum, thus further promoting the educational objectives of the “Kominka” (Japanization) movement. In general, disseminating Japanese activities amongst the Taiwanese people was intended to lead to a Japanese way of thinking and to the growth of a Japanese nationalist spirit.

All of this had a significant impact particularly on intellectual life in Taiwan for, as Ching (2001: 29) notes, “Regardless of Japan’s ambivalent relationship to the West, for the Taiwanese intellectuals, Japan irrefutably represented the modern, as compared to the colonizing West.” For the majority of people, sport had greater significance than intellectual tastes in terms of conveying identity. As part of people’s daily lives, sport served to provide a level of social integration and to ease the tension between the colonizer and the colonized. The Tai-
wanese quickly took up a variety of new sporting activities, with male and female students keen to partake in track and field and swimming contests, and male students eager to play tennis, basketball, rugby, football, hockey and baseball. In 1912, organized regional sporting events began to emerge. Baseball was particularly well received island-wide, spawning youth, junior and adult leagues (Morris 2004, Tsurumi 1999). In 1931, the Jiayi Agriculture and Forestry high school baseball team made up of Taiwanese and Japanese students represented Taiwan in the play-off competition for the Japanese High School Baseball League, claiming second place (Hsieh Shih-yuan, Hsieh Jia-fen 2003). In 1935, during the largest exhibition in Taiwan’s history, the Taiwan Sports Association staged baseball games and other sporting events in Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan, in a bid to highlight Japanese colonial achievements (Cheng Jia-hui 2004). The development of a baseball culture had a particularly profound significance for Taiwan, and when the colonial power left the island after the Second World War, baseball remained and became even more significant in terms of national consciousness.

Introducing Japanese-style sports education had less to do with making the Taiwanese into Japanese than with training them to become obedient, industrious Japanese subjects. Taiwan’s educated elite did not unconditionally accept Japan’s strategy, and students’ experiences of studying abroad and exposure to other ideological trends slowly began to awaken an alternative national consciousness. The intellectual elite, including Lin Shien-tang, Chiang Wei-shui and Tsai Pei-hou, initiated a movement that included the Taipei Youth Sport Association aimed at promoting cultural exchange, sporting activities, and the development of healthy bodies, but such efforts were banned by the Japanese Governor’s Office and the Association eventually disbanded (Lei Yen-hsiung 1988). This episode reveals the Japanese colonial government’s unwillingness to allow the Taiwanese to organize their own sports organization, and thereby to potentially challenge Japanese cultural hegemony.

Under colonial rule, major differences emerged between the Taiwanese (including aborigines) and the Japanese and were reflected in the sporting realm. Indeed, the Japanese enshrined these differences in junior baseball competitions which provided an arena for cultural resistance, justifying Anderson’s assertion that the “imagined community” may not necessarily arise from a specific cognitive national consciousness, but rather from the presence of a discernible opponent. Thus, “people in Taiwan experienced clear categorical differences between themselves and [the] Japanese which left them with a sense of non-Japanese identity” (Brown 2004: 9). Conversely, their attempts to shape an identity or a community consciousness through participating in sport permitted the construction of the Taiwanese as imagined opponents of the colonial government, some of whom had unsuccessfully striven for the formation of a nation state (Brown 2004: 8). In such ways did an apparently banal activity, sport, come to encompass and underpin “complex” national emotions (Liang Shu-
Taiwanese athletes were not only subjected to political and cultural discrimination during the Japanese colonial period, but were also treated differently by their motherland in the aftermath of this colonial experience. The Taiwanese track and field athlete Chang Hsing-hsien, who had represented Japan at two Olympic Games, was prompted to represent Taiwan/“China” in the seventh National Sports Games held in Shanghai in May 1948. Many Taiwanese who had returned to the motherland after Japanese colonial rule did not distinguish between “Taiwanese society and the Taiwanese” and “Chinese society and the Chinese,” but rather merged “tangibly existing Taiwan” with “imaginary China” (Chang Mao-guei 1993). After retiring, Chang Hsing-hsien addressed future athletes, saying that he had never had the opportunity to participate in the Olympics as a Taiwanese athlete. This prompted him to lament, “It turned out that I did not have a chance to help out the nation with a little civilian sporting diplomacy.” Chang Hsing-hsien’s son Chang Zhao-ping added, “The government continues to deprive my father from serving in any important position, reckoning that my father was Japanese.” Chang’s story can be seen as one of a number that exemplify the ambivalent national identities - Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese - in Taiwan after World War Two.

Although the Japanese colonial government has left Taiwan, the sports culture, physical education and sport system it left behind continued to ensure Japanese influence in Taiwan. For example, baseball has developed into Taiwan’s “national sport,” even though the post-war Kuomintang (KMT/Chinese Nationalist Party) government tried to ban it as a remnant of colonial rule. However, this deliberate attempt to remove such an important social and cultural experience was inevitably unable to wipe out the Taiwanese people’s collective social memory.

In reality, far from being able to ban baseball, the KMT government sought to take the sport over (Lin Chi-wen 1995) and constructed a system aimed at streamlining, rather than oppressing, grassroots baseball culture. Established to oversee this process, the National Baseball Association took steps to develop and strengthen the sport in Taiwan (Liang Shu-ling 1993; Lin Chi-wen 1995).

The KMT had decamped to Taiwan in 1945 and on 28 February 1947, Martial Law was introduced. During what was to become the longest uninterrupted period of Martial Law anywhere, the Taiwanese people’s freedom of speech, publication, gathering, religious faith and so forth were severely restricted (see Edmondson 2002). Meanwhile sport became an important feature of KMT propaganda. The earlier Taiwan Provincial Sports Games continued, but with the opening ceremonies presided over by the KMT party chairman, and the requisite singing of the national anthem, the president’s keynote speech, reciting of slogans, the singing of patriotic songs, dances and drills, these events now directly served the interests of the state. For example, the first Taiwan Provincial Sports Games’ track and field competition was held at Taiwan University in
October 1946, presided over by the highest administrative officer of the Taiwan Administrative Office, Chen Yi. In the event, however, Chiang Kai Shek presided, along with Madam Sung, and delivered the opening speech:

... You have now returned to the embrace of your motherland, and have become the owners of the Republic of China; consequently, you need to shoulder more national responsibilities, while my coming to Taiwan this time has been to deliver the responsibility of developing Taiwan, developing the nation to our people! Particularly of the youths in Taiwan, where everyone needs to realize their own responsibilities by working collectively, learning and developing a strong physical stamina, and the only way to restore the ancient Chinese virtues is to be aware of etiquette and justice, integrity, be responsible and disciplined ... (Lei Yen-hsiung 1988: 9).

Here was the “party line.” Just one month earlier, a KMT publication had emphasized that the Taiwanese people needed to undergo “re-education, for their minds had been polluted and had been coerced to receive twisted thoughts” (New Taiwan Monthly 1946: 1-3). Drawing upon Confucianism and even older philosophies, the KMT continued to view the people’s “national spirit” as the problem, failing to identify or shying away from addressing political, economic and social issues (Barrington Moore 1966). There was widespread resentment towards the KMT government, resulting in the tragic events of 28 February 1947 when the government eradicated a majority of the potentially influential leaders of Taiwan’s embryonic national movement (Roy 2003). In such circumstances, the second Provincial Sporting Games in 1947 became a highly significant event from which there would emerge traditions aimed at reaffirming Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) as a national hero in the eyes of the Han people.

Thereafter, annual Chung Cheng (Chiang Kai Shek) Cup competitions were staged by individual sports associations and by various local authorities; newly built sports buildings were named either the “Chung Cheng Sport Arena” or “Chung Cheng Sports Park,” all in an effort by the KMT rulers (through the infusion of large sums of money into sporting activities and facilities) to promote party/state consciousness by way of symbolism and ritual and, further, to inject their ideology subtly into the general public’s sporting and recreational life. A prime example of the state’s intrusion into sporting recreational activities was the “China Youth Corps” (CYC, the China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps) formed in 1952, which was initially housed in the Department of Defense. It stipulated that all students of high school and vocational high school age were required to join, and branches were set up in schools. The person directly in charge of the CYC’s school activities was a military instructor, and the CYC’s insignia used the same symbol as the KMT party. The CYC offered more than just sport. Other activities included combat training, hiking,
mountain climbing; and wilderness camping. The CYC attracted adolescents and youths by offering sporting recreational activities, together with arranging summer and winter break recreational activities, and subsequently used those opportunities for the purpose of party education and the promotion of a specific Chinese national identity (see Brown 2004).

The KMT also had plans to use international sports competitions to reawaken the public’s collective awareness (Yu and Bairner 2008). The Hong Yeh junior baseball team defeated Japan by 7-0 in 1968; the Jin Long junior baseball team won the twenty-third World Junior Baseball championship in 1969 and in 1971, the Giants team won the World Junior Baseball Championship. Around 1970, when the KMT regime was suffering setbacks in the international political arena, the triumph of their international baseball team provided the ruling party with an opportunity to reaffirm collective identity intended to divert popular attention from, or even compensate for, political difficulties. Finally, at the 1984 Olympics held in Los Angeles, the Taiwanese team took third place in baseball (an exhibition sport), causing the China Times to publish an editorial on 9 August headed, “Pondering the rise and fall of the sport of baseball”:

_Recently of late, with the country encountering setbacks, we are confronting numerous drawbacks and humiliation in the international community, no less than an isolation that was difficult to withstand. As a result, triumphing at international competitions brought the people of the entire nation to share the glorious moment, and unleashed the resentment in their hearts. While what provided us with the most opportunities was none other than baseball. Baseball brought us self-esteem, a sense of superiority, and the list goes on. Nevertheless, this year’s baseball game did not satisfy us, or even verged on setback and disappointment. ... What we were looking for was an absolute victory, for victory was very important to us, and we simply could not afford to lose (Cheng Chin-jen 1989: 332-33)._

International sports competitions offered a means for a country to secure political legitimacy and consolidate national identity, particularly when these were reflected in a representative team’s name and in the use of a national anthem and a national flag. Since 1949, the KMT had wrestled with Communist China on the issue of political representation in the international sports competing arena and, particularly, in dealings with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and other governing bodies. This representation issue in the competitive sports arena reflected and helped to consolidate two different value systems and political identities, thus warranting detailed examination of the “two Chinas” issue.

This statement highlights how baseball, as manipulated by the government, helped to integrate KMT ideology into Taiwan’s sporting culture.
The “Two Chinas” issue (1960s - 1980s)

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was ostracized by the Olympic movement from 1949. After an absence of over thirty years, it was restored to the Olympic family and competed at the Los Angeles Games in 1984, the first occasion on which the PRC and Taiwan took part in the same Olympics. The “two Chinas” issue was and has remained, first and foremost, political, emerging in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war when, following their defeat, the Chinese nationalists fled to Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the PRC and the KMT reformed Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC), a name that had been chosen by the first leader of the KMT, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, as early as 1911. The political conflict between the PRC and the ROC then carried over into the international sporting arena with both the PRC and Taiwan claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of China.

China’s relations with the IOC date back to the early 20th century when China itself was known as the ROC. China’s National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF) was recognized by the IOC in 1922. Prior to 1949, China (as the ROC) participated in the Los Angeles Olympics of 1932, at Berlin in 1936, and in London in 1948. In 1949, some Olympic Committee members fled to Taiwan while the ROC government maintained contact with the IOC and claimed jurisdiction over Olympic affairs both in mainland China and Taiwan. The new ROC’s claim was challenged by the PRC, since the CNAAF was still based in Nanjing (mainland China). Subsequently, the CNAAF was reorganized and renamed in October 1949 as the All-China Sports Federation (ACSF), claiming jurisdiction over all Chinese Olympic activities. These competing claims for jurisdiction by the PRC and Taiwan inevitably led to conflict.

The PRC had no communication with the IOC until February 1952, when the ACSF sent a message expressing its wish to participate in the Helsinki Games. The IOC was put in a difficult position, since Taiwan also intended to take part. According to IOC rules, only one national committee was permitted to represent a country and there were differences of opinion among IOC members as to which Chinese committee should be recognized. Neither the PRC nor Taiwan was willing to negotiate or to form a single team. The IOC adopted a proposal permitting both committees to participate in those events in which they had been recognized by their respective international sport federations. Taiwan was disappointed by the IOC resolution and withdrew from the 1952 Helsinki Olympics to demonstrate its opposition. This was the first time athletes from mainland China participated in the Olympic Games under the authority of the PRC government.

Two years later, the PRC was formally recognized by the IOC as the Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic, later changed to the Olympic Committee of Democratic China (Olympic Review, No. 66-67, May-June, 1973). At the same time, Taiwan was recognized under the name of the Chinese...
Olympic Committee. Thus, a “two Chinas” situation was created. At the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, both the PRC and Taiwan were invited to take part. The PRC withdrew in protest of Taiwan’s participation and continued to demand the expulsion of Taiwan from the IOC, compelling Avery Brundage, the President of the IOC, to write to Beijing on 8 January 1958:

Everyone knows that there is a separate government in Taiwan, which is recognized internationally, and specifically by the United Nations consisting of the governments of the world. Your government is not recognized by the United Nations (Olympic Review, No. 145, November 1979: 628).

Disappointed by this, in 1958 the PRC withdrew its membership from the IOC and nine other international sporting organizations in protest at the “two Chinas” policy. During the 1960s, there was little contact between the PRC and IOC or other sporting organizations and as a result, Taiwan was able to claim representation on behalf of all China in international sports events. However, in October 1971, after the PRC was admitted to the United Nations, the ROC (Taiwan) was expelled. This political event greatly aided the PRC’s efforts to participate in other international organizations and, specifically, the IOC. The PRC applied to rejoin the IOC in 1975, was granted admission in 1979 and since then has taken an active part in Olympic activities, culminating in Beijing hosting the Summer Games of 2008.

How had the PRC managed to overcome the issue of the “two Chinas” from the late 1970s? When the country fell into relative chaos during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, most sports training and competitive systems were dismantled, many sports officials and athletes attacked, sport academies closed, and sports equipment and facilities neglected or destroyed. This situation began to change when China re-entered international table tennis competition at the Scandinavian Open Championship in Sweden in November 1970. This was the first time that a Chinese team had gone abroad for an international sports competition since the Cultural Revolution (The Times, 27, 28 and 30 November 1970). Later China was invited to join the 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Japan in March-April, 1971. Mao Zedong agreed with Premier Zhou Enlai’s suggestion to send a Chinese table tennis team to Japan with the famous slogan, “Friendship first, competition second” and Mao went on to say: “We shall join this competition. We must not be afraid to bear hardship. We must not be nervous and scared” (Li 1994: 535; Wu 1999: 238). Thus began China’s so-called “Ping Pong Diplomacy” with the United States.

After 1970, Mao changed his sport policy to one of open engagement with certain partners, in particular the US, and consequently, an American table tennis team was invited to play in China in 1971, the first officially sanctioned Sino-American cultural exchange in almost twenty years. Mao increasingly re-
garded Soviet hegemony as the greatest threat to China following the border clashes of 1969 between Chinese and Soviet troops on China’s northeastern frontier. He reasoned that a tactical accommodation with the US would be less dangerous than the threat posed by the Soviet Union, a shift in attitude that was reflected in Premier Zhou Enlai’s call for peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between states with different social systems.

Although the PRC was invited to send observers to the 1972 Munich Games, the secretary-general of the All-China Sports Federation, Song Zhong, turned down the invitation because of Taiwan’s participation. China could still not tolerate a “two Chinas” or a “one China, one Taiwan” situation (Beijing Review 15(35), 1 September, 1972). In the early part of 1973, however, the Japanese Olympic Committee suggested to various international sport federations and national Olympic committees that China be reinstated as a member and Taiwan expelled (The Times, 13 February, 1973). In April 1973, Willi Daume, the West German IOC Vice-president, went to Beijing to discuss the possibility of China rejoining the Olympic movement (New York Times, 22 March, 1973). Although he was told that China would not be prepared to rejoin the IOC as long as Taiwan was a member, China was making progress in achieving Olympic recognition.

An important step towards the PRC’s eventual admission to the IOC came in 1973 when the Asian Games Federation voted to admit the PRC and exclude Taiwan from its Tehran Games. Thereafter, more federations recognized the PRC which, in April 1975, made a formal application to rejoin the IOC, demanding its own conditions, the foremost being that Taiwan should be expelled from the IOC and that the All-China Sports Federation would be recognized as the sole sports organization representing the whole of China. Beijing regarded the existing relationship between the PRC and the IOC as abnormal and unjust particularly since the PRC had become a member of the United Nations (UN), from which Taiwan was now excluded (Beijing Review 18(23), 6 June 1975).

Prior to the 1976 Olympic Games, the PRC requested Canada to unconditionally bar the Taiwanese delegation from Montreal. Instead, the Canadian government asked Taiwanese athletes to compete without any mention of the word China or the term “Republic of China.” The IOC considered the Canadian action to be a breach of a promise made in 1970 when Montreal was chosen as the host city (Espy 1979) and, to avoid further confrontation with the Canadian government, submitted a plan stating Taiwan should be allowed to participate as “Taiwan-ROC” with a flag bearing the Olympic rings. This solution drew opposition from both the PRC and Taiwan. The PRC indicated that ROC was only an abbreviation of the title Republic of China and to adopt it would be to officially acknowledge the “two Chinas.” On the other hand, Taiwan insisted on competing under its own flag and name - the Republic of China.

The PRC continued to maintain that there was one China not two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan and refused to accept any conditions under which
Taiwan could be recognized. To seek a solution to the dilemma, the IOC president, Lord Killanin, tried to arrange a meeting between China, Taiwan and the IOC in 1979. Taiwan refused to enter into direct negotiation with China, thereby forcing the IOC and PRC to pursue a solution without consultation. At the Montevideo meeting of the IOC in April 1979, the plenary session passed a resolution to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Beijing whilst continuing to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee in Taipei. However, the resolution made certain stipulations in relation to matters of names, anthems, flags and the constitutions of the two committees. At the meeting, Song Zhong claimed that:

The resolution passed... as it now stands, is unacceptable to us. We hereby reaffirm that there is only one China, that is, the People’s Republic of China. And that Taiwan is part of China. The only way to solve the problem of China’s representation is to recognize China’s Olympic Committee as the national Olympic Committee of the whole of China. As an interim arrangement, the sports organization in Taiwan may remain in the IOC bearing the name of “China-Taiwan Olympic Committee,” but it must not use any of the emblems of the “Republic of China.” We shall only accept solutions compatible with the above-stated conditions (Daily Report, 9 April, 1979: K1).

Song’s statement indicated that the PRC would not allow Taiwan to use the name “Republic of China” or that of the “Chinese Olympic Committee - Taipei” which would imply equal state status with China (“Chinese Olympic Committee - Beijing”). The perceived solution was that Taiwan should be clearly identified as part of China. Song called a press conference in Beijing and repeated China’s objection to the resolution, saying that it would be tantamount to China’s acceptance of the idea of “two Chinas.” Again Song laid down the two necessary conditions: first, that China’s Olympic Committee had to be recognized as the sole legitimate Chinese organization in the IOC; and second, that the IOC should forbid the use of the state name, national flag and anthem of the Republic of China by Taiwan.

In June 1979, the IOC Executive Board meeting in Puerto Rico confirmed China’s Olympic Committee’s title as the “Chinese Olympic Committee.” It also recommended that Taiwan should stay in the IOC as the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee” with a different national anthem and flag. After an IOC executive board meeting in Nagoya, Killanin submitted a resolution to 89 IOC members for a postal vote on 26 October 1979. According to this resolution, the National Olympic Committee of the PRC would be named the “Chinese Olympic Committee” and would use the flag and anthem of the PRC while the Olympic Committee of Taiwan would be named the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee” (CTOC) and its anthem, flag and emblem would be other than
those used by the PRC and would have to be approved by the Executive Board of the IOC. China welcomed this resolution, claiming that it took into consideration the basic fact that there was only one China of which Taiwan was a constituent part (Xinhua Yuebao, December 1979).

Taiwan was disappointed with the IOC decision. Taipei’s Olympic Committee and Henry Hsu, IOC member in Taiwan, filed lawsuits at the Lausanne Civil District Court against the Nagoya resolution claiming that it violated IOC rules, a claim rejected by the court. In his ruling, Judge Pierre Bucher said that it seemed obvious that Taipei’s Olympic Committee had no right to present a suit against the IOC (Daily Report, 17 January 1980: A2). The new IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch sent a letter to Hsu, dated 4 December 1980, guaranteeing that Taipei’s Olympic Committee would get the same treatment as any other national committee if Taiwan accepted the conditions of the Nagoya resolution (Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee 1981). Consequently, the Taipei Olympic Committee agreed to change its name to the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee” and to adopt a new flag and emblem. According to the agreement, the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee would be entitled to participate in future Olympic Games and other activities sponsored by the IOC with the same status and rights as all national Olympic Committees (Olympic Review 162, April, 1981). At least temporarily the question of Chinese representation was settled. For the PRC, there were no “two Chinas” or one China and one Taiwan. The latter was subsumed under China – implicit in the naming of the two Olympic committees. This outcome helped to facilitate communication between China and Taiwan through sport and was even seen as conducive to the reunification process. For Taiwan, there was no option but to accept the resolution if it wished to stay in the Olympic movement; for the IOC, one of its biggest problems over the previous twenty years had been resolved.

The increasing importance of sport to the PRC was linked to the international significance of the Olympic movement. In China, sport has been fought over by many different groups and it is relatively easy to demonstrate its role in promoting nationalism and its importance to the ruling elite. According to the ideology of Chinese centrism (Sino-centrism), Taiwan is regarded as part of China, which prevents the Taiwanese from using their official national name, flag and anthem in all international competitions. Since 1984, Taiwanese athletes have competed internationally under the name of “Chinese Taipei,” but the Chinese domestic media consistently refer to Taiwanese sports teams as “Taipei China.” Sporting relationships between China and Taiwan are thus symbolic of Chinese internal imperialism, even though the majority of Taiwanese people oppose unification under the official Chinese nationalist slogan of “one country, two systems.”

For the 2004 Olympics in Athens, the National Council on Physical Fitness and Sport announced that the Chinese Taipei Olympic team would consist of 85 competitors across 12 events. Coverage of the Games would be provided by
digital broadcast stations with the IOC granting broadcasting rights to Taiwan Television Enterprise Ltd., China Television Co., Chinese Television Systems and Formosa Television. The CTOC praised the IOC for promoting cooperation between the four stations not least because the mission of the CTOC remains that of promoting the Olympic movement in Taiwan.

Reaction in Taiwan to the successful Beijing Olympic bid was mixed. In the build-up, Yuan Weimin, the President of China’s Olympic Committee (COC), declined to rule out the possibility of Taiwan being involved in co-sponsoring the Games should the bid be successful, as long as the “one China” principle was adhered to. The CTOC argued that co-hosting the 2008 Games would benefit Taiwan from an economic point of view, but above all, would be an opportunity to promote sporting exchanges and enhance the process of reconciliation across the Taiwan straits. However, Yuan Weimin pointed out that, unlike the football World Cup and European Championships, which allow for joint bids from different countries, the IOC Olympic Charter only allows the Games to be staged in one city of one country.

Chinese state nationalism involves the imposition of cultural homogeneity from above. One element of this policy is to force Taiwanese sports organizations to accept that the PRC is the only central Chinese government and that Taiwan is merely a provincial authority. However, in the face of the continuing threat from the PRC, many Taiwanese people have sought their own self-identification, rather than simply accepting a definition arrived at by the Chinese government. That said, to a certain degree the debate over the “two Chinas” has moved beyond debates about two nationalisms or national identities, with the concept of post-colonialism helping to re-position central concerns.

**Republic of China, Chinese Taipei or Taiwan (1980s - 2008)**

Taiwan’s national title has become a fundamental issue because a national title relates not only to recognition on the international stage but also to internal political identity. The Taiwan government adopted the formal title of the “Republic of China,” yet in the wake of the “two Chinas” issue was now referred to as “Chinese Taipei,” at least in the international sporting arena. In turn, “Chinese Taipei” became its name on various international, non-sporting occasions. But did this mean that the Taiwanese people had come to accept the designation? Did the title “Chinese Taipei,” in and of itself, truly resolve the “two Chinas” issue? What was the prevailing mood within Taiwan? All these questions prompt us to delve even deeper into the discussion of whether Taiwan is best described as the “Republic of China,” “Chinese Taipei” or “Taiwan.”

The “two Chinas” period coincided with the Cold War when the ruling KMT thought it could harness international anti-communist sentiment to its own goals. Specifically, it believed it could gain the support of the international
community for its “legitimate” right to represent China. The plan failed. After the 1960 and 1964 Olympics, international sporting organizations leaned towards referring to Taiwan as “Taiwan,” but the KMT government adamantly refused to accept this title and continued to assert its right to represent China, resulting in diplomatic setbacks and the imposition of the title “Chinese Taipei,” which allowed Taiwanese athletes to participate in international competitions but did nothing to resolve the issue of Taiwanese national identity in the political, social and sporting realms.

There was little explicit opposition in Taiwan to the use of the name “Republic of China” under the KMT’s martial law, but outside of Taiwan, specifically within the sporting arena, it was another matter. The KMT had attempted to solidify Taiwanese identity internally using junior baseball. In 1969, Taiwan sent junior players to the USA to compete for the first time in the William Porter Cup. When the ROC national anthem was played, an ABC close-up showed an advocate for Taiwanese independence holding a poster that read “It is a Taiwanese team not the Chinese team!” At the time, representatives from the US headquarters of the Taiwan Independent League were handing out flyers to junior baseball fans, stating, “Come cheer for Taiwan’s junior baseball league” and “Taiwan (Formosa) does not have freedom nor does it belong to China… The Taiwanese are passionate about the baseball, but Taiwan’s mainlanders are not” (Morris 2007). This illustrated the close relationship between baseball and the construction of Taiwanese national identities (Yu and Bairner 2008). Sport had made it possible for the legitimacy of the KMT regime to be challenged by the Taiwanese abroad.

The Olympic experiences of two well-known Taiwanese athletes, Yang Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng, also shed some light on the relationship between sport and national identity during this period. Yang Chuan-Kwang won a silver medal in the decathlon at the Rome Olympics in 1960, earning him the nickname “Iron Man of Asia.” Chi Cheng, subsequently nicknamed “Leaping Antelope,” won a bronze medal in the women’s 80m hurdles in 1968. These were the first two Asians to achieve such results, and also the first Chinese athletes to be accorded respect by the international sporting community. But their moment of glory was not to last. In 1976, the Taiwanese and the Chinese teams both tried to enter Canada as the sole representatives of China at the 1976 Olympics. Following discussions about Taiwan’s participation, as described above, prior to the opening ceremonies the then Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, refused to issue entry visas to the ROC delegation because of the continuing “two Chinas” issue, thus leaving the delegation trapped on the border between the USA and Canada. This was especially unfortunate because, as early as the 1968 Mexico Olympics, Hsu Heng of the Taiwan Olympic Committee had succeeded in getting the IOC to accept the name of the “Republic of China Olympic Committee” for Taiwan and its athletes. Yet at the Montreal Olympics, eight years later, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau demanded that
the ROC delegation use the name of “Taiwan” in order to gain entry and participate in the Games. Not surprisingly, this prompted a strong protest from Taiwan. In an effort not to sacrifice the opportunity for athletes to participate, the ROC Olympic Committee summoned their two world-class athletes, Yang Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng, in the hope that their celebrity status might elicit compassion and support from the international community and thereby facilitate entry to Canada for the whole ROC delegation (Tsai Hsin-yi 2002; Kai Lu 2000).

Countering the attempted illicit entry into Montreal, Trudeau issued a blockade order against the Taiwan Olympic delegation. Thus, when Yang Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng flew into Montreal international airport they found it difficult just to walk, as they were surrounded by a large international press contingent and were only able to check into the Olympic village with a Canadian police force escort. They had undeniably attracted the attention and support of the international news media, causing the IOC to call an emergency meeting at which it was determined that the ROC Olympic delegation would participate in the Games under the name of “Taiwan.” But neither the Taiwanese flag nor the Taiwanese national anthem would be changed. In response, the Chinese Olympic Committee commissioner in Montreal, Shen Jia-ming, reported to the Education Minister Chiang Yen-shih and after consultation with Executive Yuan spokesman, Chiang Ching-kuo, tried to obtain an Olympic withdrawal order in protest to the “Taiwan” name change.

At the Nagoya conference in 1979, Yang Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng said of that tumultuous time, “To athletes, the most important thing is to be able to join the competition, and the issues of national flag, anthem and name are not important to them.” It was a reflection of the times that the IOC insisted that Taiwan participate in the Games under the name of “Taiwan,” whereas the “Republic of China,” then under KMT rule, could only insist upon the name of the “Republic of China.” The indifference of these Taiwanese athletes and their verdict in 1979 are even more compelling given that Taiwan accepted the name of “Chinese Taipei” in 1981, after many international disputes over changing the name from “Chinese Taipei” to “China Taipei,” for which in fact, Chi Cheng had negotiated and protested.

By 2001, individuals such as Chi Cheng and Yang Chuan-Kwang, who had experienced Olympic wrangling and Chinese oppression, were rallying support for a cross-strait long-distance run in support of Beijing’s petition to host the Olympic Games. When the Olympic torch was unable to pass through Taiwan, Chi Cheng stated straightforwardly that this was a shame, “after all it was rare for the Olympics to be this close to Taiwan.” When she took part in the Olympics for the first time at the age of 16, she had witnessed the exchange between competitors and the formation of friendships and that is what she remembered when she thought of the Games; to her, the Olympic Spirit meant Peace and Freedom (Yang Mong-yu, BBC Chinese website, 22 November,
From the experiences of these two athletes, we can see both benign feelings towards the Olympics, but also helplessness in the face of international sport politics.

The Olympic torch is intended to symbolize peace, unity, progress, mutual respect and accommodation. The Chinese regime used it (and their bid to host the 2008 Olympics) to integrate into the international community, albeit with the potentially ominous ambition of pursuing the dream of a harmonious society. Conversely, the international community thought that the PRC would soften its existing image in order to win the bid to host the Olympics successfully (Tsai Hsin-yi 2002; Chen Hui-ying 2007; Tsai Ming-yen 2007; Yeh Wei-jun 2004). Despite their proclaimed intent to take the Olympic torch on a “Harmonious journey,” the Chinese authorities planned a route that raised questions about their political motives in relation to Taiwan (Huang Shu-rong 2007). The major point of contention was that the route for the Olympic torch announced on 26 April 2007, included Taiwan as part of the domestic leg, indicating Taiwan to be a local government under the jurisdiction of the PRC. Additionally, the COC demanded that no national flag, national emblem, or national anthem representing Taiwan should appear on the torch relay route, which triggered great public resentment in Taiwan. The IOC has historically emphasized a separation of the Games themselves and the policies of individual governments for fear of allowing nation-state politics to impede international sporting exchanges. The fact remains, however, that it has proved very difficult, if not impossible, to protect the Olympics from political undertones (Tsai Hsin-yi 2002; Chen Hui-ying 2007; Tsai Ming-yen 2007). Certainly the torch relay and its repercussions reinvigorated discussions about Taiwan’s identity.

The simple announcement of the logistics of the Olympic torch relay touched a raw nerve for many Taiwanese people and inevitably discussions on the related subjects of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the significance of the China connection ensued. As revealed in a poll conducted by Taiwan’s Executive Yuan Mainland Affairs Council, over 60% of the respondents expressed the view that to allow the torch to pass through Taiwan would diminish its claim to sovereignty, and for that reason, Taiwan should not accept such an arrangement (Tsai Ming-yen 2007). When asked about the torch passing through Taiwan during the first stage of the PRC’s domestic route, with the stipulation that Taiwan be referred to as “Taipei, China,” nearly 65% of the respondents said this was unacceptable, and only 16.3% of the respondents said they would accept Taiwan being the first stop on China’s domestic torch route. As to whether the issue of the torch passing through Taiwan should be negotiated, those in agreement and those opposed accounted for 42.7% and 45.7% respectively. These figures reveal that over a half of the respondents had doubts about Beijing’s goodwill, although a substantial minority wanted continued negotiations with Beijing in order to allow the Olympic torch to be taken successfully via Taiwan (Huang Shu-rong 2007).
According to this poll, the concept of Taiwan as a political entity had garnered increasing support following political change in the 1980s and 1990s. This reflects the complex history of Taiwan and how national consciousness emerged as an issue after martial law was lifted in 1980s (Sun, Yu-ping, 2005). Chinese identity, which was presumed to be monolithic in the past, fractured into Taiwanese and other identities. Additionally, Taiwan’s “baseball nationalism” reached a new milestone on 30 April 2005, when Wang Chien-ming entered Major League Baseball and initiated the so-called “Taiwang era.” Chen Tze-shuan (2005) argues that the modernization of Taiwan’s baseball not only conforms to Tomlinson’s (1985) understanding of national modernization processes but the “Taiwang” baseball identity was a by-product of global capitalism, thereby differing from the feelings associated with junior baseball successes in the 1970s which were dictated solely by nationalism (Chen, 2005).

The term “Taiwang” consisted of a blending of the complex themes of national emotion, hero worship and commercialized sport within an identity matrix. Furthermore, the very essence of this matrix can be traced to the media and thus related not only to different levels of individual identity, but also helped to construct a national identity within the context of the global mediatization of Wang Chien-ming’s games. In terms of nationalism, the pride of Taiwan, Wang Chien-ming helped to solidify the Taiwanese sense of pride about their country and validated their feeling of possessing a distinct identity. In terms of global capitalism, Wang Chien-ming became more than a product; he has (personally) introduced Major League Baseball into the Taiwanese and other Asian markets. As for internationalism, Wang Chien-ming and other international athletes who are able to thrive in the US and get the widespread support from American and global fans, create a commonality across borders that is conducive to the process of friendship and reconciliation among countries of the world. Wang Chien-ming is not simply an example of an Asian athlete making it in the “major league” world of sport. In relation to nationalism, global capitalism and internationalism, his career has reflected and contributed to the evolution of Taiwanese identity. It was as though Wang Chien-ming was not just pitching for himself or for the Yankees – he was pitching for all of Taiwan! This phenomenon highlights a collective awareness that is a response to Taiwan’s extended international isolation and alienation, but also points to a collective optimism that Wang Chien-ming can enhance Taiwan’s international visibility.

The complexity and uniqueness of the Taiwanese engagement with the issue of national identity that have led Taiwan to be described as “a laboratory of identities” (Corcuff 2002: xxiii) and, more metaphorically, “the orphan of Asia” (Wu 2005), are the consequence of changing external opposition and concomitant internal dialogue and resistance. National identity, whether in the political, social or sporting fields, has evolved in the last decade. A once dominant Republic of China identity has increasingly been challenged by a Taiwanese identity. Particularly after the political reshuffle of 2000, Taiwanese identity be-
came a major political issue. Meanwhile sport was not only a tool for the promotion of Taiwanese identity but was also used as evidence of the emergence of that identity. For example, at the 2004 Olympics, Taiwan finally captured two gold medals in taekwondo, prompting a celebration on the return of the medallists reminiscent of national spectacles not seen for many years in the country. At the same time, the “May 11 Taiwan Sport Renaming Campaign” launched a national campaign which sought to urge the people and the media to correct their old habits and rename the “Republic of China team” (Zhong hwa dui) the “Taiwan team,” and the “Mainland Chinese team” the “China team” (Zhong guo dui). This campaign encouraged the general public to correct the media or anyone else who “erroneously” referred to the Taiwanese team as the Chinese team (Huang Shu-Fang, 2004).

Despite such efforts, the official representative team from Taiwan has continued to be referred to as “Chinese Taipei” in international sporting events. Although this is contrary to popular sentiment in Taiwan, and challenges the popular understanding of Taiwanese identity, this has not dampened Taiwan’s interest in participating in international sports. Furthermore, the growth of “Taiwanese identity” has been nurtured by continuing international suppression. For example, the PRC has frequently exerted pressure on host countries to change the name of Taiwan’s team from the internationally agreed “Chinese Taipei” to “China Taipei.” Similar influence is even exerted in the academic world of sports studies. Thus, during the 2004 Pre-Olympic Congress held in Thessaloniki, Greece, all references to Taiwan were replaced by the term “Chinese Taipei” regardless of whether the reference was to a location, school name or even a thesis title appearing in the congressional proceedings. Such behaviour does not serve to reinforce Chinese identity in Taiwan. Rather, it tends to increase Taiwanese consciousness among scholars. In such circumstances, the formation of such a consciousness has become a key issue in the relationship between sport, national identity and Taiwan’s unfolding Olympic history.

**Conclusion: Sport, national identity and Taiwan’s Olympic history**

Discussions of nationality tend to presuppose that if a nation possesses sovereignty its members should have the freedom to handle their own affairs. Either explicit or implicit is the belief that citizens share a common identity (Wang Tze-hong 1999). The Japanese colonial government’s internal rule sought to implement a modernization movement whereby Taiwanese athletes first participated in the Olympics. The KMT Republic government’s internal rule emphasized community and national identity, to which the achievements of Chi Cheng and Yang Chuan-Kwang contributed greatly. Because international sporting competitions continued to be nation-centered and individual athletes had to be attached to a country’s sporting organization in order to participate in the
Olympics, an athlete’s identity was necessarily tied to the nation, and conversely, the nation’s identity was linked to that athlete and his/her successes and failures.

Identity depends, in part, on recognition by others, or sometimes on the absence of such recognition, but it can also result from others’ misrecognition. Because of the desire for recognition and thus the elimination of misrecognition, a country’s legitimacy in the international sporting domain becomes supremely important. The Olympic movement’s emphasis on national symbolism is such that the struggle for formal Olympic membership has become a political battlefield based on the belief that Olympic acceptance can, or even will, result in wider political recognition. Thus, the disputes between Taiwan and China regarding representation in the Olympics (over the one China principle and the “two Chinas” issue) have clearly been about more than just sport. At its very core the argument has been a fundamental disagreement about Taiwan’s place in the world with Taiwan asserting independence, and China seeking to retain control over a territory believed to be its own. Taiwan has been subjected to Spanish, Dutch and Japanese colonial rules, successively over the past five centuries, and since the KMT government decamped to Taiwan in 1949, the dispute over identity questions has continued. However, because over many years no consensus has been reached through internal dialogue on Taiwanese identity, building a Taiwanese identity, externally – i.e. in terms of how others view Taiwan — became increasingly important.

In the identity formation process, as Cohen (1985) argues, the position of the other party is indispensable. Constructing “the other” is complex because the boundaries between ourselves and others are relative and interactive (Keller 2003). Furthermore, Castells (1997) emphasizes that building a social identity tends to be rooted in a power relationship. Drawing upon his analysis, sporting culture can be categorized in three ways in relation to the development of national identity.

First, there is legitimized national identity (or nationality). Sporting organizations are shaped by a dominant system. This form of national identity is linked to both civil society and the state. When the Japanese controlled a majority of Taiwan’s sporting organizations, the latter were intended to promote an identity supportive of their rule. The same point can be made in relation to the KMT and later, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Regardless of who has been in power, Taiwan’s legitimacy in international sporting organizations has been deeply affected by the Chinese government’s declaration that “the PRC is the sole legal Chinese government, and Taiwan remains part of China” (Tsai Hsin-yi 2002).

Second, there is a resistant national identity. This is a response to suppression or discrimination by the politically dominant. Scheff (1994: 281) emphasizes that “Nationalism built on ethnic groups tends to create a sense of distinction because of alienated perceptions and political, economic or social
inequality.” Thus, having experienced oppression at international sporting events, at the hands of various sporting organizations and international sporting symposia, Taiwan has been forced to substitute “Chinese Taipei” or “Taipei, China” for either “Republic of China” or “Taiwan.” This has prompted a majority of Taiwanese people to oppose “Chinese identity” and seek alternatives.

Finally, there is projected national identity. Here the functionaries of sporting society, in their search for cultural capital, have constructed a new national identity by which to redefine the position of their sporting organizations and have sought to create a completely new sports structure. Simply put, this expression of national identity becomes the main feature of sporting culture. In the recent decade, as Taiwan’s sporting trajectory has gathered momentum, a projected national identity has begun to emerge.

Each of these three forms of national identity is relevant to Taiwan’s Olympic history. In Taiwan’s history, the interactive influence of national identity, global capitalism and nationalism has concurrently spawned a new identity matrix that links Taiwan with international identities yet does not lose sight of Taiwanese individuality. To date, the emergent Taiwanese consciousness can best be understood by reference to concepts such as “civic nationalism” (Edmondson 2002) or “pragmatic nationalism” (Wu 2002). How it will develop is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. What is certain, however, as this chapter has demonstrated, is that sport will continue to play a significant role in the unfolding process.
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The Beijing Olympics and Expressions of National Identity in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong
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The Olympic Games are sports mega-events of brief duration, but they can generate strong feelings of national pride that may have long term consequences for the host city, its residents, and the national population (Waitt 2001, Gordon 2001, Roche 1994). Mewett (1999) argued that Olympic Games are useful for glorifying and uplifting the nation-state because they provide special occasions for symbols that invoke a nationalist meta-discourse. The Olympic Charter (IOC 2004) proclaims that the Games are not contested between nations, but the fact that all athletes must be trained and selected by national federations undermines this. Athletes must wear uniforms that identify the nation they represent, and on the victory medal stand, the national flags of the three medalists are raised and the gold medalist’s national anthem is played. In these and other ways, the IOC recognizes and promotes national identity (Guttmann 2002).

This nationalism was evident even in the earliest of the modern Olympics, in Athens in 1896, a time when nationalism is sweeping through Europe. Americans were not immune; local Athenians were taken aback by chants for American athletes of “USA, USA, USA” by the few fellow countrymen who came to watch, dressed in patriotic colors and waving the American flag (Guttmann 2002; also Thorne and Clarke 1989, Ritchie and Smith 1991). It was therefore quite predictable that the politics of sports would be conspicuously connected with the politics of national identities and international relations in the crucible of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 (Xu 2006).

Ikhoiya (1998) showed that national identity connotes social immersion, identification, involvement, and loyalty. It is a state of patriotic affiliation and commitment to one’s nation. He further elaborated that national identity as a social phenomenon includes citizens’ pride and trust in their country and a commitment and consciousness of that national entity. Similarly, Lee, Chan and So (2004) showed that national identity is more than merely positive feelings or the recognition of frequent social interactions. It involves imagining oneself belonging to a national community, an emotional attachment to this national community, and an understanding of the rights and duties of being a nation’s citizen. The Olympic Games were recognized by Ikhoiya (1998) as a stage to enhance such awareness and orientation. Through the Games, spectators become strongly attached to the Games athletes of their nation, identifying psychologically with the athletes as spectators at the Games or television viewers.
at home. The media have the role of ensuring that the products of national identity are produced on practical terms with emotional intensity. Furthermore, the reliability of program schedules and actual delivery is critical, and governments become the agencies to ensure the fluency of the information flow.

 Previous studies have documented ways in which the Olympic Games and sports are associated with national identity. Keech, Fox and Bramham (2001) showed that sport is an instrument of national unity, consolidating cultural nationalism and national consciousness and contributing to the search for cultural identity. Gill (2005) also found that national identity is analyzed specifically as a performance, and sport is the context in which this performance takes place. Brownell (2005) compared the relationship of sports to nationalism in the US and China over the last century. She found that the sports of both the US and China are closely related to the construction of national identity. The Chinese people hoped that the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games would mark China’s emergence as a world power. In North America, ice hockey is crucial to the maintenance of Canadian identity (Bairner 2001). In Brazil, Labriola and Negreiros (1998) showed that sports competition is not simply a competition but a system of demonstrating Brazilian national character through soccer. Garland (2004), for example, pointed to a change in tabloid press reporting during the 2002 World Cup, away from the invocation of the “hooligan” stereotype and towards the expression of “a belief that English success on the football field has led to a growth, or even a rebirth, of the idea of Englishness and English patriotism.” International sporting contests are seen as a form of ritualized war, serving as symbolic representation of the inter-state competition (Elias 1996). The importance of sport in developing national identity in Australia, Canada and the USSR is also outlined by Caldwell (1983).

 Hong Kong and Taiwan separated from Mainland China through historical treaties and civil war and have followed very different social, political and economical trajectories over the last century. Hong Kong experienced de-nationalization in the decades after the Second World War. However, it has been undergoing a re-nationalization after the return of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to China in 1997. Throughout this historical period, Hong Kong people were constantly readjusting and negotiating their identities (Lee, Chan & So 2004). People in Hong Kong started to face the reality of appropriating a new dual Hong Kong-China identity, and hence there is a clear trend of increasing identification with Hong Kong as well as the Chinese authorities (Fung 2004). According to the recent studies of Lau and Lam (2007) and Lau, Lam and Leung (2008a, 2008b), Hong Kong children demonstrated a positive relationship with the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reflected its beneficial impact for building their national identity. Hong Kong children may increase their national identity elements such as Chinese citizenship, patriotism, sense of belonging, the time planned to spend on Beijing Olympics, the appreciation of Chinese culture, positive feelings, happiness, excitement and a pride
in China. In the Taiwan context, its unique history after 1949 and the political conflict between the native Taiwanese and those who migrated from the Mainland (Lin 2003) have provoked a very public and continuing historical and cultural discussion on nationality. The main theme of this research has been citizens’ identification as Chinese, Taiwanese or both (Chu and Lin 1998). Very few studies have investigated the association between Olympics and national identity in the Chinese populations of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Given the general evidence of associations between national identity and the Olympics and other sports mega-events, we felt it important to investigate the impact of hosting the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing on the national identities of these populations.

We began with the general question of whether and how sport identity (SI) or physical activity (PA) contributed to Chinese national identity (NI). We surveyed Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan secondary students during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and examined the results in terms of gender, age, birth and residence, as well as sport identity and physical activity level. We believe the findings have important implications for future government policies in sports education.

**METHODS**

The survey was conducted with 927 students from six secondary schools in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The ages of the participants ranged from 12-17 years. Males numbered 526 (52%) and females totaled 486 (48%). Participants were asked to sign consent letters, which explained the research aims and procedures prior to the study. They were also reminded that their participation in the study was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time without penalty.

A written ten-item questionnaire was used as survey instrument, based on Ikhioya (1998) and the enthusiasm multi-item scale (Waitt 2001). Sample questions posed for degree of agreement included the following:

- “I think the 2008 Olympics can bring a positive impact for building the national identity when knowing Beijing will host the 2008 Games.”
- “My awareness of my China motherland is aroused when knowing Beijing will host the 2008 Olympic Games.”
- “I am proud to be a Chinese when knowing Beijing will host the 2008 Olympic Games.”

Using principal axis factoring analysis, only one factor was extracted and all the items were above the factor loading standard (.40). National identity was measured by the National Identity Scale (Lau & Lam 2007).

The Athletic Identity Measurement Scale (AIMS) (Brewer et al 1993) was
employed to measure the sport identity of children, that is, the degree to which a youth identifies himself/herself as a sports person. The AIMS is designed to measure both the exclusivity and strength of identification with the sport role. The reliability alpha of AIMS is between .87 and .93 from two studies (Brewer et al 1993). The AIMS also consisted of 10 items. Each of the items is a simple declarative statement that can be answered on a 5-point Likert scale. Sample items from the scale include “I consider myself an athlete” and “I spend more time thinking about sports than anything else.”

The Physical Activity Questionnaire for Children (PAQ-C) was designed to measure school-aged children’s general levels of physical activity participation. It is a self-administered recall measure that is easy for children to understand (Lau, Yu, Lee, So, & Sung 2004b). It includes nine questions about the level of sport involvement during the last seven days. Significant and satisfactory convergent validity was obtained through the correlations with the moderate to vigorous sport activities measure (Simons-Morton et al 1990) and an electronic motion sensor (Caltrac). The items asked children about the type and frequency of their sports involvement in school, during lunch, in the evening, and during other spare times. Sample items from the scale are “Sports in your spare time: Have you done any of the following activities in the past seven days (last week)?” and “Mark how often you did sports (like playing ball games, doing dance, swimming, etc) for each day last week”.

A translation-back-translation method was employed to clarify the wording and linguistics of the English version questionnaire. The Chinese version was then developed and proof-read by school teachers and primary school students to ensure the accuracy of the meaning and understanding of the translation. The questionnaires were administered to the children in a group setting after school hours. Students took approximately 25 minutes to complete the questionnaires.

Descriptive statistics for all key variables were calculated. Partial Pearson product moment correlations were used to examine the associations between students’ national identity, sport identity and physical activity level, controlled for demographic variables. Independent samples t-tests and One-way ANOVA were conducted to compare the differences of gender, age, birth and residential places, sport identity as well as physical activity level on national identity. Multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate the role of sport identity and physical activity level on the formation of national identity of Chinese secondary students.

**Survey results**

The reliability of the 3 scales was all satisfactory (National Identity Scale: \( \alpha=0.97 \); AIMS: \( \alpha=0.90 \); PAQ-C: \( \alpha=0.89 \)). Descriptive statistics for the whole and subgroups of the sample were presented in Table 1.

Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare the differences be-
tween the subgroups of age and gender. Results indicated that participants in Age Group 1 (junior secondary students) had significantly higher NI, SI and PA level than Age Group 2 (senior secondary students), with $t(1015) = 3.24$, $p < .01$; $t(981) = 2.51$, $p < .05$ and $t(859) = 7.97$, $p < .01$ respectively. Moreover, girls were found to have significantly higher NI than boys $t(1010) = -2.72$, $p > .01$). On the other hand, boys were found to have significantly higher SI and PA level than girls ($t(974) = 7.10$, $p < .01$ and $t(857) = 5.31$, $p < .01$) (refer to Table 1 for details).

Since the sample sizes of the different birth-residential place groups were not equal and heterogeneity of variance was observed among the groups in the three key variables, the Brown-Forsythe one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used (Brown & Forsythe, 1974). Results revealed that there was a significant main effect of birth-residential place on all key variables—national identity, $F(3, 507) = 408.86$, $p < .001$; sport identity, $F(3, 501) = 22.74$, $p < .001$ and physical activity level, $F(3, 745) = 102.67$, $p < .001$. The results were consistent with those found by standard one-way ANOVA (assuming equal group sizes and homogeneity of variance). Post hoc comparisons on both NI and PA level, using the Games and Howell procedures (Games and Howell 1976) to adjust for the unequal group sizes and heterogeneity of variance, revealed that all comparisons among the four subgroups were significant. That is, the “China” (CN) group has significantly higher NI than all the other three groups; the “China-HK” (CN-HK) group had significantly higher NI than the two other groups and in turn, the “Hong Kong” (HK) group had significant higher NI than the “Taiwan” (TW) group respectively. On the other hand, the CN group has significantly higher PA level than all the other three groups; the TW group had significantly higher PA level than the two other groups and in turn, the HK group had significant higher PA level than the CN-HK respectively. Finally, post hoc comparisons on sport identity between the four different subgroups revealed that the CN group has higher sport identity than the other three groups and the CN-HK group has significantly higher sport identity than the other two groups; and the HK and TW group did not differ from each other in their sport identity (refer to Table 1 for details).

Partial correlation analysis, controlled for age, gender and birth-residential place, was conducted to examine the relationship between NI, SI and PA level. Results revealed that NI was significantly and weakly correlated with SI ($r=.28$, $p < .01$) and moderately with PA level ($r=.42$, $p < .01$) respectively. Consistent with previous literature, SI was also found to be significantly correlated with PA level ($r=.56$, $p < .01$).

A sequential multiple regression analysis was thus conducted to test the relative significant contributions of different variables to the target variable—NI. Demographic variables including age, gender and birth-residential place were entered into the first step. Since birth-residential place variable (containing four subgroups) was a categorical variable, three dummy variables were created
in order to conduct the regression analysis. The CN group was adopted as the reference group in the analysis. Only gender and birth-residential place were found to be significant predictors of NI (F (5, 1198) = 221.5; p< .001; adjusted R2= 47.8%). Sport identity and PA level were then entered into the model in the second step. Both SI and PA level were found to be significant predictors of NI (F (7, 1196) = 189.8; p< .001; adjusted R2= 52.3%; refer to Table 3 for details).

Another sequential multiple regression analysis was conducted, using only students from HK (“HK” group) as the sample. Similarly, age and gender were entered into the first step. Only gender was found to be a significant predictor of NI (F (2, 391) = 1.81; p> .05; adjusted R2=.01%) in the first step. Sport identity and PA level were entered into the model in the second step. Contrary to the result using the whole sample, only PA level was found to be significant predictor of NI (F (4, 389) = 4.96; p< .001; adjusted R2= 3.9%). That is, about 3.9% unique variance was accounted for by PA level.

National identity among the three regions

Based upon the ANOVA results, “China-China” group had the highest national identity, followed by the “China-HK” and the “HK-HK” group. And the lowest was the “TW-TW” group. The differences of Chinese national identity among Mainland China (M = 4.61), China-Hong Kong (M=3.95), Hong Kong-Hong Kong (M = 3.87), and Taiwan (M = 2.84) secondary students during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games were distinct according to their mean values. Based upon the previous findings between Olympic Games and national identity (Ritchie & Smith 1991; Gordon 2001 and Gill 2005), the low politics of sports and Olympics have conspicuously been recognized as an instrument of hegemonic power to generate patriotic feelings and national pride, especially for the residents of the host country. That was the main reason that the 1990 Asian Games hosted in Beijing evoked positive nationalism among the majority of Chinese people (Brownell 1995). Consequently, the Mainland Chinese naturally demonstrated the strongest national identity among Hong Kong and Taiwan students when Beijing was granted to host the XXIX Olympics. Li and Su (2004) also stated that, in the process of new nation building, the link between sports and nationalism has persisted even until today. This notion is further supported by the regression analysis results that birth and residential place contributed the most in national identity development (Lau, Lam & Leung 2008a and 2008b).

Since there is no previous study investigating and comparing the three regions on Chinese national identity during the Olympic Games, this finding may serve as baseline data. Although there are no previous references for comparison during the Games, the national identity of Hong Kong students during the Games coincided with or even intensified compared to the recent studies of Lau
and Lam (2007) and Lau, Lam and Leung (2008a and 2008b) that Hong Kong children demonstrated a positive relationship before the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reflected the positive impact for building their national identity. Hok Yau Club (2005) and Youth Online Association (2006) had conducted surveys on Hong Kong adolescents’ Chinese identity after China resumed Hong Kong’s sovereignty in 1997. The results of Hok Yau Club indicated that Hong Kong adolescents have been demonstrating greater Chinese national identity (75%), stronger patriotism for China (60%), and this trend is more dominant and obvious when compared to previous two-year survey results. Youth Online Association also demonstrated 52% of respondents who described themselves as Chinese instead of Hong Kongese and 82% of them agreed that “as Chinese, they are proud to contribute in the Beijing Olympic Games.” These figures can be a reference on the increase of Hong Kong adolescents’ Chinese national identity after 1997. In addition, both studies suggested that the mega-sports event victories of China (80%) and the hosting of Olympic Games in China (65%) would significantly enhance the Chinese national identity among Hong Kong adolescents. Likewise, Fung (2004) deemed that a new dual Hong Kong-China national identity has emerged after 1997 and there is no conflict, but an even stronger trend in the development of this unique identity in Hong Kong.

Because they are not under the “One Country, Two Systems” and the sovereignty of the PRC Government, the much lower Chinese national identity demonstrated by Taiwanese students is foreseeable and understandable. The “greater China mentality” is highly contested in contemporary Taiwanese society and it is squarely resisted by the pro-independence politicians. Over the past 15 years, Taiwan has witnessed fast-track democratization and indigenization that gave rise to a stronger sense of Taiwanese identity as opposed to Chinese identity (Xu 2006). However, these circumstances changed somewhat when the conservative and anti-communist Kuomintang (KMT) won over the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which favors a new Taiwanese nation building. Concerning the possibility of a new national identity that combined Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity, Xu (2006) believed that the Beijing Olympics could play a constructive role.

The contributions of national identity

Correlation results demonstrated significant relationships between sport identity, PA level, and national identity in all students. This finding suggested that the higher the sport identity and PA level, the greater would be students’ national identity. In the regression analysis, birth-residential place was found to be the most significant predictor of national identity. The sport identity contributed weakly to national identity. This finding was congruent with the previous studies in which sports acted as an important arena for the development of
national identity (Bairner 2001; Jarvie 2007; Tuck 2003 and Lau, Lam and Leung 2008a and 2008b). To explain this result, it is necessary to understand more about sport identity. Sport identity is defined as the degree of strength and exclusivity to which an individual identifies with the athlete’s role (Brewer, Van Raalte and Linder 1993). The relationship between sport identity and sport intention, involvement and commitment has long been supported by Theodorakis (1994), Anderson and Cychosz (1995), and Lau, Fox and Cheung (2006).

Based upon these previous positive associations between sport identity and national identity, the present study revealed that higher sport identity led to greater sport participation and commitment. This finding coincided with the findings of Todd (1987) that members of the Ulster British who represented Ireland in sports competitions were more aware of an Irish identity. Ruane and Todd (1996) also argued that sport identity can be a positive force in promoting British identity, Northern Irish identity and Ulster or Irish Protestant identity. Though there were no related studies investigating the relationship between national identity and sport identity during the Olympic Games in Asia, we can find support from the example of Liu Xiang, a Mainland China athlete, who watched the raising of his national flag with tears after he won China’s first track and field gold medal of China at the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics. It reminds us of the broader argument of Smith and Porter (2004) that sporting identities, such as allegiances to national sports teams, often invoke a patriotic nationalism.

**Group differences among constructs**

Overall, younger students had significantly higher scores in national identity than older students, which is a finding consistent with previous studies conducted in Hong Kong. According to Hok You Club (2005) and Lau and Lam (2007), younger children demonstrated stronger national identity than older children because of their less critical thinking and weaker political sensitivity to China. In the present study, the age group was mixed with Chinese and Taiwanese students. As a result, the thinking, perception, and sensitivity to Chinese national identity could be very different. Especially during the years before and since 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to China, the Hong Kong population has constantly been reevaluating and readjusting its identity (Lee, Chan and SO 2004). People in Hong Kong started to face the reality of a new dual Hong Kong-China identity, and hence there is a clear trend of increasing identification with the Hong Kong as well as the Chinese authorities (Fung 2004). Moreover, the “Taiwanese identity” and indigenization have rapidly developed since 2000 under the governance of the Democratic Progressive Party. Separation of the three regions by age groups is recommended for deeper analysis.

With regards to gender differences, our finding that girls reported significantly higher national identity was inconsistent with previous studies. We ex-
pected that national identity would be a fairly neutral concept, implying no gender stereotyping. We also expected that heightened awareness of female rights in the last decade in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China might balance gender in notions of national identity. Cases in Japan (Harden 1994), Holland (Verkuyten 1997), and Hong Kong, China and Taiwan before the Beijing Olympic Games (Lau, Lam, and Leung 2008a and 2008b) were evidence of this.

Our results may be explained by the heightened emotionality that surrounded Chinese national identity during the Olympic ceremonies, which showcased Chinese history, and the sporting events themselves, in which Chinese athletes performed with unprecedented results. There are those who have argued that women perceive and express relatively positive emotions, such as happiness or joy, more so than men (Hochschild 1979 and 1983; Sutton 1991; Lively and Heise 2004), so women respondents may have registered more positive and passionate attachment because of this. Another explanation is that in recent Olympics, there have been more female Chinese athletes than males and Chinese women have won more gold medals than the men in every Games since 1988 (Dong 2008). In the 2008 Beijing Olympics, more than two-thirds of Chinese medalists were female, and thus, our female survey respondents might be expressing more intense resonance with these female athletes and medalists.

**Conclusion**

In sum, among students from the three regions before the Beijing Olympics, those from China demonstrated the strongest national identity. “Birth and residential place” contributed the most to national identity scores, while sport identity had the weakest connection to national identity and physical activity level had a moderate relationship.

Sport has long been recognized as a causal agent in forming and sustaining identity (Lau et al. 2006; Weiss 2001). As one of the world’s largest transnational sporting events, the Olympic Games has a deep impact on national identity (Tomlinson 2006). But precisely what form of sport influences people’s national identity is still not clear since the concept of sport is vague. It is necessary to pursue further the distinctions between sport and the Olympic Games as well as the different symbolic forms of sport in order to understand even more clearly the causal links between sport and national identity.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the key variables in whole sample and different subgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total (N=1020)</th>
<th>Age Group 1 (12-14)</th>
<th>Group 2 (15-17)</th>
<th>Male (N=526)</th>
<th>Female (N=486)</th>
<th>CN (N=372)</th>
<th>HK (N=311)</th>
<th>TW (N=259)</th>
<th>CN-HK (N=64)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>3.89 (0.92)</td>
<td>3.98** (0.92)</td>
<td>3.79 (0.90)</td>
<td>3.81 (0.96)</td>
<td>3.96** (0.86)</td>
<td>4.61** (0.45)</td>
<td>3.87 (0.63)</td>
<td>2.84** (0.77)</td>
<td>3.95 (0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Identity</td>
<td>2.92 (0.79)</td>
<td>2.98* (0.79)</td>
<td>2.85 (0.80)</td>
<td>3.09** (0.80)</td>
<td>2.74 (0.75)</td>
<td>3.16** (0.71)</td>
<td>2.78 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.87 (0.73)</td>
<td>2.91** (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Physical Activity</td>
<td>2.37 (0.76)</td>
<td>2.56** (0.80)</td>
<td>2.16 (0.66)</td>
<td>2.50** (0.78)</td>
<td>2.23 (0.72)</td>
<td>2.83** (0.79)</td>
<td>2.06** (0.59)</td>
<td>2.24** (0.63)</td>
<td>1.84** (0.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) were presented.
1 CN: born and lives in China; HK: born and lives in Hong Kong; TW: born and lives in Taiwan; CN-HK: born in China and has immigrated to and lives in Hong Kong
2 Due to missing data, the total sample size for the variable “level of physical activity” is 851.
* p<.05; ** p<.01

Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for National Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model, Step, and Predictor Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant**</td>
<td>4.361</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>3.987, 4.735</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.022, .030</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender*</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.011, .149</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth-residential group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HK**</td>
<td>-.661</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>-.748, -.574</td>
<td>-.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TW**</td>
<td>-1.514</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>-1.606, -1.422</td>
<td>-.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN-HK**</td>
<td>-.598</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>-.757, -.439</td>
<td>-.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant**</td>
<td>2.937</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>2.495, 3.379</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.002, .053</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender**</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.095, .230</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth-residential group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HK**</td>
<td>-.508</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>-.596, -.420</td>
<td>-.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TW**</td>
<td>-1.369</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>-1.486, -1.306</td>
<td>-.724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN-HK**</td>
<td>-.399</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>-.555, -.242</td>
<td>-.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Identity**</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.048, .157</td>
<td>.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Physical Activity**</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.176, .307</td>
<td>.185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the step 1 model, Adjusted $R^2 = 47.8, F(5, 1198) = 221.5, p < .001;
For the step 2 model, Adjusted $R^2 = 52.3, F(7, 1196) = 189.8, p < .001;
Note: CI = confidence interval; * p < .05; ** p < .01
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National Identity, Olympic Victory, and Chinese Sportswomen in the Global Era

Dong Jinxia

Without exaggeration, sport is a mirror in which nations, communities, men and women now see themselves. The reflection is sometimes bright, sometimes dark, sometimes distorted, sometimes magnified. This metaphorical mirror is a source of mass exhilaration and depression, security and insecurity, pride and humiliation, bonding and alienation. (Mangan 2006)

The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing attracted roughly 10,000 athletes from 204 National Olympic Committees, over 50,000 media personnel, hundreds of thousands of tourists, and over 4 billion TV viewers worldwide. It conveyed to all a vivid picture of China and the Chinese people. The successful staging of the Games and the remarkable achievements of Chinese athletes made the games “truly exceptional,” as IOC President Jacques Rogge declared at the closing ceremony. Given that the Olympic Games are grounded in the nation-state system, they are undoubtedly an effective platform for the assertion of national identity.

China’s integration into the Olympic movement is a product of globalization, following China’s opening its doors to outsiders in the late 1970s. However, this rapid globalization has generated much concern about the nature and strength of national identity. Some worry that globalization poses a threat to building national identity, while others feel that globalization actually creates more spaces for the expression of national identity.

As in the past, Chinese women again captured more medals than the men at the Beijing Games, continuing to hold up “more than half the sky.” This raises some fascinating questions about the relationships between national identity, Olympics, globalism and gender. How has the national identity of China been constructed through the pursuit of Olympic victories? What roles have Chinese sportswomen played in boosting China’s new image in the world? What impact have the Beijing Olympics had on the national identity of China and gender relations? Based on a study of government materials and academic literature on Chinese sport and on interviews conducted with coaches, athletes and administrators, this chapter will explore the complicated relationships between national identity, Olympic success and gender in the era of globalization.
National Identity and Olympic Strategy

It is widely accepted that identity is a subjective sense of belonging by which the members of a group “identify” with one another. National identity is a collective psychological state, a necessary condition for the political and legal survival of the nation-state (Bostock and Smith 2001:4, n.1). As an ideological construction, national identity “needs to be constantly nurtured, reinvented and maintained” (Cashmere 2002:305). It is formed of “widely circulating discourses of national belonging: representations of what a nation is and is not; of the nation’s character, its accomplishments, its defining traits, and its historical trajectory” (Hogan 2009:3).

Indeed, the modern national identity of China has changed over time. For centuries prior to 1840, China saw itself as the center of the world because of its five millennia of civilization and two millennia of centralized rule — with some justification, since it was a sophisticated, advanced culture when Europe was backward and America did not even exist as a nation. However, from the mid-nineteenth century until the end of World War II, China was humiliated by the Western powers and Japan. The Chinese wished to create a new global identity, one characterised by prestige, esteem and respect, after the communist regime came to power in 1949.

International sport, as a contest between nations in the competitive arena, obviously plays an important part in creating a collective awareness of national identity. Given that the Olympic Games are the world’s largest sports event, Olympic victory was considered talismanic of China’s rising world status. In 1952 when China was still fighting America in the Korean War, forty-one delegates, for the first time in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), were sent to the Helsinki Games. However, because of the difficulty of resolving the “Two Chinas” issue, the IOC invitation arrived so late that only one of the PRC athletes reached Helsinki in time to compete. In the following years Chinese athletes achieved records in a number of elite sports, such as the men’s weight-lifting world record by Chen Jingkai (1956), the women’s high jump world record by Zheng Fengrong (1957), and the first world championship of table-tennis by Rong Guotuan (1957), but none of them appeared in the Olympics. This was because China boycotted the 1956 Olympic Games in Australia and withdrew from the IOC and eight other international sports federations due to the “One China” situation. Thereafter, China was isolated from the major international sporting organizations for two decades. In the case of China, the Olympics and politics were closely intertwined.

When China began to open itself to the West in the late 1970s, the IOC reopened its door to China, and PRC’s seat in the IOC assembly was restored in 1979. “Go beyond Asia and join the advanced world ranks” was voiced by the Chinese diving team in 1980, and the slogan soon became the goal of the Chinese sports community. In 1984 the Chinese buried their humiliating “nil”
record in the Olympic gold medal table by winning fifteen gold medals at the Los Angeles Games. It was a performance that stirred up an intense patriotism among the Chinese. At the time, the Chinese who once believed they lived in a “socialist heaven” during the Maoist era suddenly discovered the backwardness of their country and the severity of its problems, resulting in distrust within the Party and in the nation. During a period of low national morale, the Olympic success gave the Chinese a measure of pride, dignity and confidence. Therefore, sport (including the Olympics) was regarded by Chinese political and sports officials as an instrument for the promotion of national pride and identity.

The Olympic success at Los Angeles fuelled China’s ambition to become a world sporting power. In 1985 an Olympic strategy was introduced and became the blueprint for elite sports programmes in China. Emphasis was shifted to Olympic sports, and all available resources in the country were concentrated on a few key sports in which athletes had the best opportunities to win medals at the Olympic Games. However, the road to world supremacy was difficult. At the 1988 Olympic Games, the PRC won only five gold medals; lagging behind even South Korea, it placed eleventh in the final medal totals. This failure not only disappointed the Chinese but reinforced their determination to become an Olympic power in the near future.

National policies and management of sport were adjusted in the early 1990s in order to secure Olympic success. For example, the timing of the National Games was changed from the year before the Olympics to the year after; only Olympic sports and traditional Chinese martial arts were incorporated into the National Games after 1997. Thereafter, a winning-oriented sports policy dominated the sports community, from athletes to coaches, researchers to administrators. In 1994, an “Olympic medal-winning plan” was drafted and the next year a special fund for Olympic related sports facilities, nutrition and sports research was established. Its first-year budget was 65 million yuan (US $8.13 million) and it has increased annually. In total, over 200 researchers have been involved in 56 Olympic-related projects (Zhang 1996).

To ensure Chinese victories in 2008, the “Plan to Win Glory in the 2008 Olympics” was drafted in 2002, following which each individual sports management centre drafted a “Project to Implement the Plan to Win Glory in the 2008 Olympics.” The Plan identified a number of sports in which China expected to excel, including shooting, men’s and women’s judo, men’s and women’s weight-lifting, classic wrestling, free wrestling, women’s wrestling, Taekwondo, diving, gymnastics, table-tennis, and badminton.

To maximize eventual Olympic performances in 2008, membership of the national teams expanded from 1316 to 3222. Some 1700 athletes of 55 national teams for 28 sports intensely prepared in the lead-up to the Games, though only less than half could participate (Yang Ming et al.: 2008). Accordingly, sports budgets soared dramatically. In 2003 the budget for sports development (including both elite and mass sport) was over 1.5 billion yuan (over US$181 mil-
lion), of which over 900 million (US$108.7 million) was from governmental financing. This was more than 45 times that of the 1981 budget and nine times that in 1991. By 2006 the budget reached over 2.1 billion yuan (US$253.7 million), of which 1.26 billion yuan (US$152.2 million) was from governmental financing. A special budget for Olympic-related research was also put in place in 2002 by the State Sports Administration. In its first year the budget of 14 million yuan (US$1.75 million) sponsored 49 projects comprising 144 studies. There was also another special budget for athletes’ nutrition. Athletes were treated differently according to performance and event. For example, the key athletes from long-distance running, race walking, men’s hurdles, and women’s weight-throwing were subsidized at 50 yuan (about US$7.25) each day, the key athletes from other teams were given 30 yuan (US$4.3), and other athletes received only 10 yuan (US$1.4) (Guojia tianjing yundong guanli zhongxin 2007).

With the approach of the Games, final training plans for key athletes were determined, and competitions were scheduled line with the 2008 Olympic schedules. It is estimated that the Chinese government spent a total of roughly 800 million yuan (US$16.79 million) in each of the lead-up years in elite sport. China won 51 gold medals and 100 total medals at the Beijing Games, making the investment in each gold medal less than 15.7 million yuan (US$2.29 million), and about 8 million yuan (US$1.17 million) for a medal (Chen Weisheng 2008).

In addition, various measures were taken to insure athletes committed to the Olympics. For example, an athletes’ insurance system was established, and their incomes rose significantly after the income distribution system for athletes was reorganized. Athletes, as an independent occupational category in the sports field, were now listed in the national occupational management system (Renti Zi 2002). To avoid the possible negative impact of commercial activities, in 2006 the State Sports Administration (SSA) prohibited athletes on national teams from all commercial work until after the Beijing Games unless they were approved by the SSA. National interest took precedent over individual livelihood.

The consequence of this unswerving pursuit of success was the astonishing achievements of Chinese athletes during the Olympics in the last two decades (see table 1). At the Beijing Games, China fulfilled its dream as its 51 gold medals topped the gold medal list for the first time in history.

In summary, Olympic victory has been regarded as the public embodiment of national strength and becoming an Olympic power has been China’s persistent and ultimate dream. Its patriotic preoccupation with the Olympic Games derived predominantly from past humiliation. Olympic success has been an instrument for building a positive national image, self-esteem and self-confidence to resume the historic role of “the pre-eminent power in East Asia” and “to
bring to an end the overlong century of humiliation and subordination to the West and Japan” (Huntington 1996:229).

**Women and the Olympic Victories**

Internationally, women have participated in the Olympics in increasing numbers for the past century and by the 2008 Games, women athletes reached more than 42 percent and competed in 137 events of all sports with the exception of boxing and baseball (softball for women). Equal participation of women in the Games has been one of the IOC’s goals since the 1980s.

It is noticeable that Chinese women took the lead in reaching the goal. More than equal, Chinese women were actually higher represented than men for four successive Olympiads from 1992 to 2004 (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Though other countries such as Japan also saw more women representatives at different periods in Olympic history, they did not dominate it as long as Chinese women did.

Chinese women have achieved much more remarkable performances than men in the Olympics since 1988 (see Figure 1). In addition to the Olympic medals, women performed better than men in virtually all the team sports in the Beijing Games (see Table 3). There were only four nations whose women won more gold medals than their male counterparts—China, Australia, Holland, and Japan—and it was China’s women who have won the most gold medals (see Figure 2). Internationally, Chinese women were also remarkable. Their 27½ medals bested the totals of women from the USA (15), Japan (5), and Korea (4). It is beyond doubt that women played the major part in fulfilling the Chinese dream of becoming an Olympic power – symbolic of China’s overall power.

Women’s prominent performances reinforced the Chinese government role in building a vigorous national identity. Even as early as the 1980s, the government used the five consecutive world titles of the national women’s volleyball team as a political slogan to spur the modernization of the country. This was not unlike the role played by the Japanese women’s volleyball team in the early 1960s. After winning the world championships in 1963 and the Olympic Games in 1964, the team members were lauded as heroines by the Japanese. Indeed, there was a direct link between the two teams. Following the Tokyo Olympic Games, coach Daimatsu and seven team members were invited by China’s Premier Zhou Enlai to teach Chinese athletes “Japanese-style volleyball,” (Olympian Voices 1964) and this had a lasting impact on Chinese volleyball. The 1960s generation of players later became the coaches in the 1970s and 1980s when the Chinese female players gained international success.

There is no doubt the Chinese sportswomen have been a source of national exhilaration and pride. Women’s athletic accomplishments have strengthened the cohesion of the Chinese nation and demonstrated a new, confident face of
China to the world. As a result, many women’s sports have obtained special treatment. First, the percentage of female athletes at provincial and national levels has increased over time (Zhang 1996). In 2006, 48.3 percent of the 1,746 national team athletes were women. Second, after the mid-1980s, most women’s teams have adopted the practice of ‘training with male sparring partners’ to ensure and maximize women’s success. Because women are considered more likely to win honors for the nation, their rigorous training with men is a state priority. This practice has continued, as confirmed by the 2008 Olympic wrestling champion Wu Jingyu: “For 11 years he (her training partner) has been with me in training. I learned to kick other’s heads starting with his” (Liu Chen 2008).

This policy of preferential attention to female athletes was part of the preparation for the Beijing Games. For instance, in 2001, women were identified to make breakthroughs in tennis. Promising players were located, trained and then sent to competitions abroad to gain experience and improve their skills with the eventual aim of Olympic medals (Hua 2005). As a consequence, the doubles players Li Ting and Sun Tiantian advanced from 171st in the world in 2002 to an Olympic gold medal in 2004. The priorities given to women, incidentally, led to complaints by men that the state ignored them and denied them opportunities to go abroad for competition (Liu Xiaoxing 2006). Clearly, these “realistic” calculations for success in the Olympics, favoring elite women performers in the interest of national interest, have helped to reconstruct gender relations.

The sporting success has resulted in increasing and luring material incentives that were virtually nonexistent before the 1980s, a result of sports reforms in the context of wider socio-economic reforms. It is noticeable that the state winning bonuses for an Olympic gold medallist have increased dramatically over time (see Figure 3), from 8,000 yuan (US$ 3484 in 1984 to 350,000 yuan (US$ 50,725) in 2008. A gold medal bonus was the equivalent of 12 times per capita GDP in 1984; in 2008, it was 19 times, yet another measure of the official importance of sport victories.

Rewards have come in other forms. Following the growth of private enterprise and sponsorship, commercialization has become pervasive after the mid-1990s. Not surprisingly, it is the successful and beautiful sportswoman who is more likely to get endorsement contracts and media attention as well as other social rewards. Guo Jingjing, the nation’s most famous female sports star,
earned endorsements with companies like Coca Cola and Nike after Athens 2004, where she won two gold medals. For a time, she was endorsing nine products for an income of 9.5 million yuan. Her popularity was further enhanced after her personal relationship with Huo Qigang (who came from a rich Hong Kong family) was revealed in 2006. Her success repeat in winning two golds at the Beijing Games consolidated her status as the highest profile woman in the media.

However, sport commercialization has its drawbacks. Less popular sports such as women’s soccer, despite its record of international success in the 1990s, find it hard to obtain sponsorship and must depend on the limited and fixed government budget. In 2005 the monthly salaries of the female soccer players ranged from 2000 and 3000 yuan (US$ 250 – 375). At a time when the average Chinese monthly income was 1167 yuan (US$ 146), some players earned as little as 1000 yuan (US$ 125). The less successful and less attractive women athletes can fall quickly after retirement. Zhou Chunlan, the national weightlifting champion in 1988, ended up as a masseuse in a bath house, with a daily income of 4.5 yuan. When this was reported in the media, it aroused heated debate on post-athletic jobs and acute concern about athletes’ lives after sport. The coexistence of government funding and corporate sponsorship has created unexpected difficulties for some sports and some athletes.

Celebrated female athletes have received glowing profiles in the Chinese media and have been frequently applauded by the media as national heroines. “Chinese Girls,” which featured the famous volleyball players, was adapted from a book for a TV documentary program. Fu Mingxia, the four-time Olympic gold medallist at the Olympic Games between 1992 and 2000, was named the world’s Best Woman Platform Diver by the US magazine Swimming World. After she retired from diving, she went on to study at prestigious Tsinghua University and married the former finance minister of Hong Kong, Liang Jinsong in 2002. Even today her life, including her marriage and children, are popular news in the media.

Women’s success in international sports and their subsequent financial and social benefits have raised sportswomen in the public’s esteem and promoted women’s social status both in the sports community and society at large. Ex-athletes are now promoted to high-level coaching and administrative positions. The former table-tennis star Deng Yaping, for example, became a member of the IOC Athletes Commission and then a member of the Chinese NOC. She was deputy director of the Beijing Olympic Village and is now deputy general secretary of the Beijing Municipal Communist Youth League. Since the initial award for the “Best Ten Athletes of the Year” in 1978, women have dominated the list for 26 years.

In the twenty-first century women have continued to garner the majority of Chinese success in international competitions. For example, women accounted for 270 (64.3 percent) of the 420 world titles won by Chinese athletes.
between 2003-06, and they have maintained their dominance in such sports as diving, badminton, table tennis, shooting, weight lifting, wrestling, gymnastics, and trampoline. They have made rapid progress in sailing (gold), rowing (gold), hockey (silver), synchronized swimming (bronze) and group rhythmic gymnastics (silver). Of course, some men have had success in past years, such as the 110m hurdler Liu Xiang, who won the Athens Olympic Games in 2004 and broke the world record in 2006, and who triumphed in the world championships in 2007; the men’s gymnastics team won seven gold medals in Beijing 2008, and men won two golds in boxing. Indeed, the gap between men and women narrowed significantly in 2008 in terms of Olympic medals and participants, as shown earlier in Figure 1.

It is clear from the above description that Chinese women have played a dominant role in realizing the Chinese Olympic dream and building the national identity of China. Elite women performers have been favoured in the interest of Chinese national image. They have benefited greatly from the medal-oriented policy and achieved astonishing achievements in the Olympics, which in turn have helped to promote women’s social, economic and political status. National identity building and gender have been intimately intertwined. The state policy, women’s achievement in sport and their high profile media coverage together have impact on the reconstruction of gender relations in the sports community and society at large.

The Beijing Games: A global event with Chinese characteristics

China has made steady progress in political, economic and social domains after the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, especially after the economic reforms were initiated in the late 1970s. However, the nation still feels it has a score to settle with the West in order to restore its image and re-establish its self-esteem.

To win the right to host the Olympics was the first major step. In 1991, Beijing submitted its application to the IOC for the 2000 Olympic Games. The former President Jiang Zeming once stated in 1992: “The quest for the Olympics was to raise national morale and strengthen the cohesion of the Chinese people both on the mainland and overseas” (Xu Qi 1992:36-7). However, the bid failed in 1993, when Beijing lost to Sydney by two votes. This failure only fuelled a stronger nationalism. The 1999 American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 spy plane collision over the South China Sea further fuelled the rising nationalism, which saw the anti-U.S. demonstrations and the resultant harsh criticism of “Western values.”

To stage the Games was considered a chance for Beijing to showcase to the world a new, vigorous image of an open, modernized, civilized and well-developed metropolis. It was also intended to restore China’s national grandeur,
National Identity, Olympic Victory

erase past memories of defeat, and ensure present memories of victory. Thus, Beijing opened a second bid for the Olympic Games in 1999. Virtually all of China, from the government to its citizens, pledged all-out support for Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games. Noticeably, Western opposition to the Chinese bid for reasons of China’s human right records did not frighten the Chinese; rather, it strengthened their determination - at home and abroad - to fight and win. As a result, the comfortable win by 56 votes over the rival cities effectively consolidated a sense of national identity in China.

The Chinese made a concerted effort to ensure the Beijing Games were the best in Olympic history. They invested more than 290 billion yuan (US$ 40 billion) in modernizing Beijing’s airport and other infrastructure, in building the required thirty-one competition venues, and in cleaning up municipal pollution and environmental hazards (Zhonggong Beijing shiwei zuzhi bu 2006). As a result, the eye-catching stadiums, the state-of-the-art airport terminal, and modern subway lines, among other things, changed the image of Beijing, which reflected “the country’s effort to give shape to an emerging national identity” (Ouroussoff 2008).

Preparing for the Games, however, was not without its problems. The budget for the National Stadium known as “Bird’s Nest” was reduced from 4 billion yuan (about US$ 506 million) to 2.267 billion yuan (US$ 287 million). This was partly a result of the IOC’s “downsizing plan,” which halted the stadium’s construction for five months; the stadium was not completed until April 2008 (Pan Chengqing 2008). In addition, the contentious European and North American legs of the torch relay dealt a blow to Chinese enthusiasm for the “Journey of Harmony” under the slogan “One World, One Dream.” Again, Western condemnation of China over the issues of human rights resulted in a surge of nationalist and anti-foreigner sentiment in the country (Elegant 2008).

Of course, domestic policies and education also played their part in generating nationalism. Take the sports community as an example. Various educational activities have been organized in the past decades to stress to athletes the importance of patriotism (the Chinese phrase is aì guó zhù yì, “loving the state”). For example, a number of national teams, such as gymnastics and volleyball, regularly visit army barracks for a few days of military training. By living with soldiers, athletes and coaches experience the hardship of the military camps and are meant to realize how preferably the state treats them. And to motivate people from various backgrounds in working for the Games’ success, a special oath ceremony was held separately for volunteers and staff at each Olympic venue and the other sectors involved in the days prior to August 8, 2008. Athletes, coaches and officials of Chinese Olympic Delegation swore that “I’ll fight tenaciously and try my best to be the first….to add colour to my life, to add luster to the Olympics … and to win glory for the motherland” (Yang Ming et al. 2008).

National identity is frequently conflated with nationalism, which is a de-
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...motion to the nation, a belief in the primacy of nations, and the actions designed to protect and promote the interests of a nation (Hogan 2009). Motivated by nationalism and by enthusiasm for the Olympics, the Chinese people wanted to contribute to the Beijing Games. Although the Games needed just 100,000 volunteer workers, prior to their opening, more than one million people had volunteered and an additional one million Beijing residents had offered to be city service volunteers (Du Xinda 2008). In the end, over 1.5 million volunteers made their contribution to the successful Games.

It should be noted that the strong sentiments of Chinese nationalism have mixed with an increasing sense of globalization. This is evidenced by popular attitudes towards migrant Chinese athletes. After the introduction of economic reform and the opening of China’s borders, a large number of Chinese athletes migrated abroad and by the 1990s they were known as “the overseas troops” (hai wai bing tuan). This phenomenon gained national attention when He Zhili, a former Chinese table-tennis world champion, represented Japan in the Asian Games in 1994 and defeated her former Chinese team-mates and the hitherto world champions Deng Yaping and Qiao Hong. This precipitated an intense national debate and led to stricter control over athletes’ migration in the 1990s. Zhili’s post-competition remark that “it is the happiest moment in my life to defeat the Chinese” not only shocked many Chinese but also impelled officials to better instil patriotism in their athletes (Long Xiong 1996). This was one of the reasons that some Chinese and some foreigners feared that there would be a chauvinistic backlash if China did not win at the Beijing Games (Dong 2007), although this did not turn out to be the case. Foreign star athletes like the US swimmer Michael Phelps, the Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt and NBA player Kobe Bryant were among the most popular with the Chinese audiences. “Sometimes we feel we are better supported here than back at home,” the American basketball player Chris Paul said (Dan Wetzel 2008). Prior to the Beijing Games, the Chinese women’s volleyball team was considered as the country’s only hope for a team gold medal, but even this was dashed by its defeat at the hands of an American team coached by Lang Ping, a famous Chinese player in the 1980s. Nonetheless, the Chinese spectators praised Lang Ping for her intelligence, fair play, and skill. Ren Yanli, the softball player accused by fans in 2004 as “China’s traitor” because she represented Japan and defeated her former Chinese team, denying China’s dream of a softball medal at the Athens Games, became a special guest on the CCTV program “My Olympics” in Beijing 2008. What a change!

Although the Chinese spectators demonstrated an unprecedented patriotism, filling the Olympic venues with tireless cheers of “Jia You” [Go, China], they also extended warm hospitality to foreign athletes and applauded excellent performances regardless of athletes’ nationalities. Though sprinter Liu’s withdrawal disappointed millions (and some accused him of being afraid to lose), most Chinese expressed their concern over his injury. The Chinese Vice President Xi Jin-
ping expressed the hope that Liu would fully recover and achieve great success in the future. The Liu incident reflected a changed attitude towards winning and athletes where the Chinese demonstrated their sympathy as well as support.

It is also significant that an increasing number of foreign coaches were employed by China’s national teams after Beijing won its Olympic bid in 2001. After the State Sports Administration issued a regulation encouraging the employment of foreign coaches in 2003, even more national teams including softball, handball, archery, fencing and rhythmic gymnastics recruited foreign coaches from America, Canada, Germany, France, Korea and even Japan. The purpose was clear: to help China maximize its results in the 2008 Games. In the Chinese delegation to the 2008 Games, twenty-eight coaches for seventeen sports including archery, canoeing, women’s handball, hockey and softball, men’s and women’s basketball, synchronized swimming and fencing were foreigners from sixteen countries. The foreign coaches not only helped the Chinese improve their performances but also provided an opportunity for the Chinese to learn more about foreign cultures. The men’s sabre gold medallist Zhang Man declared: “My French coach Christian Bauer offered tremendous help in improving my fencing skills. He is the best coach in the world. This gold medal belongs to him” (Zhou Yan 2008). There was public acclaim for Jin Yongbo, the Korean coach of China’s silver-medal women’s hockey team, the best result in its history (Yu Li 2008) and for the Japanese coach of the Chinese synchronized swimming team that for the first time won an Olympic medal.

China’s employment of foreign coaches raises the question of whether this weakens the link between sport and national identity. It does seem so, at least at the level of coach-athlete relations. However, at a broader level, their contributions have not undermined national pride because in fact they helped the Chinese to achieve such Olympic success. Indeed, the foreign coaches have not only helped to improve Chinese performances and coaching standards, but they have also introduced changes in the coach-athlete relationship. As one woman softball player pointed out:

*Before the Canadian coach Michael came, we kept our coaches at a respectful distance, rarely embraced them. We never expressed our thoughts to them frankly...Michael has become a good friend. We would tell him directly if we are not happy and he listens to us carefully without disapproval. Then he gives us his opinion and advice. (Liu Ziyuan 2006)*

Without a doubt, a more relaxed and more equal interactional style is developing, which female athletes in particular find beneficial.

The above examples illustrates some of the ways that the Beijing Games stirred strong nationalism among Chinese at home and abroad, which was shaped by state policies, patriotic education, and international tensions. How-
however, they also suggest that China’s rising economic, political, and sporting power in the world has made it both more confident and more tolerant. The Games accelerated China’s assimilation into the world scene in spite of unexpected misunderstandings and unwanted confrontations. Nationalism and internationalism co-exist in today’s China. It is inappropriate to dichotomize the national and the international. Just as the local and the global are mutually constituted, so too are nationalism and internationalism, and their complex relationship must be explored. Wu Jianmin, the former foreign minister of China, regarded the combination of nationalism and internationalism as the “Chinese Spirit” (Wu 2008).

**Sportswomen, gender relations and nationalism in the twenty-first century**

In this new century there have emerged some changes in the lives of sportswomen and their relationships to their husbands in China. Though marriage is an important issue for Chinese women, sportswomen also have the other identity of athlete to contend with. However, sports success is often more important for athletes. Before the mid-1990s, female athletes were often required to deny their relationships with boys and were unable to get married when they participated in competitive sport. Love affairs and family, so the argument went, would distract them and reduce their commitment to sports, an argument that forced sportswomen to choose between family or their athletic career. However, times have changed and starting around the mid 1990s a number of married women and mothers appeared in the sports arena, such as the 33-year-old Olympic wrestler Xian Dongmei in Beijing 2008. Not long after she won at the Athens Games she married her training partner Liu Bo. Due to severe injuries she stopped training and in 2006 gave birth in 2007. Four months before the Beijing Games, the 33 year old judoka resumed training and once again was a gold medallist. She triumphed over major problems, among them losing 11 kg within three months and overcoming the pain of severe knee injuries. Her courage moved the whole nation. She became a media heroine (*Xinlang tiyu* 2008).

Xian is just the tip of the iceberg. There were more married female athletes: the two time badminton Olympic Champion Zhang Ning, the tennis players Li Na and Zheng Jie, and several members of the women’s hockey, volleyball and football teams were married. A special note should be taken of the 50-year-old Luan Jujie, though she represented Canada in the Beijing Games. Luan was the 1984 Olympic champion representing China. After giving up competition, she and her family migrated to Canada. As a mother of three children and a coach in a fencing club, she had not trained for many years. After Beijing won the 2008 Games’ bid, she started to dream again of competing in the Games. To fulfil this dream she began training in order to qualify for the Beijing Games.
Faced with financial problems and declining physical abilities, she did not give up. Though she did not go far in the Beijing Games, her determination won her respect throughout China (Yang Shilong 2008). She became a positive role model for millions of girls and women in China and beyond.

For their contribution, men are establishing new positive role models. In modern China not a few husbands are more than content to play a supporting role to their wives who succeed in sport since women’s victories in international competitions can not only win respect and status for themselves but their families as well. Li Na, mentioned earlier, has offered a vivid picture of this support. Her husband, a former tennis player, joined the women’s national team as a coach in 2007, accompanying her everywhere for competitions. His tolerance, comfort, instruction, massage, care and love have helped Li Na greatly, improving her performance significantly in the past year. Witnessing this change, another female player Zhen Jie, one of the women’s double champions of the Australian Open and Wimbledon tournaments in 2006, also asked for permission to let her husband join the national team as a coach (Liu Xiaoxing 2008). “Without exaggeration, it can be claimed that gender relations in the family, which directly affect women’s commitment to elite and other sports, have been gradually changing from male dominance to a male and female partnership” (Dong 2003). This reflects the shifting nature of the values associated with a woman’s career and family. Now it seems that a woman can be strong and competent in sport without denying her femininity. The prolonged sports careers of women shows that the old belief of love and marriage distracting from a female athlete’s commitment has faded away. Cultural changes have been taking place.

Nevertheless, with the introduction of Western professional practices and with increased financial independence, athletes wanted to determine their own destinies - athletically, financially and socially. Inevitably, this thinking could challenge the conventional ideas of conformity, loyalty and sacrifice of individual interest - the foundation of the traditional sports arrangements. The stories of Olympic diver Guo Jingjing and the rising tennis player Peng Shuai to some extent reflect this. After the Athens Games, Guo was actively involved in a number of commercial activities for months, and did not return to the national team for training in January 2005. As she violated the regulation that an athlete who gets involved in any commercial activity has to get permission first from the Management Center of Swimming, while also handing over half of the income gained to the Center, she was expelled from the National Diving Team. Later she apologized to the Centre, handed in the required sum of money and was allowed to rejoin the team and continue her diving career. In 2006, tennis player Peng Shuai played impressively in international competitions and won an award of US$ 260,000, of which 65% was supposed to go to the National Tennis Center according to the relevant regulations. She claimed that since the tennis coaching in China was not advanced and the Centre would not employ foreign coaches for her due to the limited budget, her ranking would be hard to
improve if she stayed within the current training system. Thus, she decided to withdraw from the national team to follow in the “professional” mode. However, for various reasons, just as Guo did, she finally changed her mind and rejoined the national team. The two stories indicate that in a society with a deep-rooted respect for authority, it is still extremely difficult for a few female athletes to challenge the superior coaches, the sports culture and the established order. They face not just one man/woman, but the whole system behind coaches and the traditional Confucian culture behind the system. However, confrontation is essentially the product of a new self-assurance on the part of women athletes who now are ever more conscious of their rights, their power and their opportunities. As a result, the national sports administration had to change its policy and give the majority of any winning bonuses and rewards to the performers.

Women in other sports have expressed dissatisfaction and challenged unfair or unsatisfactory aspects of the national system. The rhythmic gymnast Ding Ning, for example, attacked the bias of the judging at the National Games. After merely winning a bronze medal for the 500m speed skating in the Asian Winter Games in January 2007, Wang Meng criticized the coaching methods of the head coach of the national team.7 The two incidents dominated the media headlines for days. They reflect both the complications generated by recent sports reform and the more independent, individualistic and self-assertive sportswomen in the twenty-first century. Sportswomen have initiated change and are now a part of it. They have successfully demanded fairness, consistency and dignity of treatment and consideration of their concerns. They have tested the limits of administrators’ tolerance and rocked the foundations of the centralized sports system.

More than this, sportswomen have taken even more action. In 2006, the long distance runner Sun Yingjie8 with three other team-mates9 sued their coach Wang Dexian for keeping their bonuses and salaries for years (Zhang, Wang 2006). This event attracted maximum media attention and led to skeletons tumbling out of the sports community closet.10 There was also precedent. In the 1990s the “Ma Family” athletes and the skater Chen Lu challenged their coaches over monetary issues (Dong 2003). While financial concerns were the compelling immediate cause for these confrontations, the growing confidence of women and their desire to control their own lives was undeniably a major factor. Increasingly, sportswomen have vehemently voiced their opposition to the manipulative control and overbearing domination of their coaches and exerted massive pressure on doctrinaire and dogmatic coaches.

Matters, however, are still far from perfect. The astonishing achievements of Chinese women in sports today, “though contributing to the improvement of women’s status in society in general, and challenging the stereotype of ‘women’s inferiority to men,’ does not mean that women have made a completely successful progression towards equality in all social spheres” (Dong 2003). Socio-economic reform in China has certainly raised living standards
for women along with men, but it has also led to the return of aspects from the previously male-dominated Chinese society. While a number of millionaire businesswomen, female executives and managers as well as film and sports stars have emerged, some women were discriminated against in employment and job promotion. An investigation into women’s social status in 2001 showed that more than half the respondents (both men and women) believed that men were superior to women (Zhongguo fulian and zhongguo guojia tongji ju 2001). As a result, the sex ratio in China has increased recently, from 116 in 2001 to 119 in 2007, well above the international average of between 103 and 107 (Wang Zhuoqing 2007). While change is in the air, traditional forces are resilient and cultural change is neither straightforward nor smooth. History has demonstrated that Chinese culture has enormous conservative resilience.

Sportswomen face the dilemma of playing in a sports world that accords them relatively equal status while living in a wider society shaped by traditional Confucian values and modern market forces. This had its effect on the women’s soccer team’s failure to qualify for the semi-finals at the Beijing Games. The team’s poor showing had several causes. First, there was a shortage of promising players. There were only about 7000 female soccer players in the whole country in 2007. Second, the game had virtually no commercial appeal. Enterprises did not want to sponsor women’s teams and events, and there were few spectators (Zhang Min 2006). Behind this shortage of young female soccer talents there were social and cultural factors. The slogan “men and women are the same” has been dated and replaced by a new injunction that “women should behave like women and display their distinctive features.” In this circumstance, girls prefer to be fashion models, singers and film stars, which can earn them money while maintaining their “feminine” features. Thus, soccer participation has little appeal to women.

Confucian tradition also played its part. Despite continuous and often dramatic political, cultural and economic changes in the twentieth century, the Confucian legacy is still visible in Chinese society. The Confucian ideal of women is compliant, humble, yielding and respectful, which is far away from the qualities required by the game of football: competition, aggression and power. For this reason, football is regarded by many as a “man’s sport” in China. A male writer even stated in his book: “Women who do not understand football are real, classic and perfect women. Women who are involved in football are damaged, modern and horrible women” (Lu 1997:160) Clearly, conventional convictions die hard. Thus, football is not as popular as other sports for women in schools and universities.

In spite of obvious progress in achieving equality in elite sports, women’s role in sports leadership has not been completely realized. At the Director level of the State Sports Administration and its affiliated units, there are just 20 women, about 12 percent of the total. In the Chinese Olympic Committee there are only 8 women out of the 40 Executive Committee members.
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utive Committee of BOCOG, there were only 3 women out of 19 members. Women’s low representation in leadership has attracted attention in the country, but is hard to change overnight.

China has meshed with the world more closely in the twenty-first century. After thirty years of economic reforms, China has become the world’s third-largest economy. Real per capita income—both in cities and in rural areas—has multiplied more than five times. China is expected to be the world’s leading economic power by 2025 (Hawksworth 2008:13). According to a survey in 2008, some 86 percent of respondents were satisfied with China’s current situation and 82 percent were optimistic about China’s economy, much higher than most of the other countries in the world (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008).

With increased confidence, an overwhelming majority of Chinese feel proud of their long historical heritage and wish to revive it and retain it. One clear illustration of this was the emphasis on Chinese traditional culture via the symbols of the Beijing Games. The Olympic emblem, entitled “Chinese Seal—Dancing Beijing” [zhongguo yin, wudong de Beijing], featured a single Chinese character on a traditional red Chinese seal with the words “Beijing 2008” written in an eastern-style brush stroke. The official mascots of the 2008 Games consisted of five little children [Fuwa] embodying the natural characteristics of the Fish, the Panda, the (Tibetan) Antelope and the Swallow together with the Olympic Flame. Collectively and individually, they carried a Chinese message of friendship, peace and blessings to children all over the world. The opening and closing ceremonies of Beijing 2008 emphasized the five-thousand-year Chinese culture through an impressive and applauded choreographic display.

While China makes every effort to continue its cultural traditions, the Chinese are also eager to learn from others about contemporary ideas, technology and management in order to become part of the global community. To organize the Beijing Games successfully, a sizable number of foreign experts in design, security, environmental protection, competition administration and publicity were employed as Olympic advisors, consultants and evaluators. Half of the 900 Olympic News Service workers were from other countries. The case of National Indoor Stadium provides a vivid picture of this. Of the 197 Olympic staff eight were foreigners who worked in the Sports Presentation and Media Operation sections; in addition, a number of experts from companies like Omega and NBC and 20 foreign college volunteers working for the New Olympic Service (NOS) were in place before and during the Games; the officials, experts and staff from the international gymnastics and handball federations numbered over 300.

This integration of Chinese and foreigners certainly promoted mutual understanding on which mutual respect could be built. According to a study of “Chinese Image in the Eyes of Foreigners” conducted by Chinese Media University, the Beijing Games significantly upgraded the national image of China.
among foreign respondents and those who had direct contact with Chinese and were highly involved in the Olympics had a better impression of China as a whole (Chen Zhenkai 2009).

The Games produced a generation of the “Bird’s Nest.” China Youth Daily conducted a survey of 3,006 internet users immediately after the Olympic Games. The results showed that 47.4% of them considered themselves as the “Bird’s Nest” generation; 55.3% claimed that “after the Games they are confident on everything without fear” and 48.4% thought they were rationally patriotic (Han Heyuan 2008). Confidence and patriotism are two features that were also rated highly in other similar surveys. The most recent survey of university students on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the “May Fourth Movement” indicated that 75.4% of universities were proud of being Chinese citizens and 87.9% were confident in a socialist road with Chinese characteristics (renmin luntan 2009). This will have impact on future development in China, on its domestic and international policies and its relations with other nations.

It is clear from the above discussion that in the new century rapid changes have taken place in every aspect of China’s society, including women’s lives and the relationship between men and women. Some changes are inseparable from women’s own endeavours and courageous action. Sportswomen set an example in this respect. They have launched challenges to authorities and superior coaches about the traditional attitude towards women’s role in society and family. Their action, though not always victorious, has had impact on the changes of state policy, management and gender relations. The fact that sportswomen have obtained enormous support from their husbands reflects the changing relationship between husbands and wives in Chinese society. The relationship is complex, diverse and dynamic in today’s China. However, the road towards equality and partnership is not straight and without difficulties and challenges. With China’s full integration into the world, there is a rising confidence and patriotism among the Chinese that owes its existence to the success of the Beijing Games.

**Conclusion**

China’s persistent pursuit of Olympic victory for half a century was motivated by the memories of its past grandeur and of humiliations experienced, and it demonstrated keenness to build a new, vigorous, modern nation. The unprecedented level of official and popular support for the Beijing Games reflected China’s determination to strengthen its international profile. The 2008 Games, through successful organization and remarkable athletic performances, indeed helped advance this international image, and it was the female athletes who led the charge. With the bulk of the medals, women assured the Chinese dream of becoming an Olympic power.

In line with national economic and social reforms, sports funding and man-
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Management have undergone extensive changes. The international mobility of athletes and coaches has integrated China into the world sports system, challenging the conventional ideas and practices. Through their athletic victories, sportswomen have won respect for themselves and glory for the nation. However, being handicapped by the legacy of conventional forces, they have voiced their opposition to manipulation of their finances by their coaches and other unjust practices in the sports community. While relationships between coaches and female athletes, between male and female athletes, and between wives and husbands are changing, traditional norms are resilient. Both change and continuity are recurrent themes in Chinese sport in the twenty-first century. Women must learn quickly how to negotiate both the legacy of traditional culture and the practices of contemporary global sports. Whether they will gain greater confidence in achieving equality and realizing their potential, however, is an open question.

Table 1 Medals won by Chinese athletes in the last four Olympics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gold medals</th>
<th>Silver medals</th>
<th>Bronze medals</th>
<th>Total medals</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Chinese male and female participants in the Olympics, 1992-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>females</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>males</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage of women</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>66.09%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1 Comparison of men and women in numbers of Olympic golds

Table 3 Chinese men’s and women’s performances in selected team sports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>volleyball</th>
<th>basketball</th>
<th>soccer</th>
<th>hockey</th>
<th>handball</th>
<th>water polo</th>
<th>Beach volleyball</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>8^{th}</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Failed for top 8</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>12^{th}</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Failed for top 4</td>
<td>2^{nd}</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>2^{nd}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes

1 Data from the Department of Economics of the State Sports Administration (unpublished).
2 Data from guojia dui guanli chu [the administrative department of the National Team], Aug. 6, 2006.
4 He is a grandson of Huo Yingdong who was a shipping magnate with a wealth in excess of US$ 1 billion in 2004, one of the Hong Kong’s richest men.
5 Sun Jinfang, the former volleyball player, is now the director of the National Tennis Association; Lang Ping was the head coach of the Chinese Women’s Volleyball Team between 1995 and 1999. She is now the head coach of the American Women’s Volleyball Team; Tang Jiuhong, the seven-time world badminton champion in the 1990s, was promoted to Deputy Director of the Hunan Provincial Sports Administration in 2004.
6 On April 1, 2001, a US EP-3E ARIES II was operating about 70 miles away from the Chinese island of Hainan when it was intercepted by two Chinese J-8 fighters. The collision caused the death of a Chinese pilot and the EP-3 was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan. The 24-member crew was detained and interrogated by the Chinese authorities until a letter of apology was issued by the United States Government.
7 She later had to apologize for her action at the team meeting and was disqualified for the World Short-track Championships and World Team Championships.
8 Sun, the champion of 5000m and 10,000m races at the 2002 Asian Games, was caught drug positive at the National Games in 2005. Though she was banned for two years, she kept training and hoped to participate in the 2008 Games.
9 They are Ai Dongmei, Guo Ping and Li Juan.
10 It was claimed that coach Wang once beat Sun badly. The toes of the athletes who sued the coach in court became disfigured obviously and even worse they are now unemployed and lead very difficult lives.
12 The author worked in the National Indoor Stadium. The data is either from the information provided by the venue management team or observations and interviews.
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The Beijing Olympics as a Turning Point? China’s First Olympics in East Asian Perspective

Susan Brownell

It is commonly stated that the 1964 and 1988 Olympics were “turning points” for the integration of Japan and South Korea, respectively, into the global community. It was anticipated that the Beijing Olympics would be a “turning point” for China. Now that the Beijing Games are over, we can ask whether anything “turned,” and if so, in which direction? This essay deals with a central paradox of the Olympic Games – they reinforce nationalism and internationalism at the same time. A one-sided focus on nationalism, such as characterized much of the media coverage of the Beijing Olympics, can lead to the erroneous conclusion that the Olympic Games exacerbate rather than moderate political conflicts. Wishful thinking that the Beijing Games would be a turning point for human rights and democracy led to the conclusion by China watchers in the West that the Beijing Games were not the turning point that was hoped for. However, reflection on what actually “turned” in Japan and South Korea helps us to see what we should actually be looking for in the case of China. This retrospective suggests that the interplay between nationalism and internationalism was similar in all three Olympic Games, and offers a more optimistic prospect for China’s peaceful integration into the international community.

Most of the modern Olympic Games held between 1896 and 1988 took place in the shadow of wars, past, present, and future. The political animosity surrounding Beijing 2008 was especially highlighted by contrast with the comparatively tranquil background of the four preceding Olympics. The Albertville 1992 Winter Games had been the first Olympics in history considered to have “100% participation,” with no boycotts or IOC-dictated exclusions (in addition to these reasons, before World War II nations often did not compete for lack of funding or indifference from the central government). South Africa’s exclusion since 1964 had ended in 1988, but the tail end of the Cold War had extended into the Seoul Games with the boycott by North Korea, Cuba, and Ethiopia. The Barcelona 1992 Summer Olympics were marred only by the IOC’s barring of Yugoslavia; both there and at the preceding Albertville Games, the former Soviet Union was represented by the Unified Team. From the Barcelona Olympics onward the Games were considered to forward integration and reconciliation, and the political issues that dominated public opinion were domestic or regional (Catalonian sovereignty in Barcelona 1992; the rise of the American South and racial integration in Atlanta 1996; Aboriginal rights in Sydney 2000; Greece taking its place as a respected EU member in 2004).
Although after the Tibetan uprisings in March 2008 some Chinese expressed the hope that the Beijing Olympics might promote ethnic reconciliation like that between Aborigines and Whites in Sydney 2000, a closer look would have revealed that in Australia the work of reconciliation through the Olympic Games had begun at least as early as 1996, when the use of aboriginal symbols in the Sydney segment of the Atlanta closing ceremony had provoked protest. In Beijing, however, the use of ethnic minority symbols, including Tibetan symbols, was notably absent in the opening ceremony, which was especially significant since the use of dancing and singing minorities to symbolize national unity is a common fixture in Chinese national celebrations. The restoration of dialogue with the Dalai Lama and a discussion about whether to invite him to the opening ceremony only emerged after the March uprisings, which suggests that previous to that time no serious attempt had been made to utilize the Games toward reconciliation between Tibetans and Han. Indeed, the National Traditional Games of Ethnic Minorities of the People’s Republic of China, which had been one of the showpieces of the P.R.C.’s ethnic policy since their initiation in 1953, suffered from a lack of attention due to the focus on the Olympics when the eighth installment was held in Guangzhou in December 2007. Most of the opening ceremonies performers were Han students dressed as minorities and many of the athletes were Han students at sport institutes recently recruited to learn “traditional ethnic sports.”

Another reconciliation that did not take place at a symbolic level was that between the people and the Communist Party as represented in the figure of Chairman Mao. As Geremie Barmé and Jeffrey Wasserstrom have observed, Chairman Mao was absent in Zhang Yimou’s opening ceremony, which skipped from the Ming dynasty to the late 1970s and gave the spotlight to Confucius, whom Wasserstrom called “the comeback kid” of the Beijing Games (Barmé 2008: 179-82; Wasserstrom 2008: 172). The Communist Revolution was also generally absent from Olympic symbolism. This was due to a decision that traced its roots back to the 1990 Asian Games, China’s first hosting of a major international sport festival. The cultural performance in the Asian Games ceremony had been choreographed by the same national team of choreographers that had designed the cultural performances for the previous three Chinese National Games – starting in 1979 with the first post-Cultural Revolution performance, which had the theme “The New Long March.” The themes and symbols utilized by this team of choreographers had gradually evolved away from the political symbols that dominated ceremonies after 1949 and toward “cultural symbols.” The 1990 Asian Games had taken place one year after the Tiananmen Incident, which had been a disaster for China’s international relations and a severe setback for its plans to reach out to the world through the Asian Games. (The Asian Games were, nevertheless, the occasion for the first official cross-strait exchanges, and Taiwan sent a large official delegation - Liang 2007: 333-55). In 1990 it was recognized that “ethnic cultural” symbols were more
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attractive to the outside world in general and also constituted a shared cultural repertoire with East Asians and overseas Chinese (Brownell 1995: 60-62, 315-18).

By the time the planning for the Beijing ceremonies had begun, this strategy for drawing in international audiences was known as the “Cultural China” strategy. It traced its roots to multiple international developments, including the 1980s and 1990s works of Harvard historian and philosopher Tu Weiming and other “New Confucianists,” as well as government policies for promoting the “cultural industry” in Japan and South Korea in the mid to late 1990s; the international orientation of the Korean cultural policies had gained impetus from the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul (Yim 2002: 46). “Cultural China” was also expressed in the Chinese government’s support for “Confucius Institutes” around the world, and it was linked to Hu Jintao’s concept of “soft power.” For the Beijing 2008 Olympics, a key policy recommendation from the People’s University concluded, “On this basis, we cautiously propose that in the construction of China’s national image, we should hold the line on ‘cultural China,’ and the concept of ‘Cultural China’ should not only be the core theme in the dialogue between China and the international community in Olympic discourse, but also it should be added into the long-term strategic plan for the national image afterwards” (People’s University 2008: 194). Although the vast majority of educational and cultural programs surrounding the Beijing Olympics targeted the domestic population (see the discussion of Olympic education below), a debate about the target audience for the opening and closing ceremonies was resolved in favor of the international audience. Film director Zhang Yimou, the choreographer of the ceremonies, is not well-regarded inside China, where his work is seen as pandering to Western tastes with a superficial and exoticized picture of traditional Chinese culture. His “Eight Minute Segment” in the closing ceremony of the Athens Olympics was so disliked that the bid competition for the choreography of the 2008 ceremonies was re-opened. That Zhang was finally re-confirmed in 2005 indicates that the final decision was to prioritize international tastes over domestic.

In his essay in this volume, Manzenreiter is suspicious of the Cultural China approach, observing, “A century ago such a spectacle demonstration may have sufficed to explain the ruling elites’ claim for power. At the present, however, it hardly convinces those who do not want to believe.” However, the generally positive reception of the Beijing opening ceremony in the West may indicate that there are many out there who do want to believe.

In the end, the only significant violence did not pit sovereign states against one another but took place in China’s Tibetan areas. However, this should not mislead us into thinking that the Beijing Games did not take place in the shadow of war – a point that, I believe, was very present in the minds of the East Asian audience but was missed by Westerners with shorter and more spatially distant memories. And it is important to remember that the Beijing Olympics were the
first Olympics to take place in an East Asian country that is not host to U.S. military bases. This was the “present absence” in 2008 in comparison to Tokyo 1964 and Seoul 1988; the chapters by Shimizu Satoshi and Ok Gwang in this volume remind us that the U.S. military presence played a very important role in the local interpretations of the Games even if today it does not figure large in the international memory.

Shimizu, Christian Tagsold, and Jilly Traganou remind us that many of the symbols of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics established continuity with pre-war Japanese national symbols (Shimizu and Tagsold in this volume; Traganou 2008). Japan did not have an official national flag or anthem in 1964: the *hinomaru* flag and the *kimigayo* anthem had been proscribed by the occupation authorities after World War II and were not officially reinstated as the national flag and anthem of Japan until 1999, and indeed, they have been plagued by controversy ever since. However, the logo of the Tokyo Olympics consisted of the rising sun over the five Olympic rings, which was also used in the first of the four official posters. While designer Kamekura Yūsaku denied that his design was the *hinomaru*, stating that it was meant simply to be a red sun, he had played an active role in nationalist representations of Japan in wartime propaganda.

The 1964 torch relay was the longest held to that date; indeed, a sense of rivalry with Japan’s coming-out party may well have been a principal reason that China insisted on holding the largest-ever international torch relay. The Tokyo 1964 torch passed from its origin in Olympia, Greece, across the Middle East and Asia, into countries that Japan had once invaded, finishing with Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong and Taiwan (but not Korea) - and then on to Okinawa, which at that time remained a U.S. military colony. As Shimizu recounts in this volume, the *Mainichi Shimbun* wrote, “In Okinawa, it gave power, hope and encouragement to the islanders who are longing for the day when America returns Okinawa to Japan.” Indeed, an Okinawan movement for reversion to Japan was gaining strength as the Olympics neared. During the relay in Okinawa, *hinomaru* flags were waved by spectators on the roadside and the *kimigayo* anthem was played, which, as Tagsold points out, lent cultural weight to Japan’s claim to Okinawa.

In Tagsold’s chapter, the role of the *genbaku* (atom boy), and the Self-Defense forces in the opening ceremony offer points of comparison with the Beijing Olympics, as does his argument that the Tokyo Olympics enabled the “re-nationalization” of Japan by associating the classical national symbols (flag, anthem, emperor, military) with the Olympic symbols of internationalism and peace. This subtle symbolic shift was largely unremarked in the West, and the absence of international contestation contributes to today’s recollection of the Tokyo Olympics as a peaceful turning point in Japan’s integration into the international community. Tagsold also argues that Sakai’s igniting of the torch enabled Japan to assume the role of victim in World War II as the first nation
to bear the brunt of atomic attack. While detailed scholarship on U.S. and Asian reactions to the use of symbols associated with emperor, nation, American killing, and the Asia Pacific War in Tokyo 1964 is lacking, it appears that neither the U.S. nor the Asian victims of Japanese colonialism and war publicly opposed the use of symbols representing Japan’s “re-nationalization” or its claim on Okinawa.

Before the Beijing 2008 Games, the major regional tension - between China and Taiwan - flared up in April 2007 over the route of the torch relay, when Taiwan insisted that the torch must enter Taiwan and exit through a third country so that it would not be portrayed as a territory of mainland China with a dependent status similar to that of Hong Kong and Macau. Given the huge IOC effort to mediate between China and Taiwan in the decades of China’s exclusion from the IOC (1958-1979), it was significant that no high-profile negotiations were held and five months later it was simply announced that Taiwan would be bypassed – but this can be understood if one realizes that this was actually a peripheral affair by Olympic standards, since no boycott of the Olympic Games was being proposed and that is the central concern of the IOC. The IOC organizes the Olympic Games, but the local organizing committee organizes the torch relay. The basic problem of the participation of both parties in the Olympic Games had been resolved decades beforehand by the IOC’s 1979 Nagoya Resolution stipulating that Taiwan cannot use any of the national symbols of the Republic of China in Olympic venues, but must compete under the name, flag and anthem of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. This “Olympic formula” is today the agreement that enables the participation of both Taiwan and China in many other international organizations. The China-Taiwan tension was eased by the March 2008 election of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s President, opening a new page in China-Taiwan diplomacy. Tony Hwang’s chapter lays out the historical background for the relationship between China and Taiwan within the Olympic Games and demonstrates that in 2008 many Taiwanese were not prepared to accept the official Chinese version of that relationship.

Like all host countries, China attempted to use the Olympic Games to promote its own agendas. The torch relay was intended to symbolize national unity when it announced that the international relay would advance from Vietnam to Taiwan and on to Hong Kong. Taiwan, however, refused to take part in a route that represented Taiwan as a domestic stop. In 1964, it had been argued that “Okinawa is the terminal point of the overseas course of the Olympic Flame” (Shimizu, this volume). Similarly, China and Taiwan agreed that the neutral word “overseas” would be used to describe the relay before the torch landed on the mainland, rather than the problematic term “international.” But this had not been enough to gain the approval of the Taiwan government, probably because it knew full well that, as in 1964, local media and politicians would argue that this was in fact the start of the domestic relay. In stark contrast to the U.S.’s
laissez-faire approach to Okinawa in 1964, the P.R.C. government maintained an uncompromising position against any symbols of Taiwanese (or Tibetan) independence and sovereignty.

Lau’s chapter also found that his Taiwanese student sample had the weakest national identification with “China,” while mainland Chinese students had the strongest. In the middle were Hong Kong students, who seem to be in the process of developing a dual Hong Kong-China identity, perhaps facilitated by the Beijing Olympic Games. Dong Jinxia’s chapter cites a China Daily poll in which young Chinese defined themselves as the “Bird’s Nest generation” with qualities of newfound confidence as well as rational patriotism. China is posing a challenge to the conventional definitions of the nation by creating political forms and “national” identities that are different from the conventional Western versions. Since its return to the mainland in 1997, Hong Kong has been defined as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), but within the IOC it retained its own Olympic committee, which had existed since 1951 and was grandfathered in and renamed the Chinese Hong Kong Olympic Committee. Since its return to the mainland in 1999, Macau has also been defined as a SAR but it has no separate Olympic Committee because it had never had one, so its athletes must represent China. Taiwan is not a SAR, but within the IOC the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee has equal status with the Chinese Hong Kong Olympic Committee (and, in theory, with all other “national” Olympic committees). As China continues its rise in the world, it may re-shape the current monolithic and simplistic Western design of the world system of nation-states — or it may ultimately be forced to conform to it.

The Parade of Athletes in the opening ceremony provoked minor issues that were mostly missed by the non-Chinese-speaking world. When the first cross-strait sports exchange was to take place at the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing, the Chinese translation of the English “Chinese Taipei” became a point of contention. The mainland had typically translated it as Zhongguo Taibei, but Taiwan translated it as Zhonghua Taibei, a distinction of one character that makes little difference even to Chinese speakers except that, if one were to split hairs, one might understand Zhongguo as implying “Chinese national territory” and Zhonghua as implying “Chinese people.” The 1989 agreement between the two sides had stated that China would allow Taiwan to use Zhonghua Taibei in official Olympic venues, but China would retain its customary usage in non-official settings, including media coverage and sports announcing in mainland events. Leading up to the opening ceremony, there had been rumblings in the Taiwanese media that if Taiwan were to be announced as Zhongguo Taibei when it entered the stadium, then Taiwan should boycott the Games; this was based on an erroneous understanding of the agreement and actually was never in question. When Taiwan entered the stadium, it was announced in English, then in French, and finally in Mandarin as Zhonghua Taibei. When Chinese Hong Kong entered, it was announced according to mainland custom as Zhongguo Xiang-
gang. Another problem had been created by the Chinese decision to use Chinese character stroke order in determining the order of the entering nations, because this put Chinese Taipei and Chinese Hong Kong next to each other - China as the host country marched in last, and so it was not a factor. As with the torch relay, Taiwan refuses to march adjacent to China in the Parade because it would symbolize it as a province of China; this is a problem in English, as well, which has been solved by having Taiwan march with the “T’s.” The problem was solved by inserting the Central African Republic between Taiwan and Hong Kong — since “China” literally means “central country,” the Central African Republic shares the character zhong with them. Ironically, the stroke order placed Japan before Chinese Taipei, but with Taiwan’s former colonial status no longer problematic for Taiwanese identity, this was not an issue.

As in the lighting of the torch by Sakai in 1964, the incident in the Paris leg of the torch relay, when a Tibetan protester tried to wrench the torch away from a young Chinese female Paralympic athlete in a wheelchair, produced an image of China as a victim that received a great deal of attention in the Chinese media. The victimization function was further carried out by the nine year-old survivor from the Sichuan earthquake disaster area who entered the stadium beside the flagbearer, basketball icon Yao Ming, in the opening ceremony. The small flag carried by the boy was upside down, an international nautical symbol for distress. However, it appeared that the boy had unintentionally flipped the flag, because no official explanation was issued, and Xinhua news agency requested clients not to use a photo of it shortly after sending it out. While not as forceful as the image of Japan victimized by the atom bombs, within China these symbols did preserve the Chinese narrative of victimization in the midst of the most grandiose Olympics ever.

Looking back on the 1964 torch relay and Olympics from the perspective of 2008, one wonders why the Tokyo Games did not incite a furor as the Beijing Games did. Given the extensive Japanese atrocities associated with colonialism and war, and Japan’s failure to make effective apologies and reparations to victims at that time, the key symbols and torch relay seem even more inflammatory than those surrounding the Beijing Games. Tagsold’s accompanying essay argues that the symbolic work was sufficiently subtle to bypass domestic legal and moral arguments, and few Western observers were aware of the ongoing conflicts between Japan and the nations it had occupied and colonized a generation earlier. But, he argues, more important was the general historical context; in the Cold War era, the effort to delimit the Olympic Games as “apolitical” was stronger than it is now because the international political stakes were higher. I would argue that in 1964 this produced a stronger “will not to know” than was present in 2008. One big difference is that the 2008 Olympics were a media mega-event far exceeding what the Tokyo Olympics were, and this provided a platform for human rights and Tibetan NGOs with a higher level of media savvy and organization than had heretofore been seen in the Olympic
_context. It was easy to be misled by the heat of the media coverage into believing that profound “political” conflicts were occurring. However, closer examination reveals that there was no serious momentum toward national boycotts of the Games, and more national Olympic committees (204) and national representatives (over 100 “national dignitaries,” of which about 80 were “heads of state”) took part in the opening ceremony than in any previous Games. It was the first opening ceremony attended by an American president outside of the U.S. From my position as a Fulbright Researcher in Beijing with regular contact with the U.S. embassy, I felt that the Bush administration strongly wanted these Games to take place and to be successful. Well-informed observers such as He Zhenliang, China’s senior IOC member and sports diplomat, felt that Sino-U.S. relations had been strengthened through the Games and perhaps had become closer than they had ever been since 1949.

As in Tokyo, soldiers had a large presence in the Beijing Olympics, including the participation of 9,000 People’s Liberation Army soldiers in the cultural performance of the opening ceremony. The Chinese “riot police” (the Chinese term is literally “violence-prevention police”) had high visibility during the Olympic Games. This is a category of security personnel whose domestic numbers and functions had been expanded in 2005, at the same time that China also started sending riot police on U.N. peacekeeping missions. Clad in black, physically bigger (many are former wushu and judo athletes), and more highly trained and educated than the regular and armed police, they were brought out in large numbers to protect sensitive locations in Beijing. Their training drills were shown on CCTV in dramatic ways that promoted a positive image of them as anti-terrorist police ready to help evacuate a stadium in case of a bomb or to secure the release of innocent spectators taken hostage. The riot police are more frequently deployed to control the local populace than to deal with terrorists – indeed, on the night of the opening ceremony I watched them clear out the crowd that had gathered in the square at the central train station to watch the opening ceremony on the big-screen TV, when the security personnel decided that the crowd was too big and the situation was dangerous. However, the effect of the Olympic coverage may have been similar to that described by Tagsold for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces – their image was improved by linking them with keeping the peace at the Olympics.

One more point in Tagsold’s analysis is also relevant to Beijing. He observes that the planning of the symbolism of the Tokyo Olympics and the opening ceremonies was led by the Ministry of Education, which controlled most of the interpretation of national symbols from 1959 onward (2007: 118). Masumoto Naofumi (2007) has recently brought to the attention of Anglophone scholars the fact that formal educational initiatives related to the Olympic Games were organized outside of the organizing committee for the first time in the context of the 1964 Tokyo Summer Games. I have argued that since that time there has been an “East Asian stream” in the “Olympic education” initia-
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tives that have surrounded the Games, which has been ignored by Eurocentric scholars (2007; 2008). From 1961 to 1964 the Ministry of Education distributed four Olympic readers and guidebooks to primary and secondary schools and colleges nationwide. Two books were produced by the organizing committee for distribution to schoolteachers from 1960-61: 1,000 copies of *The Glorious Tokyo Olympics* (130 pages) were distributed in Kanto area schools and 1,000 copies of *Olympic Facts & Figures for Teachers’ Use* (36 pages) were distributed to school teachers. In addition to school textbooks and school activities, the Ministry of Education promulgated the “Citizens’ Olympic Games Movement” aimed at educating the people in the streets about the Olympics, increasing national pride, and improving understanding of foreign countries (Tagsold 2007: 126-27).

The important role played by the Japanese Ministry of Education is particularly illuminating for a comparison with the Beijing Olympics. With the support of the Chinese Ministry of Education, the Beijing Municipal Education Commission in collaboration with the Beijing Olympic Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) organized the largest “Olympic education” program ever implemented by a host city. When this effort began, the director of the educational programs for the 1998 Nagano Winter Games was invited twice to Beijing for consultation. Nagano’s “One School, One Country” sister school program was adopted (this program has been utilized in every summer and winter Olympics since 1998, excepting the 2004 Athens Olympics). Beijing quickly far exceeded what Nagano had done — a source of pride due to the rivalry with Japan. A total of 200 primary and secondary schools in Beijing City and another 356 schools nationwide were designated as “Olympic Education Demonstration Schools,” which were responsible for devoting at least two hours per month to Olympics-related activities, and for conducting “hand-in-hand sharing” activities with other schools and the surrounding community. One of the three themes of the Beijing Olympics – translated as “People’s Olympics” or “Humanistic Olympics” — also drew on the concept of the 1964 “Citizen’s Olympic Games Movement” but unfolded it on a much larger scale. China’s effort involved the mobilization of 70,000 college students through the Communist Youth League system as “Games-time volunteers” to help at all official Olympic venues. Approximately 400,000 “city volunteers” were enlisted to staff 550 volunteer stations and maintain social order throughout the city. A multitude of cultural and educational activities for the community were organized through the central Party Office of Spiritual Civilization Development and Guidance and its Beijing branch.

Interestingly, Ok states that the International Olympic Academy (IOA) in Olympia, Greece, was one of the main inspirations for Olympic education surrounding Seoul 1988. In China, too, Ren Hai and Pei Dongguang (Donnie Pei), the university academics who spearheaded the implementation and design of Olympic education programs, had received their first inspiration there (see
Niehaus’s chapter provides background on the joint effort of the German Carl Diem and the Greek John Ketseas that led to the initial proposal for the IOA in 1938 and its eventual establishment in 1961. Diem was perhaps the key scholar to first promote the concept of Olympic education. He visited Japan and China in 1929. He also performed the amazing feat in 1941 of writing a book on *Asiatische Reiterspiele [Asiatic Equestrian Games]*, despite not speaking an Asian language, in a time when almost nothing on ancient Asian sports had been published in Western languages. From 1959-61 he was an advisor to the Japanese Olympic Committee for the Tokyo and Sapporo Olympic Games (Kluge 2002). The first session of the IOA was held in 1961, and so the beginning of the IOA was occurring at the same time as the Olympic education efforts for the Tokyo Olympics. It is possible that Diem’s ideas about Olympic education actually found fertile ground in Japan before they did in the West, and the timeline makes it possible that the German and international effort at the IOA built upon the Japanese experience and not the other way around. This contribution of Japan to the history of Olympic education has since been ignored by Westerners writing in English and German. In short, there was an East Asian influence in the history of Olympic education which was a product of the importance placed on education as a means of facilitating integration with the outside world, and this “East Asian stream” circled back from the West into Beijing in 2008 (see Brownell 2007; 2008b).

At the same time, Leo Hsu’s chapter in this volume points out that this was accomplished by adopting almost wholesale the Western-centric ideology of Olympism with very little effort to inject Far Eastern philosophy, values, or sports. But this was part of the process by which Japan, Korea and China joined the Western-dominated global community on its own terms. In Hsu’s timeline, the serious questioning of Western-centrism in Olympic education only began in 2003. Hsu is one of the leading translators of Olympic education materials from English into Chinese, and his chapter is an example of this effort to re-think Olympic education for East Asia. This process is also evident in Niehaus’s description of the inclusion of judo in the Olympic program, the first non-Western sport to be included. He demonstrates that this was only accomplished by fashioning judo to fit the mould of Western sports and downplaying elements of Japanese tradition that could be interpreted in the West as Buddhist evangelizing. China’s failure to have wushu included in the 2008 Olympic program despite a big fight with the IOC illustrates the difficulties still faced by non-Western sports. If Olympic education and sports may be taken as a barometer of the balance of power in global culture, then a shift of power away from the West and toward East Asia is only in its incipient stage and may perhaps start emerging in the near future. The World Martial Arts and Combat Sports Games in Beijing in 2010 might well have marked the “revenge of wushu” and the beginning of a shift of power in global sport, since it was organized by SportAccord, an increasingly powerful central hub for the organization of world sport
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via the International Federations. The event was spearheaded by the president
of SportAccord, Hein Verbruggen, who from 2001 to 2008 had been the IOC’s
liaison with China as the Chair of the IOC’s Coordination Commission for the
Beijing Olympics. He resigned his position as an IOC member on the day of
the Beijing closing ceremony. Therefore it appears that this shift of power is
taking place outside of the IOC and it remains to be seen whether this effort
will complement or rival the IOC’s preeminence over global sport.

In his chapter, Tagsold demonstrates that in the educational programs in
Japan, national identity was re-located within a larger international context. In
China, too, the educational project was oriented toward imagining China taking
its place in the international community. The content of the school programs
largely imparted knowledge about the world outside China, and in this respect
it differed markedly from the inward-looking focus of previous national edu-
cational/propaganda campaigns. In his chapter, Niehaus criticizes the 1964
Olympic education, arguing that “For the Japanese, learning about the Olympic
Movement and thus about other countries, paradoxically meant not only
strengthening the notion of a mono-ethnic nation, but also Japan’s feeling of
‘uniqueness.’” I did not feel that this criticism applied to China. The Beijing
organizing committee promised that it would deliver “high-quality” and
“unique” Games, and in his much-anticipated evaluation of the Games in his
address at the closing ceremony, Jacques Rogge concluded that they had been
“truly exceptional.” This phrase was much-dissected in China with puzzlement
as to whether being described as an “exception” was a complement or not.
China already felt “unique” enough; the greater emphasis in Olympic education
was on China’s integration with the world.

Western observers tended to dismiss Beijing’s Olympic education as just
another nationalist propaganda campaign, but I believe they were missing the
important point: true, one major goal was patriotic education – but as in Tokyo,
the old nationalist symbols were re-shaped by association with symbols of in-
ternationalism, the global community, and world peace (for a more detailed ex-
position of this argument, see Brownell 2009). This is the paradox of the
Olympic Games – they reinforce nationalism and internationalism at the same
time. Perhaps the national identity itself is not greatly changed, but it is an im-
portant shift in orientation if the holders of that identity start to see their nation
as an equal partner among friendly nations instead of a victimized nation among
hostile nations.

One illustration of this point is a conversation I had with a Tsinghua Uni-
versity student who, as an Olympic volunteer, was standing beneath the flagpole
when the Chinese flag was raised in the Olympic opening ceremony. He asked
me what I thought of Beijing’s Olympic education programs – didn’t I find that
much of it was just a “show” by the government? I told him that while many
of the activities might be considered to be “appearance-ism,” I thought that
teaching students that their country was taking its place among other nations
as an equal, and that China would no longer be “bullied” by other nations, would have an important effect on the students for the future. He was silent for a moment, and then confessed that when he saw the Chinese flag being raised in the stadium and heard the wild cheering of the crowd, he had gotten tears in his eyes, and this had been the first time in his life that this had ever happened to him. From this perspective, he agreed with my conclusion. Our conversation took place during a dinner to which I had been invited so that I could advise him on whether to accept admission to the Master’s Degree programs at the University of Pennsylvania or the University of Southern California, with an eye to which city would offer better future employment opportunities.

In sum, if the 1964 Games were a turning point in Japan’s peaceful integration into the international community, we can probably point to a similar outcome of the 2008 Beijing Games. On the other hand, the Tokyo Games, far from eliminating past symbols of militarism and war, only re-oriented them. The same will likely be true of the effect of the Beijing Games on the elements of revolution, socialism, Communist ideology, and anti-Western sentiment that figure so large in Chinese national identity. In both Japan and China, the idea of national victimization at the hands of the West remains, although in China it appeared that a change was finally starting. In the official rhetoric, the Beijing Games were supposed to “erase the label of the Sick Man of East Asia” that had loomed in the Chinese imagination for over a century as an insult applied to China by the West and Japan. Young Chinese told me that they recognized that the Sick Man of East Asia was political rhetoric used to stir up patriotism and that they did not think much about it themselves — although, as one college student put it, they would “never forget the history” that it represented.

If the political background of the Tokyo Olympics was emotionally-charged, Gwang Ok’s essay in this volume reminds us that the lead-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics involved outbreaks of actual violence related to the Games. On October 8, 1979, President Park Chung-hee (Bak Jeong-hee) officially announced the intention to bid for the Olympic Games; on October 26, he was assassinated at a dinner party by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and in 1980 General Chun Doo-hwan (Jeon Du-hwan) seized power in a military coup. In September 1981, Seoul was selected as the host city by the IOC. In October 1983, a North Korean assassination attempt on President Chun at the Aung San National Cemetery in Rangoon killed 14 South Korean officials. And then in 1987, less than a year before the Olympic Games, two North Korean operatives left a bomb on Korean Air #858, killing 115 people, including 93 South Koreans. The confession of the operative who survived despite eating a cyanide capsule stated that the order was intended to disrupt the Seoul Olympic Games, and was personally penned by Kim Jong-Il, now President of North Korea. It was primarily because of this act that North Korea was listed as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” by the U.S. State Department in 1988.
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It was not removed from the list until October 11, 2008.

This history has since been overshadowed by the positive recollection that the Olympics “brought democracy” to South Korea when Roh Tae-woo assumed the presidency in 1987 through a constitutional election and a promise of democratic reforms. This rosy view of Olympic history often neglects the subsequent events in which Chun and Roh were convicted of mutiny, treason, and bribery and blamed for the 1980 Kwangju massacre of several hundred pro-democracy protesters.

There were many people, including IOC members and Chinese journalists, who wondered if the Beijing Olympics could stimulate a democratic transition in China like that attributed to the Seoul Olympics. If they were looking for a dramatic change, they were disappointed. But there were key differences in China. One difference was the lack of a real external military threat. Jarol Manheim argues, based on interviews with South Korean government and Olympic officials, that one hope of the ROK government was that, by focusing world attention on South Korea, the Olympics would increase world awareness about the North Korean threat and purchase a form of insurance against northern aggression (1990: 291-93). It would appear that the Games succeeded on both counts. In the analysis of IOC member Dick Pound, it was because of this “insurance” that the conservative military stood back and allowed a democratic transition to begin before the Games had even started; the military gained a sense of security from the expressions of support for the Games issuing from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as other members of the socialist bloc (Pound 194: 320-23).

Unlike South Korea, in the past three decades China has experienced peaceful transitions of power in the midst of sweeping social and economic change, and there is currently widespread popular support for gradual instead of dramatic political change. The Tibet uprisings and the violent acts, or foiled intended acts, of groups classified as “terrorist” had an internal function similar to the external threat to South Korea; they strengthened the conservative position of the Chinese security system. It was not clear to me how well the political history surrounding the Seoul Olympics was known by intellectuals and policy-makers in China – but if it were fully understood, I can imagine that South Korea’s move toward democracy would serve as a counter-model because of the massive popular demonstrations that accompanied it, while in China there is currently a strong aversion toward mass protests. This does not, however, mean that the same forces that pushed South Korea toward political reform were not at work in China. Manheim’s interviewees believed that the presence of the international media, the negative image of South Korea it conveyed to the world, and the legitimacy it conferred on demonstrators and opposition politicians forced the ruling party to make significant political concessions (p. 291). Global scrutiny of China in 2008 was much greater and it does appear that this pressure had effects. The domestic pressure for greater media freedom
and government transparency increased in the year after the Games, not just because of the Olympics, but also because of the Wenchuan earthquake and the tainted milk scandal. Vibrant debates about China’s inability to effectively communicate a national image to the outside world were initiated, and large government investment was made in foreign communications and public diplomacy. The temporary Olympic law that guaranteed more freedom to foreign journalists was extended indefinitely just as it expired on October 15, 2008. A higher level of organized dissidence in comparison with recent years was revealed when Charter 08, a document calling for political reform signed by 303 Chinese intellectuals and activists, was initiated in late spring 2008 and publicly issued in December 2008. The Information Office of the State Council published its first Human Rights Action Plan in April 2009. I believe that these actions were the result of the ferment that was stirred up by China’s intensified interaction with the outside world in the process of organizing the Games. This ferment may produce some immediate changes, or it may produce no concrete changes at all; most likely it will produce some gradual changes, which is what Chinese people seem to support. China is changing but only greater distance will allow us to look back and assess it.

Tagsold’s essay describes the rise of the anti-Olympic movement in Japan called “trops” (“sport” spelled backwards). The opposition to Nagoya’s bid for the 1988 Summer Games was a wake-up call for the IOC, which has given increasing attention to environmental issues in the ensuing years. In China in 2008, sports scholars frequently stated that the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games gave rise to an “anti-Olympic movement” in Japan (apparently not understanding that the movement did not really emerge until 1988), and they felt that this might also occur in China. A 2002 article in Journal of Physical Education introduced the trops concept to China, but described it as advocacy for popular sport as opposed to the Olympics, and did not mention its environmental connection (Wu and Gao 2002: 9-11). While popular protests against rapacious development and environmental destruction have been cropping up all over China, and were occasionally linked to the Beijing Games, it did not appear that an organized anti-Olympic movement ever congealed. Censorship regulations promulgated by the Central Propaganda Department before and during the Games restricted the publication and broadcasting of criticism of the Olympic Games, which might cause one to suspect that any incipient anti-Olympic movement was squelched, and that the shape of public opinion in China might be similar to that in Japan in 1988 if people were allowed to openly criticize the Olympics. However, closer analysis reveals that the underlying issues were different in China compared to Japan. Japan’s trops movement has thrived in a context in which there has been a strong political will to host Olympic Games, which has aroused the opposition of citizen’s groups. Altogether, Japanese cities have put forward five unsuccessful and four successful bids for Olympic Games, including Tokyo’s successful bid for the 1940 Summer
Olympics, later rescinded; Tokyo’s unsuccessful bid for the 1960 Summer Olympics and successful bid for the 1964 Olympics; Sapporo’s unsuccessful bids for the 1968 and 1984 Winter Games; Nagoya’s bid against Seoul for the 1988 Summer Olympics; Osaka’s bid against Beijing for the 2008 Games (revealing a lack of solidarity in the East Asian bloc within the IOC); Sapporo’s successful bid for the 1976 Winter Games; and Nagano’s successful bid for the 1998 Winter Games. Shimizu and Tagsold both discuss the urban development that accompanied the 1964 Olympics, with Shimizu arguing that it facilitated the transformation of the Imperial city into a physical space appropriate for the new post-war nationalism. William Kelly (2010) discusses the massive urban development projects proposed in the Tokyo 2016 bid. Japan’s repeated bids seem to indicate that the momentum toward organizing Olympic Games in association with large-scale development is more powerful than the anti-Olympic and pro-environment movements. This impetus has been so strong that Japan has violated customs of bloc voting within the IOC and sacrificed East Asian solidarity for its Olympic bids. Similarly, a chapter by James Thomas (forthcoming) based on his fieldwork among urban squatters in Seoul in 1988 concludes that the Seoul Olympics enticed Korean citizens to support the state’s grandiose development program by linking it with a “new empowered nationalism;” he observes that even after ex-presidents Chun and Roh were imprisoned and discredited, the Olympics-inspired development program continued.

Elsewhere, I have echoed Shimizu’s argument in relation to Beijing, demonstrating that the building of sports stadiums in general, and the 1990 Asian Games and 2008 Olympic complexes in particular, were part of a process that transformed the old imperial city into a space symbolizing the power of a modern nation-state (Brownell 2008: 73-96). It may be that the Beijing Games will initiate a period of regular bids for Olympic Games. I was in Shanghai in November 2008, where preparations for the 2010 World Expo were ramping up after the conclusion of the Beijing Olympics, and the mood in the municipal government was positive toward a future Olympic bid. However, when Chinese scholars refer to an anti-Olympic movement, they are not referring to opposition to massive urban development, but rather to opposition to the state-supported sport system and the government’s neglect of popular and school sport. In 1964 Japan placed third in the gold medal count and in 1988 South Korea placed fourth, their highest placements of all time. Chinese sportspeople believed that their first place in their own Olympics might also be the peak of China’s state-supported sport system, and that the pursuit of gold medals might be downgraded after the Games and more attention given to school and recreational sport. The Director of the State Sport General Administration, Liu Peng, took a preemptive stance immediately after the Olympic Games in an interview in the People’s Daily on September 6, stating, “Our position on the state-supported sport system is clear: One, we will maintain it; two, we will perfect it” (Xu 2008). But the debates about the future of the state-supported system are still
going on, as discussed in Dong Jinxia’s chapter.

Motivated by rivalry with China and South Korea, the Japanese government established a National Training Center in 2000 and a system of subsidies for top athletes in 2003, leading to a fifth-place finish in the gold medal count at the 2004 Athens Olympics, the first time that it had defeated Korea (ninth) in the gold medal count since the 1988 Seoul Olympics – and also the first time that China, Japan, and South Korea had all finished in the top ten (excepting the socialist bloc-boycotted 1984 Olympics). When Germany found its sixth-place finish behind Japan unacceptable, it initiated the revival of several of the former East German sports schools (Johnson 2008). In addition to Germany and Japan, a number of other sport superpowers were shamed by their performance in Athens, and their governments increased funding for sport, including Russia, Australia, and Great Britain; the British Olympic Association pressed for greater funding on the premise that it, like China, should make a good showing at its own Olympic Games in 2012. In Beijing, Great Britain redeemed its national honor with an unexpected fourth (up from ninth), Germany climbed back into fifth place, Australia dropped to sixth (from fourth), South Korea surprised in seventh, and Japan slipped to eighth – due in part to South Korea’s gold medal in baseball, which added salt to Japan’s wound. Among the sport superpowers of the world, the U.S. is an anomaly in its lack of direct government investment in sport, since most American Olympians are cultivated in the collegiate sport system, a structure that is unique to the U.S. The U.S. Olympic Committee’s (USOC) investment in sport is only a miniscule part of the American sport infrastructure. About half of the USOC’s 600 million-dollar operating budget in the last Olympiad came from a long-term contract with the IOC that grants about 13% of U.S. Olympic television rights fees and 20% of Olympic Top Programme marketing revenue to the USOC, which is greater than the percentage allotted to the other 204 national Olympic committees combined. In 2008 resentment began to boil over in the IOC and among the other national Olympic committees, who felt that the U.S. government was avoiding its moral obligation to fund national sport by essentially skimming profit off the Olympics that should be shared more equitably with other countries. The USOC and IOC postponed the re-negotiation of the contract until economic conditions were more favorable. Government investment in Olympic sport seems to be on the increase worldwide, stimulated in part by China’s rise as a sport superpower. This Chinese model is itself stimulated by East Asian Olympic rivalries fueled by Japan and its memories of the 1964 Olympics as a turning point in Japan’s status among nations.

In sum, when we carefully reexamine the 1964 and 1988 Olympics, it is surprising that we remember them today as turning points in the peaceful integration of Japan and South Korea into the global community. Why would “peace” be associated with these events so clearly connected with political upheaval and war? In his chapter, Shimizu quotes a Japanese spectator who re-
members, “But the Tokyo Olympics brought the world to Japan for the first time. Everybody could see the world in Japan, and found Japan in the world.” Actually this was not strictly true, since World War II had brought the world to Japan in unprecedented numbers and cultural influence – but the Pacific wars of the twentieth century are not generally remembered for strengthening East-West cross-cultural understanding (although, ironically, they did). In the popular memory at home and abroad, probably the outstanding organization of the Olympic ceremonial pageantry and the sports events themselves worked their magic to leave lasting memories segregated from the surrounding politics and remembrances of war. Symbols of national pride that had been born in war, which emphasized collective sacrifice in the struggle for survival among hostile nations, were resituated within the pursuit of individual excellence and health, in peaceful interaction with a friendly outside world.

Dong Jinxia’s chapter captures the complexity of China’s national and international identities in the Beijing Olympic Games, which was not well-represented in the Western media accounts. Since the 1980s, nationalism in Chinese sports was actually largely stimulated by the performances of women, which should complicate a perception of Chinese sports as a symbol of aspirations to military might. The patriotic “Olympic Glory Plan” to top the gold medal count went along with big efforts to incorporate the outside world into the fabric of the Games, such as the students from other countries who comprised half of the 900 Olympic News Service workers. From the position of a Chinese academic living and working in China, Dong’s assessment of the effect of increased national confidence conflicts with the Western distrust of Chinese nationalism: she concludes that increased confidence will result in increased tolerance and openness to the outside world. As with the Japanese and South Korean Olympic Games, the Beijing Olympic Games involved a complex interplay of nationalism and internationalism that could not be summarized in a sound bite. Perhaps as the heated emotions surrounding the Beijing Olympics fade into the distance, these Games will look similar to their East Asian predecessors in hindsight, and will be remembered as a turning point in the peaceful integration of China into the global community.

Note:
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