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AFFECTIVE INTERDEPENDENCE AND WELFARE

By

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Affective interdependence and welfare

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Abstract

Purely affective interaction allows the welfare of an individual to depend on her own actions and on the profile of welfare levels of others. Under an assumption on the structure of mutual affection that we interpret as “non-explosive mutual affection,” we show that equilibria of simultaneous-move affective interaction are Pareto optimal independently of whether or not an induced standard game exists. Moreover, if purely affective interaction induces a standard game, then an equilibrium profile of actions is a Nash equilibrium of the game, and this Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal profile of strategies is locally dominant.

Key words: purely affective interactions, Pareto optimality.

JEL classification: D62.
1 Introduction

Purely affective interaction allows the welfare of an individual to depend on her own actions and on the profile of welfare levels of others. Importantly, actions of others do not affect directly the welfare of an individual. Here, we provide a concise and general treatment of the class of smooth, purely affective interactions. Affection can be positive or negative. We focus on welfare implications.

Ray and Vohra (2020) demonstrated a striking result: if a purely affective interaction induces a standard game, Nash equilibria of the induced game are Pareto optimal. Which proved a conundrum, since earlier results, notably by Arrow (1981) in gift-giving interaction with three individuals in a simultaneous-move setting and Pearce (2008) in a cake-eating game in a sequential-move setting, had concluded that affective interaction is not conducive to optimality. We resolve this conundrum by showing that optimality emerges in settings when interaction is purely affective. When inefficiency arises, dependence of individual welfare on actions of other individuals lurks in the background either via the game form, as in Arrow’s gift giving game\(^1\) or via aggregate feasibility constraints as in Pearce’s cake eating problems or, more generally, competitive economies. Indeed, in a competitive equilibrium setting, Winter (1969) and Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, and Sobel (2011) allowed individuals to have preferences over their consumption, and, concurrently, over the profile of utilities. They identified a condition, social monotonicity that, under assumptions of monotonicity and convexity in own consumption and, in particular, separability of utilities between own utility and the profile of utilities of others, implies that Pareto optimal allocations can be supported as competitive allocations and can be attained with redistributions of revenue. They also showed by example that social monotonicity does not guarantee the efficiency of competitive equilibria.

An assumption that we maintain throughout is that a transformation of the matrix of mutual affection is a \(P\)-matrix, as in Gale and Nikaido (1965), which we interpret as non-explosive mutual affection. Under this assumption, we show that equilibria of simultaneous-move purely affective interaction are Pareto optimal independently of whether or not an induced standard game exists. Moreover, if purely affective interaction induces a standard game, then an equilibrium profile of actions is a Nash equilibrium of the game, and this Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal profile of strategies is locally dominant\(^2\). For the sequential setting, Heifetz (2022) defined backward induction much more simply and directly than in Pearce (2008), and he showed that

\(^{1}\)Bourles, Bramoullé, and Perez-Richel (2017)

\(^{2}\)Optimality results indicate that games induced by purely affective interaction form a
backward induction paths of actions and utility levels are Pareto optimal, again under the assumptions of non-explosive purely affective interaction.

2 Purely affective interaction

Individuals are $i \in I = \{1, ..., n\}$, profiles of action are

$$x = (x_1, ..., x_n) \in X = \prod_{i=1}^{n} X_i,$$

and profiles of utility levels are

$$u = (u_1, ..., u_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n.$$

Utility functions are

$$V(x, u) = (V_i(x_i, u_{-i}) : i = 1, ... n),$$

and we also write

$$V_x(u) = V(x, u).$$

A profile of actions and utility levels $(x, u)$ is consistent if, for every individual, $u_i$ corresponds to the utility level at $(x_i, u_{-i})$ or

$$V_x(u) = u.$$

In a purely affective interaction, an individual controls her action $x_i$, and is aware of the direct effect of her choice on her well-being. Other individuals’ choices do not affect her directly\(^4\), but she cares about the well being of others, and her perception of others’ well-being may affect her preferences over her actions. The understanding of others’ action sets and preferences is too imprecise to allow an individual to calculate the possible indirect effect of her choices of their well-being. At a consistent profile of actions choices and utility levels, perceptions are confirmed.

\(^2\)Non-generic class within the class of games: Nash equilibria of generic games are suboptimal in Dubey (1986), and, likewise, backward-induction paths of generic sequential games are suboptimal in Heifetz, Minelli, and Polemarchakis (2021).

\(^3\)We employ the standard notation $u \leq \bar{u}$ for $u_i \leq \bar{u}_i$, $i = 1, ..., n$ and $u < \bar{u}$ for $u_i \leq \bar{u}_i$, $i = 1, ..., n$ with at least one strict inequality.

\(^4\)Maybe because every externality has been priced – see the last section of the paper.
A parametric equilibrium is a consistent profile of actions and utility levels, \((x^*, u^*)\) that satisfies individual optimization: every individual maximizes \(V_i\) taking \(u_{-i}^*\) as given or
\[
V_x(u^*) \leq V_x^*(u^*). 
\]
A profile of actions and utility levels, \((\tilde{x}, \tilde{u})\) is a Pareto improvement over a profile \((x, u)\) if
\[
\tilde{u} > u.
\]
A consistent profile of actions and utility levels, \((x, u)\) is Pareto optimal if it does not permit a consistent Pareto improvement.

Assumption 1. For every individual, \(X_i\) is an open subset of Euclidean space, and the utility function \(V_i(\cdot, \cdot)\) is twice continuously differentiable.

The Jacobian of \(V_x\) at \(u\) is \(J_x(u)\).

A square matrix is a P-matrix if all its principal minors are positive.\(^5\)

Assumption 2. For every \(x \in X\) and \(u \in \mathbb{R}^n\), the matrix \((I - J_x(u))\) is a P-matrix.

To interpret the assumption, we recall a useful characterization that we use repeatedly.

Gale-Nikaido Lemma [Gale and Nikaido (1965), Theorem 2] A matrix \(A\) is a P-matrix if and only if, for any non-zero \(y \in \mathbb{R}^n\), there exists \(i \in \{1, 2, \ldots n\}\), such that \(y_i(Ay)_i > 0\).

In words, P-matrices do not fully reverse the sign of any non-zero vector.

In our context, this property allows us to interpret Assumption 2 as an assumption of non-explosive mutual affection. To see this, notice that the Gale-Nikaido characterization allows us to rewrite Assumption 2.

For every \(x\) and \(u\) and all \(\Delta u \neq 0\), there exists an \(i\), such that
\[
\Delta u_i > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad v \Delta u_i > \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\partial V_{x,i}(x_i, u)}{\partial u_j} \Delta u_j
\]
or
\[
\Delta u_i < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta u_i < \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\partial V_{x,i}(x_i, u)}{\partial u_j} \Delta u_j.
\]

\(^{5}\)A principal minor is obtained by the elimination of rows and corresponding columns, but, importantly, without transpositions of rows or columns prior to elimination.
Suppose now that we start from a consistent pair \((\hat{x}, \hat{u})\) at which
\[
\hat{u} - V_{\hat{x}}(\hat{u}) = 0.
\]
Then, for any exogenous change in utility levels while holding the profile of actions fixed, \(\Delta u = u - \hat{u} \neq 0\), there is one individual \(i\), for whom
\[
u_i > \hat{u}_i, \quad \text{and} \quad V_i(\hat{x}, u) < u_i
\]
or
\[
u_i < \hat{u}_i \quad \text{and} \quad V_i(\hat{x}, u) > u_i.
\]
That is, under Assumption 2, starting from a consistent pair of actions and utility levels, for any exogenous change in the utility levels there is always one individual whose resulting utility, after the change, does not reinforce the exogenous change. Thus, Assumption 2 allows for a wide array of positive and negative individual feelings about changes in the well-being of (any subset) of other individuals, but it prevents explosive affective interaction. We shall come back to the interpretation of Assumption 2 later, when discussing alternative, stronger restrictions. Here we record an important implication.

**Theorem 1.** Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if \((x^*, u^*)\) is a parametric equilibrium, then the consistent allocation of utility levels, \(u^*\) is Pareto optimal.

**Proof.** Suppose, by way of contradiction, that \((\tilde{x}, \tilde{u})\) Pareto improves on \((x^*, u^*)\),
\[
V_{\tilde{x}} (\tilde{u}) = \tilde{u} > u^*.
\]
Let \(F : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n\) be defined by
\[
F(u) = u - V_{\tilde{x}}(u).
\]
Since \((x^*, u^*)\) is a parametric equilibrium,
\[
F(u^*) = u^* - V_{\tilde{x}}(u^*) \geq 0,
\]
and
\[
F(\hat{u}) = \hat{u} - V_{\tilde{x}}(\hat{u}) = 0 \leq F(u^*).
\]
By Assumptions 1 and 2, the matrix \((I - J_{\tilde{x}}(u))\), the Jacobian of \(F\), is a P-matrix and, by Theorem 3 of Gale and Nikaido (1965), the inequalities (1) and (2) cannot obtain simultaneously for \(\hat{u} \neq u^*\). 

4
The case of linearly separable affection

In a linearly separable purely affective interaction, the individuals’ utility functions have the form

$$V_i(x_i, u) = f_i(x_i) + \sum_{j \neq i} a_{ij} u_j.$$ (3)

At every $x = (x_1, ..., x_n)$ the Jacobian $J$ of $V$ with respect to $u = (u_1, ..., u_n)$ has a zero diagonal $J_{ii} = 0$ and off-diagonal entries $J_{ij} = a_{ij}$.

Consistency in this special case takes the form

$$u = f(x) + Ju.$$ (4)

Under Assumption 2, $\det(I - J) \neq 0$, and we can uniquely solve the system of equations (4) at every $x$, thus obtaining the induced game corresponding to (3),

$$U(x) = (I - J)^{-1}f(x) = Bf(x).$$

The utility functions $U = (U_1, ..., U_n)$ in the induced game are linear combinations of the ‘base utilities’ $f = (f_1, ..., f_n)$. The matrix $B = (I - J)^{-1}$ summarizes the effect of changes in the base utilities $f(x)$ on the final well being of individuals, taking into account the network of affective interactions between them.

Under Assumption 2, $B = (I - J)^{-1}$ is also a P-matrix. In particular, the diagonal of $B$ is positive, and, for every $i$,

$$b_{ii} = \frac{|(I - J)_{ii}|}{\det(I - J)} > 0.$$ (5)

Claim 1. Under Assumption 2, in a situation of linearly separable affection, an action profile $x^*$ is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game $U$ if and only if $(x^*, U(x^*))$ is a parametric equilibrium of $V$.

A planner may try to obtain a Pareto improvement over a Nash equilibrium in the induced game $U$ by jointly changing the actions of everybody. In the case of linearly separable affection, a Pareto improvement is a $\Delta f_x$ such that $\Delta U = B\Delta f_x > 0$, while a Nash deviation in the induced game is a $\Delta f^x_x = (0, ..., df^x_i, ..., 0)$ such that $\Delta U^x = B\Delta f^x_x > 0$. If $x^*$ is a Nash equilibrium of $U$ and $y = \Delta f_{x^*}$ a Pareto improvement, then $By > 0$ and $y \neq 0$. But then, by the Gale-Nikaido Lemma, there must exist $i$ such that $y_i = \Delta f^x_i > 0$ (also, given (5), $B\Delta f^x_i > 0$), a contradiction with $x^*$ being a Parametric equilibrium (also, with $x^*$ being Nash equilibrium).

---

$^6$Horn and Johnson (2013), Theorem 4.3.2
Claim 2. Under Assumption 2, in a situation of linearly separable affection, if \( x^* \) is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game \( U \), then \( x^* \) is Pareto optimal.

For given \( \lambda \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ \setminus \{0\} \), consider the welfare function

\[
W_{\lambda}(x) = \lambda U(x) = \lambda B f(x),
\]
a linear combination of the 'base utilities' \( f_i(x_i) \). The maximization of each \( f_i(x_i) \) thus assures that the first order conditions for the maximization of \( W_{\lambda}(x) \) are satisfied. Let us assume concavity of base utilities.

Assumption 3. For every \( i \), the function \( f_i \) is concave in \( x_i \).

Even under Assumption 3, \( W_{\lambda} \) need not be concave in \( x \), because Assumption 2 does not guarantee that the elements of \( B \) are non-negative.

Using Farkas’s Lemma, Gale and Nikaido (1965) (Corollary 2) prove that

\[
B \text{ is a P-matrix } \implies \exists \lambda \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ \text{ s.t. } \lambda B >> 0.
\]

Therefore, under Assumptions 2 and 3, there exist welfare weights \( \lambda \) such that for those weights \( W_{\lambda} \) is a sum of concave functions, and therefore concave, leading to an alternative proof of Pareto optimality of Nash equilibrium.

Claim 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, in a situation of linearly separable affection, if \( x^* \) is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game \( U \), there exists \( \lambda \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ \) such that \( x^* \) is a global maximum of \( W_{\lambda} \).

Example 1 (Two person linearly separable affection). Consider the two person purely affective interaction where

\[
\begin{align*}
V_1(x, u_2) &= f(x) + au_2, \\
V_2(y, u_1) &= g(y) + bu_1,
\end{align*}
\]

with

\[
ab < 1.
\]

That is, the two individuals can have positive or negative feelings towards each other, and these feelings may even be strong, but they satisfy the assumption of moderate reciprocal affection: if feelings go in the same direction (both love or both spite) they cannot be too strong.

For each \( (x, y) \) the Jacobian of the map \( V_{(x,y)} : \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}^2 \) is

\[
J_{(x,y)} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & a \\ b & 0 \end{pmatrix}.
\]
and the matrix \((I - J(x,y))\) has a unitary diagonal and determinant \(\det(I - J(x,y)) = 1 - ab > 0\), and therefore it is a P-matrix\(^7\).

The induced game is

\[
U_1(x, y) = \frac{f(x) + ag(y)}{1 - ab}, \\
U_2(x, y) = \frac{g(y) + bf(x)}{1 - ab},
\]

whose Nash equilibria (if there are any) are \((x^*, y^*)\) where

\[
x^* \in \arg \max f(x), \quad y^* \in \arg \max g(y).
\]

That is, every Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies.

In particular, if \(f\) and \(g\) are concave then there exists at most one Nash equilibrium \((x^*, y^*)\). A social welfare function of the form

\[
W(x, y) = \lambda_1 U_1(x, y) + \lambda_2 U_2(x, y),
\]

where \((\lambda_1, \lambda_2) > 0\), is then concave and maximized at the unique Nash equilibrium \((x^*, y^*)\) if and only if

\[
\frac{1}{1 - ab} \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 & \lambda_2 \\ 1 & a \\ b & 1 \end{pmatrix} > 0.
\]

With \(ab < 1\) and therefore \(\frac{1}{1 - ab} > 0\), such \((\lambda_1, \lambda_2) > 0\) indeed exists since

(i) if both \(a \geq 0\) and \(b \geq 0\) (mutual sympathy) then \(U_1\) and \(U_2\) are already concave themselves, the Nash equilibrium \((x^*, y^*)\) is their global maximum, and any \((\lambda_1, \lambda_2) > 0\) will do,

(ii) if \(a \geq 0\) but \(b < 0\) (individual 1 is sympathetic and individual 2 is spiteful) then \(U_1\) is concave and the Nash equilibrium \((x^*, y^*)\) is its global maximum, while \(U_2\) is not concave, and \((x^*, y^*)\) is a saddle point of it. One can then choose \(\lambda_1 > 0\) and \(\lambda_2 = 0\) to get a concave welfare function \(W\) which is maximized at \((x^*, y^*)\).

\(^7\)Such separable interactions in which \(|a| > 1\) (and \(|b| < \frac{1}{|a|}\)) do not induce “a game of love and hate” in the sense of Ray and Vohra (2020), and therefore are not covered by their analysis, because their boundedness condition (i) is not satisfied – for every \((x, y)\) and every function \(B(x, y) < \infty\), whenever \(|u_2| > B(x, y) + |f(x)|\), in the sup norm \(\|\cdot\|\),

\[
\|U((x, y), (u_1, u_2))\| \geq |f(x) + au_2| \geq |u_2| - |f(x)| > B(x, y).
\]
(iii) similarly, if \( b \geq 0 \) but \( a < 0 \) one can choose \( \lambda_2 > 0 \) and \( \lambda_1 = 0 \) to the desired effect, and

(iv) finally, if both \( a < 0 \) and \( b < 0 \) (mutual spite) then both \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) are not concave, and the Nash equilibrium \((x^*, y^*)\) is a saddle point of each of them. Nevertheless, since \( ab < 1 \) (the reciprocal extent of spite is moderate), the vectors \((1, b)\) and \((a, 1)\) are within a half-plane containing the positive orthant, and therefore both \((1, b)\) and \((a, 1)\) form an acute angle with vectors \((\lambda_1, \lambda_2) > 0\) in some positive cone.

We therefore conclude that in all cases, the Nash equilibrium \((x^*, y^*)\) is Pareto optimal.

**Locally induced game**

In the general, non additively separable case, Assumption 2 does not guarantee that at any given \( x \) the system of equations

\[
F_x(u) = u - V_x(u) = 0
\]

has a solution, so the induced game \( U(x) \) need not be well defined everywhere on \( X \).

Still, under Assumption 2, another result of Gale and Nikaido (1965), Theorem 4, implies that if a solution \( u_x \) of (6) exists, then it is unique.

Also, again by Assumption 2, \( \det(I - J_x(u_x)) \neq 0 \), and we can apply the implicit function theorem to \( F : X \times \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n \) at \((x, u_x)\) to obtain the existence of smooth real-valued utility functions \( U_x(\cdot) = (U_i(\cdot))_{i=1,...,n} \) defined on some neighborhood \( \mathcal{O}_x \) of \( x \) with

\[
U_x(x) = u_x,
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial U_i(x)}{\partial x_j} = \frac{\partial V_j(x_i, u_{x-i})}{\partial x_j} \left( (I - J_x(u_x))^{-1} \right)_{ij}.
\]

We call \( U_x : \mathcal{O}_x \to \mathbb{R}^n \) the locally induced game of \( V \) at \( x \).

We now derive analogs of Claims 1 and 2 for the general case of purely affective interactions.

**Theorem 2.** Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if \((x^*, u^*)\) is a parametric equilibrium of \( V \), then \( x^* \) is a Nash equilibrium of the locally induced game \( U_{x^*} \).

\(^8\)This cone becomes narrower as \( ab \uparrow 1 \). The weights \((\lambda_1, \lambda_2) > 0\) in this cone ‘strike the right balance’ between the curvatures of \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) at \((x^*, y^*)\) – between the concavity of \( U_1 \) in \( x \) and the convexity of \( U_2 \) in \( x \) so that the linear combination \( W \) – the social welfare function – is concave in \( x \), and at the same time also between the convexity of \( U_1 \) in \( y \) and the concavity of \( U_2 \) in \( y \), so that the linear combination \( W \) is concave also in \( y \).
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that $x^*$ is not a Nash equilibrium of the locally induced game. Then, for some individual $i$, there exists an alternative choice $\tilde{x}_i \in X_i$ for which the locally induced game is defined at

$$x = (\tilde{x}_i, x^-_i),$$

and

$$\tilde{u}_i = U_i (x) > U_i (x^*) = u^*_i$$

Where, to simplify notation, use $U$ for the locally induced game $U_{x^*}$.

Let

$$\tilde{u} = U (x) = (V_j (x, \tilde{u}^-_j))_{j=1}^n,$$

and let $F : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ be defined by

$$F (u) = u - V_x (u).$$

By the definition of $\tilde{u}$,

$$F (\tilde{u}) = 0.$$  

Also, for $j \neq i$, since $x_j = x^*_j$,

$$F_j (u^*) = 0.$$  

At the same time, since $(x^*, u^*)$ is a parametric equilibrium and $x_i \neq x^*_i$,

$$F_i (u^*) \geq 0.$$  

Altogether,

$$(u^*_k - \tilde{u}_k) (F_k (u^*) - F_k (\tilde{u})) \leq 0, \quad k = 1, \ldots, n.$$  

However, since by Assumption 2 the Jacobian $I - J_x (u)$ of $F (u)$ is a P-matrix for every $u \in \mathbb{R}^n$, by theorem 20.5 in Nikaido (1968), this set of inequalities cannot obtain for $\tilde{u} \neq u^*$.

If the induced game is well defined everywhere, the converse of Theorem 2 holds as well:

**Theorem 3.** Suppose the induced game $U$ is defined on the entirety of $X$. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if $x^*$ is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game, then $(x^*, U (x^*))$ is a parametric equilibrium.
Proof. Denote \( u^* = U (x^*) \) and suppose, by way of contradiction, that \((x^*, u^*)\) is not a parametric equilibrium. Then, for some individual \( i \), there exists an alternative choice \( \hat{x}_i \in X \) with

\[
\hat{u}_i = V_i (\hat{x}_i, u_{-i}^*) > V_i (x_i^*, u_{-i}^*) = u_i^*.
\]

By assumption, the induced game is defined at

\[
x = (\hat{x}_i, x_{-i}^*).
\]

Let

\[
\hat{u} = U (x) = (V_j (x_j, \hat{u}_{-j}))_{j=1}^n
\]

and let \( F : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^n \) be defined by

\[
F (u) = u - V_x (u).
\]

By the definition of \( \hat{u} \),

\[
F (\hat{u}) = 0.
\]

For \( j \neq i \), since \( x_j = x_j^* \),

\[
F_j (u^*) = 0.
\]

At the same time, since \((x^*, u^*)\) is a parametric equilibrium, and \( x_i \neq x_i^* \),

\[
F_i (u^*) \geq 0.
\]

Altogether,

\[
(u_k^* - \hat{u}_k) (F_k (u^*) - F_k (\hat{u})) \leq 0, \quad k = 1, ..., n.
\]

However, since by Assumption 2 the Jacobian \( I - J_x (u) \) of \( F (u) \) is a P-matrix for every \( u \in \mathbb{R}^n \), by theorem 20.5 in Nikaido (1968) this set of inequalities cannot obtain for \( \hat{u} \neq u^* \).

Theorems 1 and 3 imply the analog of Claim 2:

**Corollary 1.** Suppose the induced game \( U \) is defined on the entirety of \( X \). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if \( x^* \) is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game \( U \), then it is Pareto optimal.

As a last remark on the special structure of purely affective interaction, we prove that, while in the linearly separable case parametric equilibrium strategies are by construction dominant strategies, even in the general case parametric equilibrium strategies are locally dominant.
**Theorem 4.** At a parametric equilibrium \((x^*, u^*)\), each individual’s action is locally dominant in the locally induced game \(U_{x^*} \).

**Proof.** At a parametric equilibrium, for each individual,

\[
\frac{\partial V_i (x^*_i, u^*_{-i})}{\partial x_i} = 0, \tag{8}
\]

and therefore, by (7) with \(j = i\), the induced utility function \(U_i\) is flat as a function of \(x_i\) at \(x^*\). Moreover, for \(j \neq i\), it follows, again from (7), that

\[
\frac{\partial U_i (x^*)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \left( \frac{\partial V_i (x^*_i, u^*_{-i})}{\partial x_i} \right) \left( (I - J_{x^*} (u^*))^{-1} \right)_{ii} = 0,
\]

where the last equality is due to the first order condition (8) coupled with the fact that \(\frac{\partial V_i (x^*_i, u^*_{-i})}{\partial x_i} \frac{\partial}{\partial x_j} \left( (I - J_{x^*} (u^*))^{-1} \right)_{ii} = 0\), since \(V_i\) does not depend on \(x_j\). With a marginal change in \(x_j\) from \(x^*\), the function \(U_i\) remains constant as a function of \(x_i\), and \(x^*_i\) therefore remains a local maximizer of \(U_i\). \(\square\)

**Stronger conditions**

Stronger conditions imply that \((I - J_{x} (u))\) is a P-matrix.

**Spectral radius less than one**

If the induced game \(U\) is defined at \(x\), i.e. if \((x, U (x))\) is consistent, then, by definition, \(U (x) = V_x (U (x))\), and therefore also \(U (x) = V_x^k (U (x))\) for every \(k \geq 1\). Moreover, given Assumption 2, the first equality holds only for \(U (x)\). By Gale and Nikaido (1965)Theorem 4, if \(u \neq U (x)\) then \(V_x (u) \neq u\).

\(^9\)\(V_x^k\) is defined inductively by

\[
V_x^1 (u) = V_x (u), \quad V_x^k (u) = V_x \left( V_x^{k-1} (u) \right)
\]

for \(k > 1\).
Now, if $u$ is some small perturbation of $U(x)$, representing a slight mis-assessment of the players regarding each other’s utility levels with the action profile $x$, would the repeated re-assessments $V_x(u)$, $V_x(V_x(u))$, ..., $V_x^k(u)$, ... converge back towards $U(x)$? This is a plausible requirement, because otherwise $U(x)$ is an unstable rest-point of $V_x$, and the definition of the induced game $U$ is not robust to slight misperceptions.

The required convergence

$$V_x^k(u) \to_{k \to \infty} U(x)$$

is guaranteed in some small enough neighborhood of $U(x)$. That is, $U(x)$ is an asymptotically stable fixed point of $V_x$ if the spectral radius of $J_x(U(x))$ (the largest of the absolute values of its eigenvalues), denoted $\rho(J_x(U(x)))$, satisfies\(^{10}\)

$$\rho(J_x(U(x))) < 1,$$

whereas if, in contrast, $\rho(J_x(U(x))) > 1$ and no eigenvalue of $J_x(U(x))$ has absolute value equal to 1, then $V_x$ is not asymptotically stable, and diverges away from arbitrarily small perturbations of $U(x)$.

In fact, the above re-assessments may take place among any subset $I_0 \subseteq I$ of the individuals, for fixed utility levels $\bar{u} = (\bar{u}_j)_{j \in I \setminus I_0}$ of the remaining individuals. The purely affective interaction $V$ defines a purely affective sub-interaction $V^{\bar{u}}$ among the individuals in $I_0$,

$$V^{\bar{u}}(x,u) = (V_i(x,u,\bar{u}),)_{i \in I_0},$$

where $x = (x_i)_{i \in I_0}$ and $u = (u_i)_{i \in I_0}$. The set of purely affective sub-interactions of $V$ is thus defined by ranging over all the non-empty subsets of individuals $I_0 \subseteq I$ and utility levels $\bar{u} = (\bar{u}_j)_{j \in I \setminus I_0}$ of the other individuals.

**Assumption 4.** For every $x \in X$ and $u \in \mathbb{R}^n$,

$$\rho(J_x(u)) < 1,$$

and the same holds for all the sub-interactions of $V$.

This assumption implies our Assumption 2.

\(^{10}\)Galor (2007), Theorem 4.8
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 4, for every $x \in X$ and $u \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $(I - J_x(u))$ is a P-matrix.

Proof. $\rho(J_x(u)) < 1$ implies that all the eigenvalues $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_n$ of $J_x(u)$ are within the open unit disk around the origin of the complex plane, and therefore that so are $-\lambda_1, \ldots, -\lambda_n$, which are the eigenvalues of $-J_x(u)$. Hence $1 - \lambda_1, \ldots, 1 - \lambda_n$, which are the eigenvalues of $I - J_x(u)$, all have positive real parts. These eigenvalues are the roots of the characteristic polynomial of $I - J_x(u)$. This characteristic polynomial has positive coefficients, and therefore its roots are all either real, and therefore positive by the above, and/or come in conjugate pairs of the form $c + di$ and $c - di$ whose product $c^2 + d^2$ is also positive. Hence the determinant of $I - J_x(u)$, which is the product of its eigenvalues, is positive.

All the above is true also for every sub-interaction involving only the subset $I_0$ of individuals, implying the positivity of the determinant of the principal submatrix of $I - J_x(u)$ with rows and columns in $I_0$, i.e. the positivity of the principal minor with rows and columns in $I_0$. We thus conclude that $I - J_x(u)$ is a P-matrix. \qed

Remark. The conclusion of proposition 1, i.e. Assumption 2, is weaker than its premise, Assumption 4. For example, in the case of two individuals, denoting $J_x(U(x)) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & a \\ b & 0 \end{pmatrix}$, $(I - J_x(U(x)))$ being a P-matrix means $ab < 1$, whereas $\rho(J_x(U(x))) < 1$ means the more stringent requirement $|ab| < 1$.

If $ab < -1$ then Assumption 2 holds, but Assumption 4 does not. In this case the eigenvalues of $J_x(U(x))$ are $\pm \sqrt{ab}$, whose absolute values are both larger than 1, and therefore $V_x$ diverges away from $U(x)$ from arbitrarily small neighborhoods of $U(x)$.

Dominant Diagonal

Another property of the matrix $(I - J_x(u))$ that we may consider is that the matrix is dominant diagonal:

Assumption 5. For every $x$ and $u$, the matrix $(I - J_x(u))$ is dominant diagonal: there exists $h(u) \in \mathbb{R}^n$, such that, for any $i = 1, \ldots n$,

$$h_i(u) > \sum_{j \neq i} h_j(u) \left| - \frac{\partial V_{x,i}}{\partial u_j} \right|.$$
That is, there is a way to rescale utilities at \( u \), such that marginal changes in \( u_j \), for \( j \neq i \), have a total effect on \( V_{x,i} \) less than 1.

**Proposition 2.** Under Assumption 5, for every \( x \in X \) and \( u \in \mathbb{R}^n \), 
\((I - J_x(u))\) is a \( P \)-matrix\(^{11}\).

## 3 Examples

Examples illustrate the results and their implications.

**Example 2 (Non-separable affection)**. Now let
\[
V_1(x, u_2) = x(1 - x) - 2xu_2, \\
V_2(y, u_1) = y(1 - y) + \frac{1}{8}yu_1,
\]
where \( x, y \in (0, 1) \). In this example, individual 1 is rather spiteful towards individual 2, and individual 2 is mildly sympathetic towards individual 1. For each \( x, y \in (0, 1) \) the Jacobian of \( V \) is
\[
J_{(x,y)} = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & -2x \\
\frac{1}{8}y & 0
\end{pmatrix},
\]
whose eigenvalues are \( \pm \frac{1}{2} i \sqrt{xy} \), and its spectral radius is therefore \( \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{xy} < 1 \).

The induced game is
\[
U_1(x, y) = \frac{8x((1 - x) - 2y(1 - y))}{8 + 2xy}, \\
U_2(x, y) = \frac{y(8(1 - y) + x(1 - x))}{8 + 2xy},
\]
with the best reply functions
\[
\beta_1(y) = \frac{2 \sqrt{2y^3 - 2y^2 + y + 4} - 4}{y}, \\
\beta_2(x) = \frac{\sqrt{-2x^3 + 2x^2 + 16x + 64} - 8}{2x},
\]
whose intersection is the Nash equilibrium
\[
x = 0.24620, \quad y = 0.50379,
\]
where the reaction curves are locally flat.

\(^{11}\)Moylan (1977)
For the spiteful individual 1, the Nash equilibrium is at a saddle point of his utility function.

For the sympathetic individual 2, the Nash equilibrium is at a hilltop of her utility function.
Example 3 (Shifting attitudes). Next,
\[ V_1 (x, u_2) = x^2 (1 - x^2) + \frac{1}{2} xu_2, \]
\[ V_2 (y, u_1) = y^2 (1 - y^2) + \frac{1}{2} yu_1, \]
for \( x, y \in (-1, 1) \), so that each individual is sympathetic/spiteful with positive/negative actions respectively. The Jacobian of \( V \) at \((x, y)\) is
\[ J(x,y) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \frac{1}{2} x \\ \frac{1}{2} y & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \]
whose eigenvalues are \( \pm \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{xy} \). This implies that the spectral radius of the Jacobian is smaller than \( \frac{1}{2} \).

The induced game is
\[ U_1 (x, y) = \frac{4x^2 (1 - x^2) + 2xy^2 (1 - y^2)}{4 - xy}, \]
\[ U_2 (x, y) = \frac{4y^2 (1 - y^2) + 2yx^2 (1 - x^2)}{4 - xy}. \]

The graphs of \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) are in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

[Figure 4]
The unique Nash equilibrium is

\[ x = y = 0.75197 \]

Both individuals are sympathetic and the Nash equilibrium is at the peak of their utility functions. The Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal, and it maximizes the average of their utilities.

If, instead, the individuals were confined to negative actions \( x, y \in (-1, 0) \), the unique Nash equilibrium would be

\[ x = y = -0.68266 \]

that is at a saddle point of \( U_1 \) and of \( U_2 \), and maximizes the individuals’ average utility in that quadrant but not globally.

Similarly, if individual 1 were confined to positive actions (and thus sympathy) while individual 2 to negative actions (spite), there would be a unique Nash equilibrium within that quadrant

\[ x = 0.72471, \quad y = -0.66576 \]

with individual 1 at a hilltop and individual 2 at a saddle point, maximizing the average utility within that quadrant, but not globally.

## 4 Economies with affective interaction

Pearce (2008) showed that, in cake-eating games with positive interdependent affect, the subgame perfect path is not Pareto optimal. This is not in contrast with Corollary 1, though, because in cake-eating games, the available choices
of subsequent individuals are restricted by those of the preceding ones. Put differently, if an individual was to be assigned a very negative utility if she tried to consume more than the remainder of the cake, the utility functions $V_i$ would depend on the actions of other players (and cease to be smooth). In yet other words, cake-eating games are not genuine games, but rather economies with sequential consumption.

To understand the nature of the problem induced by the presence of a feasibility constraint, we consider a slightly modified version of Bergstrom (1989) ‘Love and Spaghetti’ example.

Romeo and Juliet both care about good $x$, spaghetti, and the other’s happiness, and

\[
V_1(x_1, u_2) = \sqrt{x_1} + au_2,
\]

\[
V_2(x_2, u_1) = \sqrt{x_2} + bu_1.
\]

Differently from Bergstrom, we allow for negative $a$ and $b$. As in the general model, we assume that $ab < 1$ (so here Romeo and Juliet do not necessarily love each other, but their affective interdependence, positive or negative, is moderate).

We also add a second good, money, entering quasi-linearly in the utility function, and assume each member of the couple has an initial endowment $e_i = (1, M)$.

We can solve for the induced utilities $U_i(x, m)$ and $U_j(x, m)$, and

\[
U_1(x, m) = \frac{1}{1-ab} (\sqrt{x_1} + m_1) + \frac{a}{1-ab} (\sqrt{x_2} + m_2),
\]

\[
U_2(x, m) = \frac{b}{1-ab} (\sqrt{x_1} + m_1) + \frac{1}{1-ab} (\sqrt{x_2} + m_2).
\]

At a competitive equilibrium of an economy with affective interaction, each individual chooses $(x_i, m_i)$ to maximize $U_i$ taking $(x_j, m_j)$ as given, under the budget constraint: $p_x x_i + p_m m_i = p_x + p_m M$, and prices adjust to guarantee feasibility.

If we fix $p_m = 1$ (and $M$ is large enough), at the unique competitive equilibrium,

\[
\hat{p}_x = 1,
\]

\[
\hat{x}_i = e_i = 1, \quad i = 1, 2.
\]

A benevolent non-myopic social planner chooses the allocation $(x_1, x_2)$ of spaghetti to solve

\[
\max_{x_1, x_2} W_{\lambda}(x_1, x_2, m) = \sum_i \lambda_i U_i(x_1, x_2, m),
\]

18
under the constraint
\[ x_1 + x_2 = 2, \]
leading to the first order condition
\[
\frac{\sqrt{x_1}}{\sqrt{2 - x_1}} = \frac{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 b}{\lambda_1 a + \lambda_2}. \tag{9}
\]

We see that, in an economy, moderate reciprocal affection, \( ab < 1 \) does not guarantee that there exist \( (\lambda_1, \lambda_2) > 0 \) such that the equilibrium allocation \( \hat{x}_1 = 1 \) solves the planner problem.

For example, if \( a = 2 \) and \( b = 1/4 \), at \( \hat{x}_1 = 1 \), (9) becomes \( \lambda_1 = -\frac{3}{2} \lambda_2 \). Indeed, the equilibrium allocation of good, \( \hat{x}_1 = \hat{x}_2 = 1 \), generates utilities \( \hat{u}_1 = 2\sqrt{\hat{x}_1} + 4\sqrt{\hat{x}_2} = 6 \), \( \hat{u}_2 = \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\hat{x}_1} + 2\sqrt{\hat{x}_2} = 2.5 \), while a planner solving (9) with \( \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 1 \) would rather choose \( \hat{x}_1 = 0.29 \), \( \hat{x}_2 = 2 - \hat{x}_1 = 1.71 \), generating utilities \( \tilde{u}_1 = 2\sqrt{\tilde{x}_1} + 4\sqrt{\tilde{x}_2} = 6.28 \) and \( \tilde{u}_2 = \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\tilde{x}_1} + 2\sqrt{\tilde{x}_2} = 2.87 \), a Pareto improvement: the planner reallocates the good taking into account the strong love of individual 1 towards individual 2.

For the specific preferences and endowments of the example, positive welfare weights such that the competitive equilibrium maximizes social welfare, and is therefore Pareto optimal, do exist under the stronger condition: \( ab < 1 \) and \( a < 1, b < 1 \). A characterization of economies with affective interaction in which competitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal remains an open problem.

References


