Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) (MY AFC)

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Abstract

The Malaysian economy was relatively well positioned at the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997 Annual Report Foreword – pp. 1). However, the government’s response of tight fiscal and monetary policy, along with contagion from surrounding countries, had severely negative consequences (1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 1). The banking industry became particularly vulnerable due to substantial loan growth preceding the crisis and exposure to volatile sectors, leading to an increase in NPLs and deterioration of capital (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 9-10) (IMF 1999 – pp. 55). As part of its approach to assist the ailing banking sector, the Bank Negara Malaysia created Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) on August 10, 1998, a wholly owned subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing banking institutions (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). Funding for Danamodal came from RM3 billion in BNM seed capital and RM7.7 billion of 5-year zero-coupon bonds (Malaysian Approach – pp. 12). Beneficiaries submitted a capital-injections strategy to Danamodal, which performed assessments, in conjunction with external advisors, to determine the viability of the institution and required injection amounts (Danamodal PR August 4, 1998) (Malaysian Approach – pp. 8-10).

The first phase of injections consisted of interim Tier 2 Capital; beneficiaries then negotiated and signed Definitive Agreements (DAs) that converted the temporary capital into various types of permanent capital and outlined a long-term relationship with Danamodal (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10-11). Danamodal appointed two nominees to the beneficiary’s board of directors with additional appointments dependent on the amount of Tier 1 capital injected (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated mergers and implemented behavioral reforms (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). Injections through Danamodal totaled approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking institutions and all funds were repaid by 2007 resulting in a final pre-tax profit of RM200 million (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 107) (2007 FSPSR Ch. 2 – pp. 51-52).

Keywords: Definitive Agreements (DAs), interim capital, Exchangeable Subordinated Capital Loans (ESCL), first-loss principle, Board nominees

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At a Glance

As the Asian Financial Crisis began spilling over into the Malaysian economy, its banking industry quickly began to struggle. Substantial loan growth preceding the crisis and exposure to volatile sectors had led to an increase in NPLs and deterioration of capital (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 9-10). As part of a larger plan, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) created Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) on August 10, 1998, a wholly owned subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing banking institutions (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). The BNM funded this Special Purpose Vehicle through RM3 billion in BNM seed capital and RM7.7 billion of 5-year zero-coupon bonds (Malaysian Approach – pp. 12).

Danamodal, along with international advisors, reviewed submissions and performed analyses on banking institutions to determine their viability and required injection amounts (Danamodal PR August 4, 1998). Initially, Danamodal injected Exchangeable Subordinated Capital Loans (ESCL), a form of Tier 2 Capital, as a temporary injection to allow for further due diligence and negotiation (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 14) (Danamodal PR February 5, 1999). During this interim period, beneficiaries signed Definitive Agreements (DAs) that converted ESCL into permanent capital and outlined a long-term relationship with Danamodal (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10-11). The three primary forms of permanent capital included Common Shares, Irredeemable Non-Cumulative Convertible Preference Shares (INCEPS), and Subordinated Loans (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10). The different instruments provided a range of expected returns, control, and subordination (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10). Following the injection of capital, Danamodal appointed nominees to the beneficiary’s Board of Directors based on the amount of Tier 1 Capital injected (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated mergers and implemented behavioral reforms (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). In addition, Danamodal worked with beneficiaries to create performance targets and closely monitored their progress (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 4). Over its lifetime Danamodal injected approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking institutions, resulting in an increase of risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) for beneficiaries from 9.9% at end of September 1998 to 12.3% at end of December 1999 (1999 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 11) (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 107).

Summary Evaluation

All beneficiaries exited the scheme by 2007 resulting in a final pre-tax profit of RM200 million (2007 FSPSR Ch. 2 – pp. 51-52). Although Danamodal has been credited as an essential part of the banking industry’s recovery from the Asia Financial Crisis, the IMF raised issues regarding its strategy to spur lending and enhance beneficiaries leadership and corporate governance (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 108) (IMF 1999 – pp. 72).
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I. Overview

Background

In the years preceding the Asia Financial Crisis, market participants hailed East Asia as the global growth center for the next century, stemming from years of substantial economic growth through international inclusion, external facing strategy, and conservative fiscal policy (Abidin 2000 – pp. 184). As a result, East Asian economies experienced “rapid export-driven growth, relatively low inflation, rising per capita incomes and reduced poverty” (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 1). Unfortunately, certain characteristics of East Asia’s rapid growth created a precarious economic situation that ultimately precipitated financial market turmoil (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 2). After years of pegged currency exchange rates, many regional currencies required realignment against the US Dollar (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 2). The overvaluation of currencies fed a perception of uncompetitive export sectors and currency peg instability (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 2). Additionally, macroeconomic imbalances began building as short-term investment from foreign investors financed large current account deficits across the region (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 2). Foreign capital began flowing into domestic financial markets as well (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 2). The final vulnerability emerged in the banking sector, where high credit growth in preceding years and the increase of funds flowing to illiquid and high-risk sectors such as property and equity markets had led to overall fragility (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 2). Eventually the increasing of interest rates to manage inflation and halt capital outflows exacerbated issues in this sector as asset quality weakened and Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) rose (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 2).

The immediate response by East Asian governments to curb currency pressures included hiking interest rates, direct currency exchange intervention, and implementing selective measures to curtail speculation (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 3). This approach proved untenable as foreign exchange reserves dwindled and other interventions had a perverse impact on domestic markets (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 3). The first clear indication of the Asia Financial Crisis occurred when Thailand was forced to abandon its currency peg and float the Thai Baht on July 2, 1997, resulting in a rapid depreciation of the Baht by about 10-15% (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 1). Economies such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan quickly felt the effects of this shock (1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 1-2).

Malaysia’s economy remained strong at the onset of the crisis, with an economic expansion of 7.8% in 1997 (1997 Annual Report Foreword – pp. 1). Unlike other East Asian economies, it did not implement an IMF-supported plan or receive IMF financial assistance due to its relatively strong balance of payments position and its lower foreign debt load (Teo et. Al 2000 – pp. 79) (1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 5). However, the initial Malaysian response consisted of tight fiscal and monetary policy, similar to the IMF recommendation to neighboring countries (Abidin 2000 – pp. 193). Examples of such policies included “reducing the current account deficit in the balance of payments, increasing the fiscal surplus through significant cutbacks in public sector expenditure,
reducing credit growth and containing inflationary expectations by tightening further monetary policy” (1997 Annual Report Foreword – pp. 1). These measures aimed to repair market confidence in Malaysia, stem economic pressures, and stabilize the exchange rate (Abidin 2000 – pp. 193). The government also targeted the banking sector by introducing stricter regulations regarding the categorization of NPLs and requiring increased transparency from financial institutions (1997 Annual Report Foreword – pp. 1). However, it became clear that tighter fiscal and monetary policy had a deleterious impact on the economy as real output in 1998 declined 6.7% following twelve years of continuous expansion, averaging 7.8% annually (1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 1). In response to these negative consequences, the Malaysian government decided to reverse course; it began to relax fiscal policies in March 1998 and ease monetary policy in August 1998 (1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 4). By this time, financial market turmoil had taken its toll; the Malaysian stock market, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), fell by 72% and the Malaysian ringgit depreciated by 40% against the US dollar from pre-crisis levels (1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 4).

Similar to the overall economy, the Malaysian banking sector was well situated at the beginning of the Asian Financial Crisis; this strength was displayed through quality of assets, strong capitalization, and prudential supervision (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 9). The primary forms of deposit-taking institutions within the banking sector included commercial banks, finance companies, and merchant banks (IMF 1999 – pp. 56). Across the banking sector, by the end of June 1997, the risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) was 12% (substantially above the minimum of 8%) and net NPL ratios were 2.2% (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 9). In addition, the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) provided an integrated approach to bank supervision in Malaysia through regulations dictating capital ratios, transparency, and risk management (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 9).

Despite this perceived strength, underlying structural issues resulted in a deterioration of the Malaysian financial sector as the crisis continued. One contributing factor was the meteoric loan growth, averaging approximately 25% per year, between 1994-1997 (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 9). The private sector was especially reliant on banking sector financing due to the underdeveloped bond market (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 9-10). Increased lending led to elevated credit levels relative to GDP and significant credit exposures by institutions to at-risk sectors including property and equity markets (IMF 1999 – pp. 55).

Due to the protracted crisis and ensuing contraction in economic activity, NPLs increased and capital deteriorated within financial institutions (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 10). By the end of June 1998, the net NPL ratio increased to 8.9% while RWCR had decreased to 11.2% (still above the 8% minimum) for the system as a whole (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 10, 14).

The ailing banking sector prompted the Malaysian government to implement a multi-faceted policy approach to restore confidence in financial markets and struggling banking institutions (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 10-11).

**Program Description**
In July 1998, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), on behalf of the Malaysian government, released a National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) that outlined a strategy of government intervention (Malaysian Approach – pp. 1). One stated goal of the NERP was recapitalizing the struggling banking sector to stabilize financial markets (Malaysian Approach – pp. 1). On August 10, 1998, Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the central bank of Malaysia (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). This Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) would serve two purposes: inject capital into banks and, through its shareholder role, merge core and weaker institutions and improve their management. (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). Danamodal’s Board of Directors included BNM representatives as Chairman, Managing Director, and other additional members along with a nominee from the Ministry of Finance and private sector appointees (Danamodal PR August 4, 1998).

After performing a number of stress tests in various scenarios, BNM estimated the maximum budget for Danamodal to be RM16 billion (Malaysian Approach – pp. 4-5). This amount would guarantee that the RWCR across the banking industry would stay above 9% (Malaysian Approach – pp. 5). Funding for Danamodal came from RM3 billion in BNM seed capital and RM7.7 billion of 5-year zero-coupon bonds with a nominal value of RM11 billion, 5-year maturity, and yield to maturity (YTM) of 7.25% (T&C Danamodal Bonds) (Malaysian Approach – pp. 12). The bonds traded on the secondary market for Malaysian government securities. Unlike bonds issued by Danaharta, Danamodal’s sister agency that purchased nonperforming loans, Danamodal’s bonds did not carry an explicit government guarantee. However, they carried an implicit guarantee. BNM accepted them as collateral at its discount window and treated them as government securities on bank balance sheets in calculating banks’ liquidity and capital requirements (IMF 1999 – pp. 62).


During the first phase of recapitalization, Danamodal injected Exchangeable Subordinated Capital Loans (ESCL), a form of Tier 2 Capital (Danamodal PR February 5, 1999). It bore an interest rate of 7.5% annually and a three-month maturity, beneficiaries had the option to extend the maturity if required (Financial Statements 1999 – pp. 16). After receiving the interim ESCL, beneficiaries negotiated and signed Definitive Agreements (DAs) that converted ESCL into permanent capital and outlined a long-term relationship with Danamodal (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10-11) (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 14). The three types of permanent capital were Common Shares, Irredeemable Non-Cumulative Convertible Preference Shares (INCEPS), and Subordinated Loans (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10). The different instruments provided a range of expected returns, control, and
subordination (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10). Danamodal valued its investments based on market-based methods (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 5).

Danamodal stringently observed a “first-loss” principle throughout the process, whereby “shareholders would be required to bear all losses before the recapitalisation by Danamodal” (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). Adherence to this principle resulted in beneficiaries selling their NPLs to Danaharta, an asset management company created to purchase NPLs from banks, prior to receiving capital injections from Danamodal (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). The individual needs of each beneficiary, including safety (application of first-loss principle), control, return, capital base, exit potential, and monitoring requirements, would dictate the structure of its investments (Malaysian Approach – pp. 9).

Following the injection of capital, Danamodal would appoint a minimum of two nominees to serve as Executive Director and either Chairman or Deputy Chairman on the Board of Directors of beneficiary institutions (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). The amount of Tier 1 Capital injected dictated greater Board representation (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). Through its Board presence, Danamodal expected to facilitate mergers and implement behavioral reforms such as “sound risk management practices and credit culture, good corporate governance and higher operational efficiencies” (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). In addition, Danamodal worked with beneficiaries to create performance targets and closely monitored their progress (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 4).

Danamodal stated that it had an expected lifespan of no more than five years, with the majority of capital injections occurring during the first two years (Malaysian Approach – pp. 3) (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 5). Beneficiaries exited the scheme through “initial public offering, strategic sales of its holdings, and sales of its holdings directly in the market” (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 6).

Outcomes

Danamodal injected RM6.15 billion of ESCL into 10 banking institutions in 1998, resulting in an increase in RWCR across the banking system from 11.2% at end of June 1998 to 11.9% at end of January 1999 (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 14). Throughout 1998 to 1999, all ten beneficiary banks, with the exception of Perdana Merchant Bankers, finalized their injection amounts and terms through Definitive Agreements (Danamodal PR November 13, 1998) (Danamodal PR March 30, 1999). Danamodal performed no additional capital injections following December 1999 (2001 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 134). The composition of the injections are shown in Figure 1 and balances over time are shown in Figure 2.

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2 For more information on Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) see Dreyer (2020)
**Figure 1: Breakdown of Danamodal Injections (RM millions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banking Institution</th>
<th>Total Injection Amount</th>
<th>Date of Definitive Agreements Signing</th>
<th>Not converted from ESCL</th>
<th>Common Shares - Tier 1</th>
<th>Preference Shares (INCEPS) - Tier 1</th>
<th>Subordinated Loan - Tier 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHB Bank Berhad</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>November 30, 1998</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>February 5, 1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBf Finance Berhad</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>March 12, 1999*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>680</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Merchant Finance Berhad</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>March 30, 1999</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Bank Berhad</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>March 30, 1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>February 5, 1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSN Commercial Bank (M) Berhad</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>February 5, 1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Malaysian Merchant Berhad</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>February 5, 1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabah Bank Berhad</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>February 12, 1999</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perdana Merchant Bankers Berhad</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>November 13, 1998**</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,590</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>2,256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Danamodal injected RM680 million of Subordinated loans into MBf Finance Berhad on December 30, 1999
**Perdana Merchant Bankers received an injection of ESCL on November 13, 1998

The actions taken by Danamodal supported mergers and acquisition activity within the sector. On October 8, 1998, Danamodal announced its intent to invest RM1.5 billion in the RHB Bank and Sime Bank merger (Danamodal PR October 8, 1998). Following its purchase of Sime Bank for RM852.2 million, RHB Bank approached Danamodal to assist in a previously estimated RM1 billion capital shortfall (Danamodal PR October 8, 1998). The injection of funds was estimated to resulted in an increase in capital adequacy to 10.5% and was performed on October 21, 1998 (Danamodal PR October 8, 1998) (Danamodal PR November 30, 1998). Danamodal announced its plan to inject an additional RM723.4
minute for a 30% share in RHB Capital on November 30, 1998 (Danamodal PR November 30, 1998). However, Khazanah Nasional Berhad made this investment instead of Danamodal after expressing its interest and Danamodal’s determination “that Khazanah is in a better position to undertake such an investment” (Danamodal PR December 21, 1998).³ RHB Bank was later acquired by Bank Utama during merger exercises performed by the BNM (Cook 2008 – pp. 92).

Danamodal became controlling shareholder in MBf Finance following its initial injection of RM1.6 billion in exchange for a 70% stake (Danamodal PR March 12, 1999). The divestment of its injection resulted in further consolidation as Danamodal sold its stake to Arab-Malaysian Finance on August 3, 2001 (Danamodal PR August 3, 2001). The total price of the acquisition was RM925 million, composed of RM475 million in cash and RM450 million contingent on NPL recoveries (Danamodal PR August 3, 2001). The sale recouped funds from the RM1.6 billion injection, although it resulted in an RM675 million loss (Financial Statements 2001 – pp. 21). Additional mergers included EON Bank acquired Oriental Bank, Affin Bank acquired BSN Commercial Bank (M), Southern Bank acquired United Merchant Finance and Perdana Merchant Bankers, and Multi-Purpose Bank acquired Sabah Bank (Danamodal PR January 8, 2001) (Danamodal PR December 22, 2000) (BNM PR February 14, 2000). It is important to note that some of these mergers were a result of the broader effort by the Malaysia government to consolidate the banking sector and occurred after Danamodal funds had been paid back (BNM PR February 14, 2000).

Danamodal implemented behavioral reforms through its board representation alongside broader efforts by BNM to improve corporate governance. As part of this effort BNM issued a framework for standard credit risk management by financial institutions (Sulaiman 05/18/1999). These guidelines covered appropriate oversight by the board of directors and management, adequate infrastructure for credit risk management, an integrated risk management process, and comprehensive internal controls and audit procedures (Best Practices 09/05/2001 – pp. iii). Additional reforms included constructing a sector-wide training program for lending officers, limiting external interference in lending decisions, and intermittent assessments by BNM on executives based on whether they were “fit and proper” (Sulaiman 05/18/1999).

Over its lifetime, Danamodal injected approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking institutions, substantially less than the maximum budget of RM16 billion (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 107). For these beneficiaries, the capital injections by Danamodal resulted in RWCR increasing from 9.9% at end of September 1998 to 12.3% at end of December 1999 (1999 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 11). On October 21, 2003, the 5-year zero-coupon bonds issued by Danamodal matured and operations ceased on December 31, 2003 (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 107-108). At the time of its wind down, Danamodal had RM2.2 billion in assets remaining and RM1 billion of capital outstanding in RHB Bank (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 107-108). These final holdings and assets were liquidated

³ Khazanah Nasional Berhad is the sovereign wealth fund of Malaysia. More information on Khazanah can be found [here](#)
by the end of 2007, resulting in all institutions exiting the scheme and a final pre-tax profit of RM200 million (2007 FSPSR Ch. 2 – pp. 51-52).

**Figure 2: Outstanding Balance of Danamodal Injections Over Time (RM millions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banking Institution</th>
<th>Outstanding Balance (February 9, 2000)</th>
<th>Outstanding Balance (September 30, 2001)</th>
<th>Outstanding Balance (December 20, 2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RHB Bank Berhad</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBf Finance Berhad</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Merchant Finance Berhad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Bank Berhad</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSN Commercial Bank (M) Berhad</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Malaysian Merchant Berhad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabah Bank Berhad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perdana Merchant Bankers Berhad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,740</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,140</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Danamodal PR February 11, 2000, Danamodal PR October 11, 2001, Danamodal PR December 22, 2001)

II. **Key Design Decisions**

1. The Malaysian Government executed a three-pronged approach, including recapitalization, to strengthen the banking sector.
The Malaysian government instituted a three-pronged approach to assist its ailing banking sector during the Asia Financial Crisis. The three interventions dealt with purchasing Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), recapitalization, and debt restructuring (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 11-13). It included:

i. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) – an asset management company that purchased and managed NPLs from banking institutions (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12)

ii. Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) – a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that injected capital into banking institutions (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12)

iii. Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) – a debt restructuring agency that allowed borrowers and creditors to negotiate agreements and avoid legal proceedings (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 13)

Each individual program interacted with one another in various ways. For example, banks sold their NPLs to Danaharta at fair market value, resulting in substantial losses (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). In a healthy economic environment, these banks would be able to raise capital to make up for this shortfall through shareholders (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). However, due to uncertain financial conditions, there was insufficient appetite from investors (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). Therefore, Danamodal stepped in to recapitalize these institutions and restore capital levels (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). In fact, Danamodal required beneficiaries to sell their NPLs to Danaharta in order to receive capital injections, resulting in existing shareholders bearing the losses associated with these sales (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). Additionally, if negotiations undertaken by the CDRC could not reach a consensus, Danaharta purchased the NPLs from the dissenting institutions, which assisted the restructuring process (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 13).

Due to the overlap between programs, shown in Figure 3, the Malaysian government created a Steering Committee that coordinated the interventions of Danaharta, Danamodal, and CDRC (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 13). The Governor of the BNM chaired the Steering Committee, which met every two weeks (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 13). Its primary responsibilities included ensuring “operations of these institutions are well coordinated and complement each other, and to keep track of their progress” as well as properly sequencing interventions (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 13).
2. **Danamodal was a limited liability company and wholly owned subsidiary of BNM.**

Danamodal was legally categorized as a limited liability company and incorporated on August 10, 1998 as a wholly owned subsidiary of BNM (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20) (Danamodal PR August 4, 1998). Its governance structure reflected this ownership as its board of directors had BNM representatives as Chairman, Managing Director, and other additional members (Danamodal PR August 4, 1998). The board also consisted of a nominee from the Ministry of Finance and private sector appointees (Danamodal PR August 4, 1998).

3. **BNM announced the creation of Danamodal through a press release and maintained transparency throughout its existence.**

On July 13, 1998, BNM announced the creation of an SPV to recapitalize the banking system (BNM PR July 13, 1998). The press release occurred two months after the creation of Danaharta and it references the SPV as a complement to it; “as Danaharta was set up to help remove NPLs from the banking system, there is a need for us to explore other pre-emptive alternatives to recapitalise the banking system” (BNM PR July 13, 1998). The approach to recapitalization included a dual objective:

i. To inject government capital, both in “core” banking institutions and in weaker institutions that BNM identified as viable

ii. To merge core and weaker banking institutions, taking advantage of its role as a strategic shareholder (BNM PR July 13, 1998)

The press release outlined a number of characteristics of the SPV including structure, lifespan, financing requirements, and operation and financing arrangements (BNM PR July 13, 1998). It explains that the SPV would receive seed capital from BNM, with additional
funding through bond issuances, and have a finite lifespan with the goal of selling its holdings once it achieved its objectives (BNM PR July 13, 1998). The maximum expected budget was RM16 billion, which would maintain a risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) above 9% across the banking system (BNM PR July 13, 1998). In addition, BNM would leverage international consultants to construct the operating details and financing arrangements of the SPV (BNM PR July 13, 1998).

Danamodal was transparent in disclosing changes in management, operations, and selection criteria (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). A significant number of these announcements occurred through press releases. It also issued financial statements that aligned with international accounting standards (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu, an independent and external vendor, audited these annual financial statements (Financial Statements 1999 – pp. 4).

4. Danamodal strictly employed a “first-loss” principle during interventions.

Under the “first-loss” principle, “existing shareholders were required to bear all losses prior to recapitalization” (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12). In practice, the application of this principle required banks to mark down the value of existing shareholders investments to accurately reveal net tangible assets and sell their NPLs to Danaharta prior to receiving capital injections from Danamodal (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). This forced shareholders to realize the losses stemming from declining investments and NPL sales (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). In addition, it resulted in “equitable burden sharing” and reduced the use of public funds (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20).

The “first-loss” principle also played an integral role in the negotiation of Definitive Agreements (DAs), which specified the terms and types of capital used in capital injections (Danamodal PR February 5, 1999).

5. Danamodal conducted an industry-wide stress test and determined it needed RM16 billion to recapitalize the banking sector.

The worst-case scenario estimated by BNM dictated a budget of RM16 billion (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). This funding amount would guarantee that the RWCR across all banking institutions would be at least 9% (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). To estimate a maximum budget the BNM conducted a preliminary, industry-wide stress test in May 1998 that examined how banking institutions performed based on a variety of parameters and assumptions (Malaysian Approach – pp. 4). The analysis looked at institution-specific characteristics such as projected NPLs, specific provisions (property and shares), investments, and off-balance-sheet items (Malaysian Approach – pp. 4). In addition, it included environmental factors such as interest rates (3-month KLIBOR), foreign exchange (USD/MYR exchange rate), real estate (property prices), equity markets (Kuala Lumpur Composite Index), and contagion risk (exposure to Indonesia, Thailand, Korea) (Malaysian Approach – pp. 4-5).

The results of the stress test, shown in Figure 4, prescribed a maximum funding requirement of RM16 billion, approximately 12% of Malaysia GDP (Malaysian Approach – pp. 5). This was broken down into two phases; the first phase would recapitalize 14
banking institutions that the BNM deemed very likely to experience solvency issues and required a total of RM12.8 billion to bolster their RWCR to greater than 9% (Malaysian Approach – pp. 5). The second phase involved 11 institutions that the BNM felt had a lower likelihood of experiencing solvency issues (Malaysian Approach – pp. 5). Therefore, the BNM allocated RM1.6 billion to ensure that the RWCR of these lower-risk institutions stayed above 9% (Malaysian Approach – pp. 5). In addition, the BNM added a precautionary 10% buffer, totaling RM1.6 billion (Malaysian Approach – pp. 5). Only 10 of the 14 institutions identified in the phase-one analysis received injections, as “Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, Bank of Commerce Berhad, Perwira Affin Bank Berhad and Utama Merchant Bank Berhad...opted for their own solutions to address their capitalisation issues” (Danamodal PR March 12, 1999). Improved market conditions made injections for the institutions associated with phase two unnecessary (IMF 1999 – pp. 6).

**Figure 4: Stress Test Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Institution</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
<th>Injection Amount</th>
<th>Total Injection Amount (RM billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Phase 1 (RM billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Banks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Companies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant Banks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10% buffer)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12,768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Malaysian Approach – pp. 5)

6. The recapitalizations were funded through seed capital from BNM and bond issuances.

In order to fund itself, Danamodal received RM3 billion in seed capital from BNM (Malaysian Approach – pp. 12). It then raised an additional RM7.7 billion on October 21, 1998 through the issuance of zero-coupon bonds (T&C Danamodal Bonds). The BNM decreased its statutory reserve requirement from 6% to 4% in conjunction with this issuance (Cook 2008 – pp. 88) (IMF 1999 – pp. 62). It also required banks to use the additional liquid capital from the lowered requirement to buy Danamodal bonds (Cook 2008 – pp. 88). The bonds had a nominal value of RM11 billion, 5-year maturity, yield to maturity (YTM) of 7.25%, and qualified as a class one liquid asset with zero risk-weighting for capital requirements (T&C Danamodal Bonds). Additionally, Danamodal had the ability to extend the duration of the bonds, either partially or fully, by a minimum of one year and maximum of five years (T&C Danamodal Bonds). The new YTM, if Danamodal triggered the maturity extension, would equal the “sum of the average YTMs of Malaysian Government Securities (MGS) of similar or closest tenor to the extension period and 50 basis points
(T&C Danamodal Bonds). Unlike Danaharta, Danamodal’s bonds did not carry an explicit government guarantee (1998 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 24). However, the bonds carried an implied government guarantee since Danamodal was wholly owned by BNM (IMF 1999 – pp. 62).


7. Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney served as independent advisers during the recapitalization process.

Danamodal leveraged the expertise of “reputable, international financial advisors”, Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney (Malaysian Approach – pp. 7) (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). They were selected due to their ability to:

i. Immediately provide highly trained resources, bridging the learning curve gap
ii. Supplement Danamodal’s resources needed to meet performance expectations
iii. Provide a third party objective and independent viewpoint
iv. Provide expert advice skills and methodologies to ensure an effective recapitalization process (Malaysian Approach – pp. 7)

The advisors had a number of functions, such as performing assessments and due diligence reviews (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 20). These reviews were a prerequisite to receive funds and aimed to gauge the overall health of the beneficiary as well as determine the amount of capital required (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12) (IMF 1999 – pp. 65). Other responsibilities included the construction of an operational infrastructure along with overall policies and procedures governing capital injections (Malaysian Approach – pp. 7).

8. To determine the viability of beneficiary institutions and recapitalization amounts, Danamodal conducted comprehensive individual assessments.

Along with BNM, Goldman Sachs, and Salomon Smith Barney, Danamodal worked to assess the long-term prospects for each institution (IMF 1999 – pp. 65) (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 3-4). The selection process included an in-depth analysis of competitive position and financial standing of each banking institution, quantification of potential synergies to be realized through consolidation, and CAMEL (capital, assets, management, earnings, and liquidity) analysis (Danamodal PR August 4, 1998). The banks that were selected as beneficiaries were identified in the first phase of stress tests and defined as very likely to experience solvency issues (Danamodal PR March 12, 1999). The risk profiles of these banks were determined through a the stress tests outlined in KDD 5 (Malaysian Approach – pp. 5). Of the original 14 banks identified in phase one, 10 received capital injections, while Bank Bumiputra, Bank of Commerce, Perwira Affin Bank, and Utama Merchant Bank secured alternative solutions (Danamodal PR March 12, 1999). Bank Bumiputra Malaysia and Bank of Commerce were merged with government assistance outside of Danamodal, Perwira Affin Bank acquired BSN Commercial and did not require a further injection of
capital, and Utama Merchant Bank was recapitalized by its shareholders (IMF 1999 – pp. 66). It is important to note that none of the banks identified as lower-risk institutions in the second phase received injections (IMF 1999 – pp. 66).

Danamodal’s holistic approach to determine future viability and capital injection amounts, shown in Figure 5, accounted for both quantitative and qualitative factors (Malaysian Approach – pp. 7).

**Figure 5: Danamodal Recapitalization Assessment Process**

9. **Danamodal injected Tier 2 capital then signed Definitive Agreements (DAs) with beneficiary institutions, converting the capital into three types of securities.**

Danamodal would first inject Tier 2 subordinated debt, in the form of Exchangeable Subordinated Capital Loans (ESCL), which was converted into equity, debt, or hybrid capital through Definitive Agreements (DAs) (IMF 1999 – pp. 65) (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 14). ESCL bore an interest of 7.5% annually and had a three-month maturity, with the option for beneficiaries to extend (Financial Statements 1999 – pp. 16). The temporary funds allowed for additional due diligence and negotiations prior to conversion (Danamodal PR February 5, 1999).

Following this interim period, stakeholders signed DAs that outlined recapitalization amount and instruments used (including the decision whether to convert the ESCL into permanent Tier-1 and/or Tier-2 capital), pricing of instruments, investment protection, exit option, shareholder’s call option (Malaysian Approach – pp. 10-11). It is important to note that Danamodal used market-based valuation methods in making investment decisions (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 4). The DAs varied across institutions due to the unique situation of each individual beneficiary, and time constraints required an accommodating and practical approach (Malaysian Approach – pp. 9). Six main principles guided Danamodal’s structuring of investments: safety (application of first-loss principle), control,
return, capital base, exit potential, and monitoring requirements (Malaysian Approach – pp. 9).

The three primary instruments used for capital injections by Danamodal and their characteristics are outlined in Figure 6. The different instruments allowed Danamodal to tailor injections to the issues faced by the at-risk institution (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). The composition of the capital injection depended “primarily on the cash flow characteristics of the instruments and the unique circumstances of the banking institutions concerned” (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21).

**Figure 6: Characteristics of Capital Used by Danamodal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Capital</th>
<th>Capital Category</th>
<th>Expected Rate of Return</th>
<th>Control Level</th>
<th>Subordination Level</th>
<th>Additional Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Shares</td>
<td>Tier 1 Capital</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Direct control through proportionate voting rights and board representation</td>
<td>Potential for complete erosion of value if company performs poorly</td>
<td>Call option that results in existing shareholders compensating Danamodal by transferring shares at nominal value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irredeemable Non-Cumulative</td>
<td>Tier 1 Capital</td>
<td>8% (12% when converted)</td>
<td>Moderate control through board representation (negotiation and potential for conversion)</td>
<td>Priority to common equity in liquidation proceedings</td>
<td>Fully convertible to common shares in all cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convertible Preference Shares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INCEPS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinated Loans</td>
<td>Tier 2 Capital</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>High downside protection behind senior debt</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**10. In order to institute behavioral reforms and facilitate mergers, Danamodal appointed nominees to the boards of beneficiaries.**

Danamodal would appoint a minimum of two nominees to serve as Executive Director and either Chairman or Deputy Chairman on the Board of Directors of beneficiary institutions (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). The amount of Tier 1 Capital injected dictated additional Board representation beyond the minimum two Appointee (1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 21). Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated mergers and implemented behavioral reforms such as “sound risk management practices and credit culture, good corporate governance and higher operational efficiencies” (1998 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 12).

The restructuring process employed by Danamodal encompassed improvements in financial analysis/capital frameworks, operations/IT, organizational structure/human resources, and the beneficiary’s business portfolio (Malaysian Approach – pp. 14).
initial phase consisted of an internal and external situation assessment, followed by the
development of a strategic plan (strategic position, operational design, IT design, etc.) and
implementation plan (changes in restructuring, governance, consolidation, etc.) (Malaysian

11. Danamodal created performance targets for the beneficiary institutions and
 monitored their progress towards these targets.

Prior to receiving capital injections, beneficiaries were required to provide a
comprehensive business plan and establish, in conjunction with Danamodal, “a list of
comprehensive performance targets, monthly reporting, and swift and firm remedial
actions against the banks in the event of material shortfalls in performance relative to such
targets” (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 4). Danamodal closely monitored these performance
targets, tightening its overall approach to banking supervision. This included requiring
financial statement reporting to the BNM on a quarterly, semi-annual, and yearly basis,
along with weekly and monthly balance sheet disclosure (IMF 1999 – pp. 67). The BNM
also deployed CAMEL-based supervision, which focused on capital adequacy, asset quality,
and management, regarding both in-person assessments, which were increased to a
minimum of once per year for all banks, and external monitoring (IMF 1999 – pp. 67-69).
Additional supervisory changes included BNM approval of financial statements prior to
public disclosure and creation of “prompt corrective measures” which created pre-agreed
responses by bank managers and owners to breaches of regulatory levels (IMF 1999 – pp. 69).

Many of the indicators that were assessed are outlined in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Major Performance Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Measure</th>
<th>Monitoring Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Migration of Performing Loans to Non-Performing</td>
<td>• Monitor percentage of loans in each loan class (current, substandard, doubtful, bad) on a monthly basis, by type blending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>• Monitor loan migration between classes of loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPL Recovery</td>
<td>• Monitor amount of NPLs converted into collateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitor amount of collateral sold in each period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Recovery Rate</td>
<td>• Make assessments of FMV of underlying collateral on all categories of loans on a periodic basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitor actual cash values received versus estimates. Encourage cash sales of collateral/loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Interest Margin</td>
<td>• Monitor performance and trend of Net Interest Margin on a monthly basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify sources of strengths and weaknesses of Net Interest Margin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct monthly reviews of pricing by product compared to competitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Interest Income Growth</td>
<td>• Performance of fee-based business lines as well as prospects for growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• New initiatives that may be undertaken to develop new fee-based Businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Structure</td>
<td>• Identify and monitor the sources of strengths and weaknesses in overall cost structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Interest Expense Growth</td>
<td>• Encourage major focus by management on appropriate level of overhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>needed to match current business opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Detailed management reports on salary, overhead expenses, and other operational costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to Income Ratio</td>
<td>• Benchmark progress in improving overall efficiency relative to other institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Growth</td>
<td>• Gross loan production figures provided monthly with periodic assessment of negative or positive trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Amounts and trend of new loan disbursements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit Growth</td>
<td>• Total deposits figures provided monthly with periodic assessment of any trends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Malaysian Approach – pp. 15)

12. **BNM anticipated that the recapitalization process would take five years.**

At inception, BNM predicted that the recapitalization process would take no more than five years (Malaysian Approach – pp. 3). This timeframe would allow Danamodal to accomplish its short and medium-term objectives and make significant headway towards the long-term goal of industry consolidation and restructuring (Malaysian Approach – pp. 3). It is important to note that Danamodal expected the majority of capital injections to occur during the first two years (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 5). Danamodal’s exit strategy followed the below principles:

i. Seize the earliest chance to exit
ii. If satisfied that it achieved its objectives of recapitalization or if it’s may enhance prospects of future achievement
iii. Aims for full recovery of investments
iv. If the overall economic recovery helps to restore solvency issues among banking institutions, the need for Danamodal’s continued involvement may be reduced
v. Overall policies views of the Malaysian government and BNM regarding the timing of the exit (Malaysian Approach – pp. 17-18)

On October 31, 2003, approximately five years after its creation, Danamodal closed its operations (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 107). It exited the scheme through “initial public offering, strategic sales of its holdings, and sales of its holdings directly in the market” (Danamodal FAQs – pp. 6).

### III. Evaluation

BNM championed the success of the Danamodal program; it found that the speedy creation and implementation of the scheme was an essential part of the banking industry’s recovery from the Asia Financial Crisis (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 108). The capital injections performed by Danamodal helped struggling but viable banking institutions raise capital and instill enhanced corporate governance (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 108). This resulted in beneficiaries resuming lending activities and led to increased consumer confidence along with a revival of business and economic activities in the domestic real sector (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 108) (Malaysian Approach – pp. 19). In addition, BNM stated that Danamodal’s strict observance to the “first-loss” principle successfully minimized the total cost of recapitalization (2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 108). BNM felt the capital injections were performed “with a strong commercial orientation, focus on
speed and outcomes, transparency in [Danamodal’s] policies and operations, sense of public accountability and credibility, and bias for hope and possibilities” (Malaysian Approach – pp. 18).

On the other hand, the IMF expressed concerns regarding Danamodal's attempts to replace ineffective leadership with more capable alternatives (IMF 1999 – pp. 72). In particular, the IMF feared, even with new senior leadership, the potential for “inadequate, ineffective, or otherwise deficient management teams [to] remain” (IMF 1999 – pp. 72). This could lead to similar issues occurring in the future (IMF 1999 – pp. 72). Additionally, the IMF felt that the emphasis on loan growth by BNM and the interventions aimed at sparking growth had the potential to generate poor quality loans (IMF 1999 – pp. 72).

Abidin (2000) credits the Malaysian government’s interventions as having “made serious efforts and registered good progress in restructuring its financial and corporate sectors”, specifically citing the success of Danaharta and Danamodal (Abidin 2000 – pp. 196). These two programs were particularly effective “because they were executed efficiently, in a transparent manner and at a cost much lower than that incurred by the other crisis-hit countries” (Abidin 2000 – pp. 196).

IV. References


Danamodal Nasional Berhad. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Danamodal. 


V. Key Program Documents

Summary of Program


20
Danamodal Nasional Berhad. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Danamodal.

Press Releases/Announcements

https://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/04_prudential_stds/10_best_practices_credit_risk.pdf


Reports/Assessments


Danamodal Nasional Berhad. Salient Terms and Conditions of the Bonds.  


VI. Appendices

Appendix 1: Timeline of Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Malaysia Government Actions Taken</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2, 1997</td>
<td>Thailand forced to abandon its currency peg and float the Thai Baht resulting in depreciation of the Baht by 10-15%</td>
<td>(1997 Annual Report Ch. 3 – pp. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1998</td>
<td>The Malaysia Government created the National Economic Action Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>Malaysian Government begins to relax previously tight fiscal policies</td>
<td>(1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1998</td>
<td>BNM performed a stress test ascertain the likely size of a recapitalization scheme</td>
<td>(Malaysian Approach – pp. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 1998</td>
<td>Danaharta, an asset management company for the purchase and management of NPLs, was incorporated</td>
<td>(1998 Annual Report Annex – pp. 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1998</td>
<td>The NEAC announced a comprehensive National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) to bring about stability and expedite economic recovery</td>
<td>(Malaysian Approach – pp. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>Malaysian Government begins to ease previously tight monetary policy</td>
<td>(1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1, 1998/September 2, 1998</td>
<td>Malaysian Government introduces selective exchange control measures / fixes the RM3.80 to USD</td>
<td>(1998 Annual Report Ch. 1 – pp. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 1998</td>
<td>Danamodal issued RM7.7 billion in 5-year zero-coupon bonds</td>
<td>(T&amp;C Danamodal Bonds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 13, 1998</td>
<td>Danamodal injected RM50 billion into Perdana Merchant Bankers</td>
<td>(Danamodal PR November 13, 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 30, 1998</td>
<td>Danamodal signed DA with RHB Bank Berhad</td>
<td>(Danamodal PR November 30, 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 5, 1999</td>
<td>Danamodal signed DA with Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad, Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad, BSN Commercial Bank (M) Berhad, Arab-Malaysian Merchant Berhad</td>
<td>(Danamodal PR February 5, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 12, 1999</td>
<td>Danamodal signed DA with Sabah Bank</td>
<td>(Danamodal PR February 12, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 1999</td>
<td>Danamodal signed DA with MBf Finance Berhad</td>
<td>(Danamodal PR March 12, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30, 1999</td>
<td>Danamodal signed DA with United Merchant Finance Berhad, Oriental Bank Berhad</td>
<td>(Danamodal PR March 30, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 30, 1999</td>
<td>Final Injection performed by Danamodal</td>
<td>(2001 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 2003</td>
<td>Bonds issued by Danamodal mature</td>
<td>(T&amp;C Danamodal Bonds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 2003</td>
<td>Danamodal ceased operations</td>
<td>(2003 Annual Report Ch. 4 – pp. 108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2: Breakdown of Injection Process
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Process</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Assessment of recapitalisation requirements | • To assess the criticality of capital deficiency  
• To quantify the amount of capital required by the banks to withstand the full impact of the crisis | • Establish the framework to assess capital needs  
• Establish methodologies and tools to assess recap requirements  
• Conduct due diligence  
• Quantify capital needs |
| Recapitalisation/Investment   | • To speedily inject capital into viable banking institutions  
• To structure investment in order to optimise safety, control, return, capital adequacy, exit potential and monitoring capabilities  
• To satisfy stakeholders' expectation  
• To maintain or promote objectivity, consistency, independent, credibility of process | • Establish selection criteria and assess each potential candidate against these criteria, which will include (but would not be limited to): criticality of capital deficiency, systematic impact of the bank’s failure, non-feasibility of market solutions, potential synergies to be realised through consolidation, specific requests from shareholders  
• Formulate options  
• Structure the recapitalisation investment (i.e. price, terms and conditions, type of securities)  
• Negotiate with banks on recap amount, valuation, timing, mode of investment, representation, and other terms and conditions  
• Finalise contractual agreements |
| Financing of the Recapitalisation | • To obtain cost-effective funds to finance Danamodal’s recapitalisation initiatives | • Ascertain the funding requirements vis-à-vis quantum and timing  
• Evaluate financing alternatives (sources and modes of financing)  
• Liaise with BNM and other agencies to ensure a well-coordinated capital and fund raising programme |
| Restructuring and Monitoring | • To restore stability  
• To effect turnaround  
• To use shareholder’s rights to inject best practices, promote managerial excellence, enhance operating efficiency, and improve profitability  
• To protect the value of investments through constant monitoring of | • Participate actively in the corporate governance process  
Influence management agenda  
• Establish performance targets and regular reviews of performance/status  
• Act decisively and effectively in dealing with deviations from expectations |
| Exit | • To dispose of Danamodal’s stake in banks and optimise returns on Danamodal’s investments and the achievement of restructuring objectives | • Determine timing and amount of disposals  
• Evaluate disposal alternatives: initial public offerings (IPOs), strategic sales, direct sale to market  
• Distribute gains on disposal to Danamodal’s shareholder |

financial, operational, and managerial performance of banks  
• To promote consolidation and restructuring of the industry  
• Formulate restructuring strategies and determine specific policies and instruments for achieving the goals  
• Seize opportunities to strengthen the banking sector through consolidation and restructuring |

(Source: Malaysian Approach – pp. 6)