Bank Failures: The FDIC’s Systemic Risk Exception

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When Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank failed, the Treasury Secretary, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve (Fed) announced on March 12, 2023, that the FDIC would guarantee uninsured deposits at those banks under the statutory systemic risk exception to least-cost resolution (LCR; 12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(G)). (See CRS Insight IN12125, Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank Failures.) The FDIC insures deposits up to a statutory limit of $250,000. (See CRS In Focus IF12361, Deposit Insurance and the Failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank.) Currently, the FDIC projects that the two resolutions will cost the FDIC $22.5 billion. The two banks’ combined estimated uninsured deposits were $231.1 billion in 2022. Under LCR, at least some of these losses would have been borne by uninsured depositors.

**FDIC Least-Cost Resolution**
When a bank fails, it does not enter the bankruptcy process like other businesses to resolve creditors’ claims. Instead, it is taken into receivership by the FDIC, which takes control of the bank and resolves it through an administrative process. Costs to the FDIC associated with a resolution are funded through assessments on banks and backed by the U.S. Treasury. (See CRS In Focus IF10055, Bank Failures and the FDIC.)

A banking crisis in the 1980s was more costly to the FDIC, and ultimately the taxpayer, because of the frequent use of regulatory forbearance—allowing troubled banks to stay open—which in many cases increased the losses that they suffered before they were ultimately shut down. In some cases, the FDIC used open bank assistance to provide funds or guarantees to troubled banks to keep them going rather than taking them into receivership.

Following the crisis, Congress reformed how the FDIC resolves banks in 1991 (P.L. 102-242). This act introduced prompt corrective action and LCR requirements as cornerstones of resolution. These two principles are intended to minimize resolution costs by ensuring that banks are resolved as quickly and inexpensively as possible. As such, uninsured depositors and other creditors can be repaid in a resolution only insofar as it is consistent with LCR, unless the systemic risk exception is invoked.

**What Is the Systemic Risk Exception?**
Systemic risk is financial market risk that poses a threat to financial stability. (See CRS In Focus IF10700, Introduction to Financial Services: Systemic Risk.) In the case of SVB and Signature, the FDIC, Fed, and Treasury Secretary were concerned that a run by uninsured depositors would spread to other banks, causing a broader crisis that could be detrimental to the real economy.

Under the 1991 law, LCR can be waived under the systemic risk exception when five statutory requirements have been met: (1) The Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the President and upon a written recommendation of at least two-thirds of the boards of the FDIC and Fed, determines LCR “would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability” and the FDIC’s actions would avoid or mitigate those effects. (2) Any loss to the FDIC must be repaid through a special assessment on banks by the FDIC. In levying this assessment, the FDIC need not follow normal deposit insurance assessment rates and may consider who benefited from the action and the effects on the banking industry (as amended by P.L. 111-22). In testimony, FDIC Chair Martin Gruenberg confirmed that the FDIC will be levying a special assessment in this case. (3) The Treasury Secretary must document the decision. (4) The Government Accountability Office (GAO) must review the incident. (5) The Treasury Secretary must notify the congressional committees of jurisdiction within three days.

Before 1991, the FDIC considered several goals, including cost, in determining how to deal with a troubled bank. As such, LCR, even with the exception, represents a constraint on its pre-1991 authority. The FDIC can take a number of actions under the exception, but it can be used only in an FDIC receivership.

**Previous Uses of the Exception**
Before 2023, GAO reported five planned uses of the systemic risk exception since 1991, all occurring between September 2008 (in the depths of the financial crisis) and March 2009.

1. **Wachovia.** The FDIC sought a buyer to prevent the imminent failure of Wachovia, the fourth-largest U.S. bank. Citigroup made an offer to acquire Wachovia under which the FDIC would partially guarantee $312 billion of Wachovia’s assets using the systemic risk exception. The FDIC initially accepted this offer but subsequently rejected it in favor of a competing offer from Wells Fargo that required no FDIC assistance.

2. **Citigroup.** Concerned that Citigroup, the third-largest U.S. bank, would fail and exacerbate the financial crisis, policymakers decided to provide an assistance package involving the Fed, the FDIC, and the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). As part of this package, the FDIC used its systemic risk exception to provide open bank assistance in the form of a partial asset guarantee for $306 billion of Citigroup’s assets. This guarantee (joint with the Fed and TARP) never paid off.

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out, and the government received compensation in the
form of stock and warrants.

3. **Bank of America.** A similar partial asset guarantee for
$118 billion of assets was offered to Bank of America,
the second-largest bank, for similar reasons but was
never finalized. Bank of America paid the government
a termination fee to cancel the guarantee when
financial market conditions stabilized. Unlike with
Wachovia and Citigroup, the exception was invoked in
anticipation of market pressure on Bank of America
before it occurred.

4. **FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program.**
To help banks remain liquid during the financial crisis,
the FDIC created this two-part temporary program—
the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP) and the
Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAG). Both
programs were voluntary but automatic unless banks
opted out. Under DGP, the FDIC guaranteed
certain debt issued by banks between October 2008 and
October 2009. Under TAG, the FDIC guaranteed non-
interest-bearing deposit accounts (primarily owned by
businesses and local governments) above the deposit
limit. Both programs charged participating banks fees
to cover potential costs.

5. **Public Private Investment Program (PPIP).**
Treasury created the Legacy Loan Program within
TARP’s PPIP. Under this program, the FDIC would
have partially guaranteed “legacy loans” acquired by
PPIP. The program never progressed beyond a pilot
phase.

Of the five cases, only the TAG program resulted in net
costs to the FDIC. Assistance to Citigroup, Bank of
America, and the DGP resulted in positive net income to
the FDIC or the government as a whole. (A special
assessment was not levied for TAG because its net income
was considered jointly with the DGP.) In the cases of
Wachovia, Bank of America, and PPIP, the proposed action
never occurred. (See CRS Report R43413, *Costs of
Government Interventions in Response to the Financial
Crisis: A Retrospective.*)

None of these five episodes involved a bank in FDIC
receivership. (Wachovia would have been an FDIC-assisted
open bank transaction.) Although the exception was clearly
intended to be a bank resolution tool, policymakers used the
authority at the time to justify two crisis programs that were
open to all banks, including healthy ones. In 2010, the
Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) limited the systemic risk
exception to receiverships to rule out its future use for
broadly based programs. It provided separate authority for
future debt guarantee programs and temporary authority for
a TAG program that was not renewed when it expired.

**Policy Issues**
The systemic risk exception is a recognition by Congress
that financial stability concerns sometimes trump the desire
to minimize potential costs to the taxpayer. Financial crises
impose economic costs that can far exceed resolution costs
to the FDIC. Because systemic risk is unpredictable and fast
moving, emergency tools such as the systemic risk
exception have been crafted to give policymakers broad,
discretionary powers to respond quickly to a range of
potential risks. This way, financial conditions can be
stabilized before a crisis spirals out of control. In this case,
guaranteeing uninsured deposits may have prevented a
broader deposit run that could have caused other banks to
fail. Broad, discretionary powers come at a cost, however.
Policymakers may have “itchy trigger fingers” and
intervene before the need has been proven. In this case, the
failure of two mid-sized banks, in isolation, posed little risk
to the economy or financial system. It may be that other
banks could have fended off the pressure of withdrawals on
their own and conditions could have stabilized.

The downside to intervening is the cost to the government
and moral hazard—the concept that when individuals or
businesses are protected from losses they will act more
recklessly. In this case, SVB and Signature and their
leadership and shareholders were not “bailed out,” as the
banks were closed, but uninsured depositors were. Congress
set a deposit insurance limit in part because there is an
expectation that depositors above the limit should be
financially sophisticated enough to monitor their banks’
riskiness (i.e., impose market discipline). By using the
systemic risk exception, policymakers have signaled that
uninsured depositors and their banks need be less concerned
about risk taking going forward. (The systemic risk
exception was not used to protect the banks’ debtholders or
shareholders, so debtholders at other banks arguably still
have an incentive to monitor risk taking.)

Guaranteeing uninsured depositors also shifts the costs of
the resolution to banks that did not fail. In a counterfactual
where all deposits had been insured, banks including SVB
and Signature would have pre-funded the deposit insurance
fund ex ante to a size sufficient to absorb the costs of
guaranteeing all deposits. Instead, those costs must be
recouped ex post. But the FDIC is required to consider who
benefited from the intervention when levying assessments.

A long-standing moral hazard concern is that some banks are
“too big to fail,” meaning that their failure could result in
financial instability, which would result in government
bailouts to prevent them. Although SVB and Signature
were taken into receivership, the use of the systemic risk
exception at two institutions that few previously believed
were TBTF supports those concerns. In addition to moral
hazard concerns, TBTF could potentially put small banks at
a competitive disadvantage if uninsured depositors believe
their deposits are safer at large banks because the systemic
risk exception would be invoked only for a large bank.

The first use of the systemic risk exception since it was last
amended in 2010 raises questions about whether additional
legislative changes are warranted. Policymakers’ discretion
could be narrowed, but it might impede their ability to
quickly and flexibly respond to a crisis. Nevertheless, the
Dodd-Frank Act added more parameters to the Fed’s
emergency lending authority (12 U.S.C. §343) concerning
when and how that authority should be used—and what
should be reported to Congress—compared to the FDIC’s
exception. Those changes did not prevent the Fed from
responding aggressively to the COVID-19 pandemic or
from creating a new emergency program following the
failures of SVB and Signature. Legislative changes to bank

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regulation or deposit insurance could also change the likelihood of the systemic risk exception being used again.

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