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MOTIVATIONAL RATINGS

By
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Motivational Ratings*

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Abstract

Rating systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated agent. This paper solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating system within the standard career concerns framework. It is a mixture two-state rating system. That is, it is the sum of two Markov processes, with one that reflects the belief of the rater and the other the preferences of the rated agent. The rating, however, is not a Markov process. Our analysis shows how the rating combines information of different types and vintages. In particular, an increase in effort may affect some (but not all) future ratings adversely.

Keywords: Career Concerns; Mechanism Design; Ratings.

JEL codes: C72, C73

1 Introduction

Helping users make informed decisions is only one of the goals of ratings. Another is to motivate the rated firm or agent. These two goals are not necessarily aligned.

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Excessive information depresses career concerns and distorts the agent’s choices.\footnote{In the case of health care, Dranove, Kessler, McClellan, and Satterthwaite (2003) find that, at least in the short run, report cards decreased patient and social welfare. In the case of education, Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014a,b) argue that the benefits of value-added measures of performance outweigh the counterproductive behavior that it encourages—but gaming is also widely documented (see Jacob and Lefgren (2005) among many others).}

The purpose of this paper is to examine this trade-off. In particular, we ask the following: how should different sources of information be combined? At what rate, if any, should past observations be discounted? Finally, how do standard rating mechanisms compare?

We demonstrate that the optimal rating system always confounds the different signals yet never adds any irrelevant noise. To maximize incentives for effort, the rater combines the entire history of signals in a one-dimensional statistic, which neither is a simple function of the rater’s current belief (about the agent’s type) nor enables the market to back out this belief from the rating history. It is not simply a function of her latest rating and signal either.\footnote{This contrasts with several algorithms based on the principle that the new rating is a function of the old ratings and the most recent review(s) (Jøsang, Ismail, and Boyd (2007)). However, there is also significant evidence that, in many cases, observed ratings (based on proprietary rules) cannot be explained by a simple (time-homogeneous) Markov model. See, among others, Frydman and Schnermann (2008), who precisely argue that two-dimensional Markov models provide a better explanation for actual credit risk dynamics. Such two-state systems are already well-studied under the name of mixture (multinomial) models. See, among others, Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005).} Furthermore, the time series of ratings fails to satisfy the Markov property.\footnote{In credit ratings, this failure has been widely empirically documented; see Section 3.2.}

However, the optimal rating system has a remarkably simple structure: it is a linear combination of two processes, namely, the rater’s underlying belief and an incentive state that reflects both the agent’s preferences and the determinants of the signal processes. That is, the optimal rating process admits a simple decomposition as a two-dimensional Markov mixture model.

The agent’s preferences determine the impulse response of the incentive state via his impatience. That is, past observations are discounted in the overall rating at a rate equal to the agent’s discount rate. Instead, the characteristics of the signal processes determine the weights of the signal innovations in the incentive state; that is, these characteristics determine the role and relative importance of the signals in the overall rating. Hence, the optimal rating balances the rater’s information, as summarized by the rater’s belief, with some short-termism that is in proportion to the agent’s impatience.\footnote{The ineffectiveness of irrelevant conditioning also resonates with standard principal-agent theory; see, for instance, Green and Stokey (1983).} Signals that boost career concerns should see their weight...
amplified, while those that stifle career concerns should be muted.

These findings are robust to the informational environment. They hold irrespective of whether past ratings can be hidden from the market (confidential vs. public ratings) and of whether the market has access to additional non-proprietary information (exclusive vs. non-exclusive ratings). However, these distinctions matter for the particulars of the rating mechanism. For instance, if past ratings are observable, then hiding information is only effective if the mechanism has access to diverse sources of information (i.e., multidimensional signals). If it relies on a single source of information, then the best public rating is transparent. Non-exclusivity also matters. In the public case, the mechanism might release more information regarding its hidden sources when others are freely available. Instead, in the confidential case, the free information and that revealed by the rating can be substitutes.

Surprisingly, perhaps, we show that the rating system can count past performance against it. That is, performing well at some point can boost the rating in the short term but depress it in the long term. This is because the impact of a rating is proportional to its scale, the market adjusting for its variance. However, when the agent’s ability is not too persistent (low mean-reversion), the variance of the rating is naturally high. By counting recent and older signals in opposing directions, the rating counteracts this. Of course, there is also a direct adverse impact on incentives, but this effect is smaller than the indirect positive effect if the agent is impatient.

Our analysis builds on the seminal model of Holmström (1999). An agent exerts effort unbeknown to the market, which pays him a competitive wage. This wage is based on the market’s expectation of the agent’s productivity, which depends on instantaneous effort and his ability, a mean-reverting process. This expectation is based on the market’s information. Rather than directly observing a noisy signal that reflects ability and effort, the market obtains its information via the rating set by some intermediary. The intermediary potentially has many sources of information about the agent and freely chooses how to convert these signals into the rating. In brief, we view a rating system as an information channel that must be optimally designed. We focus on a simple objective that in our environment is equivalent to social surplus: to maximize the agent’s incentive to exert effort or, equivalently, to solve for the range of effort levels that are implementable. (We also examine the

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Modeling differences with Holmström (1999) include the continuous-time setting, mean-reversion in the type process, and a multidimensional signal structure. See Cisternas (2015) for a specification that is similar to ours in the first two respects.
trade-off between the level of effort and the precision of the market’s information.¹⁶

We allow for a broad range of mechanisms, imposing stationarity and normality only.¹² As we show, a rating mechanism is equivalent to a time-invariant linear filter, mapping all the bits of information available to the intermediary into a (without loss) scalar rating. In general, such mechanisms are infinite-dimensional.

In Section 4 we study two extensions. First, we allow for ratings that are not exclusive. That is, the market has access to independent public information. We show how the optimal rating reflects the content of this free information. Second, we discuss how our results extend to the case of multiple actions.¹⁳ We show that it can be optimal for the optimal rating system to encourage effort production in dimensions that are unproductive, if this is the only way to also encourage productive effort. Third, we apply our techniques to compare existing methods, showing that exponential smoothing dominates a moving window.

**Related Literature.** Foremost, our paper builds on Holmström (1999). (See also Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999).) His model elegantly illustrates why neither perfect monitoring nor a lack of oversight cultivates incentives. His analysis prompts the question raised and answered in our model: what type of feedback stimulates effort? Our interest in multifaceted information is similar to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), who consider multidimensional effort and output to examine optimal compensation. Their model has neither incomplete information nor career concerns. Our work is also related to the following strands of literature.

**Reputation.** The eventual disappearance of reputation in standard discounted models

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¹⁶These two objectives feature prominently in economic analyses of ratings according to practitioners and theorists alike. As Gonzalez et al. (2004) state, the rationale for ratings stems from their ability to gather and analyze information (information asymmetry) and affect the agents’ actions (principal-agent). To quote Portes (2008), “Ratings agencies exist to deal with principal-agent problems and asymmetric information.” To be sure, resolving information asymmetries and addressing moral hazard are not the only roles that ratings play. Credit ratings, for instance, play a role in a borrowing firm’s default decision (Manso (2013)). Additionally, ratings provide information to the agent himself (e.g., performance appraisal systems); see Hansen (2013). Moreover, whenever evaluating performance requires input from the users, ratings must account for their incentives to experiment and report (Kremer, Mansour, and Perry (2014), Che and Hörner (2015)).

¹²Throughout, we ignore the issues that rating agencies face in terms of possible conflict of interest and their inability to commit, which motivates a broad literature.

¹³Our focus on such mechanisms nonetheless abstracts from some interesting questions, such as the granularity of the rating (the rating’s scale) or its periodicity (e.g., yearly vs. quarterly ratings), as well as how ratings should be adjusted to account for the rated firm’s age.

¹⁴With multidimensional product quality, information disclosure on one dimension may encourage firms to reduce their investments in others, harming welfare (Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuiñat (2012)).
(as in Holmström (1999)) motivates the study of reputation effects when players’ memory is limited. There are many ways to model such limitations. One is to simply assume that the market can only observe the last $K$ periods (in discrete time), as in Liu and Skrzypacz (2014). This allows reputation to be rebuilt. Even more similar to our work is Ekmekci (2011), who interprets the map from signals to reports as ratings, as we do. His model features an informed agent. Ekmekci shows that, absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs. However, if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period, then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is approximately his Stackelberg payoff after every history. As in our paper, Pei (2015) introduces an intermediary in a model with moral hazard and adverse selection. The motivation is very similar to ours, but the modeling and the assumptions differ markedly. In particular, the agent knows his own type, and the intermediary can only choose between disclosing and withholding the signal, while having no ability to distort its content. Furthermore, in Pei (2015), the intermediary is not a mediator in the game-theoretic sense but a strategic player with her own payoff that she maximizes in the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game.

**Design of reputation systems.** The literature on information systems has explored the design of rating and recommendation mechanisms. See, among others, Dellarocas (2006) for a study of the impact of the frequency of reputation profile updates on cooperation and efficiency in settings with pure moral hazard and noisy ratings. This literature abstracts from career concerns, the main driver here.

**Design of information channels.** There is a vast literature in information theory on how to design information channels, and it is impossible to do it justice. Restrictions on the channel’s quality are derived from physical rather than strategic considerations (e.g., limited bandwidth). See, among many others, Chu (1972), Ho and Chu (1972) and, more related to economics, Radner (1961). Design under incentive constraints is recently considered by Ely (2015) and Renault, Solan, and Vieille (2015). However, these are models in which information disclosure is distorted because of the incentives of the users of information; the underlying information process is exogenous.
2 The Model

2.1 Exogenous Information

The relationship involves a long-lived agent (he) and a competitive market (it), mediated by an intermediary (she). We first abstract from the intermediary’s objective by treating the information transmitted by the intermediary to the market as exogenous. We then turn to optimizing over information structures in Section 3.

Time is continuous, indexed by \( t \geq 0 \), and the horizon is infinite.

There is incomplete information. The agent’s ability, or type, is \( \theta_t \in \mathbb{R} \). We assume that \( \theta_0 \) has a Gaussian distribution. It is drawn from \( \mathcal{N}(0, \gamma^2/2) \). The law of motion of \( \theta \) is mean-reverting, with increments

\[
d\theta_t = -\theta_t \, dt + \gamma \, dZ_{0,t},
\]

where \( Z_0 \) is an independent standard Brownian motion (BM), and \( \gamma > 0 \).\(^{10}\) The unit rate of mean-reversion is a mere normalization, as is its zero mean.\(^{11}\) Mean-reversion ensures that the variance of \( \theta \) remains bounded, independent of the market information, thereby accommodating a large class of information structures.\(^{12}\) The noise \( Z_0 \) ensures that incomplete information persists and that the stationary distribution is nontrivial. The specification of the initial variance precisely ensures that the process is stationary.

The type affects the distribution over output and signals. Specifically, given some real-valued process \( A_t \) (the action of the agent), cumulative output \( X_t \in \mathbb{R} \) solves

\[
dX_t = (A_t + \theta_t) \, dt + \sigma_1 \, dZ_{1,t},
\]

with \( X_0 = 0 \). Here, \( Z_1 \) is an independent standard Brownian motion, and \( \sigma_1 > 0 \). We allow for but do not require additional signals of ability.\(^{13}\) We model such sources of

\(^{10}\)Throughout, when we refer to an independent standard Brownian motion, we mean a standard Brownian motion independent of all the other random variables and random processes of the model.

\(^{11}\) Going from a mean-reversion rate of 1 to \( \rho \) requires the following changes of variables: \( t \mapsto \rho t \), \( \gamma \mapsto \gamma/\sqrt{\rho} \), \( r \mapsto r/\rho \), \( (\alpha_k, \beta_k, \sigma_k) \mapsto (\alpha_k/\rho, \beta_k/\rho, \sigma_k/\sqrt{\rho}) \).

\(^{12}\) An alternative approach that we leave unexplored is to allow for some background learning.

\(^{13}\) In the case of a company, besides earnings, there is a large variety of indicators of performance (profitability, income gearing, liquidity, market capitalization, etc.). In the case of sovereign credit ratings, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s list numerous economic, social, and political factors that underlie their rating (Moody’s Investor Services (1991), Moody’s Investor Services (1995), Standard & Poor’s (1994)); similarly, workers are evaluated according to a variety of performance measures, both objective and subjective (see Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994)).
information as processes \( \{S_{k,t}\} \), \( k = 2, \ldots, K \), which are solutions to
\[
    dS_{k,t} = (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \theta_t) \, dt + \sigma_k \, dZ_{k,t},
\]
with \( S_{k,0} = 0 \). Here, \( \alpha_k \in \mathbb{R} \), \( \beta_k \geq 0 \) (wlog), \( \sigma_k > 0 \) and \( Z_k \) is an independent standard Brownian motion. For convenience, we set \( S_1 := X \) (and \( \alpha_1 = \beta_1 = 1 \)), as output also plays the role of a signal. Alongside some initial (for now, exogenous) sigma-algebra \( \mathcal{G}_0 \), the random variables \( S := \{S_k\}_{k=1}^K \) are the only sources of information. We refer to the corresponding filtration as \( \mathcal{G} \), where \( \mathcal{G}_t \) is (the usual augmentation of) \( \mathcal{G}_0 \vee \sigma(\{S_s\}_{s \leq t}) \). This is the information of the intermediary. The agent observes these signals but also knows his own past effort choices. Note that, like the intermediary, the agent learns about his type over time by observing \( \mathcal{G} \). On path, his belief coincides with the intermediary’s assessment.

The information available to the market at time \( t \) is modeled by a sigma-algebra \( \mathcal{F}_t \subseteq \mathcal{G}_t \). We do not impose that \( \mathcal{F} \) be a filtration, an important point for the sequel. An (agent) strategy is a bounded process \( A \) that is progressively measurable with respect to \( \mathcal{G} \). Let \( \mathcal{A} \) denote the collection of strategies\(^{14}\). Neither the market nor the intermediary observe the process \( A \). Instead, the market forms a conjecture about \( A \), denoted \( A^* \in \mathcal{A} \), from which a “belief” \( P^A^* \) is derived. This belief defines the law of motion of the signals and output processes as if the agent exerted effort \( A^*_t \) at time \( t \), instead of \( A_t \). Expectations relative to this measure are denoted \( E^A^* \). This contrasts with the belief \( P^A \) of the agent, which captures the actual law of motion.

\(^{14}\)This is intuitive, but heuristic. Formally, as in continuous-time principal-agent models, to avoid circularity problems where actions depend on the process that they define, \( (2) \) and \( (3) \) are to be interpreted in the weak formulation of stochastic differential equations (SDE), where \( Z \) is a BM that generally depends on \( A \). Specifically, signal processes are defined for a reference effort level (say, 0); one defines \( S_k \) as the solution to
\[
    dS_{k,t} = \beta_k \int_0^t \theta_s \, ds + \sigma_k Z_{k,t},
\]
and then \( \mathcal{G} \) as the natural augmented filtration generated by the processes \( S_k \) alongside \( \mathcal{G}_0 \), with associated probability measure \( P^0 \). Thus, the agent actions do not define the signal process itself, which is fixed \textit{ex ante}. Instead, they define the law of the process: given \( A \in \mathcal{A} \), define \( Z^A_k \) by
\[
    Z^A_{k,t} := Z_{k,t} - \frac{\alpha_k}{\sigma_k^2} \int_0^t A_s \, ds.
\]
By Girsanov theorem, there exists a probability measure \( P^A \) such that the joint law of \( (\theta, Z^A_1, \ldots, Z^A_K) \) under \( P^A \) is the same as the joint law of \( (\theta, Z_1, \ldots, Z_K) \) under \( P^0 \). Given \( A \in \mathcal{A} \), the signal \( S_k \) satisfies
\[
    dS_{k,t} = (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \theta_t) \, dt + \sigma_k \, dZ^A_{k,t},
\]
with \( Z^A_{k,t} \) a BM under \( P^A \). These are the signals that the intermediary observes.
Expectations relative to $P^A$ are denoted $E[\cdot]^{15}$.

We now turn to payoffs. Given a (cumulative) real-valued transfer process to the agent (a continuous, $\mathcal{F}$-adapted process) $\pi$, the market retains

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-rt}(dX_t - d\pi_t),$$

whereas the agent receives

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-rt}(d\pi_t - c(A_t) dt).$$

Here, $r > 0$ is the common discount rate. The cost of effort $c(\cdot)$ is twice differentiable, with $c'(0) = 0$, and $c'' > 0$. The transfer $\pi$ does not matter for efficiency (joint surplus maximization), which demands setting $A_t$ at the constant solution of $c'(A_t) = 1$.

The equilibrium definition has three ingredients. The first is how transfers are set. We assume that the market is competitive and that there is no commitment, in the sense that output-contingent wages are not allowed. Given the market conjecture $A^*$, it pays a flow transfer $d\pi_t$ equal to $E^*[dX_t \mid \mathcal{F}_t]$ “upfront” (note that this transfer can be negative). Second, the agent chooses his strategy $A$ to maximize his expected payoff. Third, the market has rational expectations, and hence, its belief about $A$ coincides with the optimal strategy. Because our focus will be on equilibria with deterministic effort, we assume throughout that $A^*$ is a deterministic function of time.

**Definition 2.1** Fix an information structure $\mathcal{F}$. An equilibrium is a profile $(A, A^*, \pi)$, $A, A^* \in \mathcal{A}$, such that:

1. (Zero-profit) For all $t$,

$$\pi_t = \int_0^t E^*[A^*_s + \theta_s \mid \mathcal{F}_s] ds.$$

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15Formally, we use the star notation when we refer to the law on $(\theta, S_1, \ldots, S_K)$ induced by $P^A^*$ (see ft. 14), i.e., the law of motion of the ability and signal processes from the perspective of the market. We use the no-star notation when we refer to the law on $(\theta, S_1, \ldots, S_K)$ induced by $P^A$, i.e., the law of motion of the agent according to his own belief. The belief of the market is given by the law of the joint process $(\theta, S_1, \ldots, S_K)$, but as the mean ability is all that is payoff-relevant, we abuse language and often call belief the mean ability. The same remark holds for the agent’s belief. We drop the star notation for variance and covariance, for which the distinction is irrelevant.

16Only the agent’s impatience is relevant for equilibrium analysis, and this is how we interpret the parameter $r$. However, equal discounting is necessary for transfers to be irrelevant for efficiency.
2. (Optimal effort)

\[ A \in \arg\max_{\hat{A} \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \left( d\pi_t - c(\hat{A}_t) \, dt \right) \right]. \]

3. (Correct beliefs) It holds that

\[ A^* = A. \]

This paper is concerned with the optimal design of the information structure. An important special case is obtained for \( \mathcal{F} = \mathcal{G} \) such that the market observes all there is to observe, save for the actual effort. We refer to this case as the model of Holmström (with obvious abuse), or as transparency. However, many more structures are considered. The following are two important properties of information structures.

**Definition 2.2** An information structure \( \mathcal{F}_t(\subseteq \mathcal{G}_t) \) is public if \( \mathcal{F} \) is a filtration.

Hence, an information structure is public if all information available to the market in the past remains available at later times. We say that the information structure is confidential to insist that we do not require, but do not rule out, that it is public.\(^{17}\)

**Definition 2.3** An information structure \( \mathcal{F}_t(\subseteq \mathcal{G}_t) \) is non-exclusive (w.r.t. signals \( K' \subseteq \{1, \ldots, K\} \)) if

\[ \sigma(\{S_{k,t}\}_{k \in K'}) \subseteq \mathcal{F}_t. \]

Informally, non-exclusivity means that some signals are observed by the market over time. When such a restriction is not imposed, the information structure is exclusive (with further abuse, as non-exclusive information structures are instances of exclusive ones). Non-exclusivity with respect to \( X \) is a natural case to consider because this information can be backed out from the payoff process of the market.\(^{18}\)

Because the payments received by the agent reflect the market belief concerning his type, the agent has incentives to affect this belief via his effort. Hence, given the equilibrium payment, the agent maximizes his discounted reputation, net of his cost of effort, as formalized below in (4). Fixing the conjecture \( A^* \), a sufficient statistic for \( \mathcal{F} \) is the conditional expectation \( \mathbb{E}^*[\theta_t \mid \mathcal{F}_1] \). This is all the information that matters for equilibrium analysis.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{17}\)Confidentiality can be defined in a stronger sense: market participants at time \( t \) could receive different information. As long as they still pay expected output, this does not change the results.

\(^{18}\)The relative importance of exclusive vs. non-exclusive information varies substantially across and within industries: in the credit rating industry, solicited ratings are based on both public and confidential information; unsolicited ratings, by contrast, rely exclusively on public information.

\(^{19}\)Note that, unlike \( \mathcal{F} \), the information structure \( \{\mathbb{E}^*[\theta_t \mid \mathcal{F}_1]\}_t \) refers to the market conjecture.
Lemma 2.4
1. Given a payment process that satisfies the zero-profit condition, the effort strategy A maximizes the agent’s payoff if and only if it maximizes
\[ E \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} (\mu_t - c(A_t)) \, dt \right] \] over A, where \( \mu_t := E^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}_t] \) is derived using \( A^* \) as the market conjecture.
2. If \((A, \pi)\) is an equilibrium given \( \mathcal{F} \), then it is an equilibrium given \{\( \sigma \left( E^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}_t] \right) \}\}.

2.2 Ratings

The intermediary selects an information structure \( \mathcal{F} \). \textit{A priori}, such a structure can be arbitrarily complex. However, given Lemma 2.4 the equilibrium effort when the market observes \( \mathcal{F}_t \) at time \( t \) is identical to the equilibrium effort when the market observes the scalar \( E^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}_t] \) only. Hence, without loss, it can be assumed that the intermediary releases a scalar rating to the market, \( Y_t \), at time \( t \). Figure 1 summarizes how participants interact.

We focus on stationary environments. This requires defining \( \mathcal{G}_0 \) such that the environment is as if time began at \(-\infty\). One way to do so is to regard signals \( S_k \) and \( \theta \) as two-sided processes.\(^{20,21}\) Rating processes are a special class of scalar ratings, defined as follows.

**Definition 2.5** A (two-sided) process \( Y \) is a rating process if, for all \( t \in \mathbb{R} \), \( Y_t \) is \( \mathcal{G}_t \)-measurable, and, when the agent’s effort is constant over time,

(1) for all \( \tau > 0 \), \((\bar{Y}_t, S_t - S_{t-\tau})\) is jointly stationary and Gaussian, where \( \bar{Y}_t := Y_t - E[Y_t] \) is the mean-normalized rating;

\(^{20}\)A two-sided process is defined on the entire real line, as opposed to the nonnegative half-line. In particular, we call two-sided standard Brownian motion any process \( Z(=\{Z_t\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}}) \) such that both \( \{Z_t\}_{t \geq 0} \) and \( \{Z_t\}_{t \leq 0} \) are standard Brownian motions.) Let \( \{\mathcal{G}_t\}_{t \in \mathbb{R}} \) be the natural augmented filtration generated by \( \{S_k\}_{k} \), which induces the filtration \( \mathcal{G} \) on the nonnegative real line.

\(^{21}\)Formally, for all \( t \in \mathbb{R} \),

\[ \theta_t = e^{-t} \bar{\theta} + \int_0^t e^{-(t-s)} \gamma \, dZ_{0,s}, \]

where \( \bar{\theta} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \gamma^2/2) \), and \( Z_0 \) is two-sided. Similarly, let \( X = S_1 \) and, given the two-sided BM \( Z_k \), \( S_k \) be the two-sided process defined by (see ft. 14),

\[ S_{k,t} = \beta_k \int_0^t \theta_s \, ds + \sigma_k Z_{k,t}. \]
(2) for all $k$, $\tau \mapsto \text{Cov}[Y_t, S_{k,t-\tau}]$ is absolutely continuous, with integrable and square integrable generalized derivative.

We restrict attention to information structures induced by rating processes. A rating process $Y$ induces an information structure $\mathcal{F}$ via $\mathcal{F}_t = \sigma(Y_t)$. We say that $Y$ is a confidential/public rating process when $\mathcal{F}$ is a confidential/public information structure.

Rating processes preclude some interesting practices. Normality rules out coarse ratings, for instance. Still, it encompasses a variety of rating practices. In the case of a one-dimensional signal, for instance, the process can involve exponential smoothing (as allegedly used by Business Week in its business school ranking), which involves setting

$$Y_t = \int_{s \leq t} e^{-\delta(t-s)} \, dX_s,$$

for some choice of $\delta > 0$. The rating system can be a moving window (as commonly used in consumer credit ratings or Better Business Bureau (BBB) grades) when

$$Y_t = \int_{t-T}^{t} dX_s,$$

for some $T > 0$. (In both cases, the choice of $\mathcal{G}_0$ ensures that this is also well defined for $s \leq 0$.) A comparison between these two ratings is given in Section 4.3.

Both the stationarity and normality inherent to rating processes are severe restrictions. Yet, without it, one can conceive of ratings that make the problem trivial in some environments. Suppose, for instance, that one of the signals perfectly reveals the agent’s effort. Then, it suffices for the rating system to raise a “red flag” (ostensibly ceasing to provide any rating in the future) as soon as it detects a deviation from the desired effort level to ensure that any deviation is unattractive in the first place. We consider such a system unrealistic: in punishing the agent, the rating also “punishes” the market by worsening the information it provides. The history should affect the content of the rating but not the quality of the information that it conveys or the equilibrium effort. Focusing on (Gaussian, stationary) rating processes rules out such constructions.

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22 The restriction to adapted processes also rules out the use of extraneous noise by the intermediary. This is merely a modeling choice, as white noise can be modeled as one of the signals.

23 More sophisticated schemes can be devised that apply when there is some small noise in the signal regarding effort while inducing efficient effort at all times.

24 This is not the only way to rule them out, but it is a natural way to do so. The restriction is decisively weaker than assuming the rating to be a Markov function of the intermediary’s belief.
Gaussian processes make the model tractable. It allows to apply linear filtering techniques. In addition, stationarity ensures that equilibrium effort is a scalar, facilitating comparisons. From now on, $A^*$ is taken to be constant on $\mathbb{R}_+$ and the equilibrium to be stationary (set by convention $A_s = A^*_s = 0$ if $s < 0$).

Rating processes can represent beliefs for both confidential and public information structures. The following is an immediate and intuitive characterization.

**Proposition 2.6** Let $Y$ be a rating process. Then, $Y$ is as follows:

1. A belief for a confidential information structure if and only if, for all $t$,
   $$E^*[\theta_t | Y_t] = Y_t.$$

2. A belief for a public information structure if and only if, for all $t$,
   $$E^*[\theta_t | \{Y_s\}_{s \leq t}] = Y_t.$$

The following provides a simple criterion to decide whether a rating process is equal to a market belief of a confidential or a public information structure.\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\)The characterization is helpful to compute the optimal ratings, as it allows us to restrict attention to ratings that are belief processes. The optimization is then performed under a set of constraints that we relax by internalizing them in the objective function.

As an alternative approach, we could optimize over the general, unconstrained family of rating processes $Y$, and compute the associated beliefs $E[\theta_t | Y_t]$ or $E[\theta_t | \{Y_s\}_{s \leq t}]$. This can be done for confidential information structures (with or without exclusive information). However, for public
Lemma 2.7 (Confidential Belief) A rating process $Y$ is a belief for a confidential information structure if, and only if, for all $t$,

$$E^*[Y_t] = 0 \text{ and } \text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] = \text{Var}[Y_t].$$

Hence, the lemma implies that any rating process with mean zero is proportional to the mean belief that it induces.

Lemma 2.8 (Public Belief) A rating process $Y$ is a belief for a public information structure if and only if it is a belief for a confidential information structure and in addition, for all $t$ and all $\tau \geq 0$

$$\text{Corr}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] = \text{Corr}[\theta_t, \theta_{t+\tau}] \left(= e^{-\tau}\right).$$

Instead of focusing on beliefs, it is often convenient to work with a slighter broader class of rating processes. Scaling a rating process by a nonzero constant does not affect its informational content. Hence, we may select as convenient a rating process within the equivalence class that this constant of proportionality defines.

2.3 Characterization of Equilibrium

Lemma 2.9 Fix a rating process $Y$. Under the information structure it induces, $\mathcal{F} = \{\sigma(Y_t)\}_{t \geq 0}$, there exists a unique equilibrium.

We now turn to the characterization. This is done in two stages. First, the restriction to rating processes leads to a convenient analytic representation.

Lemma 2.10 (Representation Lemma) Fix a rating process $Y$. Given any market conjecture $A^*$, there exist essentially unique integrable and square-integrable functions $u_k$, $k = 1, \ldots, K$, such that

$$Y_t = E^*[Y_t] + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k(t-s)(dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A^*_s ds). \quad (5)$$

information structures, the computation of beliefs is not tractable. In particular, since $Y$ is not required to have a Markovian structure, common linear filters such as Kalman-Bucy cannot be used. Instead, the computation of beliefs involves the determination of a continuum of variables associated with conditional variances of ratings that solve a continuum of equations, the analytic solution to which can only be written in some special cases.

20Unique up to measure zero sets.
The coefficient $u_k(s)$ is the weight that the current rating $Y_t$ attaches to the innovation (the term $(dS_{k,s}-\alpha_kA_s\, ds)$ pertaining to the signal of type $k$ and vintage $s$. Following information-theoretic terminology, we refer to $\{u_k\}_k$ as the linear filter defined by $Y$. When the filter is a sum of exponentials (e.g., $u_k(t) = \sum \gamma^\ell c^\ell e^{-\delta^\ell t}$), the coefficients (resp., exponents) are the weights (resp., impulse responses) of the filter. Conversely, given some filter $\{u_k\}_k$, (5) uniquely defines a rating process.

The decomposition of Lemma 5 can be interpreted as a regression of $Y_t$ on the infinite continuum of signal increments $dS_{k,s}$, $s \in (-\infty, t]$. It is an infinite-dimensional version of the familiar result that a Gaussian variable that is a dependent function of finitely many Gaussian variables is a linear combination thereof. It turns the optimization problem into a deterministic one. There is an explicit formula for $u_k$ in terms of the covariance of the rating, which shows how $u_k$ captures not only the covariance between the rating and a weighted average of the signals of a given vintage but also how this covariance decays over time for signal $k$. For all $t \geq 0$,

$$u_k(t) = \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\sigma_k^2} \left( \frac{\sinh \kappa t + \kappa \cosh \kappa t}{1 + \kappa} \right) \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} \tilde{f}(s) \, ds - \int_0^t \sinh \kappa(t-s) \, d\tilde{f}(s) - \int_0^t \kappa(t-s) \, d\tilde{f}(s),$$

with $\kappa := \sqrt{1 + \gamma^2 \sum_k \beta_k^2 / \sigma_k^2} (> 1)$, and

$$f_k(s) := \text{Cov}[Y_t, S_{k,t-s}], \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{f}(s) := \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} f_k(s).$$

Second, we express equilibrium effort in terms of the filter given by Lemma 5.

**Lemma 2.11** Let $Y$ be a rating process with normalized variance, $\text{Var}[Y_t] = 1$. The unique equilibrium effort level $A$ is constant and determined by

$$c'(A) = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \int_0^\infty u_k(t)e^{-rt} \, dt \right] \left[ \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k \int_0^\infty u_k(t)e^{-t} \, dt \right], \quad (6)$$

---

27 Determining the coefficients of such continuous-time regressions is often achieved via a linear filtering argument. Here, the lack of Markovian structure with the infinite fictitious history, together with the stationarity condition, makes the problem non-trivial because it prevents the use of the Kalman-Bucy filter and involves finding a continuum of terms of the form $\text{Var}[Y_t \mid G_{t-s}]$ that solve a continuum of equations. To obtain the closed-form solution for the coefficients $u_k$, we write the equations that link $f$ to $u_k$; then, via algebraic manipulation and successive differentiation, we obtain a differential equation that $u_k$ must satisfy, the solution of which is found explicitly.

28 Given the continuum, stronger assumptions are necessary. The restriction to stationary processes is key to obtaining a linear representation. See Jeulin and Yor (1979) for a counter-example otherwise.

29 The somewhat unwieldy statement of this constraint in terms of $\{u_k\}_k$ is given in (15) below.
where $u_k$ is defined by Lemma 2.10, given $Y$.

Hence, effort is proportional to the product of two covariances. The first pertains to the agent: the impact of effort and his discount rate. The other pertains to the type: the impact of ability and the mean-reversion rate. This formula assumes a normalized variance. Alternatively, we may write (6) in a compact way as

$$c'(A^*) = \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_0^\infty u_k(t)e^{-rt} dt \right] \frac{\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t]}{\text{Var}[Y_t]}.$$  

(7)

The objective of Section 3 is to find the rating process that maximizes the right-hand side of (6), under the constraints imposed by lemmas 2.7 and 2.8.

2.4 Transparency

Here, we consider the benchmark in which $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{G}$. This case is close to the one considered by Holmström (1999) in discrete time (specifically, his Section 2.2 solves for the stationary equilibrium with one signal, and no mean-reversion). Define:

$$m_\alpha = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\alpha_k^2}{\sigma_k^2}, \quad m_{\alpha\beta} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\alpha_k \beta_k}{\sigma_k^2}, \quad m_\beta = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k^2}{\sigma_k^2}. \quad (8)$$

The belief of the market $\mu_t = \mathbb{E}^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}_t]$ is then equal to the intermediary’s belief $\nu_t := \mathbb{E}^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{G}_t]$. The latter is a Markov process that solves

$$d\nu_t = (\kappa - 1) \sum_k \frac{1}{m_\beta \sigma_k^2} (dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A^*_t dt) - \kappa \nu_t dt, \quad (9)$$

where $A^* \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is equilibrium effort. Explicitly, the belief is equal to

$$\nu_t = (\kappa - 1) \int_{s \leq t} e^{-\kappa(t-s)} \sum_k \frac{1}{m_\beta \sigma_k^2} (dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A^*_s ds). \quad (10)$$

Innovations $(dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A^*_s ds)$ are weighted according to their type and their vintage. A signal of type $k$ is weighted by the signal-to-noise ratio $\beta_k/\sigma_k^2$. If it is noisy (high $\sigma$) or insensitive to ability (low $\beta$), it matters little for inferences. Given that ability changes, older signals matter less than recent ones: a signal of vintage $t - s$ is discounted (in the belief at time $t$) at rate $\kappa$. The market “rationally forgets.”

30Specifically, $\beta_k/\sigma_k^2$ is the inverse of the Fano factor (the signal-to-noise ratio is $\beta_k/\sigma_k$).
Theorem 2.12 The unique equilibrium effort level when $F = G$ is the solution to
\[
\frac{c'(A)}{\kappa + r} = m_{\alpha \beta} \left( \kappa - 1 \right),
\]
if the right-hand side of (11) is nonnegative. Otherwise, $A = 0$.

Equation (11) is a standard optimality condition for investment in productive capital. The market’s belief is an asset. Effort is an investment in that asset. We interpret the three terms in (11) as persistence ($(\kappa + r)^{-1}$), substitutability ($m_{\alpha \beta}$), and sensitivity $(\kappa - 1)$. The asset depreciates at rate $\kappa$, to be added to the discount rate when evaluating the net present value of effort. Investment has productivity $m_{\alpha \beta}/m_{\beta}$, which measures the increase in belief given a (permanent) unit increase in effort. In turn, sensitivity measures the increase in belief given a unit increase in the type.

Substitutability, sensitivity and persistence already appear in (9). Sensitivity is the first coefficient, scaling the impact of a surprise in the signal on the belief; substitutability appears in the sum, as the impact of effort on the surprise; and persistence enters via the last term, capturing the rate of decay of the belief. Only discounting is missing. The general formula given by (6) shows that, for an arbitrary rating process, effort depends also on a fourth term, the ratio $\frac{\text{Cov}[Y, \theta]}{\text{Var}[Y]}$, which is equal to one under transparency. Persistence, sensitivity and substitutability matter as well, and are all nested in the first term, $\int_{t \geq 0} \left( \sum_k \alpha_k u_k(t) \right) e^{-rt} dt$.

Effort can be too high or low, according to how (11) compares to one. If $m_{\alpha \beta} < 0$, the agent has perverse career concerns: to impress the market, lower effort is better. As a result, effort is 0. Hereafter, we assume that $m_{\alpha \beta} \geq 0$. A signal for which $\alpha_k = 0$ is not irrelevant, as it enters both sensitivity and persistence. With no signal beside output, effort is inefficiently low, even as discounting vanishes. This is in contrast to Holmström and is due to mean-reversion, which eventually erases the benefits from an instantaneous effort increase. The proof of the following is immediate and omitted.

Lemma 2.13 Effort increases in $\gamma$ and $\alpha_k$, $k = 1, \ldots, K$. It decreases in $\sigma_k$ if signals are homogenous ($\alpha_k, \beta_k, \sigma_k$ independent of $k$). It admits an interior maximum with respect to $\beta_k$.

The comparative statics with respect to $\alpha_k, \gamma$ need no explanation. The role of $\beta_k$ is more interesting. If it is small, then the market dismisses signal $k$ in terms of learning. If it is high, then the small variation in the signal caused by an effort increase is (wrongly) attributed to the type, but by an amount proportional to $\beta_k^{-1}$.

\[31\] See Cisternas (2012) for the same observation in a model with human capital accumulation.

\[32\] Effort need not decrease in $\sigma_k$ if signals are heterogeneous.
which is small and hence not worth the effort cost: a higher $\beta_k$ makes signal $k$ more relevant but less manipulable. The “best” signals are those involving intermediate values of $\beta_k$. Adding a signal has ambiguous consequences for effort, as should be clear. Depending on parameters, it might reduce noise, and so bolster incentives, but it might help tell apart effort and ability, and so undermine career concerns. Either way, it improves the quality of the market’s information.

2.5 The Role of the Intermediary

The intermediary’s objective is to maximize equilibrium effort $A$. She chooses the information structure $\mathcal{F}$ via a rating process $Y$, which, by our earlier results, we can consider scalar and proportional to the market mean belief it induces. Recall from Lemma 2.9 that the stationary equilibrium is unique, and hence that her choice of $Y$ determines $A$. She might face constraints: the information structure that the rating defines might be public, non-exclusive, or both. She has commitment, in the sense that $Y$ is chosen once and for all, and it is common knowledge.\[33\]

Maximizing $A$ does not always maximize efficiency. Even under transparency, equilibrium effort can be too high (cf. (11)). However, solving for the maximum effort is equivalent to solving for the range of implementable actions. If effort is excessive, a simple adjustment to the rating process (adding “white noise,” for instance) scales it to any desired lower effort, including the efficient level.

Lemma 2.14 Fix a confidential/public rating process $Y$ such that stationary effort is $A$.

For all $A' \in [0, A]$, there exists a confidential/public rating process $Y'$ such that, under the information structure defined by $Y'$, equilibrium effort is $A'$.

However, under non-exclusivity, there can be a strictly positive lower bound on the effort that the intermediary can induce. (The information structure that $Y'$ defines in Lemma 2.14 might violate non-exclusivity constraints satisfied by $Y$.) Surprisingly, this lower bound is not typically achieved by silence (the intermediary disclosing no information). Maximum and minimum effort are dual problems. In the presence of non-exclusivity, an optimized information structure can depress effort below what silence achieves, just as it can motivate effort beyond what transparency achieves. See Section 4.1 for further discussion.

---

33 This intermediary can be regarded as a “reputational intermediary,” an independent professional whose purpose is to transmit a credible quality signal about the agent. Commitment, then, results from the professional’s incentive to preserve his reputation. Reputational intermediaries not only include so-called rating agencies but also, in some of their roles, underwriters, accountants, lawyers, attorneys and investment bankers (see Coffee (1997)).
Hence, our goal is primarily normative: to identify the range of implementable actions. Yet, there are plausible scenarios in which a profit-maximizing rating agency would find it optimal to induce the maximum effort level. For instance, if the agency charges the market a commission (a set percentage of the value of output), then maximizing effort is equivalent to maximizing revenue.

Depending on the context, it might be desirable to evaluate the performance of a rating process along other dimensions, for instance, the quality of the information it conveys (as measured by the variance of the type conditional on the belief), or its stability over time (as measured by the variance of the belief). These properties satisfy a simple relationship.

**Lemma 2.15** Fix a rating process $Y$. It holds that

$$\text{Var}[	heta_t | \mu_t] + \text{Var}[\mu_t] = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \left(= \text{Var}[\theta_t]\right).$$

Precision and stability are perfect substitutes. If stability comes first, lower precision is desirable. This also means that we can restrict attention to one of these measures when evaluating the trade-off with maximum effort. A systematic analysis of this trade-off would take us too far afield, but it can be done, as illustrated in Section 3.5.

### 3 Main Results

#### 3.1 Persistence vs. Sensitivity: Two Examples

To build intuition, let us begin with a simple example: exponential smoothing as a confidential rating. Suppose that the intermediary wishes to use the rating

$$Y_t = \sum_k \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \int_{s\leq t} e^{-\delta(t-s)} dS_{k,s},$$

where she freely selects $\delta > 0$. The choice $\delta = 1$ reveals her own belief, and transparency results, as in Section 2.4. Any other choice of $\delta$ implies that the market is less well-informed than she is. Using the formula from Lemma 2.11 we obtain

$$c'(A) = \frac{1}{\delta \kappa + \bar{r} m_a} \frac{m_{a\beta} \delta(\kappa + 1)(\kappa - 1)}{\kappa + \delta}.$$

---

34These properties of ratings are often cited as being desirable (Cantor and Mann (2006)).
In terms of the effects introduced before, the first factor \(\frac{1}{\delta_\kappa + r}\) is persistence. Future returns on effort are discounted both because of impatience and because future ratings discount past signals at rate \(\delta_\kappa\). Rating persistence increases the impact of current effort on future ratings. However, increasing persistence decreases sensitivity. This is clear from the last term, which increases in \(\delta\) and goes to zero if \(\delta\) does. If \(\delta\) is small, then the rating is very persistent, which means that it treats old and recent innovations symmetrically. Because ability changes over time, this blunts the impact of a one-time innovation in the belief. If, instead, \(\delta\) is large, the rating disproportionately reacts to recent innovations, heightening their relative importance.

What goes up must come down: in a stationary system, a blip in a signal cannot simultaneously jolt the belief and have its impact linger. The intermediary must trade off persistence with sensitivity. But she can do better than transparency. Taking derivatives (with respect to \(\delta\)) yields as optimal solution

\[
\delta = \sqrt{r}.
\]

She chooses a rating process that is more or less persistent than Bayesian updating according to \(r \leq 1\), that is, depending on how the discount rate compares to the rate of mean-reversion. The best choice reflects agent preferences, which Bayes’ rule ignores. If the agent is patient, it pays to amplify persistence, and \(\delta\) is low.

Let us turn to a richer example. Departing from our convention regarding output, assume that output is solely a function of ability, not of effort \((\beta := \beta_1 > 0, \alpha_1 = 0)\), while the unique other signal purely concerns effort \((\alpha := \alpha_2 > 0, \beta_2 = 0)\), and set \(\sigma := \sigma_1 = \sigma_2\). Consider the best rating system within the two-parameter family

\[
\begin{align*}
 u_1(t) &= \frac{\beta}{\sigma^2}e^{-\kappa t}, \\
 u_2(t) &= \frac{d\beta}{\sigma^2} \sqrt{\delta}e^{-\delta t},
\end{align*}
\]

with \(d \in \mathbb{R}, \delta > 0\). This family is special yet intuitive: because the agent cannot affect output, the intermediary does not distort the corresponding innovations. However, she adds to the resulting integral an integral over the innovations of the second signal. The parameter \(d\) scales the weight on this term and \(\delta\) is its impulse response. The normalization constant \(\sqrt{\delta}\) ensures that the choice of \(\delta\) does not affect the variance of the market belief.\footnote{In this example, efficiency requires \(A = 0\): an efficient rating process should discourage effort, a trivial endeavor. We seek the effort-maximizing scheme.} Using Lemma 2.11 here as well,

\[
c'(A) = \frac{1}{\delta + r} \sqrt{\delta m_{\alpha_\beta} d} \frac{2}{(1 + d^2)(1 + \kappa)}. \tag{12}
\]
The first term is familiar by now: it is the impact on persistence of the choice of \( \delta \). An effort increase at time \( t \) is reflected in the rating at time \( t + \tau > t \) but discounted twice: at a rate \( e^{-rt} \) by the agent and \( e^{-\delta t} \) by the market. Integrating over \( \tau \geq 0 \) yields a boost to incentives proportional to \( 1/(r+\delta) \), which is further amplified by the factor \( \sqrt{\delta} \) that scales substitutability. The constant \( d \) increases substitutability. But increasing it also increases the belief variance, depressing sensitivity and, hence, effort. This is reflected by the denominator \( 1 + d^2 \). If \( d \) is too small, sensitivity disappears, as \( \delta \) is useless if the second signal does not enter the rating; if too large, sensitivity vanishes because ratings no longer inform ability. An intermediate value is best. The maximization problem is separable, as is clear from (12); \( d/(1 + d^2) \) is maximized at \( d = 1 \) and \( \sqrt{\delta}/(r + \delta) \) at \( \delta = r \). Independent of \( \delta \), the optimal weight on the second term is 1; independent of \( d \), the choice of impulse response is \( r \).

Hence, the intermediary does not only wish to influence persistence, by distorting via \( \delta \) the weights assigned to signals of different vintages. Via \( d \), she also manipulates the weights assigned to signals of different types to influence substitutability.

### 3.2 Optimal Ratings

This section solves for the optimal exclusive rating processes. We assume throughout that \( \kappa, \kappa^2, r, \) and 1 are all distinct. Define

\[
\lambda = (\kappa - 1)\sqrt{r}(1+r)m_{\alpha\beta} + (\kappa - r)\sqrt{\Delta}, \quad \Delta = (r + \kappa)^2(m_{\alpha\beta} - m_{\alpha\beta}^2) + (1 + r)^2m_{\alpha\beta}^2.
\]

**Theorem 3.1** The optimal confidential rating process is unique and given by

\[
u^c_k(t) = \beta_k \sigma_k^2 \left( d_k^c \frac{\sqrt{r}}{\lambda} e^{-rt} + e^{-\kappa t} \right),
\]

with coefficients

\[
d_k^c := (\kappa^2 - r^2)m_{\beta\beta} \frac{\alpha_k}{\beta_k} - (\kappa^2 - 1)m_{\alpha\beta}.
\]

**Theorem 3.2** The optimal public rating process is unique and given by

\[
u^p_k(t) = \beta_k \sigma_k^2 \left( d_k^p \frac{\sqrt{r}}{\lambda} e^{-\sqrt{\tau}t} + e^{-\kappa t} \right),
\]

\[37\text{Recall that we take ratings as proportional to the market mean belief. Throughout, uniqueness is to be understood as up to such a transformation.}

\[38\text{For convenience, the formula here also assumes that } \lambda \neq 0. \text{ The proof gives the general formula.}
\]
with coefficients
\[ d_k^p = \frac{\kappa - \sqrt{r}}{\kappa - r} d_k^c + \lambda \frac{\sqrt{r} - 1}{\kappa - r}. \] (13)

Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 provide solutions that are remarkably similar. Because the linear filter is the sum of two exponentials, the rating can be written as a sum of two Markov processes. That is, in both cases, for some \( \phi \in \mathbb{R} \),
\[ Y_t = \phi I_t + (1 - \phi) \nu_t, \]
where
\[ dI_t = \frac{\beta_k \sqrt{r}}{\sigma_k^2} \lambda \sum_k d_k (dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_t^* dt) - \delta I_t dt, \]
with \((d, \delta) = (d^c, r)\) in the confidential case and \((d, \delta) = (d^p, \sqrt{r})\) in the public one. The intermediary combines her own belief \( \nu_t \) with another Markov process, which we denote \( I \) (for “incentive”). Its impulse response reflects the agent’s patience, as in the second example in Section 3.1. If he is patient, the rating is persistent. If not, performance is reflected in the rating more rapidly than under Bayes’ rule. This common representation has several consequences:

- The optimal rating is not a Markov process. This echoes a large empirical literature documenting that (bond and credit) ratings do not appear to satisfy the Markov property (Altman and Kao (1992), Altman (1998), Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000), Bangia et al. (2002), Lando and Skødeberg (2002), etc.).
- The optimal rating is not a function of the intermediary’s belief alone. At first glance, this might be surprising, as the intermediary’s belief is the only payoff-relevant variable (in the confidential case). However, there is no reason to expect the optimal way of distributing the impact of an innovation over future ratings to be measurable with respect to the intermediary’s future beliefs.
- The optimal rating is a two-state mixture Markov rating—a combination of Markov chains moving at different speeds (Frydman (2005)). Using an EM algorithm, Frydman and Schuermann (2008) find that not only does such a two-state mixture Markov model outperform the Markov model in explaining credit ratings, but it also allows one to explain economic features of rating data.

What is most surprising is not that two Markov processes are needed to compute the rating but that two suffice. The part of the proof establishing sufficiency, explained

\[39\] This property is distinct from the first. The rating can be Markov without being a function of the belief (this occurs in the first example in Section 3.1). The rating can be a function of \( \nu \) without being Markov, as functions of Markov processes typically fail to inherit the Markov property.
in Section 3.3, sheds light on this. When regarded as a principal-agent model (the principal is the intermediary), promised utility does not suffice as a state variable. Utility is meted out via the market’s belief, and beliefs are correct on average. This imposes a constraint on an auxiliary variable and hence demands a second state.

The incentive state is an abstract construct. Another way of understanding what the intermediary does involves re-writing the rating in terms of another pair of states. For instance, using \((Y, \nu)\) (the rating itself and the intermediary’s beliefs) leads to a more concrete if less elegant prescription. Explicitly, in the confidential case,

\[
dY_t = \frac{\beta_k \sqrt{r}}{\sigma_k^2} \sum_k (d_{k,t}^c + 1) (dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_t^c dt) - rY_t dt + \frac{(\kappa + 1)(r - \kappa)}{\gamma^2} \nu_t dt,
\]

and hence, the intermediary continues to incorporate some of her private information (via her belief \(\nu_t\)) into the rating. In terms of \((Y, \nu)\), \(Y\) is a hidden Markov process, with \(\nu\) as the hidden state. This is the formulation occasionally considered for empirical purposes; see Giampieri, Davis, and Crowder (2005). Other representations of the rating process are possible, of course (e.g., as a process with rating momentum; see Stefanescu, Tunaru, and Turnbull (2006)).

Consider now the specific coefficients of the optimal rating processes. The following holds for both the optimal confidential and public ratings. \textit{White noise is harmful}: if \(\alpha_k = \beta_k = 0\), then signal \(k\)’s weight in the rating is zero. Irrelevant noise has no use, as it depresses effort. \textit{All signals enter the rating}: except for a non-generic parameter set, the rating involves them all. Some might be weighted negatively, when innovations along that dimension adversely impact incentives. However, as long as a signal is informative of at least type or effort, the rating takes it into account.

Among the differences between public and confidential ratings, two are notable. First, the impulse response on the incentive state conspicuously differs across the two environments: this state decays at the discount rate \(r\) in the confidential case, whereas in the public case, it does so at a rate equal to the harmonic mean between discounting and mean-reversion: \(\sqrt{r} = \frac{r}{1 + \frac{1}{2}}\) (the correct interpretation, using the change of variables in ft. 11). The reason is simple. As the second example in Section 3.1 suggests, the impulse response that best trades off persistence with sensitivity is \(r\). Unfortunately, the resulting autocorrelation fails to align with that of a public belief, which decays at the mean-reversion rate (Lemma 2.8). The optimal public rating fixes this in two ways: it distorts the impulse response on the incentive state away from the discount rate toward the mean-reversion rate, and it skews the weight on the incentive term \(d_{k}^p\) away from its favorite weight \(d_{k}^c\) (see (13)).

The second difference is concealed in the definition of this weight \(d_{k}^p\). If signals are
identical (more generally, if and only if the ratio $\alpha_k/\beta_k$ is the same for all signals that are not white noise), then these weights are all zero, and transparency is obtained. While this condition is non-generic for $K > 1$, it is always true when output is the only signal. Instead, with confidential ratings, transparency is a non-generic phenomenon, independent of $K$. The problem with one signal only is that twisting a weight and an impulse response partially is insufficient to fix the autocorrelation. The weight must be taken all the way down to zero: the “continuum” of autocorrelation constraints determines the “one-dimensional continuum” of variables (the filter $u_1(\cdot)$), and hence the rating, up to some white noise that the intermediary does not wish to use.

To conclude this section, we note that the weights of different signals in the incentive term are ordered according to $\alpha_k/\beta_k$.

3.3 Proof Overview

Our problem has some unconventional features that make it difficult to apply dynamic programming or Pontryagin’s maximum principle, as is usually done in principal-agent models. Hence, our method of proof is somewhat non-standard and hopefully useful in related contexts.

In the first part, we derive necessary conditions using calculus of variations. The necessary condition determines a unique candidate for the optimal rating (up to a factor), if it exists and is sufficiently regular. In the second part, we verify that the guess from the first part is optimal. This step introduces a parameterized family of auxiliary principal-agent models and takes limits in a certain way.

Part I: Necessary Conditions

Recall that the ratings communicated to the market may be confidential or public and the information generated by the signals exclusive or non-exclusive. Thus, there are four settings of interest. In all settings, we normalize the mean rating to zero, and the variance to one.

The Representation Lemma (Lemma 2.10) characterizes all rating processes in terms of a linear filter $u$, which we use as a control variable. Lemma 2.11 expresses the equilibrium marginal cost of the agent as a function of the filter. Maximizing the equilibrium action is equivalent to maximizing the marginal cost. Thus, we seek to

\[40\]

Although whether the ranking increases or decreases in the ratio depends not only on the sign of $m_\beta$ but also on whether $r \in [\kappa, \kappa^2]$ ($r \leq \kappa^2$) in the confidential (public) case.
identify a control \( u \) that maximizes a product of two integrals over \( u \):

\[
\frac{\gamma^2}{2} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_0^\infty u_k(t)e^{-rt} \, dt \right] \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \int_0^\infty u_k(t)e^{-t} \, dt \right].
\] (14)

In this first part of the proof, we focus on controls that exhibit a sufficient degree of regularity, and we assume that a solution exists within that family.

The maximization is subject to the constraints that the rating process must satisfy. In the simplest case of confidential exclusive information structures, the only constraint is the variance normalization, which is written as follows:

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_0^\infty u_k(s)^2 \, ds + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty U(s)U(t)e^{-|s-t|} \, ds \, dt = 1,
\] (15)

where \( U := \sum \beta_k u_k \). The higher dimensionality of the problem is plain in (15). Maximizing (14) subject to (15) is a variational problem with an isoperimetric constraint. We form the Lagrangian and consider a relaxed, unconstrained problem that “internalizes” the variance normalization as part of the objective function. However, the problem is not standard: both objective (14) and constraint (15) include multiple integrals, yet the control has a one-dimensional input. Adapting standard arguments, we prove a version of the Euler-Lagrange necessary condition that covers our class of programs (see Appendix B). This condition takes the form of an integral equation in \( u \), which can be solved in closed form via successive differentiation and algebraic manipulation. The solution of the relaxed problem can be shown to be a solution of the original problem, which yields a candidate for the optimal rating (unique subject to regularity conditions).

In the more general public and/or non-exclusive settings (see Section 4.1), the objective (14) remains the same, but there are additional constraints on the rating process. These capture the restriction that market beliefs are linked to public or non-exclusive information structures. The lemmas 2.7 and 2.8 state these constraints in the exclusive case, and Lemma 4.1 does so for the non-exclusive cases. Then, we can apply the Representation Lemma (Lemma 2.10) to directly express these constraints in terms of the filter \( u \).

There are two additional difficulties in these settings. First, there is no longer a finite number of constraints but a continuum of them. Second, these constraints involve further integral equations with delay.

\footnote{There is a small literature on the calculus of variations with delayed arguments for single integrals. See Kamenskii (2007) and references therein. There is also a literature on multiple...}
setting, the constraint (15) is replaced by

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_0^\infty u_k(t)u_k(t+\tau) \, dt + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty U(s)U(t)e^{-|s+\tau-t|} \, ds \, dt = 1, \quad \forall \tau \geq 0. \quad (16)
\]

To address this, we reduce the continuum of constraints to a finite set of constraints, applying “educated” linear combinations. We solve the relaxed optimization problem with a finite number of constraints in a manner similar to that for the simplest setting just described. For instance, in the public exclusive setting, we replace (16) by

\[
1 = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_0^\infty u_k(t)u_k(t) \, dt + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty U(s)U(t)e^{-|s+\tau-t|} \, ds \, dt,
\]

where \( h(\tau) := e^{-\tau}. \) Naturally, \( h \) can be interpreted as a continuum of Lagrange multipliers, but as opposed to the discrete Lagrange multipliers, deriving \( h \) via the Euler-Lagrange equations is not feasible. Instead, inspired by numerical simulations, we guess the functional form of \( h. \) Because two solutions satisfy the Euler-Lagrange conditions, corresponding to a minimum and maximum equilibrium action, we must select the maximizer using some form of second-order condition, which is, loosely, in our setting the analogue of the classical Legendre necessary condition.

Part II: Verification

The calculus of variations determines an essentially unique candidate for the filter \( u \) and thus a unique candidate rating. However, few sufficient conditions are known in the calculus of variations. Most are based on the Hilbert Invariant Integral. However, in the case of (even one-dimensional) integral equations with delayed argument, the integrals without delayed arguments; see Morrey (1966) for a classical treatise. In both cases, the domain of the control is of the same dimension as the domain of integration.
method does not apply (Sabbagh (1969)).

Instead, we interpret the intermediary’s optimization differently, as a principal-agent model. In this auxiliary model, the agent produces signals and outputs exactly as in the original model and obtains the same payoffs. However, there is no longer a market, nor an intermediary. Instead, the agent receives transfers from a principal, who observes all outputs and signals, as does the agent. The principal’s information at time \( t \) is thus \( \mathcal{G}_t \), as defined in the original model. To simplify the exposition, let us focus on the confidential exclusive case. There are already two difficulties to overcome here: the action must be constant (a constraint that is difficult to formalize in the principal-agent context) and the transfer must be equal to the “market” belief.

The principal chooses a transfer process \( \mu \), which is interpreted as the instantaneous payment flow from the principal to the agent. As in the original model, the agent chooses an action process \( A \) (the agent’s strategy) that maximizes, at all \( t \),

\[
E \left[ \int_{s \geq t} e^{-r(s-t)}(\mu_s - c(A_s)) \, ds \right]_{\mathcal{G}_t}. \tag{17}
\]

In the principal-agent formulation, the transfer process \( \mu \) is not constrained to be a belief nor to have a Gaussian form.

The principal has a discount rate \( \rho < r \) and seeks to maximize the ex ante payoff

\[
E \left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} \rho e^{-\rho t}(c'(A_t) + \phi \mu_t(\nu_t - \mu_t)) \, dt \right], \tag{18}
\]

where \( \phi \) is some scalar multiplier and \( \nu_t := E[\theta_t | \mathcal{G}_t] \) is the mean ability of the agent under transparency. The maximization is performed over all strategies \( A \) and transfer processes \( \mu \) such that the action \( A \) is incentive compatible, i.e., it maximizes (17).

To interpret the principal’s objective, it is useful to consider the reward appearing in (18). The term \( c'(A_t) \) is the agent’s marginal cost, which the intermediary maximizes in the original model. If the payoff were reduced to this term, the principal might not choose a \( \mu \) associated with a market belief. However, for the principal-agent and original models to be comparable, \( \mu \) must be close to a market belief. The second term \( \phi \mu_t(\nu_t - \mu_t) \) imposes a penalty on the principal to incite the principal to choose a \( \mu \) close to a market belief. Indeed, observe that if \( \mu_t \) and \( \nu_t \) are jointly normal, then \( E[\mu_t(\nu_t - \mu_t)] = 0 \) if and only if \( \text{Cov}[\mu_t, \nu_t] = \text{Var}[\mu_t] \); this is the condition required

\footnote{The Lagrangian can be interpreted as a bilinear quadratic form with a continuum of variables. Proving that the candidate control \( u \) is optimal is then equivalent to proving that the quadratic form has no saddle point. This involves a diagonalization of the quadratic form in an infinite-dimensional space, which in our case is not tractable.}
for a Gaussian process \( \mu \) to be a market belief, by Lemma 2.7.

If \( \mu \) is a market belief process associated with a confidential information structure, then \( \text{Cov}[\mu_t, \nu_t] = \text{Var}[\mu_t] \) and the principal’s payoff is equal to

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^\infty r e^{-\rho t} c'(A_t) \right] = c'(A),
\]

where \( c'(A) \) refers to the stationary marginal cost. Thus, the maximum payoff of the principal is never less than the marginal cost in the original model for every \( \rho \).

We find that there is no multiplier \( \phi \) such that the principal maximizes his payoff by choosing a \( \mu \) that is exactly a market belief. However, using the calculus of variations from Part I, we can “guess” a multiplier \( \phi \) such that the payoff-maximizing \( \mu \) approaches a market belief as \( \rho \to 0 \).

Note that in the original model, the intermediary must induce a constant equilibrium effort by the agent. In the principal-agent formulation, instead, the principal maximizes over all equilibrium action processes. Perhaps surprisingly, it is easier to solve this “fully dynamic” problem. Indeed, we are able to solve the principal-agent problem in closed form for every \( \rho \in (0, r) \). Then, sending the principal’s discount rate to zero leads to a solution that is constant in the limit, the optimal transfer tends to a market belief, and the principal’s payoff becomes equal to the intermediary’s objective in the original model (the agent’s marginal cost). Formally, by sending \( \rho \) to 0, the maximum principal payoff converges to the conjectured maximum marginal cost from Part I. Because the principal’s payoff cannot be lower than the intermediary’s objective, this proves that the rating obtained in Part I is optimal.

In the public and non-exclusive cases, the methodology is similar, but the payoff of the principal is different to account for a different set of constraints to internalize. In those cases, the principal’s payoff includes additional state variables to induce the principal to choose a \( \mu \) associated with public or non-exclusive market beliefs.

Note that, if we were able to properly internalize the constraint that the principal must choose transfer processes among what would correspond to market beliefs, the principal-agent formulation could, in principle, be used to obtain the necessary conditions of Part I. The difficulty is precisely that we cannot internalize these constraints, both with finite and infinite horizons, with a positive discount rate. This is why we consider a family of principal-agent problems and take limits as \( \rho \to 0 \). The calculus of variations then makes it possible to obtain the candidate optimal rating and the correct multipliers to be used in the principal-agent formulation.
Figure 2: Rating in the case of homogenous signals (here, $\alpha = \beta = \sigma = 1$).

### 3.4 The Incentive State as a Benchmark

To gain further insight into the role and structure of the incentive state, let us consider a special case. Suppose that signals are identical, namely, $\alpha_k = \beta_k = 1$, $\sigma_k = \sigma$ for all $k$. As discussed, transparency is obtained under public ratings. Let us instead consider confidential ratings. Theorem 3.1 immediately yields that, for all $k$,

$$u_k^c(t) = u^c(t) := \frac{1}{\sigma^2} \left[ \frac{1 - \sqrt{r}}{\sqrt{\kappa}} \sqrt{r} e^{-rt} + e^{-\kappa t} \right].$$

Hence, whether the incentive state is added or subtracted from the belief state depends on how $\sqrt{r}$ compares to 1 and $\kappa$. If $\sqrt{r}$ lies in $[1, \kappa]$, the sign of its coefficient is negative, meaning that it is subtracted. If it is outside this interval, it is added.

Plainly, which of the two impulse responses $r$ and $\kappa$ is largest depends on whether $\sqrt{r} \leq \sqrt{\kappa} \in (1, \kappa)$, leading us to distinguish four intervals: $\sqrt{r} \in [0, 1]$, $[1, \sqrt{\kappa}]$, $[\sqrt{\kappa}, \kappa]$, and $[\kappa, \infty)$. The relative size of $r$ vs. $\kappa$ translates into how the negative sign affects the shape of $u^c(\cdot)$, as illustrated by Figure 2. If $\sqrt{r} \in [1, \sqrt{\kappa}]$, then $u(0) > 0$, but it is single-troughed and negative above some threshold $t$. Instead, if $\sqrt{r} \in [\sqrt{\kappa}, \kappa]$, then $u(0) < 0$ and $u$ is single-peaked and positive above some threshold $t$. To see why a negative weight on the incentive term can be optimal, consider the case of a patient
agent \((r < \kappa)\) with output as the only signal and a rating process from the family

\[
u(t) = \frac{\beta}{\sigma^2} (de^{-\delta t} + e^{-\kappa t}),
\]

for some \(d \in \mathbb{R}, \delta > 0\). Applying Lemma 2.11 (see (7)) yields as effort

\[
c'(A) = \alpha \int_0^\infty u(t)e^{-rt}dt \frac{\sqrt{\text{Var}[Y_t]}}{\text{Corr}[Y_t, \theta_t]} \propto \frac{\sqrt{(1+d)^2 + \delta(1+\delta/\kappa)j^2}}{1+\delta} \text{Corr}[Y_t, \theta_t].
\]

(19)

Correlation (Term B) is maximized by transparency, setting \(d = 0\): the market is never as well informed as when the intermediary reveals her own belief. Hence, to understand whether \(d \geq 0\), we focus on the first term of (19), Term A. Its numerator is a gross (non-adjusted) measure of incentives. It is decreasing in \(r\) and linearly increasing in \(d\): the higher the rating scale is, the greater the impact of additional effort on the rating and hence, if the market does not account for the scale, the stronger the agent’s incentives. However, the market adjusts for scaling via the denominator of Term A (the standard deviation of the rating). This standard deviation is decreasing in the rate of mean-reversion (see ft. 11) and nonlinear in \(d\). The derivative of Term A evaluated at \(d = 0\) is of the same sign as

\[
\frac{\kappa + r}{\delta + r} - \frac{\kappa + 1}{\delta + 1},
\]

the sign of which when \(\delta < \kappa\) (as when \(\delta = r\), its optimal value) is determined by \(r \geq 1\). Impatience dilutes the positive impact of a higher \(d\) (the first term of (20)) on the numerator of Term A, just as mean-reversion dilutes the negative impact of a higher \(d\) (the second term) via the denominator. If impatience outweighs mean-reversion \((r > 1)\), it is better to opt for a lower standard deviation and select a negative \(d\).

For \((r, \kappa) = (3,4)\), for instance, the negative weight for \(t = 1\) implies that a positive surprise at time \(\tau\) negatively impacts the rating at \(\tau + 1\) (see the top-right panel of Figure 2). However the rating has a positive impact until then (or, rather, until \(\sim \tau + .6\)). The market accounts for the fact that the rating “understates” performance; the way it is done improves its quality.

Certainly, this is a rather subtle point, but it is robust. While it is simplest to see in the case of identical signals, it holds for a broad range of parameters (roughly, \footnote{The case in which \(r > \kappa\) can be interpreted similarly, but \(c'(A)\) is not single-peaked in \(d \leq 0\) in that case and the derivative at 0 is not informative.}
when \( r \) is close to \( \kappa \) for confidential ratings. It also occurs under public ratings, for the same reasons. Moreover, it resonates with some practices. Murphy (2001) documents the widespread practice of past-year benchmarking as an instrument to evaluate managerial performance, commenting on its seemingly perverse incentive to underperform with an eye on the long term. Ratcheting does not explain it, as the compensation systems under study involve commitment by the firm.

### 3.5 Public vs. Confidential Ratings: A Closer Look

In this subsection, we further develop the comparison between public and confidential ratings by examining performance (effort) and informativeness (variance of the market belief). Throughout, the superscripts \( p \) and \( c \) refer to the information structure. The explicit value of the objective is given first.

**Lemma 3.3** The marginal cost induced is

\[
c'(A^c) = \frac{\kappa - 1}{4(\kappa + r)m_\beta} \left( 2m_\alpha \beta + \sqrt{\Delta/r} \right),
\]
given the optimal confidential rating process, and, given the optimal public process,

\[
c'(A^p) = \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\sqrt{r} - 1}{\sqrt{r} + 1} \right)^2 \right) c'(A^c).
\]

The first factor in the formula for \( c'(A^p) \) quantifies the extent to which the public rating fails to match the performance of the confidential rating. Because the discount rate is the only parameter that enters this wedge, the two effort levels vary in the same way with respect to all other parameters. A higher impact of effort on signals \((m_\alpha)\) or noise in the type process \((\gamma)\) increases effort. It is readily verified that effort is decreasing in \( r \) in the public case and that this need not be in the confidential case. In both cases, effort vanishes when \( r \to \infty \) and is maximized when \( r \to 0 \). In the confidential case, effort then grows without bound, whereas it approaches a finite limit with a public rating. The informativeness of the rating is measured by the variance of the belief: the higher this variance is, the better informed the market.

**Lemma 3.4** The variance of the market belief is

\[
\text{Var} \mu^c = \frac{(\kappa - 1)^2}{4m_\beta} \left( 1 + 2m_\alpha \beta \sqrt{r/\Delta} \right),
\]
given the optimal confidential rating process, and

\[ \text{Var } \mu^p = \left( 1 + \left( \frac{\sqrt{r} - 1}{\sqrt{r} + 1} \right)^2 \right) \text{Var } \mu^c, \]

given the optimal public rating process.

Hence, the market is better informed given public ratings, confirming a plausible but not foregone conclusion. Here also, the wedge is a function of the discount rate alone, implying that the degrees of informativeness vary alike in all other respects.\textsuperscript{44}

However, with respect to the discount rate, the variation of accuracy could not be more different. As the left (right) panel of Figure 3 illustrates, variance is maximized (minimized) at an intermediate level of patience in the confidential (public) case. When ratings are confidential, an emphasis on the incentive state becomes dominant with extreme discounting. Thus, the rating becomes less accurate. Instead, given public ratings, transparency is obtained asymptotically, whether \( r \to 0, \infty \). Publicness is a constraint that leaves the intermediary with little flexibility when only the long term matters \( (r \approx 0) \). When only the very short term matters, the incentive state decays too rapidly. As a result, under public ratings, the market backs out the belief state (the weight that the rating would have to assign to the incentive state to prevent this would transform the rating into de facto white noise).

![Figure 3: Confidential and public variance, as a function of \( r \) (here, \((\alpha_2, \beta_2, \sigma_2, \gamma, \sigma_1) = (3, 2, 1, 1, 2), K = 2)\).](image)

---

\textsuperscript{44}Which is not to say that these comparative statics are foregone conclusions. For instance, \textit{adding} a signal can lead to a less-informed market.
Figure 4: Marginal cost of effort as a function of maximum belief variance, public vs. confidential ratings (here, \((\beta_1, \beta_2, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \gamma, r, \sigma_1, \sigma_2) = (3, 2, 1/3, 5, 1, 1/5, 1, 2))

This raises a natural question: is requiring ratings to be public equivalent to setting standards of accuracy? To answer this, we plot the solution (maximum marginal cost of effort) to the two problems—confidential and public ratings—subject to an additional constraint on the variance of the market belief. See Figure 4.45

Quality and effort are substitutes: transparency does not maximize effort. These substitutes are imperfect, as the effort-maximizing rating does not leave the market in the dark. Hence, there is a range of precision levels over which it conflicts with effort provision. Fixing precision, there is a maximum effort level that can be induced by the rating. (Curves are truncated at this maximum.) This maximum effort corresponds to a rating process qualitatively similar to the unconstrained one; only the weights on the exponentials vary. As is clear from the figure, effort is higher in the confidential case for any given level of variance. A confidential rating system is simultaneously able to incentivize more effort and provide better information than a public system.

4 Extensions

For brevity, we focus here on two generalizations. First, we allow some signals to be non-exclusive. That is, the intermediary cannot prevent the market from observing them publicly. Second, we consider the case in which the agent’s actions are multidimensional, possibly differentially affecting signals and output. All proofs for this section are in the online appendix (Hörner and Lambert (2015)).

45This plot is based on necessary conditions, but we expect that Theorems 3.1 3.2 extend.
4.1 Exclusivity

Not all information can be hidden. If the market represents long-run consumers that repeatedly interact with the agent, cumulative output is likely publicly observable. In credit ratings, solicited ratings are based on a mix of information that is widely available to market participants, as well as information that is exclusively accessible to the intermediary (see ft. [18]). We refer to this distinction as exclusive vs. non-exclusive information. The intermediary does not ignore the fact that the market has direct access to this source of information. What she reveals about the exclusive signals that she can conceal also reflects the characteristics of those signals that she cannot.

Formally, all participants observe \( \{ S_{k,s} \}_{s \leq t, k=1,...,K_0} \) in addition to the information provided by the intermediary (we consider the cases of both public and confidential structures, according to whether past information is publicly available).

Signals \( S_{k,t}, k > K_0 \), are only observed by the intermediary and the agent. If \( K_0 = 0 \), ratings are exclusive, as in Section 3. If \( K_0 = K \), it is transparency, as in Section 2.4. The statements for \( K_0 = 0, K \) require adjustments in the theorems given below; as they are already covered by earlier results, we rule them out. The next lemma generalizes lemmas 2.7 and 2.8.

Lemma 4.1

1. (Confidential non-exclusive ratings) Given a scalar rating process \( Y \),

\[
Y_t \propto E^* [\theta_t \mid Y_t, \{ S_{k,s} \}_{k \leq K_0, s \leq t}] \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}
\]

if and only if \( E^*[Y_t] = 0 \) \( \forall t \) and, for all \( k \leq K_0 \),

\[
\text{Corr}[S_{k,t}, Y_{t+\tau}] = \text{Corr}[Y_t, \theta_t] = \text{Corr}[S_{k,t}, \theta_{t+\tau}] \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}, \tau \geq 0.
\]

2. (Public non-exclusive ratings) Given a scalar rating process \( Y \),

\[
Y_t \propto E^* [\theta_t \mid \{ Y_s \}_{s \leq t}, \{ S_{k,s} \}_{k \leq K_0, s \leq t}] \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}
\]

if and only if \( E^*[Y_t] = 0 \) \( \forall t \),

\[
\text{Corr}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] = \text{Corr}[\theta_t, \theta_{t+\tau}] \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}, \tau \geq 0,
\]

and, for all \( k \leq K_0 \),

\[
\text{Corr}[S_{k,t}, Y_{t+\tau}] = \text{Corr}[Y_t, \theta_t] = \text{Corr}[S_{k,t}, \theta_{t+\tau}] \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}, \tau \geq 0.
\]

\footnote{By our ordering convention, output is observed whenever any signal is observed.}
Similarly, Lemma 2.10 remains valid, with the obvious modification. But a new choice arises: does the belief represent the interim belief based solely on the information communicated by the intermediary, to be combined with the non-exclusive signals into a posterior belief (in which case, \( u_k = 0 \) for \( k \leq K_0 \)), or this posterior belief itself? In other words, should the rating already incorporate the information conveyed by the non-exclusive signals? Both formulations are possible, so this is a matter of convention. We attempt to preserve as much as possible the analogy with the solution in the exclusive case. This demands an interim approach for confidential information structures and a posterior approach for public information structures.

The main results of this section require the following notation. First, we introduce the rate at which a belief based solely on public signals decays, namely,

\[
\hat{\kappa} = \sqrt{1 + \gamma^2 \sum_{k=1}^{K_0} \frac{\beta_k^2}{\sigma_k^2}}.
\]

Second, we generalize the sums \(8\) to the current framework, e.g.,

\[
m_n^{\alpha} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_0} \frac{\alpha_k^2}{\sigma_k^2}, \quad m_n^{\alpha\beta} := \sum_{k=1}^{K_0} \frac{\alpha_k\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2}, \quad m_n^{\beta} := \sum_{k=1}^{K_0} \frac{\beta_k^2}{\sigma_k^2},
\]

and

\[
m_e^{\alpha} = \sum_{k=K_0+1}^{K} \frac{\alpha_k^2}{\sigma_k^2}, \quad m_e^{\alpha\beta} := \sum_{k=K_0+1}^{K} \frac{\alpha_k\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2}, \quad m_e^{\beta} := \sum_{k=K_0+1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k^2}{\sigma_k^2}.
\]

We assume throughout that either \(m_n^{\alpha\beta} \geq 0\) or \(m_{\alpha\beta} \geq 0\), ensuring that positive effort can be achieved in equilibrium (by either disclosing no or all exclusive information).\textsuperscript{47}

More generally, we add superscripts \(n,e\) (for non-exclusive and exclusive) whenever convenient, with the meaning being clear from the context.

We find that Theorem 3.1 holds \textit{verbatim}, provided we redefine \(\Delta\). Let

\[
\lambda = (\kappa - 1) \left( \sqrt{r}(1 + r)m_{\alpha\beta} + (\kappa^2 - r^2)\sqrt{\Delta} \right),
\]

where

\[
\Delta := \frac{(\kappa + 1)(\hat{\kappa} + 1)}{2(\kappa - \hat{\kappa})} \left[ \frac{m_e^{\alpha}m_e^{\beta}}{\kappa^2 - \hat{\kappa}^2} + \frac{(1 + 2r + \hat{\kappa})(m_n^{\alpha\beta})^2}{(r + \hat{\kappa})^2(\hat{\kappa} + 1)} - \frac{(1 + 2r + \kappa)m_n^{2\alpha\beta}}{(r + \kappa)^2(\kappa + 1)} \right].
\]

\textsuperscript{47}These assumptions are not necessary. The rating process defined in the theorem yields a candidate value for \(c'(A)\). If it is positive, the rating system is optimal. If not, then effort is zero.
With these slightly generalized formulas, we restate Theorem 3.1.

**Theorem 4.2** The optimal confidential rating process is unique and given by, for $f \leq K_0$, $u_k = 0$ and $k > K_0$,

$$u_k(t) = \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \left( d_k \frac{\sqrt{r}}{\lambda} e^{-rt} + e^{-\kappa t} \right),$$

with coefficients

$$d_k := (\kappa^2 - r^2)m_\beta \frac{\alpha_k}{\beta_k} - (\kappa^2 - 1) m_\alpha \beta.$$ 

**Theorem 4.3** The optimal non-exclusive public rating process is unique and given by, for signals $k \leq K_0$,

$$u^n_k(t) = \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \left( d^n e^{-\delta t} + e^{-\kappa t} \right),$$

and for signals $k > K_0$,

$$u^e_k(t) = \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \left( \left( c^e \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + d^e \frac{\alpha_k}{\beta_k} \right) e^{-\delta t} + e^{-\kappa t} \right),$$

for some constants $d^n, c^e, d^e$ and $\delta > 0$ given in Appendix A.

The parameters $d^n, c^e, d^e$ are elementary functions of $\delta$, where $\delta$ is a root of a polynomial of degree 6. This polynomial is irreducible. Using Galois theory, we show that it admits no solution in terms of radicals. It always admits exactly two positive roots, and we indicate how to select the correct one (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A).

The differences in parameter values should not distract from the overarching commonalities. Most important, as in the exclusive case, the optimal process is expressed in terms of a two-state Markov process, with one state being the intermediary’s belief. As before, it can be restated as a system in which the intermediary revises the rating by gradually incorporating her belief. As under exclusivity, with public ratings, the optimal rating reduces to transparency if the exclusive signals are redundant (i.e., if $\alpha_k/\beta_k$ is independent of $k, k > K_0$) as is the case if there is only one such signal.

The intermediary does not need to observe the realized values of the non-exclusive signals to incentivize the agent. Yet non-exclusivity affects the quality of the information available to the market. As an example, consider Figure 5, which

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48 This is not obvious from the statement of Theorem 4.3 because we chose to state the optimal non-exclusive public rating process as a posterior belief.
Figure 5: Belief variances (here, $K = 2$ and $(\alpha_k, \beta_k, \sigma_k, \gamma) = (1, 1, 1, 4), k = 1, 2$).

describes variances under confidential ratings in a variety of cases. The market is better informed (i.e., the variance of the market belief is highest) when information is non-exclusive (the higher solid line) than when it is not (the dotted line). However, this is only the case because the market can rely on the non-exclusive signal (the output) in addition to the rating. If (counterfactually) a market participant were to rely on the rating alone to derive inferences on ability (lower solid line), he would be worse off under non-exclusivity. This does not necessarily imply that the information conveyed by the rating is degraded because of the existence of another signal that the intermediary cannot hide. As is clear from Figure 5, variance could be even lower if the non-exclusive signal did not exist at all and we were considering the confidential rating process for the case of one signal only (dashed line). For nearly all discount rates, however, the presence of non-exclusive information depresses the intermediary’s willingness to disclose information regarding her unshared signal—free information and the information conveyed by the rating are then strategic substitutes.

4.2 Multiple Actions

Ratings are often criticized for biasing, rather than bolstering, incentives. When the agent engages in multiple tasks, a poorly designed system might distract attention from those actions that boost output and toward those that boost ratings.

49This is consistent with a large empirical literature in finance showing that (i) ratings do not summarize all the information that is publicly available and that (ii) the value-added of these ratings decreases in the quality of information otherwise available.
Such moral hazard takes many forms. In credit rating, for instance, both shirking and risk-shifting by the issuer are costly moral hazard activities that rating systems might encourage (see Langohr and Langohr (2009), Ch. 3). Report cards in sectors such as health care and education are widely criticized for encouraging providers to “game” the system, leading doctors to inefficient selection behavior and teachers to concentrate their effort on developing those skills measured by standardized tests.\footnote{See Porter (2015) for a variety of other examples.}

Our model can accommodate such concerns. We illustrate how in the context of confidential ratings. Suppose that there is not one but $L$ effort levels $A_\ell$, $\ell = 1, \ldots, L$, with a cost of effort that is additively separable.\footnote{For a discussion of the restriction implied by separability, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).} With some abuse of notation,

$$c(A_1, \ldots, A_L) = \sum_\ell c(A_\ell).$$

For concreteness, assume that $c(A_\ell) = c A_\ell^2$, $c > 0$, although the method applies quite generally.\footnote{That is, as long as the resulting Lagrangian is not abnormal.} Signals are now defined by their law

$$dS_{k,t} = (\sum_\ell \alpha_{k,\ell} A_{\ell,t} + \beta_k \theta_t) dt + \sigma_k dW_{k,t},$$

for all $k = 1, \ldots, K$, with $\sum_\ell \alpha_{1,\ell} \neq 0$. The model is otherwise unchanged.

This model is solved as in Section 3.2 via a change of variables. Define a fictitious model with one-dimensional effort $A$, cost $c(A) = c A^2$ and signals $\tilde{S}_k$ with law

$$d\tilde{S}_{k,t} = (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \theta_t) dt + \sigma_k dW_{k,t},$$

for all $k = 1, \ldots, K$, where

$$\alpha_k := \frac{\sum_\ell \alpha_{1,\ell} \alpha_{k,\ell}}{\sum_\ell \alpha_{1,\ell}}.$$

**Lemma 4.4** The optimal confidential rating process is the same in both the original model and the fictitious model.

In terms of the optimal linear filter $\{u_k\}_k$ for the fictitious model, each effort level in the original model is then given by

$$c'(A_\ell) = \frac{\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t]}{\text{Var}[Y_t]} \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \left( \sum_k \alpha_{k,\ell} u_k \right) dt,$$
The following example shows that the optimal rating remains opaque and does not seek to deter effort in unproductive tasks. Output is only a function of effort $A_1$; however, the signal $S_2$ reflects both effort $A_2$ and the agent’s type; namely,

$$dS_{1,t} = A_{1,t} \, dt + \sigma_1 \, dW_{1,t}, \text{ and }$$

$$dS_{2,t} = (A_{2,t} + \theta_t) \, dt + \sigma_2 \, dW_{2,t}.$$  

Absent any rating, if either only the first signal or both signals are observed, the unique equilibrium involves $A_\ell = 0$, $\ell = 1, 2$. Action $A_1$ does not affect learning about the type, and the type does not enter output. The optimal rating is given by

$$u_1(t) = \frac{\sqrt{r}}{\sigma_1} e^{-rt}, \text{ and } u_2(t) = \frac{e^{-\kappa t}}{\sigma_2^2}.$$  

The signal that is irrelevant for learning is not discarded. Rather, it is exclusively assigned to the incentive term; conversely, the signal that matters for learning matters only for the learning term. This leads to positive effort on both dimensions, namely,

$$c'(A_1) = \frac{\kappa - 1}{4 \sqrt{r} \sigma_1}, \quad c'(A_2) = \frac{\kappa - 1}{2(r + \kappa) \sigma_2^2},$$

and market belief variance $\frac{1}{4} (\kappa - 1)^2 \sigma_2^2$. Unproductive effort in the unobservable dimension that affects learning is the price to pay for effort in the productive activity.

### 4.3 Performance of Standard Policies

Many real-world systems do not use two-state mixtures. Here, we illustrate how our methods also allow us to compare some standard policies that are used in practice. As mentioned in Section 2.2, exponential smoothing and moving windows are two common systems. We argue that a properly calibrated exponential smoothing rating process outperforms any moving window rating process. For simplicity, we focus on confidential exclusive ratings with only one additional signal (simply denoted $S_t$).

Formally, in the case of exponential smoothing, the intermediary releases signal

$$Y_t = \int_{s \leq t} e^{-\delta(t-s)} [c \, dX_s + (1 - c) \, dS_s]$$

at time $t$, where $\delta > 0$ is the coefficient of smoothing and $c$ is the relative weight.
placed on the output. With a moving window, the intermediary releases a signal

\[ Y_t = \int_{t-T}^t [c \, dX_s + (1 - c) \, dS_s], \]

where \( T > 0 \) is the size of the moving window. The \textit{optimal} exponential smoothing (resp., moving window) system is defined by the choice of \((c, \delta)\) (resp., \((c, T)\)) such that equilibrium effort is maximized. It is simple to show the following.

**Lemma 4.5** The \textit{optimal confidential exponential smoothing rating process yields higher effort than any moving window rating process.}

The proof establishes a stronger statement: for any weight \( c \) on the output, the best rating process using exponential smoothing with that weight outperforms the best moving window rating process with the same weight.

### 5 Concluding Comments

Our stylized model lays bare why one should not expect ratings to be Markovian and why, for instance, the same performance can have an impact on the rating that is either positive or negative according to its vintage. Richer versions might deliver more nuanced rating systems but will not overturn these insights.

Nonetheless, it is desirable to extend the analysis in several directions. First, in terms of technology, we have assumed that effort and ability are substitutes. While this follows Holmström (1999) and most of the literature on career concerns, it is limiting, as Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) make clear. Building on Cisternas (2015), for instance, it might be possible to extend the analysis to cases in which effort and ability are complements. The absence of risk-aversion allows us to use effort as a yardstick for efficiency. Allowing for CARA preferences, for instance, would be useful to discuss the welfare implications of the informativeness of ratings.

Second, in terms of market structure, we have assumed a competitive market without commitment and a single agent. When the firm that designs the rating system is the same that pays the worker, one might wish to align its ability to commit along these two dimensions. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) offer an obvious framework. Relative performance evaluation requires introducing more agents but is also a natural extension, given the prevalence of the practice in performance appraisal.

Third, in terms of the rating process, stationarity, in particular, is an assumption that one might wish to relax. It is needed (among other uses) for the Representation Lemma (Lemma 2.10), one of the premises of our analysis. Nonetheless, one can
bypass this difficulty by simply asserting that the rating process admits a (possibly non-stationary) linear filter. This might be difficult to interpret in terms of primitives (the random process of the rating), but it includes the class considered here.

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A Missing Formulas for Theorem 4.3

The missing formulas for Theorem 4.3 are

\[ d^n := -\frac{\kappa - 1}{\delta - 1} - \frac{\Lambda_1 R_\beta (\delta + \kappa - r - 1)}{z(\delta - 1)(\delta + \kappa - R_\beta)}; \]

\[ c^e := \frac{(\delta - r)(m_{\alpha \beta} R_\beta + z)}{(r - \kappa)z}, \quad d^e := \frac{(\delta - r)(\kappa + r)m_\beta R_\beta}{(\kappa^2 - 1)z}, \]

where

\[ \Lambda_1 := \frac{\lambda_1 (\kappa + r) ((1 - \delta^2) m_\beta + (\kappa^2 - 1)m_\beta^n)}{(\delta - 1)m_\beta(r - \delta)}, \]

\[ R_\beta := \frac{(\kappa - 1)((\delta - 1)(r + 1)m_\beta + (\kappa + 1)m_\beta^n(r + 1 - \delta - \kappa))}{(\delta - 1)m_\beta(r - \delta)}, \]

\[ z := \frac{m_{\alpha \beta} \left( (r^2 - 1)m_\beta - (\kappa^2 - 1)m_\beta^n \right)}{(\delta - \kappa)m_\beta(r - \delta)} + \frac{r^2 - \kappa^2 \left( (\kappa^2 - 1) \lambda_1 m_\beta^n - (\delta - 1)m_\beta \left( (\delta + 1)\lambda_1 + m_{\alpha \beta}^n(r - \delta) \right) \right)}{(\delta - 1)(\delta - \kappa)m_\beta(r - \delta)}, \]

in terms of \( \lambda_1 \) and \( \delta \).

The parameter \( \lambda_1 \) is a function of \( \delta \), and we accordingly write \( \lambda_1(\delta) \) when convenient. It holds that

\[ \lambda_1 = \frac{(r - \delta)((\kappa - 1)\sigma_\beta (r(\delta + \kappa + 1) - \delta^2) + (\delta + \kappa)(\delta^2 - \kappa r))}{(1 - \kappa)\sigma_\beta D_1 + \sigma_{\alpha \beta}(\kappa + r)D_2} (A_1 + A_2), \]

where

\[ A_1 = (\kappa^2 - 1)m_{\alpha \beta}^2 \left( (\delta + \kappa)^2 - (\kappa + 1)\sigma_\beta (2\delta + \kappa - 1) \right) \left( (\kappa^2 - 1)\sigma_\beta + 2\sigma_{\alpha \beta} \right); \]

\[ A_2 = (\kappa + r)^2 \left( x^2 \sigma_\alpha m_\alpha m_\beta - (\kappa + 1)\sigma_{\alpha \beta}^2 \right) \left( (\delta - 1)(\delta + r)(r - \kappa) + x(\delta + \kappa - r - 1) \right). \]
with
\[ x := (\kappa + 1)\sigma_\beta(\delta + \kappa - r - 1) + (\delta + \kappa)(r - \kappa). \]

The expressions for \( D_1 \) and \( D_2 \) are somewhat unwieldy, unfortunately. It holds that

\[
D_1 = (\kappa - 1)(\kappa + 1)^2 \sigma_\beta^2 \left( \delta^4 - r^4 - 2\delta^3 + 2r^2 \right) - (\kappa + 1)\sigma_\beta(\delta + \kappa) \left( \delta^3 \left( \delta^2 + 3\delta \kappa + \kappa - 1 \right) + r^4(\delta - 2\kappa + 1) \right) \\
+ r^3(- \delta(\kappa - 3) - 3\kappa + 1) + r^2(2\delta^3 + \delta^2(3\kappa - 1) + \delta(4\kappa^2 - \kappa + 1) + 4\kappa(\kappa^2 - 1)) \\
+ \delta^2 r \left( -3\delta(\kappa + 1) - 8\kappa^2 + 3\kappa + 3 \right) \\
+ (\delta + \kappa)^2 \left( \delta^3(2\delta + \delta + \kappa) + r^4(\delta - \kappa) + (\delta + 1)r^3(\delta - \kappa) \right) \\
+ r^2(- \delta^3 + \delta^2(\kappa + 1) - \delta \kappa + 2\kappa^2(\kappa + 1)) - \delta^2 r \left( \delta^2 - \delta \kappa + \delta + \kappa(4\kappa + 3) \right),
\]

and

\[
D_2 = (\kappa^2 - 1)\sigma_\beta^2 \left( (\delta - 1)\delta^3(\kappa - 1) + r^3 \left( - (2\delta^2 + 3\delta \kappa + \delta + 2\kappa^2 + \kappa - 1) \right) \right) \\
+ r^2 \left( 4\delta^3 + \delta^2(7\kappa + 1) + \delta(4\kappa^2 + \kappa - 1) + 2\kappa(\kappa^2 - 1) \right) \\
+ \delta^2 r \left( -2\delta^3 - 5\delta \kappa + \delta - 4\kappa^2 + \kappa + 1 \right) \\
+ \sigma_\beta(\delta + \kappa) \left( - \delta^3(\kappa^2 + 1) + \delta(3\delta^2 - 1) + (1 - \kappa)\kappa \right) \\
+ r^3 \left( \delta^2(\kappa - 1) + \delta(3\delta^2 - 1) + \kappa(4\kappa^2 + \kappa - 3) \right) \\
+ r^2 \left( \delta^3(1 - 3\kappa) + \delta^2(3 - 9\kappa^2) - \delta \kappa(4\kappa^2 + \kappa - 1) - 4\kappa^2(\kappa^2 - 1) \right) \\
+ \delta^2 r \left( \delta^2(3\kappa + 1) + 5\delta \kappa^2 + \delta + \kappa(8\kappa^2 - \kappa - 5) \right) \right) - 2(\delta + \kappa)^2(r - \kappa)(\delta^2 - \kappa r)^2.
\]

Finally, regarding \( \delta \), consider the polynomial
\[
\tilde{P}(z) = b_0 + b_1 z + b_2 z^2 + b_3 z^3 + b_4 z^4 + b_5 z^5 + z^6,
\]
with

\[ b_0 := \zeta (\zeta + \psi g_{\alpha \beta}), \]
\[ b_1 := \zeta (2\eta_\beta + g_{\alpha \beta}), \]
\[ b_2 := \frac{1}{2} \left( -2\eta_\beta (2\zeta - \eta_\beta) - g_{\alpha \beta} ((4\psi - 1)\eta_\beta + \psi) - |g_{\alpha \beta}|\sqrt{\zeta + \psi^2 - 2\psi\eta_\beta} \right), \]
\[ b_3 := -2 (\eta_\beta + \zeta) - g_{\alpha \beta} (\eta_\beta + \psi) - |g_{\alpha \beta}|\sqrt{\zeta + \psi^2 - 2\psi\eta_\beta}, \]
\[ b_4 := \frac{1}{2} \left( 2 (\eta_\beta - 2) \eta_\beta + g_{\alpha \beta} (\eta_\beta + \psi) - |g_{\alpha \beta}|\sqrt{\zeta + \psi^2 - 2\psi\eta_\beta} \right), \]
\[ b_5 := 2\eta_\beta + g_{\alpha \beta}, \]

where \( \sigma_\beta = 1 - m_\beta^n / m_\beta, \sigma_\alpha = 1 - m_\alpha^n / m_\alpha, \sigma_{\alpha \beta} = 1 - m_{\alpha \beta}^n / m_{\alpha \beta} \) and

\[ \eta_\beta := \frac{\kappa (1 - \sigma_\beta) + \sigma_\beta}{r}, \quad \zeta := \frac{\kappa^2 (1 - \sigma_\beta) + \sigma_\beta}{r^2}, \]
\[ g_{\alpha \beta} := \frac{2(\kappa - 1)(r + 1)^2 \chi (\chi + 1)m_{\alpha \beta}^2}{r (\sigma_\alpha m_\alpha m_\beta (\kappa + r)^2 + (\kappa - 1)m_{\alpha \beta}^2 (2(r + 1) \chi - (\kappa - 1) \sigma_\beta))}, \]
\[ \psi := \frac{(\kappa - 1) \sigma_\beta + \chi (\kappa (\chi + 2) + \chi)}{2r \chi (\chi + 1)}, \quad \chi := \frac{(\kappa - 1) \sigma_\beta - \sigma_{\alpha \beta} (\kappa + r)}{r + 1}. \]

In the supplementary appendix, we prove

**Lemma A.1** The polynomial \( \tilde{P} \) is irreducible and admits no solutions in terms of radicals. It has exactly two positive distinct roots \( \tilde{\delta}_-, \tilde{\delta}_+ \). Let \( \delta_- = r \tilde{\delta}_-, \delta_+ = r \tilde{\delta}_+ \). It holds that either \((\delta_-^2 - r)\lambda_1(\delta_-) < 0\) or \((\delta_+^2 - r)\lambda_1(\delta_+) < 0\), but not both. The parameter \( \delta \) is equal to \( \delta_- \) if \((\delta_-^2 - r)\lambda_1(\delta_-) < 0\), and to \( \delta_+ \) otherwise.

### B Euler-Lagrange First-Order Conditions

In this section, we derive the first-order conditions for the particular type of control problems considered in this paper.

Let \( N, M, K, L \), be positive integers. For \( \ell = 1, \ldots, L \), let \( F^\ell : \mathbb{R}_+^N \to \mathbb{R} \), and \( G^\ell : \mathbb{R}^{K \times M} \to \mathbb{R} \), where every \( G^\ell \) can be written

\[ G^\ell((y_1, \ldots, y_{K,1}), \ldots, (y_{1,M}, \ldots, y_{K,M})) = y_{k,i} y_{k',i'}, \]
for some \(k, k', i, i'\). In other words, letting

\[
F(x, y_1, \ldots, y_M) = \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} F^\ell(x) G^\ell(y_1, \ldots, y_M),
\]

we have that \(F(x, \cdot)\) is a quadratic form, and \(F^\ell(x)\) are the coefficients.

For every \(i = 1, \ldots, M\), let \(\phi_i : \mathbb{R}_+^N \to \mathbb{R}_+\) be a (possibly shifted) projection, in the following sense: \(\phi_i((x_1; \ldots; x_N)) = x_j + \delta\) for some \(j\) and some \(\delta \geq 0\). Let \(U\) be the space of measurable functions \(u : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}^K\) that are continuous, integrable and square integrable.

Define \(G^\ell_k((y_{1,1}; \ldots; y_{K,1}), \ldots, (y_{1,M}; \ldots; y_{K,M}))\) as

\[
\frac{\partial G((y_{1,1}; \ldots; y_{K,1}), \ldots, (y_{1,M}; \ldots; y_{K,M}))}{\partial y_{k,i}},
\]

and let

\[
F_{k,i}(x, y_1, \ldots, y_M) = \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} F^\ell(x) G^\ell_k(y_1, \ldots, y_M).
\]

We consider the problem of maximizing

\[
\int_{\mathbb{R}_+^N} F(x, u(\phi_1(x)), u(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u(\phi_M(x))) \, dx,
\]

over control functions \(u \in U\).

We make the following assumptions:

1. For every \(\ell,\) every \(u \in U, x \mapsto F^\ell(x) G^\ell(u(\phi_1(x)), u(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u(\phi_M(x)))\) is integrable on \(\mathbb{R}_+^N\).

2. For every \(\ell, i, k, x \mapsto F^\ell(x) G^\ell_{k,i}(u(\phi_1(x)), u(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u(\phi_M(x)))\) is integrable on \(\mathbb{R}_+^N \cap \{\phi_i = t\}\) for every \(t\).

3. The map

\[
t \mapsto \int_{\mathbb{R}_+^N \cap \{\phi_i = t\}} F^\ell(x) G^\ell_{k,i}(u(\phi_1(x)), u(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u(\phi_M(x))) \, dx
\]

is piecewise continuous, where the integral is taken with respect to the Lebesgue measure on \(\mathbb{R}_+^N \cap \{\phi_i = t\}\).
Compared to standard problems of calculus of variations (see, for example, Burns (2014), Chapter 3), this optimization problem involves delayed terms and integrals over a domain whose dimension is unrelated to the dimension of the control. The classical Euler-Lagrange equations do not hold. However, the argument can be adapted to yield the following first-order condition.

Proposition B.1 Assume the control function $u^* \in \mathcal{U}$ maximizes (21). Then, for every $k$ and every $t$,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{M} \int_{\mathbb{R}_+^N \cap \{\phi_i = t\}} F_{k,i}(x, u^*(\phi_1(x)), u^*(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u^*(\phi_M(x))) \, dx = 0.$$ 

\textbf{Proof.} For a control function $u \in \mathcal{U}$, let

$$J(u) := \int_{\mathbb{R}_+^N} F(x, u(\phi_1(x)), u(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u(\phi_M(x))) \, dx,$$

and assume $J(u)$ is maximized for $u = u^*$.

The proof relies on classical variational arguments. Fix $k$ and let $v : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}^K$, where we write $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_K)$ and where $v_{k'} = 0$ for $k' \neq k$, and assume $v_k$ is continuous with bounded support. Let $j(\epsilon) = J(u^* + \epsilon v)$. Differentiating under the integral sign (see, for example, Theorem 6.28 of Klenke (2014)), we get

$$j'(0) = \int_{\mathbb{R}_+^N} \sum_{i=1}^{M} F_{k,i}(x, u^*(\phi_1(x)), \ldots, u^*(\phi_M(x))) v_k(\phi_i(x)) \, dx.$$ 

We observe that $j$ is maximized at $\epsilon = 0$, and so $j'(0) = 0$.

Suppose by contradiction that, for some $t$,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{M} \int_{\mathbb{R}_+^N \cap \{\phi_i = t\}} F_{k,i}(x, u^*(\phi_1(x)), u^*(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u^*(\phi_M(x))) \, dx$$

is nonzero—for example, positive. The sum is piecewise continuous with respect to $t$, and so by continuity,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{M} \int_{\mathbb{R}_+^N \cap \{\phi_i = t'\}} F_{k,i}(x, u^*(\phi_1(x)), u^*(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u^*(\phi_M(x))) \, dx$$

is positive for $t'$ on an interval to the left or the right of $t$. Let $I_t$ be such an interval,
and let \( v_k \) be a function that is zero outside of \( I_t \) and that is positive inside \( I_t \). Then

\[
0 < \int_{t \in I_t} \sum_{i=1}^{M} \int_{\mathbb{R}^N \cap \{ \phi_i = t' \}} F_{k,i}(x, u^*(\phi_1(x)), u^*(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u^*(\phi_M(x))) v_k(t') \, dx \, dt'
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{M} \int_{\mathbb{R}^N} F_{k,i}(x, u^*(\phi_1(x)), u^*(\phi_2(x)), \ldots, u^*(\phi_M(x))) v_k(\phi_i(x)) \, dx,
\]

which contradicts \( j'(0) = 0 \). □

C Proofs of Section 2

C.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4

1. If the cumulative payment process satisfies the zero-profit condition, then the agent who chooses effort strategy \( A \) makes \((ex \ ante)\) payoff

\[
E \left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} (A_t^* + \mu_t - c(A_t)) e^{-rt} \, dt \right],
\]

where \( A^* \) denotes the market conjectured effort level. The agent has no impact on \( A^* \). Thus, the agent’s strategy is optimal if and only if it maximizes

\[
E \left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} (\mu_t - c(A_t)) e^{-rt} \, dt \right].
\]

2. If \( \mathcal{F}' = \{ \mathcal{F}'_t \}_{t \geq 0} \), with \( \mathcal{F}'_t = \sigma(\mu_t) \), then \( E^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}'_t] = E^*[\theta_t | \mu_t] = \mu_t \), hence for a given conjectured effort level \( A^* \), the market’s transfers and the agent’s optimal action are the same under both information structures \( \mathcal{F} \) and \( \mathcal{F}' \).

C.2 Proof of Proposition 2.6

1. If \( Y \) is a belief for a confidential information structure \( \mathcal{F} \), then \( Y_t = \mu_t \), where, by definition, \( \mu_t = E^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}_t] = E^*[\theta_t | \mu_t] \). Conversely, if \( Y_t = E^*[\theta_t | Y_t] \), then \( Y \) is the belief \( \mu \) for the confidential information structure induced by \( Y \).

2. If \( Y \) is a belief for a public information structure structure \( \mathcal{F} \), then \( Y_t = \mu_t \), where, by definition, \( \mu_t = E^*[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}_t] = E^*[\theta_t | \{ \mu_s \}_{s \leq t}] \), using that \( \mathcal{F} \) is a
filtration. Conversely, if $Y_t = E^*[\theta_t \mid \{Y_s\}_{s \leq t}]$, then $Y$ is the belief $\mu$ for the public information structure that is the filtration generated by $Y$.

C.3 Proof of Lemma 2.7

The lemma is immediate by application Proposition 2.6, observing that, by the projection formula for jointly normal random variables,

$$E^*[\theta_t \mid Y_t] = \frac{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, Y_t]}{\text{Var}[Y_t]}(Y_t - E^*[Y_t]).$$

C.4 Proof of Lemma 2.8

The correlation between $\theta_t$ and $\theta_{t+\tau}$ satisfies

$$\text{Corr}[\theta_t, \theta_{t+\tau}] = \frac{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \theta_{t+\tau}]}{\sqrt{\text{Var}[\theta_t]} \sqrt{\text{Var}[\theta_{t+\tau}]}},$$

where we note that, as $\theta$ is a stationary Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with mean-reverting rate 1 and scale $\gamma$,

$$\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \theta_{t+\tau}] = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} e^{-\tau}, \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Var}[\theta_t] = \text{Var}[\theta_{t+\tau}] = \frac{\gamma^2}{2}.$$

Let $\mu$ be the market belief process induced by some public information structure $F$. We have $E^*[\mu_t] = E^*[\theta_t] = 0$. As $F$ is also a confidential information structure, $\mu$ is also a belief for a confidential information structure.

Conditionally on $\mu_t$, the random variable $\theta_t$ is then independent from every $\mu_{t-\tau}$, $\tau \geq 0$, because $\mu_t$ carries all relevant information about $\theta_t$. Thus, $\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_{t-\tau} \mid \mu_t] = 0$. Let $\tau \geq 0$. The projection formulas for jointly normal random variables yield

$$\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_{t-\tau} \mid \mu_t] = \text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_{t-\tau}] - \frac{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_t] \text{Cov}[\mu_{t-\tau}, \mu_t]}{\text{Var}[\mu_t]}.$$

Hence,

$$\text{Cov}[\mu_{t-\tau}, \mu_t] = \frac{\text{Var}[\mu_t]}{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_t]} \frac{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_{t-\tau}]}{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_t]} = \frac{\text{Var}[\mu_{t-\tau}]}{\text{Cov}[\theta_{t-\tau}, \mu_{t-\tau}]} \frac{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_{t-\tau}]}{\text{Cov}[\theta_{t-\tau}, \mu_{t-\tau}]},$$

(22)

where we used the stationarity of the pair $(\mu, \theta)$. Besides, by Lemma 2.10 there exist
$u_1^\mu, \ldots, u_K^\mu$, such that $\mu_t$ can be written as

$$
\mu_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k^\mu(t - s) [dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s^* ds].
$$

Hence, as $\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \theta_{t-\tau}] = \gamma^2 e^{-\tau}/2$,

$$
\text{Cov}[\mu_{t-\tau}, \theta_{t-\tau}] = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \int_0^\infty u_k^\mu(s) e^{-s} ds,
$$

and,

$$
\text{Cov}[\mu_{t-\tau}, \theta_t] = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \int_0^\infty u_k^\mu(s) e^{-(\tau+s)} ds = e^{-\tau} \text{Cov}[\mu_{t-\tau}, \theta_{t-\tau}].
$$

Hence, plugging these last two expressions into (22), we have

$$
\text{Cov}[\mu_t, \mu_{t+\tau}] = \text{Cov}[\mu_{t-\tau}, \mu_t] = \text{Var}[\mu_{t-\tau}] e^{-\tau} = \text{Var}[\mu_t] e^{-\tau}.
$$

Now, we prove the converse. Let $Y$ be a rating process that is a belief for a confidential information structure, and satisfies

$$
\text{Cov}[Y_{t+\tau}, Y_t] = \text{Var}[Y_t] e^{-\tau},
$$

for every $\tau \geq 0$. By Lemma 2.10 as $E[Y_t] = 0$, there exist $u_1^Y, \ldots, u_K^Y$, such that $Y_t$ can be written as

$$
Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k^Y(t - s) [dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s^* ds],
$$

so that, as above, we get

$$
\text{Cov}[Y_{t-\tau}, \theta_t] = e^{-\tau} \text{Cov}[Y_{t-\tau}, \theta_{t-\tau}] = e^{-\tau} \text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t],
$$

using the stationarity of $(Y, \theta)$, and we have by assumption on $Y$ that

$$
e^{-\tau} = \frac{\text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t-\tau}]}{\text{Var}[Y_{t-\tau}]} = \frac{\text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t-\tau}]}{\text{Var}[Y_t]}.
$$
Therefore,

\[
\text{Cov} \left[ \theta_t, Y_{t-\tau} \mid Y_t \right] = \text{Cov} \left[ \theta_t, Y_{t-\tau} \right] - \frac{\text{Cov} \left[ \theta_t, Y_t \right] \text{Cov} \left[ Y_{t-\tau}, Y_t \right]}{\text{Var} [Y_t]} = 0.
\]

As \( \theta \) and \( Y \) are jointly normal, it implies that \( \theta_t \) and \( Y_{t-\tau} \) are independent conditionally on \( Y_t \) for every \( \tau \geq 0 \), so the market belief associated to the public information structure that is the filtration generated by \( Y \) satisfies

\[
\mathbb{E}^{*} \left[ \theta_t \mid \{Y_s\}_{s \leq t} \right] = \mathbb{E}^{*} \left[ \theta_t \mid Y_t \right] = Y_t.
\]

The conclusion follows from Proposition 2.6.

C.5 Proof of Lemma 2.9 and Lemma 2.11

We prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and give the closed-form expression of the equilibrium action.

We have, following the projection formulas for jointly normal random variables, using the Representation Lemma (Lemma 2.10)

\[
\mu_t = \mathbb{E}^{*} \left[ \theta_t \mid Y_t \right] = \text{Cov} [Y_t, \theta_t] (Y_t - \mathbb{E}^{*} [Y_t])
\]

\[
= \text{Cov} [Y_t, \theta_t] \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k (t - s) \left[ dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A^*_{s} \, ds \right],
\]

where \( A^* \) is the effort level conjectured by the market. Observe that by stationarity, \( \text{Cov} [Y_t, \theta_t] \) is constant.

We prove that, given the (unique) cumulative payment process that satisfies the zero-profit condition, there exists an optimal effort strategy for the agent, and that it is unique (up to measure zero sets) and pinned down by the first-order condition given in Lemma 2.11. This, in turn, yields existence of a unique equilibrium.

Let us fix the cumulative payment process that satisfies the zero-profit condition, and suppose that the agent follows effort strategy \( A \). The agent’s time-0 (ex post) payoff is then

\[
\int_{0}^{\infty} [A^*_t + \mu_t - c(A_t)] e^{-rt} \, dt. \tag{23}
\]

Maximizing the agent’s ex ante payoff is equivalent to maximizing the agent’s ex post payoff, up to probability zero events. Hence, we seek conditions on \( A \) that
characterize when it is a maximizer of (23).

Therefore, as
\[ dS_{k,s} = (\alpha_k A_s + \beta_k \theta_s) \, ds + \sigma_k \, dZ_{k,s}, \]
maximizing (23) is equivalent to maximizing
\[
\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] \int_0^\infty \int_0^t \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(t-s) A_s e^{-rt} \, ds \, dt - \int_0^\infty c(A_t) e^{-rt} \, dt. \tag{24}
\]

Let us re-write
\[
\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] \int_0^\infty \int_0^t \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(t-s) A_s e^{-rt} \, ds \, dt
\]
\[
= \text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] \int_0^\infty \int_{s}^{+\infty} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(t-s) A_s e^{-rt} \, dt \, ds
\]
\[
= \text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] \int_0^\infty A_s e^{-rs} \int_{s}^{+\infty} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(t-s) e^{-r(t-s)} \, dt \, ds
\]
\[
= \text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] \int_0^\infty A_s e^{-rs} \int_{0}^{s} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(\tau) e^{-r\tau} \, d\tau \, ds.
\]

Maximizing (24) is then the same as maximizing
\[
\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] \int_0^\infty A_s e^{-rs} \int_{0}^{s} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(\tau) e^{-r\tau} \, d\tau \, ds - \int_0^\infty c(A_t) e^{-rt} \, dt,
\]
which is the same as maximizing
\[
\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] A_s \int_{0}^{\infty} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(\tau) e^{-r\tau} \, d\tau - c(A_s),
\]
for (almost) every \( s \). By strict convexity of the agent’s cost, (24), and thus (23), is maximized if and only if
\[
c'(A_t) = \text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] \int_{0}^{\infty} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k u_k(\tau) e^{-r\tau} \, d\tau,
\]
for (almost) every $t$.

We note that $\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t]$ is constant and equal to

$$\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t] = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(s)e^{-s} \, ds.$$ 

Hence, (23) is maximized if and only if

$$c'(A_t) = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(t)e^{-t} \, dt \right] \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(t)e^{-rt} \, dt \right],$$

for every $t$ up to measure zero sets. Thus, the optimal effort strategy exists for the agent, it is unique (up to measure zero events and times), it is constant and pinned down by the last equation.

### C.6 Proof of Lemma 2.10

The proof proceeds in three parts. In the first part, we make additional regularity assumptions to derive necessary conditions so as to pin down a unique candidate for the coefficients $u_k$. In the second part, we prove that the candidate obtained is integrable and square integrable. In the third part, we relax the regularity assumptions and show that the conjectured coefficients obtained in the first part are valid for the rating process being considered. The first part is useful to get an educated guess of the candidate weight functions. Given the educated guess, the second and third parts are self-contained and sufficient to prove the lemma.

#### Guess of the coefficients.

Assume that $Y$ has the linear representation

$$Y_t = \mathbb{E}^*[Y_t] + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k(t-s)(dS_k,s - \alpha_k A_s^* \, ds),$$

with $u$ measurable, integrable and square-integrable. Further, let $B > 0$, and assume that every $u_k$ is twice continuously differentiable on $[0, B]$, and that $u_k(s) = 0$ if $s > B$. Later, we will relax the bounded-support assumption. We define $U := \sum_k \beta_k u_k$. 

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We have
\[ f_k(\tau) = \text{Cov}[Y_t, S_{k,t-\tau}] = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \int_0^{\infty} u_i(s) \text{Cov}[dS_{i,t-s}, S_{k,t-\tau}] \]
\[ = \sigma_k^2 \int_\tau^{\infty} u_k(s) \, ds + \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_0^{\infty} \int_\tau^{\infty} U(s)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, dj \, ds. \]

Successive differentiations yield
\[ f'_k(\tau) = -\sigma_k^2 u_k(\tau) - \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_0^{\infty} U(s)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds, \quad (25) \]
\[ f''_k(\tau) = -\sigma_k^2 u'_k(\tau) + \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_0^{\tau} U(s)e^{-(\tau-s)} \, ds - \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_{\tau}^{\infty} U(s)e^{+(\tau-s)} \, ds, \]
\[ f'''_k(\tau) = -\sigma_k^2 u''_k(\tau) + \beta_k \gamma^2 U(\tau) - \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_0^{\tau} U(s)e^{-(\tau-s)} \, ds - \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_{\tau}^{\infty} U(s)e^{+(\tau-s)} \, ds. \]

Thus
\[ f'_k - f'''_k = \sigma_k^2 u'' - \sigma_k^2 u - \beta_k \gamma^2 U. \quad (26) \]

Multiplying \([26]\) by \(\beta_k/\sigma_k^2\) and summing over \(k\) yields an ordinary differential equation (ODE) for \(U\): \[ \bar{f}' - \bar{f}''' = U'' - U - \gamma^2 \nu \beta \bar{U} = U'' - \kappa^2 U, \quad (27) \]

where we recall that
\[ \bar{f}(s) := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k f_k(s). \]

Integrating by parts the general solution of \([27]\) gives
\[ U(\tau) = C_1 e^{\kappa \tau} + C_2 e^{-\kappa \tau} - \bar{f}'(\tau) - \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{\kappa} \int_0^{\tau} \sinh(\kappa(\tau - s)) \bar{f}'(s) \, ds, \quad (28) \]

for some constants \(C_1\) and \(C_2\). Multiplying the expression for \(f'_k\) by \(\beta_k/\sigma_k^2\) and summing over \(k\) gives
\[ \bar{f}'(\tau) = -U(\tau) - \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{2} \int_0^{\infty} U(s)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds, \quad (29) \]

for every \(\tau \geq 0\). Together, and after simplification, \([28]\) and \([29]\) yield an equation
that $C_1$ and $C_2$ should satisfy, for every $\tau$:

$$\bar{f}'(\tau) = \bar{f}'(\tau) - C_1 e^{\kappa \tau} - C_2 e^{-\kappa \tau}$$

$$- \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{2} C_1 \left[ \frac{e^{B(k-1)+\tau}}{\kappa - 1} - \frac{e^{-\tau}}{\kappa + 1} + \frac{e^{\kappa \tau}}{\kappa + 1} - \frac{e^{-\kappa \tau}}{\kappa - 1} \right]$$

$$- \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{2} C_2 \left[ - \frac{e^{-B(k+1)+\tau}}{\kappa - 1} + \frac{e^{-\tau}}{\kappa + 1} + \frac{e^{-\kappa \tau}}{\kappa + 1} - \frac{e^{-\kappa \tau}}{\kappa - 1} \right]$$

$$+ \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{2} \frac{e^{-B+\tau}}{\kappa^2 - 1} \int_0^B \bar{f}'(j) \left[ \kappa \cosh(\kappa(B-j)) + \sinh(\kappa(B-j)) \right] dj.$$  

After further simplification, we obtain a system of two equations in $C_1$ and $C_2$:

$$- \frac{1}{\kappa - 1} e^{B(k-1)} + \frac{1}{\kappa + 1} e^{-B(k+1)}$$

$$+ \frac{e^{B(k-1)}}{2\kappa} (\kappa + 1) \int_0^B \bar{f}'(j)e^{-\kappa j} dj + \frac{e^{-B(k+1)}}{2\kappa} (\kappa - 1) \int_0^B \bar{f}'(j)e^{\kappa j} dj = 0,$$

and

$$\frac{C_1}{\kappa + 1} = \frac{C_2}{\kappa - 1}.$$  

Therefore, solving these two equations,

$$C_1 = \frac{1}{2\kappa} \frac{e^{B(k-1)}(\kappa + 1)^2(\kappa^2 - 1) \int_0^B \bar{f}'(j)e^{-\kappa j} dj + e^{-B(k+1)}(\kappa + 1)^2(\kappa - 1)^2 \int_0^B \bar{f}'(j)e^{\kappa j} dj}{(\kappa + 1)^2 e^{B(k-1)} - (\kappa - 1)^2 e^{-B(k+1)}},$$

and

$$C_2 = \frac{1}{2\kappa} \frac{e^{B(k-1)}(\kappa + 1)^2(\kappa - 1)^2 \int_0^B \bar{f}'(j)e^{-\kappa j} dj + e^{-B(k+1)}(\kappa^2 - 1)(\kappa - 1)^2 \int_0^B \bar{f}'(j)e^{\kappa j} dj}{(\kappa + 1)^2 e^{B(k-1)} - (\kappa - 1)^2 e^{-B(k+1)}}.$$  

To get candidate coefficients whose support is not necessarily bounded, we send $B$ to infinity and get

$$C_1 \to C_1^\infty := \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{2\kappa} \int_0^\infty \bar{f}'(j)e^{-\kappa j} dj, \quad (30)$$

and

$$C_2 \to C_1^\infty := \frac{(\kappa - 1)^2}{2\kappa} \int_0^\infty \bar{f}'(j)e^{-\kappa j} dj. \quad (31)$$
Thus, a candidate for $U$ is

$$U(\tau) = C_1^\infty e^{\kappa \tau} + C_2^\infty e^{-\kappa \tau} - \bar{f}'(\tau) - \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{\kappa} \int_0^\tau \sinh(\kappa(\tau - s)) \bar{f}'(s) \, ds.$$  

We plug in the expression of $U$ in (25) which yields the candidate for $u_k$:

$$u_k(\tau) = C_1^\infty \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\sigma_k^2(\kappa^2 - 1)} e^{\kappa \tau} + C_2^\infty \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\sigma_k^2(\kappa^2 - 1)} e^{-\kappa \tau} - f_k'(\tau) - \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\sigma_k^2} \int_0^\tau \sinh(\kappa(\tau - s)) \bar{f}'(s) \, ds,$$

and after simplification,

$$u_k(\tau) = \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\sigma_k^2} \left( \frac{\sinh \kappa \tau + \kappa \cosh \kappa \tau}{1 + \kappa} \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} \, d \bar{f}(s) - \int_0^\tau \sinh \kappa(t - s) \, d \bar{f}(s) \right) - \frac{f_k'(\tau)}{\sigma_k^2},$$

(32)

**Proof of integrability.** We show that every $u_k$ defined by Equation (33) is integrable and square-integrable. To do so, we have to show that

$$(\sinh \kappa t + \kappa \cosh \kappa t) \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds - (1 + \kappa) \int_0^t \sinh \kappa(t - s) h(s) \, ds$$

(34)

is integrable and square-integrable whenever $h$ and $h^2$ are. We note that (34) is linear in $h$, so that it suffices to show that its positive and negative parts are integrable. Hence, without loss, we assume that $h \geq 0$.

After re-arranging the terms, (34) is equal to

$$\frac{1}{2} (\kappa + 1) \left( e^{\kappa t} \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds + e^{-\kappa t} \int_0^t e^{\kappa s} h(s) \, ds \right) + \frac{1}{2} (\kappa - 1) e^{-\kappa t} \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds.$$  

(35)

Thus, (34) is nonnegative, and showing the integrability of (34) reduces to showing that the integral of (34) converges on $[0, +\infty)$.

It is readily verified by differentiation that (34) is the derivative of

$$\frac{\cosh \kappa t + \kappa \sinh \kappa t}{\kappa} \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds - \frac{1 + \kappa}{\kappa} \int_0^t \cosh \kappa(t - s) h(s) \, ds + \frac{1 + \kappa}{\kappa} \int_0^t h(s) \, ds.$$  

We must show that this expression converges as $t \to \infty$. Since by assumption, the
last term is convergent, it suffices to show that

\[
(cosh \kappa t + \kappa \sinh \kappa t) \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds - (1 + \kappa) \int_0^t \cosh \kappa(t - s) h(s) \, ds
\]

converges. Further, since

\[
cosh \kappa t + \kappa \sinh \kappa t = \frac{\kappa + 1}{2} e^{\kappa t} - \frac{\kappa - 1}{2} e^{-\kappa t}, \quad \text{and} \quad \cosh \kappa(t - s) = \frac{e^{-\kappa(t-s)}}{2} + \frac{e^{\kappa(t-s)}}{2},
\]

it suffices to show that

\[
(\kappa + 1)e^{\kappa t} \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds - (1 + \kappa) \int_0^t e^{\kappa(t-s)} h(s) \, ds = (\kappa + 1) \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa(s-t)} h(s) \, ds
\]

converges, which is immediate from the integrability of \(h\). Thus, (34) is integrable. Next, to show that (35) is square-integrable, we show that

\[
e^{\kappa t} \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds
\]

is square-integrable. As square-integrable functions are closed under additivity, and \(h\) is integrable, (36) is the only non-trivial term of (35) for which we must show square-integrability. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,

\[
\left( \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds \right)^2 \leq \left( \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h^2(s) \, ds \right) \left( \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} \, ds \right)
\]

\[
= \kappa^{-1} e^{-\kappa t} \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h^2(s) \, ds.
\]

Thus,

\[
\int_0^\tau \left( e^{\kappa t} \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h(s) \, ds \right)^2 \, dt \leq \kappa^{-1} \int_0^\tau e^{\kappa t} \int_t^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h^2(s) \, ds \, dt
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\kappa^2} \int_\tau^\infty e^{-\kappa(s-\tau)} h^2(s) \, ds - \frac{1}{\kappa^2} \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa s} h^2(s) \, ds
\]

\[
+ \frac{1}{\kappa^2} \int_0^\tau h^2(t) \, dt,
\]

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where the equality follows from integration by parts. Convergence is immediate by square-integrability of $h$.

**Proof that the educated guess is correct.** In this part, we show that the candidate for $\{u_k\}_k$ derived in the first step defines valid coefficients for the rating process.

Let $u_k$ be defined by (33), or, equivalently, by (32). Let

$$
\tilde{Y}_t = E^*\{Y_t\} + \sum_{k=1}^K \int_{s \leq t} u_k(t-s)(dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A^*_s ds).
$$

Note that, if we have $\text{Cov}[Y_t - \tilde{Y}_t, S_{k,t-\tau}] = 0$ for every $\tau$ and $k$, then $Y_t$ and $S_{k,t-\tau}$ are independent for every $\tau$ and $k$. As $Y_t - \tilde{Y}_t$ is measurable with respect to the information generated by the past signals $S_{k,t-\tau}$, $\tau \geq 0$, $k = 1, \ldots, K$, it implies that $\text{Var}[Y_t - \tilde{Y}_t] = 0$ and thus $Y_t = \tilde{Y}_t$.

In the remainder of the proof, we show that $\text{Cov}[Y_t - \tilde{Y}_t, S_{k,t-\tau}] = 0$ for every $\tau \geq 0$ and every $k = 1, \ldots, K$.

Let $g_k(\tau) = \text{Cov}[\tilde{Y}_t, S_{k,t-\tau}]$. Then we have:

$$
g_k(\tau) = \sum_{i=1}^K \int_0^\infty u_i(s) \text{Cov}[dS_{i,t-s}, S_{k,t-\tau}]
= \sigma_k^2 \int_\tau^\infty u_k(s) \, ds + \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_{\tau}^\infty \int_0^\tau U(s)e^{-|s-j|} \, dj \, ds,
$$

and so

$$
g_k'(\tau) = -\sigma_k^2 u_k(\tau) - \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_{0}^\infty U(s)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds.
$$

So, replacing $u_k$ by its definition in (32),

$$
g_k'(\tau) = f_k'(\tau) - C_1 \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\kappa^2 - 1} e^{\kappa \tau} - C_2 \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\kappa^2 - 1} e^{-\kappa \tau}
+ \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\kappa} \int_{0}^{\tau} \sinh(\kappa(\tau - s)) \bar{f}'(s) \, ds
- \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} \int_{0}^\infty U(s)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds
$$

(37)
Further, multiplying (32) by $\beta_k$ and summing over $k$, we have

$$U(\tau) = C_1^\infty e^{\kappa \tau} + C_2^\infty e^{-\kappa \tau} - \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{\kappa} \int_0^\tau \sinh(\kappa(\tau - s)) \tilde{f}'(s) \, ds.$$ 

It holds that

$$\int_0^\infty U(s) e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds = \lim_{B \to \infty} \int_0^B U(s) e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds.$$

Thus,

$$\int_0^B U(s) e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds = C_1^\infty \int_0^B e^{\kappa s} e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds + C_2^\infty \int_0^B e^{-\kappa s} e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds - \int_0^B \tilde{f}'(s) e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds$$

$$- \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{\kappa} \int_0^B \int_0^s \sinh(\kappa(s-j)) \tilde{f}'(j)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, dj \, ds.$$

Then, for any $B > \tau$, we write

$$\int_0^B \int_0^s \sinh(\kappa(s-j)) \tilde{f}'(j)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, dj \, ds$$

$$= -\frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 - 1} \int_0^B \tilde{f}'(j)e^{-|\tau-j|} \, dj$$

$$+ \frac{e^{-B+\tau}}{\kappa^2 - 1} \int_0^B \tilde{f}'(j) [\kappa \cosh(\kappa(B-j)) + \sinh(\kappa(B-j))] \, dj$$

$$- \frac{2}{\kappa^2 - 1} \int_0^\tau \sinh(\kappa(\tau - j)) \tilde{f}'(j) \, dj.$$

Using the expressions for $C_1^\infty$ and $C_2^\infty$ given by (30) and (31) we get that

$$C_1^\infty \left[ \frac{e^{B(\kappa-1)+\tau}}{\kappa-1} - \frac{e^{-\tau}}{\kappa+1} \right]$$

$$+ C_2^\infty \left[ -\frac{e^{-B(\kappa+1)+\tau}}{\kappa+1} + \frac{e^{-\tau}}{\kappa-1} \right]$$

$$+ \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{\kappa} \frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 - 1} \int_0^B \tilde{f}'(j)e^{-|\tau-j|} \, dj$$

$$- \frac{\kappa^2 - 1}{\kappa} \frac{e^{-B+\tau}}{\kappa^2 - 1} \int_0^B \tilde{f}'(j) [\kappa \cosh(\kappa(B-j)) + \sinh(\kappa(B-j))] \, dj$$
converges to 0 as $B \to \infty$. Therefore,

$$
\int_0^\infty U(s)e^{-|\tau-s|} \, ds = \frac{2}{\kappa} \int_0^\tau \sinh(\kappa(\tau-j)) \tilde{f}'(j) \, dj 
+ C_1^\infty \left[ \frac{e^{\kappa \tau}}{\kappa + 1} - \frac{e^{\kappa \tau}}{\kappa - 1} \right] 
+ C_2^\infty \left[ \frac{e^{-\kappa \tau}}{\kappa + 1} - \frac{e^{-\kappa \tau}}{\kappa - 1} \right].
$$

(38)

Plugging the expression of (38) in (37) yields

$$
g'_k(\tau) = f'_k(\tau) - C_1^\infty \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\kappa^2 - 1} e^{\kappa \tau} - C_2^\infty \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\kappa^2 - 1} e^{-\kappa \tau}
+ \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\kappa} \int_0^\tau \sinh(\kappa(\tau-s)) \tilde{f}'(s) \, ds
- \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{\kappa} \int_0^\tau \sinh(\kappa(\tau-j)) \tilde{f}'(j) \, dj
- \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} C_1^\infty \left[ \frac{e^{\kappa \tau}}{\kappa + 1} - \frac{e^{\kappa \tau}}{\kappa - 1} \right]
- \frac{\beta_k \gamma^2}{2} C_2^\infty \left[ \frac{e^{-\kappa \tau}}{\kappa + 1} - \frac{e^{-\kappa \tau}}{\kappa - 1} \right]
= f'_k(\tau).
$$

So $g'_k = f'_k$. As $f_k(0) = g_k(0) = 0$, it follows that $f = g$. Uniqueness of the coefficients (up to measure zero sets) is immediate by linearity, as different coefficients on a set of positive measure yield a different joint distributions over ratings and signals.

C.7 Proof of Theorem 2.12

Following Equation (10) of Section 2.4, we have the following linear representation of $\nu$,

$$
\nu_t = \sum_{k=1}^K \int_{s \leq t} u_k(t-s) \left( dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s^* \, ds \right),
$$

with

$$
u_k(\tau) := (\kappa - 1) \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2 m_\beta} e^{-\kappa \tau}.
$$
We apply Lemma 2.11 and Equation (7), and get equilibrium action \( A \) given by

\[
c'(A_t) = (\kappa - 1) \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\alpha_k \beta_k}{\sigma_k^2 m_\beta} \int_0^\infty e^{-\kappa \tau} e^{-r \tau} d\tau
\]

\[
= (\kappa - 1) \frac{m_\alpha \beta}{m_\beta} \frac{1}{\kappa + r}.
\]

### C.8 Proof of Lemma 2.14

Let \( \mathcal{F} \) be a public or confidential information structure. Let \( Y \) be a rating process proportional to the market belief, and let \( A \) be the (stationary) effort level it induces.

To show that any action in the range \([0, A]\) can be attained in the equilibrium of an alternative public/confidential information structure, we modify the rating process that achieves \( A \) to depress incentives to any desired extent. To do so, we use a source of independent noise. In addition to the \( K \) signals described in the model, we include one additional signal indexed by \( K + 1 \) that is entirely uninformative about both the agent’s action and the agent’s ability. Let us assume \( S_{K+1} \) is a two-sided standard Brownian motion.

Consider the two-sided process

\[
\xi_t = \int_{s \leq t} e^{-(t-s)} dS_{K+1,s}.
\]

From Proposition 2.11 if \( Y \) has linear filter \( \{u_k\}_k \), the equilibrium action \( A \) in both the public and confidential cases is the solution to

\[
c'(A) = \frac{\text{Cov}[Y_t, \theta_t]}{\text{Var}[Y_t]} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_0^\infty u_k(\tau)e^{-r \tau} d\tau.
\]

Consider the alternative rating process \( \hat{Y} = (1 - a)Y + a \xi \), for some constant \( a \in [0, 1] \). Note that \( \hat{Y} \) is a well-defined rating process for the information generated by the \( K + 1 \) signals.

Consider the information structure generated by the rating process \( \hat{Y} \), and the
induced equilibrium action, \( \hat{A} \). We have

\[
c'(\hat{A}) = \frac{\text{Cov}[\hat{Y}, \theta_t]}{\text{Var}[\hat{Y}]} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(\tau)e^{-r\tau} d\tau 
= \frac{(1-a)\text{Cov}[\hat{Y}, \theta_t]}{(1-a)^2\text{Var}[\hat{Y}]+a^2\text{Var}[\xi]} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(\tau)e^{-r\tau} d\tau 
= \frac{1-a}{(1-a)^2 + a^2\text{Var}[\xi]/\text{Var}[\hat{Y}]}c'(A).
\]

By varying \( a \) over the interval \([0,1]\), \( c'(\hat{A}) \) covers the entire interval \([0,c'(A)]\), and thus \( \hat{A} \) covers the interval \([0,A]\).

Besides, as \( Y \) and \( \xi \) are independent, for \( \tau \geq 0 \),

\[
\text{Cov}[\hat{Y}, \hat{Y}_{t+\tau}] = (1-a)^2 \text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] + a^2 \text{Cov}[\xi_t, \xi_{t+\tau}].
\]

By Itô’s isometry, we get

\[
\text{Cov}[\xi_t, \xi_{t+\tau}] = \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-s}e^{-(s+\tau)} ds = \frac{1}{2}e^{-\tau} = \text{Var}[\xi_t]e^{-\tau}.
\]

By Lemma 2.8,

\[
\text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] = \text{Var}[Y_t]e^{-\tau}.
\]

Thus,

\[
\text{Cov}[\hat{Y}, \hat{Y}_{t+\tau}] = ((1-a)^2 \text{Var}[\hat{Y}]+a^2\text{Var}[\xi])e^{-\tau} = \text{Var}[\hat{Y}]e^{-\tau},
\]

and invoking Lemma 2.8 a second time, we get that \( \hat{Y} \) is proportional to the market belief associated with a public information structure. Hence, \( \hat{A} \) also denotes the equilibrium action under that public information structure.

It follows that under both the public and confidential information structures, any action in the interval \([0, A]\) can be induced in equilibrium.
C.9 Proof of Lemma 2.15

We note that $\theta_t$ and $\mu_t$ are jointly normal, and as $\mu_t$ is the market belief, $\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_t] = \text{Var}[\mu_t]$ by Lemma 2.7, so applying the projection formulas:

\[
\text{Var}[\theta_t | \mu_t] = \text{Var}[\theta_t] - \frac{\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \mu_t]^2}{\text{Var}[\mu_t]} = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} - \text{Var}[\mu_t].
\]

D Proofs of Section 3

D.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1

In this section, we prove Theorem 3.1. The proof proceeds in two parts. In the first part, we provide a candidate optimal rating by deriving first-order conditions using a variational argument. In the second part, we verify the optimality of the candidate.

D.1.1 Part I: First-Order Conditions

Throughout this subsection, we use the following shorthand notation:

\[
U(t) := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k u_k(t),
\]
\[
V(t) := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k u_k(t),
\]
\[
U_0 := \int_{0}^{\infty} U(t)e^{-t} \, dt,
\]
\[
V_0 := \int_{0}^{\infty} V(t)e^{-rt} \, dt.
\]

We seek to maximize $c'(A)$ (where $A$ is the stationary equilibrium action of the agent) among confidential information structures generated by rating processes with mean zero and with linear filter $\{u_k\}_k$, that in addition satisfy the normalization condition that the rating has variance one.
Given a rating process $Y$ of the form

$$Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(t-s) [dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s^* ds],$$

we note that, by Itô’s isometry,

$$\text{Var}[Y_t] = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(s)^2 ds + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{k'=1}^{K} \int_{j\leq t} \int_{i\leq t} \beta_k \beta_{k'}^* u_k(t-i) u_{k'}(t-j) \text{Cov}[\theta_i, \theta_j] \, di \, dj,$$

and since $\theta$ is a stationary Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with mean-reversion rate 1 and scale $\sigma$, we have $\text{Cov}[\theta_t, \theta_s] = \gamma^2 e^{-|t-s|}/2$, so that

$$\text{Var}[Y_t] = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(s)^2 ds + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} U(i) U(j) e^{-|j-i|} \, di \, dj.$$

Together with Lemma 2.11, we get that the problem of maximizing $c(A)$ among rating processes that satisfy the normalization conditions reduces to choosing a vector of functions $u = (u_1, \ldots, u_K)$ that maximizes

$$\left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} V(t) e^{-rt} \, dt \right] \left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} U(t) e^{-t} \, dt \right],$$

subject to

$$\frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} U(i) U(j) e^{-|j-i|} \, di \, dj + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(t)^2 dt = 1.$$

Assume there exists a solution $u^*$ to this optimization problem, where $u^*$ is twice differentiable, integrable, and square-integrable.

Observe that we can write both the objective and the constraint as a double integral. The objective is equal to

$$\int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} V(i) U(j) e^{-ri-j} \, di \, dj,$$
while the constraint can be written as

\[
\int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty \left( \frac{\gamma^2}{2} U(i)U(j)e^{-|j-i|} \right) \, di \, dj + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 u_k(j)^2 e^{-i} \right) \, di \, dj = 1.
\]

This allows us to apply the results of Proposition B.1. Specifically, let

\[ L(u, \lambda) = F(u) + \lambda G(u), \]

where \( F \) and \( G \) are defined as

\[
F(u) = \left[ \int_0^\infty V(t)e^{-rt} \, dt \right] \left[ \int_0^\infty U(t)e^{-t} \, dt \right],
\]

and

\[
G(u) = \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty U(i)U(j)e^{-|j-i|} \, di \, dj + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_0^\infty u_k(t)^2 \, dt.
\]

Assume there exists a \( \lambda^* \) such that \( u = u^* \) maximizes \( u \mapsto L(u, \lambda^*) \). In this proof, we refer to the unconstrained optimization problem as the relaxed optimization problem, as opposed to the original (constrained) maximization problem.

Note that at the optimum, the objective of the original optimization problem is strictly positive, i.e., \( F(u^*) > 0 \), since the optimal solution does at least as well as transparency (giving all information included in all signals to the market) and transparency induces a positive equilibrium effort, and thus yields a positive value for \( F \), by our assumption that \( \alpha_\beta \geq 0 \). It implies \( \lambda^* < 0 \) as \( F(u^*) > 0 \) (and naturally \( G(u^*) = 1 \)).

Proposition B.1 gives the first-order condition derived from the Euler-Lagrange equations: if \( \lambda = \lambda^* \) and \( u = u^* \), then for all \( k \) and all \( t \), we have \( L_k(t) = 0 \), where we define

\[
L_k(t) := \alpha_k U_0 e^{-rt} + \beta_k V_0 e^{-t} + \lambda \gamma^2 \beta_k \int_0^\infty U(j)e^{-|t-j|} \, dj + 2\lambda \sigma_k^2 u_k(t) = 0, \tag{39}
\]

and where \( U_0, V_0, U \) and \( V \) are defined as above as an implicit function of \( u \).

We differentiate the above equation in the variable \( t \) twice, and get, for all \( k \) and
all $t$:

$$
\alpha_k U_0 r^2 e^{-rt} + \beta_k V_0 e^{-t} - 2 \lambda \gamma \beta_k U(t) + \lambda \gamma^2 \beta_k \int_0^\infty U(j)e^{-|t-j|} dj + 2 \lambda \sigma_k^2 u''_k(t) = 0.
$$

(40)

The difference between (39) and (40) is

$$(1 - r^2) \alpha_k U_0 r^2 e^{-rt} + 2 \lambda \gamma \beta_k U(t) + 2 \lambda \sigma_k^2 (u_k(t) - u''_k(t)) = 0. 
$$

(41)

In particular, multiplying (41) by $\beta_k / \sigma_k^2$ and summing over $k$, we get a linear differential equation that $U(t)$ must satisfy, namely,

$$(1 - r^2) m_{\alpha \beta} U_0 r^2 e^{-rt} + 2 \lambda \gamma^2 m_\beta U(t) + 2 \lambda U(t) - U''(t) = 0,$$

where we recall that $m_\beta = \sum_k \beta_k^2 / \sigma_k^2$, $m_{\alpha \beta} = \sum_k \alpha_k \beta_k / \sigma_k^2$, and $m_{\alpha} = \sum_k \alpha_k^2 / \sigma_k^2$.

The characteristic polynomial has roots $\pm \sqrt{1 + \gamma^2 m_\beta} = \pm \kappa$. A particular solution is $Ce^{-rt}$, for some constant $C$. If the solution is admissible, it is bounded, hence we get

$$U(t) = C_1 e^{-rt} + C_2 e^{-\kappa t},$$

for some constants $C_1$ and $C_2$.

For such $U$, $u_k$ satisfies the linear differential equation (41), whose characteristic polynomial has roots $\pm 1$. A particular solution is a sum of scaled time exponentials $e^{-rt}$ and $e^{-\kappa t}$. As every $u_k$ is bounded, we must consider the negative root of the characteristic equation, and we get that

$$u_k(t) = D_{1,k} e^{-rt} + D_{2,k} e^{-\kappa t} + D_{3,k} e^{-t},$$

(42)

for some constants $D_{1,k}, D_{2,k}, D_{3,k}$.

**Determination of the constants.** We have established that the solution belongs to the family of functions that are sums of scaled time exponentials. We now solve for the constant factors.

We plug in the general form of $u_k$ from (42) in the expression for $L_k$, and get:

$$L_k = L_{1,k} e^{-rt} + L_{2,k} e^{-\kappa t} + L_{3,k} e^{-t},$$

where the coefficients $L_{1,k}, L_{2,k}, L_{3,k}$ depend on the primitives of the model and the constants $D_{1,k}, D_{2,k}, D_{3,k}$. The condition that $L_k = 0$ implies that $L_{1,k} = L_{2,k} = L_{3,k} = 0$. 

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First, note that \( U(t) \) does not include a term of the form \( e^{-t} \), which implies that

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{\kappa} \beta_k D_{3,k} = 0. \tag{43}
\]

We also observe that

\[
L_{2,k} = 2\lambda \sigma_k^2 D_{2,k} - \frac{2\gamma^2 \lambda \beta_k \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i D_{2,i}}{\kappa^2 - 1},
\]

so that \( L_{2,k} = 0 \) for all \( k \) implies

\[
D_{2,k} = a \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2}, \tag{44}
\]

for some multiplier \( a \). Next, we use (44) together with (43) to show that

\[
L_{3,k} = \frac{\beta_k}{2r} \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \alpha_i D_{1,i} + \frac{\beta_k}{r+1} \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \alpha_i D_{3,i} + \frac{\gamma^2 \lambda \beta_k}{r-1} \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i D_{1,i} + 2\lambda \sigma_k^2 D_{3,k}
\]

\[
\quad + \frac{a \gamma^2 \lambda \beta_k m_{\beta}}{\kappa - 1} + \frac{a \beta_k m_{\alpha \beta}}{\kappa + r},
\]

and \( L_{3,k} = 0 \) for every \( k \) implies that \( D_{3,k} = 0 \) for all \( k \). The equation \( L_{3,k}/\beta_k = 0 \) is linear in \( \lambda \), and then simplifies to:

\[
\lambda \left( \frac{\gamma^2}{r-1} \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i D_{1,i} + \frac{a \gamma^2 m_{\beta}}{\kappa - 1} \right) + \frac{1}{2r} \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \alpha_i D_{1,i} + \frac{am_{\alpha \beta}}{\kappa + r} = 0. \tag{45}
\]

Next, we use (44) together with (43) to show that

\[
L_{1,k} = 2\lambda \sigma_k^2 D_{1,k} + \frac{\alpha_k m_{\beta}}{\kappa + 1} + \frac{((r-1)\alpha_k - 2\gamma^2 \lambda \beta_k)}{r^2 - 1} \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i D_{1,i},
\]

and, since \( L_{1,k} = 0 \) must hold for every \( k \), we get, since \( \lambda \neq 0 \),

\[
\sigma_k^2 D_{1,k} = \left( \frac{\gamma^2 \beta_k}{r^2 - 1} - \frac{\alpha_k}{2\lambda + 2\lambda^2} \right) \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i D_{1,i} - \frac{a \alpha_k m_{\beta}}{2\kappa \lambda + 2\lambda}. \tag{46}
\]

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We multiply (46) by $\beta_k/\sigma_k^2$, and sum over $k$ to get

$$[(\kappa + 1) ((r - 1) (m_{\alpha \beta} + 2 \lambda (r + 1)) - 2 \gamma^2 \lambda m_{\beta})] \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} = -a (r^2 - 1) m_{\alpha \beta} m_{\beta}.$$ 

As by assumption $r \neq 1$, the right-hand side is non-zero, which implies

$$((r - 1) (m_{\alpha \beta} + 2 \lambda (r + 1)) - 2 \gamma^2 \lambda m_{\beta}) \neq 0,$$

and thus

$$\sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} = \frac{-a (r^2 - 1) m_{\alpha \beta} m_{\beta}}{(\kappa + 1) ((r - 1) (m_{\alpha \beta} + 2 \lambda (r + 1)) - 2 \gamma^2 \lambda m_{\beta})}. \quad (48)$$

Similarly, if we multiply (46) by $\alpha_k/\sigma_k^2$ and sum over $k$, we get

$$\sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i D_{1,i} = \left(\frac{\gamma^2 m_{\alpha \beta}}{r^2 - 1} - \frac{m_{\alpha}}{2 \lambda + 2 \lambda r}\right) \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} - \frac{am_{\alpha} m_{\beta}}{2 \kappa \lambda + 2 \lambda} = \frac{am_{\beta} (m_{\alpha} (\gamma^2 m_{\beta} - r^2 + 1) - \gamma^2 m_{\alpha \beta}^2)}{(\kappa + 1) ((r - 1) (m_{\alpha \beta} + 2 \lambda (r + 1)) - 2 \gamma^2 \lambda m_{\beta})}. \quad (48)$$

Putting together (45), (48) and (D.1.1) yields a quadratic equation in $\lambda$ of the form

$$A \lambda^2 + B \lambda + C = 0,$$

which, after simplification and using that $\kappa^2 = 1 + \gamma^2 m_{\beta}$, gives

$$A = m_{\beta} \frac{\kappa + r}{1 - \kappa},$$

$$B = m_{\alpha \beta} \frac{(\gamma^2 m_{\beta} (-2 \kappa^2 + r^2 + 1) + (\kappa^2 - 1) (r^2 - 1))}{\gamma^2 (\kappa^2 - 1) (\gamma^2 m_{\beta} - r^2 + 1)}$$

$$= -\frac{2}{\gamma^2} m_{\alpha \beta},$$

$$C = m_{\alpha} m_{\beta} (\kappa + r) (r^2 - \kappa^2) + m_{\alpha \beta}^2 (\gamma^2 m_{\beta} (\kappa + r) - 2 (\kappa + 1) (r - 1) r)$$

$$= \frac{(\kappa - 1) m_{\alpha} (\kappa + r)^2 - \gamma^2 m_{\alpha \beta}^2 (\kappa + 2 r - 1)}{4 \gamma^4 (\kappa + r)}.$$
As \( \kappa > 1 \), we immediately have \( A < 0 \). Also, \( C \) has the sign of
\[
(\kappa - 1)m_\alpha(\kappa + r)^2 - m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa - 1 + 2r)\gamma^2
\]
\[
= (\kappa - 1)m_\alpha(\kappa + r)^2 - m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa - 1 + 2r)m_\beta^{-1}(\kappa^2 - 1).
\]
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, \( m_\alpha m_\beta \geq m_{\alpha\beta}^2 \), so:
\[
(\kappa - 1)m_\alpha(\kappa + r)^2 - m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa - 1 + 2r)m_\beta^{-1}(\kappa^2 - 1)
\]
\[
\geq m_\alpha \{(\kappa - 1)(\kappa + r)^2 - (\kappa - 1 + 2r)(\kappa^2 - 1)\}
\]
\[
= m_\alpha(\kappa - 1)(1 - r)^2 > 0.
\]
Hence \( C \) is positive, \( A \cdot C \) is negative, and Equation (49) has two roots, one positive and one negative. Besides, as \( m_{\alpha\beta} > 0 \) by assumption, \( B < 0 \). As we have already established that \( \lambda \) must be negative, we conclude that
\[
\lambda = \frac{-B + \sqrt{B^2 - 4AC}}{2A}.
\]
Pulling out the term \( \sum_i \beta_i D_{1,i} \) in (46) using (48), we express \( D_{1,k} \) as a solution of the linear equation. It follows that
\[
D_{1,k} = a \frac{m_\beta \left[ \gamma^2 m_{\alpha\beta} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} - (\kappa^2 - r^2) \frac{\alpha_k}{\sigma_k^2} \right]}{(1 + \kappa) \left[ 2\lambda(\kappa^2 - r^2) + (1 - r)m_{\alpha\beta} \right]},
\]
where the denominator is non-zero by (47). We can simplify those expressions further. We define
\[
\tilde{\lambda} := (\kappa - 1)\sqrt{r}(1 + r)m_{\alpha\beta} + (\kappa - r)\sqrt{\Delta},
\]
with
\[
\Delta = (r + \kappa)^2(\alpha_\beta m_\alpha - m_{\alpha\beta}^2) + (1 + r)^2m_{\alpha\beta}^2.
\]
Then, \( D_{1,k} = a \sqrt{r}c_k/\tilde{\lambda} \) with
\[
c_k := (\kappa^2 - r^2)m_\beta \frac{\alpha_k}{\sigma_k^2} + (1 - \kappa^2)m_{\alpha\beta} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2}.
\]
Note that, as a rating process induces the same effort level up to a scaling of the rating process, any multiplier \( a \) yields the same equilibrium action. Thus, a candidate optimal rating process for the original optimization problem is given by the linear
filter
\[ u_k(t) = c_k \frac{\sqrt{r}}{\lambda} e^{-rt} + \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} e^{-kt}, \forall k. \]

If
\[ a = \frac{(\kappa - 1) \left( (\kappa - 1) m_{\alpha\beta} (r + 1) \sqrt{r} + \sqrt{\Delta (\kappa - r)} \right)}{2 \sqrt{\Delta} m_{\beta} (\kappa - r)}, \]
then the conditions of Lemma 2.7 are satisfied, so that the associated rating process is a market belief for a confidential information structure.

D.1.2 Part II: Verification

We now verify that the candidate rating process of Section D.1.1 is optimal. To so
so, we consider an auxiliary principal-agent setting. We refer to the principal-agent
setting as the auxiliary setting, and to the main setting detailed in the main body of
the paper as the original setting.

Auxiliary setting. In the auxiliary setting, there is a principal (she) and an agent
(he). Time \( t \geq 0 \) is continuous and the horizon infinite. The agent is as in the
original model. He exerts private effort (his action), has an exogenous random ability,
produces output \( X \) and generates signals \( S_1 = X, S_2, \ldots, S_K \) over time. The various
laws of motion, for the agent’s ability, output, signals, are as in the original setting.
The filtration \( \mathcal{G} \) captures all information of the signal processes as in the original
setting. The agent’s information at time \( t \) continues to be \( \mathcal{G}_t \), as defined in Section 2.1.
The agent’s strategy, which specifies his private action at every time as a function of
his information, continues to be a bounded \( \mathcal{G} \)-adapted process \( A \).

However, the agent’s payoff is not defined as in Section 2.1. In the auxiliary
setting, the agent is not paid by a market, but by a principal. Informally, over
interval \( [t, t + dt) \), the principal transfers the amount \( Y_t \, dt \) to the agent. Here \( Y \) is the
stochastic process that determines the transfer rate (payments may be negative). The
agent is risk-neutral, he discounts future payoffs at rate \( r > 0 \), and his instantaneous
cost of effort is \( c(\cdot) \), as in the original setting. The agent’s total payoff is
\[ \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} (Y_t - c(A_t)) \, dt. \]

Given \( Y \), the agent chooses a strategy \( A \) that maximizes his expected discounted
payoff:

\[ A \in \arg\max_{\tilde{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \left( Y_t - c(\tilde{A}_t) \right) dt \mid \mathcal{G}_0 \right], \tag{50} \]

where the expectation is under the law of motion defined by strategy \( \tilde{A} \). A strategy that satisfies (50) is called a best-response to the transfer process \( Y \).

In the auxiliary setting, the principal combines features of both the market and the intermediary in the original setting. As the market, the principal sets the transfer to the agent, and as the intermediary, she observes all the signals the agent generates over time, i.e., she knows \( \mathcal{G}_t \) at time \( t \). The principal also recommends a strategy for the agent, denoted \( A^* \)—the analogue of the market conjecture in the original setting. She is risk-neutral and has discount rate \( \rho \in (0, r) \). Her total payoff is

\[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} H_t dt. \]

For now, we do not need to specify the instantaneous payoff process \( H \). We specialize \( H \) below as we discuss the principal’s optimization program.

A contract for the principal is a pair \((A^*, Y)\). The contract is incentive compatible if \( A^* \) is a best-response to \( Y \).

For the most part, we focus on stationary linear contracts. These are contracts whose transfer processes \( Y \) are affine in the past signal increments, and are stationary: there exist \( u_k, k = 1, \ldots, K \), such that, up to an additive constant,

\[ Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^K \int_{s\leq t} u_k(t - s) dS_{k,s}. \]

The principal wants to maximize her own payoff over all contracts that are incentive compatible. This implies that there are two optimal control problems, one embedded into the other. First, we solve the agent’s problem, and then turn to the principal’s problem.

**The Agent’s Problem.** We first state conditions of incentive compatibility as in the main body of the paper. The proof follows the same arguments used in Lemma 2.11.

**Lemma D.1** Let \((A, Y)\) be a stationary linear contract. The contract is incentive
compatible if, and only if,
\[
c'(A) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k \int_0^\infty u(t)e^{-rt} \, dt.
\]

As common in principal-agent problems, to solve the principal’s problem using a dynamic programming approach, we express incentive compatibility in terms of the evolution of the agent’s continuation value, or equivalently, the agent’s continuation transfer.

In the sequel, as in the main body of the paper, we let \( \nu_t = E[\theta_t \mid G_t] \) be the agent’s best current estimate about his ability.

**Lemma D.2** Let \((A,Y)\) be a stationary linear contract. If the contract is incentive compatible, then there exists constants \(C_1, \ldots, C_K\) such that the agent’s continuation transfer process \( J \) defined by
\[
J_t = E\left[\int_{s \geq t} e^{-r(s-t)} Y_s \, ds \mid G_t\right],
\]
(where the expectation is taken with respect to the law of motion induced by strategy \( A \)) satisfies the SDE
\[
dJ_t = \left( r J_t - Y_t \right) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \xi_{\beta} \frac{\gamma^2}{(1 + \kappa)(1 + r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + C_k \right) \left[ dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) \, dt \right],
\]
and the two transversality conditions
\[
\lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho\tau} J_{t+\tau} \mid G_t] = 0, \text{ and } \lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho\tau} J^2_{t+\tau} \mid G_t] = 0,
\]
where \( \xi_{\beta} := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k C_k \). In addition, the equilibrium action is defined by \( c'(A_t) = \xi_{\alpha} := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k C_k \).

Note that transversality is with respect to the principal’s discount rate, not the agent’s.

**Proof.** Consider a stationary linear contract \((A,Y)\), where
\[
Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k(t-s) [dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s] \, ds.
\]
Let

$$J_T = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_{t \geq T} e^{-r(t-T)} Y_t \, dt \mid \mathcal{G}_T \right].$$

We compute

$$\int_{t \geq T} e^{-r(t-T)} Y_t \, dt = \sum_{k=1}^K \int_{t \geq T} \int_{s \leq T} e^{-r(t-T)} u_k(t-s) [dS_{k,s} - A_s ds] \, dt$$

$$+ \sum_{k=1}^K \int_{s \geq T} \int_{t \geq s} e^{-r(t-T)} u_k(t-s) \, dt [dS_{k,s} - A_s ds].$$

Note that, for $t \geq T$, $\mathbb{E} \left[ \theta_t \mid \mathcal{G}_T, \theta_T \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \theta_t \mid \theta_T \right] = e^{-(t-T) \theta_T}$, so using the law of iterated expectations, $\mathbb{E} \left[ \theta_t \mid \mathcal{G}_T \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \mathbb{E} \left[ \theta_t \mid \mathcal{G}_T, \theta_T \right] \mid \mathcal{G}_T \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-(t-T) \theta_T} \mid \mathcal{G}_T \right] = e^{-(t-T) \nu_T}$. Hence, we can compute $J_T$ as

$$J_T = \sum_{k=1}^K \int_{t \geq T} \int_{s \leq T} e^{-r(t-T)} u_k(t-s) [dS_{k,s} - A_s ds] \, dt$$

$$+ \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k \int_{s \geq T} \int_{t \geq s} e^{-r(t-T)} u_k(t-s) e^{-(s-T) \nu_T} \, dt.$$

$$= \int_{t \geq T} \int_{s \leq T} e^{-r(t-T)} u(t-s) [dS_{k,s} - A_s ds] \, dt$$

$$+ \frac{\nu_T}{1 + r} \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k \int_{\tau \geq 0} e^{-r \tau} u_k(\tau) \, d\tau.$$

Now, let us define the constants $C_1, \ldots, C_K$ as

$$C_k = \int_{\tau \geq 0} e^{-r \tau} u_k(\tau) \, d\tau.$$

Recall that the lemma introduces

$$\xi_\alpha := \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k C_k, \quad \xi_\beta := \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k C_k.$$
Then
\[ dJ_T = \frac{\xi_\beta}{1 + r} d\nu_T - Y_T dT + \sum_{k=1}^{K} C_k [dS_{k,T} - \alpha_k A_T dT] + rJ_T dT - \frac{r}{1 + r} \xi_\beta \nu_T dT \]
\[ = \frac{\xi_\beta}{1 + r} d\nu_T + (rJ_T - Y_T) dT + \sum_{k=1}^{K} C_k \left[ dS_{k,T} - \left( \alpha_k A_T + \frac{r}{1 + r} \beta_k \nu_t \right) dT \right]. \]

After simplification and using \( d\nu_t = -\kappa \nu_t dt + \frac{\gamma^2}{1 + \kappa} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} [dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_t dt] \), we get
\[ dJ_t = (rJ_t - Y_t) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \xi_\beta \frac{\gamma^2}{(1 + \kappa)(1 + r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + \hat{C}_{k,t} \right) [dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) dt]. \]

That \( c'(A_t) = \xi_\alpha \) follows from Lemma D.1.

**Lemma D.3** Let \((A, Y)\) be a stationary linear contract. Suppose \( J \) and \( \hat{C}_1, \ldots, \hat{C}_K \) are \( \mathcal{G} \)-adapted processes, and that \( J \) satisfies the SDE
\[ dJ_t = (rJ_t - Y_t) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \xi_\beta \frac{\gamma^2}{(1 + \kappa)(1 + r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + \hat{C}_{k,t} \right) [dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) dt], \]
and the two transversality conditions
\[ \lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho \tau} J_{t+\tau} \mid \mathcal{G}_t] = 0, \quad \text{and} \]
\[ \lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho \tau} J^2_{t+\tau} \mid \mathcal{G}_t] = 0, \]
where \( \hat{\xi}_\beta := \sum_k \beta_k \hat{C}_k \).
Then, \( J_t \) is the agent’s continuation transfer \( E \left[ \int_{s \geq t} e^{-r(s-t)} Y_s ds \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] \), the contract is incentive compatible, and the agent’s equilibrium action satisfies \( c'(A_t) = \sum_k \alpha_k \hat{C}_k \).

**Proof.** We fix a stationary linear contract \((A, Y)\). Let \( J \) and \( \hat{C}_1, \ldots, \hat{C}_K \) be \( \mathcal{G} \)-adapted processes such that \( J \) satisfies (51) subject to (52) and (53).
Integrating $J$ yields
\[
J_t - e^{-r\tau} J_{t+\tau} = 
\int_t^{t+\tau} e^{-r(s-t)} \left[ Y_s - \sum_{k=1}^K \left( \xi_{\beta,t} \frac{\gamma^2}{(1+\kappa)(1+r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + \hat{C}_{k,t} \right) [dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) dt] \right],
\]
and using that $J$ is $\mathcal{G}$-adapted, together with the law of iterated expectations, we get
\[
J_t - \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-r\tau} J_{t+\tau} \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{t+\tau} e^{-r(s-t)} Y_s \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] + \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{t+\tau} e^{-r(s-t)} \left( \xi_{\beta,t} \frac{\gamma^2}{(1+\kappa)(1+r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + \hat{C}_{k,t} \right) [dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) dt] \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right].
\]
Taking the limit as $\tau \to +\infty$ and applying the transversality condition \((52)\), we get $J = V$, where $V$ is defined as the agent’s continuation transfer,
\[
V_t := \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-r(s-t)} Y_s \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right].
\]
As in the proof of Lemma \((D.2)\) for any stationary linear contract—incenitive compatible or not—and an arbitrary strategy $A$ of the agent, we have that
\[
dV_t = [r V_t - Y_t] dt + \sum_{k=1}^K \left( \xi_{\beta,t} \frac{\gamma^2}{(1+\kappa)(1+r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + C_k \right) [dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) dt],
\]
with $C_k := \int_{\tau > 0} e^{-r\tau} u_k(\tau) d\tau$ and $\xi_{\beta} := \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k C_k$. That $J = V$ implies $\hat{C}_k = C_k$, and thus by Lemma \((D.1)\) the contract is incentive compatible. □

**The Principal’s Problem.** The problem for the principal is to choose a contract $(A,Y)$ such that two conditions are satisfied:

1. The process $Y$ maximizes
\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} H_t dt \mid \mathcal{G}_0 \right].
\]
2. The contract is incentive compatible.

In the remainder of this proof, we consider the following instantaneous payoff for the principal:

\[ H_t := c'(A_t) - \phi Y_t (Y_t - \nu_t), \]  

(54)

where

\[ \phi := \frac{\sqrt{\Delta}}{\sqrt{r(\kappa - 1)(r + \kappa)}} > 0, \]  

(55)

and \( \Delta := (r + \kappa)^2 (m_\alpha m_\beta - m_{\alpha\beta})^2 + (1 + r)^2 m_{\alpha\beta}^2 \), as defined in Section 3.2.

**Remarks on the choice of the principal’s payoff:** In the original setting, the intermediary seeks to maximize the agent’s discounted output. In a stationary setting, it is equivalent to maximizing the agent’s discounted marginal cost. The marginal cost is the first term in the right-hand side of (54). However, in the original setting, the agent’s incentives are driven by the market’s belief process. By Proposition 2.6, the market belief process \( \mu \) satisfies

\[ \mu_t = \mathbb{E}[\theta_t | \mu_t] = \mathbb{E}[\nu_t | \mu_t] = \frac{\text{Cov}[\mu_t, \nu_t]}{\text{Var}[\mu_t]} \mu_t, \]

using the law of iterated expectations and the projection formula for jointly normal random variables. Thus \( \text{Cov}[\mu_t, \nu_t] = \text{Var}[\mu_t] \). To make the principal’s payoff in the auxiliary setting and the intermediary’s objective of the original setting comparable, we include a penalty term \( \phi \mu_t (\nu_t - \mu_t) \) in the principal’s payoff. Note that \( \mathbb{E}[Y_t(\nu_t - Y_t)] = \text{Cov}[Y_t, \nu_t] - \text{Var}[Y_t] \). As a Lagrangian multiplier, the parameter \( \phi \) captures the tradeoff between the maximization of the agent’s marginal cost and the penalty term, so as to constrain the transfer to be close to a market belief. Its specific value (given in (55)) is picked using the conjectured optimal rating derived in the first part of the proof.

The principal’s problem is an optimal control problem with two natural state variables: the agent’s estimate of his ability, \( \nu \), and the agent’s continuation transfer \( J \). The state \( \nu \) appears explicitly in the principal’s payoff. Recall that \( \nu \) can be expressed in closed form, namely,

\[ \nu_t = \frac{\gamma^2}{1 + \kappa} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \int_{s \leq t} e^{-\kappa(t-s)} \left[ dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s ds \right]. \]
Thus, for $t \geq 0$, the state variable $\nu$ is determined by its initial value,

$$\nu_0 = \gamma^2 \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \int_{s \leq 0} e^{\kappa s} dS_{k,s},$$

and the equation of evolution of $\nu$,

$$d\nu_t = -\kappa \nu_t \, dt + \gamma^2 \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \left[ dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s \, ds \right].$$

The other state $J$ does not appear explicitly in the principal’s payoff, but must be controlled to ensure that the transversality conditions are satisfied—by the lemmas [D.2] and [D.3], these transversality conditions are necessary and sufficient to ensure that the contract is incentive compatible.

The principal’s problem can then be restated as follows: the principal seeks to find a stationary linear contract $(A, Y)$, along with processes $\hat{C}_k$, $k = 1, \ldots, K$ such that, for all $t$, the principal maximizes

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{-\rho(s-t)} (c'(A_t) - \phi Y_t (Y_t - \nu_t)) \, ds \right] \bigg| \mathcal{G}_t$$

subject to:

1. Incentive compatibility: $c'(A_t) = \hat{\xi}_\alpha$, where $\hat{\xi}_\alpha := \sum_k \alpha_k \hat{C}_k$.

2. The evolution of the agent’s belief $\nu$ is given by

$$d\nu_t = -\kappa \nu_t \, dt + \gamma^2 \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \left[ dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s \, ds \right].$$

3. The evolution of the agent’s continuation transfer $J$ is given by

$$dJ_t = (rJ_t - Y_t) \, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \frac{\beta_k}{(1 + \kappa)(1 + r)} \hat{C}_{k,t} \right) \left[ dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) \, dt \right],$$

where $\hat{\xi}_\beta := \sum_k \beta_k \hat{C}_k$. 

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4. The following transversality conditions hold

\[
\lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho \tau} J_{t+\tau} \mid G_t] = 0, \text{ and } \\
\lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho \tau} J_{t+\tau}^2 \mid G_t] = 0.
\]

To solve the principal’s problem, we use dynamic programming. The principal maximizes

\[
E \left[ \int_t^\infty \rho e^{-\rho(u-t)} (\xi_{\alpha,t} - \phi Y_t(Y_t - \nu)) \, ds \bigg| G_t \right]
\]

for every \( t \), subject to the evolution of the state variables \( \nu \) and \( J \), and the transversality conditions on \( J \). Without the restriction to stationary linear transfer processes, the dynamic programming problem is standard. We solve the principal’s problem without imposing that restriction, and verify \textit{ex post} that the optimal transfer in this relaxed problem is indeed stationary linear.

Assume the principal’s value function \( V \) as a function of the two states \( J \) and \( \nu \) is \( C^1(\mathbb{R}^2) \). By standard arguments, an application of Itô’s Lemma yields the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for \( V \):

\[
\rho V = \sup_{y,c_1,\ldots,c_K} \rho \hat{\xi}_\alpha - \rho \phi y(y - \nu) + (rJ - y)V_J - \nu V_\nu + \gamma^2 \frac{k - 1}{\kappa + 1} V_{\nu \nu} \\
+ \frac{(\kappa + r)\gamma^2 \hat{\xi}_\beta}{(1 + \kappa)(1 + r)} V_{\nu J} + \sum_k \left( \frac{\gamma^2}{1 + \kappa(1 + r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k + \sigma_k c_k} \right)^2 V_{JJ},
\]

(56)

where to shorten notation we have used the subscript notation for the (partial) derivatives of \( V \), and have abused notation by using \( \hat{\xi}_\alpha \) and \( \hat{\xi}_\beta \) to denote \( \sum_k \alpha_k c_k \) and \( \sum_k \beta_k c_k \), respectively.

We conjecture a quadratic value function \( V \) of the form

\[
V(J, \nu) = a_0 + a_1 J + a_2 \nu + a_3 J \nu + a_4 J^2 + a_5 \nu^2.
\]

(57)

Using the general form of the conjectured value function \( V \), we can solve for \( y, c_1, \ldots, c_K \) using the first-order condition. We can then plug these variables expressed as a function of the coefficients \( a_i \)'s back into (56), which allows to uniquely identify
We obtain

\[ a_0 = -\frac{m_{\alpha\beta}^2(k-1)(1 + 2r + \kappa)}{4m_{\beta}(\kappa + r)^2(2r - \rho)\phi} + \frac{m_{\alpha\beta}(k-1)}{2m_{\beta}(\kappa + r)} + \frac{(k-1)^2\phi}{2m_{\beta}(2 + \rho)} + \frac{m_{\alpha}}{4(2r - \rho)\phi}, \]

\[ a_1 = 0, \]
\[ a_2 = 0, \]
\[ a_3 = \frac{(2r - \rho)\rho\phi}{1 + r}, \]
\[ a_4 = -(2r - \rho)\rho\phi, \]
\[ a_5 = \frac{\rho(1 - r + \rho)^2\phi}{4(1 + r)^2(2 + \rho)}. \]

It is readily verified that the second-order condition is equivalent to \( a_5 < 0 \), and so it is satisfied for all \( \rho < r \).

After simplification, we obtain the following expressions for \( y \) and \( c_k \):

\[ y(J, \nu) = (2r - \rho)J + \frac{1 - r + \rho}{2(1 + r)}\nu, \]
\[ c_k(J, \nu) = \frac{\alpha_k}{2\sigma_k^2(2r - \rho)\phi} - \frac{\beta_k(k-1)(m_{\alpha\beta}(1 + 2r + \kappa) - (r + \kappa)(2r - \rho)\phi)}{2\sigma_k^2m_{\beta}(r + \kappa)^2(2r - \rho)\phi}. \]

Thus, we obtain that the optimal processes \( \hat{C}_k \) are constant, and we obtain the optimal transfer at time \( t \), \( Y_t \) as a linear function of the state variables \( J_t, \nu_t \):

\[ Y_t = \begin{bmatrix} 2r - \rho \\ \frac{1 - r + \rho}{2(1 + r)} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} J_t \\ \nu_t \end{bmatrix}. \]

We insert the expression of the optimal control \( Y_t \) back into the equations that determine the evolution of the state variables. Doing so yields a linear two-dimensional stochastic differential equation for the state variables, namely

\[ d \begin{bmatrix} J_t \\ \nu_t \end{bmatrix} = M \begin{bmatrix} J_t \\ \nu_t \end{bmatrix} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left[ \frac{\gamma^2}{\kappa - 1} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \frac{1}{m_{\beta}} \frac{\hat{C}_{k,t}}{\sigma_k^2} \right] [dS_{k,t} - \alpha_kA_t dt], \]

\[ \text{The details of the identification are lengthy and omitted.} \]
where

\[
M := \begin{bmatrix}
-r + \rho & -\xi \beta + \frac{1 - r + \rho}{2(1 + r)} \\
0 & -\kappa
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

The matrix \(M\) has two eigenvalues, \(-(r - \rho)\) and \(-\kappa\), which are generically distinct, and negative for \(\rho < r\). We can write

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
J_t \\
\nu_t
\end{bmatrix} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} (f_k e^{-(r-\rho)(t-s)} + g_k e^{-\kappa(t-s)}) \left[ dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_t \, dt \right],
\]

where \(f_k\) and \(g_k\) are two-dimensional vectors that can be expressed in closed form as:

\[
f_k = \begin{bmatrix}
m_{2\beta(r+\kappa)}(r-\kappa-\rho) \alpha_k \sigma_k^2 + m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa-1)(1+\kappa+\rho) \beta_k \sigma_k^2 \\
0
\end{bmatrix}, \text{ and}
\]

\[
g_k = \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{-\kappa - 1}{2m_{\beta}(1+r)(r-\kappa-\rho)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} \\
\frac{-\kappa - 1}{2m_{\beta}(1+r)(r-\kappa-\rho)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2}
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Moreover, when we plug the expressions of the state variables into (58), we get a stationary linear transfer process

\[
Y_t = \sum_k \int_{s \leq t} u_k(t-s) \left[ dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s \, ds \right],
\]

with linear filter

\[
u_k(\tau) = F_k e^{-(r-\rho)\tau} + G_k e^{-\kappa\tau},
\]

where

\[
F_k := \frac{m_{2\beta(r+\kappa)}(r-\kappa-\rho) \alpha_k}{2m_{\beta}(r+\kappa)(r-\kappa-\rho) \phi \sigma_k^2} + \frac{m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa-1)(1+\kappa+\rho) \beta_k}{2m_{\beta}(r+\kappa)(r-\kappa-\rho) \phi \sigma_k^2}, \text{ and}
\]

\[
G_k := \frac{m_{2\beta}(1+r)(\kappa+\rho)(\kappa-r+\rho) \phi \beta_k}{2m_{\beta}(r+\kappa)(\kappa-r+\rho) \phi \sigma_k^2}.
\]

The equilibrium action for the agent is stationary and given by

\[
c'(A_t) = \frac{\Delta + m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa-1)(r+\kappa)(2r-\rho) \phi}{2m_{\beta}(r+\kappa)^2(2r-\rho) \phi}.
\]
Thus, the contract \((A,Y)\) just defined is an optimal stationary linear contract for the principal.

Note that, as \(\rho \to 0\),
\[
c'(A_t) \to \frac{\kappa - 1}{4(\kappa + r)m_\beta} \left(2m_\alpha\beta + \sqrt{\Delta/r}\right),
\]
and \(\{u_k\}_k\) converges to the linear filter associated with the market belief of the conjectured optimal rating in the first part of this proof.

**Back to the original model.** We now make the connection between the auxiliary model and the original model, and conclude the verification. We prove by contradiction that the candidate rating obtained in the first part of this proof is indeed optimal.

We continue to consider the auxiliary model defined in this section. Let \((A^*, Y^*)\) be the incentive-compatible contract defined by
\[
c'(A^*) = \frac{\kappa - 1}{4(\kappa + r)m_\beta} \left(2m_\alpha\beta + \sqrt{\Delta/r}\right),
\]
and
\[
Y^*_t = \frac{(\kappa - 1) \left((\kappa - 1)m_\alpha\beta(r + 1)\sqrt{r} + \sqrt{\Delta}(\kappa - r)\right)}{2\sqrt{\Delta}m_\beta(\kappa - r)}
\[
\cdot \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k^c(t - s) \left[dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A^*_s \, ds\right].
\]

Note that \(Y^*_t\) is defined as the market belief of the conjectured optimal rating of the original setting, obtained in Section D.1.1, while \(A^*\) is the corresponding equilibrium action. Consider an information structure \(\widehat{F}\), generated by some rating process, that induces a stationary action \(\widehat{A}\). Let \(\widehat{Y} := E[\theta_t | \widehat{F}_t]\). Note that \((\widehat{A}, \widehat{Y})\) is a well-defined incentive-compatible stationary linear contract. We show that \(c'(A^*) \geq c'(\widehat{A})\). Let \((A^{(\rho)}, Y^{(\rho)})\) be the optimal incentive-compatible stationary linear contract defined above, as a function of the discount rate of the principal \(\rho\). Let \(V^{(\rho)}\) be the corresponding principal’s expected payoff.

Note that, for every confidential exclusive information structure \(F\) generated by a rating process, the equilibrium market belief of the original setting, \(\mu_t = E[\theta_t | F_t]\), satisfies \(\text{Cov}[\mu_t, \nu_t] = \text{Var}[\mu_t]\), and thus the principal’s expected payoff for contract \((A^*, Y^*)\) is \(V^* := c'(A^*)/\rho\), while the principal’s expected payoff for contract \((\widehat{A}, \widehat{Y})\)
is \( \hat{V} := \frac{c'(A)}{\rho} \).

Then, for every \( \rho \in (0, r) \), the inequalities \( \rho V^{(\rho)} \geq \rho \hat{V} = c'(A) \) must hold. However, as \( \rho \to 0 \), \( c'(A^{(\rho)}) \to c'(A^*) \), and the linear filter of \( Y^{(\rho)} \) converges pointwise to the linear filter of \( Y^* \). Thus, \( \text{Cov}[Y^{(\rho)}, \nu_t] - \text{Var}[Y^{(\rho)}] \to 0 \), which in turn implies that \( \rho V^{(\rho)} \to c'(A^*) \). Hence, \( c'(A^*) \geq c'(A) \).

### D.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2

We prove Theorem 3.2. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we proceed in two parts. In the first part, we compute a candidate optimal rating using calculus of variations, while in the second part, we verify the optimality of the candidate using an auxiliary principal-agent model.

#### D.2.1 Part I: First-Order Conditions

Recall the shorthand notation of Section D.1.1 that will be used throughout this proof as well:

\[
U(t) := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k u_k(t), \\
V(t) := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k u_k(t), \\
U_0 := \int_{0}^{\infty} U(t) e^{-t} dt, \\
V_0 := \int_{0}^{\infty} V(t) e^{-rt} dt.
\]

We seek to maximize \( c'(A) \), where \( A \) is the stationary equilibrium action of the agent, among all public information structures generated by a rating process \( Y \) that satisfies the variance normalization \( \text{Var}[Y_t] = 1 \) and that is proportional to the market belief. Such rating processes are described by their linear filter \( \{u_k\}_k \), and can be written as follows:

\[
Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(t - s) [dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A_s ds].
\]
As in Section D.1.1, we note that, by Itô’s isometry, for \( \tau \geq 0 \),

\[
\text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_0^{\infty} u_k(s)u_k(s+\tau) \, ds \\
+ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{k'=1}^{K} \beta_k \beta_{k'} u_k(t-i)u_{k'}(t+\tau-j) \text{Cov}[\theta_i, \theta_j] \, dj \, di.
\]

Hence, as \( \text{Cov}[\theta_i, \theta_j] = \gamma^2 e^{-|i-j|/2} \), after a change of variables in the last term, we get

\[
\text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_0^{\infty} u_k(s)u_k(s+\tau) \, ds + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_0^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} U(i)U(j)e^{-|j+\tau-i|} \, di \, dj.
\]

By Lemma 2.8, the rating process \( Y \) is proportional to the belief of a public information structure if, and only if, \( \text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] = e^{-\tau} \) for every \( \tau \geq 0 \).

Using the expression for \( \text{Cov}[Y_t, Y_{t+\tau}] \) just obtained, and Lemma 2.11 this is equivalent to maximizing

\[
\frac{\gamma^2}{2} \left[ \int_0^{\infty} U(t)e^{-t} \, dt \right] \left[ \int_0^{\infty} V(t)e^{-rt} \, dt \right],
\]

subject to the continuum of constraints

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_0^{\infty} u_k(j)u_k(j+\tau) \, dj + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_0^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} U(i)U(j)e^{-|j+\tau-i|} \, di \, dj = e^{-\tau},
\]

for every \( \tau \geq 0 \).

The continuum of constraints makes it difficult to solve this optimization problem directly by forming the Lagrangian as we did in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Instead, we solve a relaxed optimization problem with a single constraint: we maximize \( F(u) \), defined as

\[
F(u) = \left[ \int_0^{\infty} U(t)e^{-t} \, dt \right] \left[ \int_0^{\infty} V(t)e^{-rt} \, dt \right],
\]

(the original objective without the constant factor \( \gamma^2/2 \)), subject to \( G(u) = \frac{2}{1+r} \), where

\[
G(u) := g(0) + (1-r) \int_0^{\infty} e^{-r\tau} g(\tau) \, d\tau,
\]

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\[ g(\tau) := \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sigma_k^2 \int_{0}^{\infty} u_k(j)u_k(j + \tau) \, dj + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} U(i)U(j)e^{-|j+i-t|} \, di \, dj. \]

As will be shown, the solution of this relaxed optimization problem satisfies the original continuum of constraints.

Focusing on the relaxed optimization problem, we begin with the necessary first-order conditions that pin down uniquely a smooth solution. Assume there exists a solution \( u^* \) to the above problem. Let

\[ L(u, \lambda) = F(u) + \lambda G(u). \]

Assume there exists some \( \lambda^* \) such that \( u^* \) maximizes \( u \mapsto L(u, \lambda^*) \). As in the confidential setting, it will be useful to observe that \( \lambda^* < 0 \) is necessary. Indeed, \( G(u^*) = \frac{2}{1 + r} > 0 \) and \( F(u^*) > 0 \), since the optimal solution does at least as well as transparency, which is a public information structure, and so induces a positive equilibrium effort level by our assumption that \( m_{\alpha_\beta} \geq 0 \).

We apply Proposition B.1 to get first-order conditions: if \( \lambda = \lambda^* \) and \( u = u^* \), then for all \( k = 1, \ldots, K \) and all \( t \), \( L_k(t) = 0 \), with

\[ L_k(t) := F_k(t) + \lambda G_k(t), \]

\[ F_k(t) := \alpha_k U_0 e^{-rt} + \beta_k V_0 e^{-t}, \]

and

\[ G_k(t) := 2\sigma_k^2 u_k(t) + \frac{\gamma^2 \beta_k}{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} U(j)e^{-|j-t|} \, dj \]

\[ + (1 - r) \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-r\tau} [u_k(t + \tau) + u_k(t - \tau)] \, d\tau \]

\[ + (1 - r) \frac{\gamma^2 \beta_k}{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} U(j)e^{-|j+i-t|} \, dj \, d\tau \]

\[ + (1 - r) \frac{\gamma^2 \beta_k}{2} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} U(i)e^{-|j+i-t|} \, di \, d\tau. \]

Throughout the proof, any function \( h \) defined on the nonnegative real line is extended to the entire real line with the convention that these functions assign value zero to any negative input. By convention, the derivative of \( h \) at 0 is defined to be the right-derivative of \( h \) at 0, which is well-defined for \( h \) twice differentiable. Let some function \( h : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) be twice differentiable and such that \( h, h', h'' \) are all
integrable. Throughout the proof, to compute derivatives of integral functions, we use the following arguments.

First, if \( H(t) = \int_0^\infty h(i)e^{-|t+i\tau-i|} \, di \) for some \( \tau \geq 0 \), then

\[
H(t) = \int_0^{t+\tau} h(i)e^{-(t+i\tau-i)} \, di + \int_{t+\tau}^\infty h(i)e^{t+i\tau-i} \, di, 
\]

so that

\[
H''(t) = H(t) - 2h(t + \tau). 
\]

Similarly, if instead \( H(t) = \int_0^\infty h(j)e^{-|j+i\tau-t|} \, dj \) then if \( t > \tau \),

\[
H(t) = \int_0^{t-\tau} h(j)e^{(j+i\tau-t)} \, dj + \int_{t-\tau}^\infty h(j)e^{-(j+i\tau-t)} \, dj, 
\]

and for every \( t \),

\[
H''(t) = H(t) - 2h(t - \tau). 
\]

Finally, if \( H(t) = \int_0^\infty e^{-r\tau}[h(t+\tau)+h(t-\tau)] \, d\tau \), then

\[
H'(t) = e^{-rt}h(0) + \int_0^\infty e^{-r\tau}[h'(t+\tau)+h'(t-\tau)] \, d\tau, 
\]

and

\[
H''(t) = -re^{-rt}h(0) + e^{-rt}h'(0) + \int_0^\infty e^{-r\tau}[h''(t+\tau)+h''(t-\tau)] \, d\tau. 
\]
We can now compute $p_k := L_k - L''_k$ as
\[
p_k(t) = L_k(t) - L''_k(t) = \alpha_k U_0 (1 - r^2) e^{-rt} \\
+ 2 \lambda \sigma_k^2 [u_k(t) - u''_k(t)] + 2 \lambda \gamma^2 \beta_k U(t) \\
+ \lambda (1 - r) \sigma_k^2 \int_0^\infty e^{-r \tau} [u_k(t + \tau) + u_k(t - \tau)] d\tau \\
- \lambda (1 - r) \sigma_k^2 \int_0^\infty e^{-r \tau} [u''_k(t + \tau) + u''_k(t - \tau)] d\tau \\
- \lambda (1 - r) \sigma_k^2 [-re^{-rt} u_k(0) + u'_k(0)e^{-rt}] \\
+ \lambda (1 - r) \gamma^2 \beta_k \int_0^\infty e^{-r \tau} U(t - \tau) d\tau \\
+ \lambda (1 - r) \gamma^2 \beta_k \int_0^\infty e^{-r \tau} U(t + \tau) d\tau.
\]

Next, we let
\[
J_k(t) = \int_0^\infty e^{-r \tau} [u_k(t + \tau) + u_k(t - \tau)] d\tau,
\]
and
\[
J(t) = \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k J_k(t).
\]

We observe that $J''_k = -2ru_k + r^2 J_k$. Plugging $J_k$ in the expression for $p_k$:
\[
p_k(t) = \alpha_k U_0 (1 - r^2) e^{-rt} + 2 \lambda \sigma_k^2 [u_k(t) - u''_k(t)] + 2 \lambda \gamma^2 \beta_k U(t) \\
+ 2r \lambda (1 - r) \sigma_k^2 u_k(t) + \lambda (1 - r)(1 - r^2) \sigma_k^2 J_k(t) + \lambda (1 - r) \gamma^2 \beta_k J(t).
\]

After differentiation, we get
\[
p_k''(t) = r^2 \alpha U_0 (1 - r^2) e^{-rt} + 2 \lambda \sigma_k^2 [u''_k(t) - u'''_k(t)] + 2 \lambda \gamma^2 \beta U''(t) \\
+ 2r \lambda (1 - r) \sigma_k^2 u''_k(t) + \lambda (1 - r)(1 - r^2) \sigma_k^2 [-2ru_k(t) + r^2 J_k(t)] \\
+ \lambda (1 - r) \gamma^2 \beta_k [-2r U(t) + r^2 J(t)].
\]
Finally, we let \( q_k := p''_k - r^2 p_k \). We have
\[
q_k(t) = 2\lambda \sigma_k^2 [u''_k(t) - u''''_k(t)] - r^2 2\lambda \sigma_k^2 [u_k(t) - u''_k(t)] \\
+ 2\lambda \gamma^2 \beta U''(t) - 2r^2 \lambda \gamma^2 \beta U(t) \\
+ 2r\lambda (1-r) \sigma_k^2 u''_k(t) - 2r^3 \lambda (1-r) \sigma_k^2 u_k(t) \\
- 2r\lambda (1-r) (1-r^2) \sigma_k^2 u_k(t) \\
- 2r\lambda (1-r) \gamma^2 \beta U(t).
\]

We must have \( q_k(t) = 0 \) for all \( k \) and all \( t \). In particular, and since \( \lambda \neq 0 \),
\[
\frac{1}{2\lambda} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} q_k(t) = 0,
\]

hence
\[
U'' - U'''' - r^2 (U - U'') + \gamma^2 m_\beta U'' - r^2 \gamma^2 m_\beta U \\
+ r(1-r)U'' - r(1-r)U - r(1-r) \gamma^2 m_\beta U = 0.
\]

The characteristic polynomial associated with this homogeneous linear differential equation has roots \( \pm \sqrt{1 + \gamma^2 m_\beta} = \pm \kappa \) and \( \pm \sqrt{r} \). As we have assumed that the solution to the optimization problem is admissible, it follows that \( U \) must be bounded, and we discard the positive roots. Thus, \( U \) must have the form
\[
U(t) = C_1 e^{-\sqrt{r}t} + C_2 e^{-kt},
\]
for some constants \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \).

Next, pick an arbitrary pair \((i, j)\) with \( i \neq j \), and define \( Z_{ij}(t) := \beta_i \sigma_j^2 u_j(t) - \beta_j \sigma_i^2 u_i(t) \). That \((\beta_i q_j(t) - \beta_j q_i(t))/(2\lambda) = 0\) yields, after simplification, the following differential equation for \( Z_{ij} \):
\[
Z''_{ij} - Z''''_{ij} - r^2 (Z_{ij} - Z''_{ij}) + r(1-r)(Z''_{ij} - Z_{ij}) = 0.
\]

The characteristic polynomial associated with this homogeneous linear differential equation has roots \( \pm 1 \) and \( \pm \sqrt{r} \). As \( Z_{ij} \) must be bounded, we get that \( Z_{ij} \) has the form
\[
Z_{ij}(t) = C'_1 e^{-\sqrt{r}t} + C'_2 e^{-t},
\]
for some constants \( C'_1 \) and \( C'_2 \).
Putting together (60) and (61), we get that
\[ u_k(t) = D_{1,k}e^{-\sqrt{rt}} + D_{2,k}e^{-\kappa t} + D_{3,k}e^{-t}, \] (62)
for some constants \( D_{1,k}, D_{2,k}, D_{3,k} \).

**Determination of the constants.** As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have established that the solution belongs to a family of functions that are sums of some given scaled time exponentials. We now solve for the constant factors \( D_{1,k}, D_{2,k}, D_{3,k}, k \geq 1 \).

We first note that, since the term \( e^{-t} \) vanishes in Equation (60) that gives the general form of the function \( U \), the equality
\[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k D_{3,k} = 0 \] (63)
obtains.

Using (63), we plug (62) in the equation for \( L_k(t) \) and get that
\[ L_k(t) = L_{1,k}e^{-rt} + L_{2,k}e^{-\kappa t} + L_{3,k}e^{-t}, \]
where \( L_{1,k}, L_{2,k} \) and \( L_{3,k} \) are scalar factors that will be expressed as a function of the primitives of the model and the constants \( D_{1,k}, D_{2,k}, D_{3,k} \). Note that the exponential \( e^{-\sqrt{rt}} \), that exists in the general form of \( u_k(t) \) given in (62) vanishes after simplification, while instead an exponential \( e^{-rt} \) appears that is not present in \( u_k(t) \).

We observe that
\[
L_{2,k} = \frac{2\sigma^2_k \lambda (r - \kappa^2)}{(r - \kappa)(\kappa + r)} D_{2,k} + \frac{2\gamma^2 \lambda \beta_k (r - \kappa^2)}{(\kappa - 1)(\kappa + 1)(\kappa - r)(\kappa + r)} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{2,i}
\]
\[
= \frac{2\lambda \sigma^2_k (r - \kappa^2)}{(r - \kappa)(\kappa + r)} D_{2,k} + \frac{2\lambda \beta_k (\kappa^2 - r)}{m_\beta (r - \kappa)(\kappa + r)} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{2,i},
\]
using that \( \gamma^2 = (\kappa^2 - 1)/m_\beta \). That \( L_{2,k} = 0 \) for all \( k \) implies
\[ D_{2,k} = a \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma^2_k}, \] (64)
for some constant \( a \). It can be seen that if \( a = 0 \), then \( D_{1,k} = D_{2,k} = D_{3,k} = 0 \) for all
In which case \( u_k = 0 \) and the variance normalization constraint is violated. Hence, in the remainder of the proof, we assume \( a \neq 0 \). (As it turns out, as ratings yield the same market belief up to a scalar, the precise value of \( a \) is irrelevant, as long as it is non-zero.) In particular,

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k D_{2,k} = a m_{\alpha\beta},
\]

and

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k D_{2,k} = a m_{\beta}.
\]

Using (63), (64), and \( \gamma^2 = (\kappa^2 - 1)/m_{\beta} \), we get

\[
L_{3,k} = \frac{(\kappa^2 - 1) \lambda \beta_k}{(\sqrt{r} - 1)(r + 1)} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} + \frac{\beta_k}{r + \sqrt{r}} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i D_{1,i} + \frac{\beta_k}{r + 1} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i D_{3,i} + \frac{2 \lambda \sigma_k^2}{r + 1} D_{3,k} + \frac{a \beta_k m_{\alpha\beta}}{\kappa + r} + \frac{a (\kappa + 1) \lambda \beta_k}{r + 1}.
\]

As \( L_{3,k} = 0 \) for all \( k \), we can multiply (65) by \( \beta_k / \sigma_k^2 \), sum over \( k \), and use (63) to get that \( D_{3,k} = 0 \). In addition, after plugging \( D_{3,k} = 0 \), the term \( L_{3,k} \) simplifies to

\[
L_{3,k} = \frac{(\kappa^2 - 1) \lambda \beta_k}{(\sqrt{r} - 1)(r + 1)} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} + \frac{\beta_k}{r + \sqrt{r}} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i D_{1,i} + \frac{a \beta_k m_{\alpha\beta}}{\kappa + r} + \frac{a (\kappa + 1) \lambda \beta_k}{r + 1} = 0.
\]

which we will use to determine \( \lambda \).

Finally, given \( D_{2,k} = a \beta_k / \sigma_k^2 \) and \( D_{3,k} = 0 \), and using that \( \gamma^2 = (\kappa^2 - 1)/m_{\beta} \), the remaining constant \( L_{1,k} \) simplifies to

\[
L_{1,k} = \left( \frac{\alpha_k}{\sqrt{r} + 1} - \frac{(\kappa^2 - 1) \lambda \beta_k}{(\sqrt{r} - 1) \sqrt{r}(r + 1) m_{\beta}} \right) \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} + \frac{\lambda (\sqrt{r} + 1) \sigma_k^2}{\sqrt{r}} D_{1,k} + \frac{a \alpha_k m_{\beta}}{\kappa + 1} + \frac{a \lambda \beta_k (\kappa + r)}{r + 1}.
\]

As \( L_{1,k} = 0 \) must hold for every \( k \), we multiply (67) by \( \beta_k / \sigma_k^2 \), sum over \( k \), and we
get an equation that the term $\sum_i \beta_i D_{1,i}$ must satisfy:

$$\left( \frac{m_{\alpha \beta}}{\sqrt{r} + 1} - \frac{(\kappa^2 - 1) \lambda m_\beta}{(\sqrt{r} - 1) \sqrt{r} (r + 1) m_\beta} \right) \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} + \frac{\lambda (\sqrt{r} + 1)}{\sqrt{r}} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} + \frac{am_{\alpha \beta} m_\beta}{\kappa + 1} + \frac{a \lambda m_\beta (\kappa + r)}{r + 1} = 0. \quad (68)$$

As $m_{\alpha \beta} \geq 0$ and $m_\beta > 0$,

$$\frac{am_{\alpha \beta} m_\beta}{\kappa + 1} + \frac{a \lambda m_\beta (\kappa + r)}{r + 1} \neq 0, \quad (69)$$

which implies that the factor of $\sum_i \beta_i D_{1,i}$ is non-zero. Similarly, if we multiply (67) by $\alpha_k / \sigma_k^2$ and sum over $k$, we get an equation that the term $\sum_i \alpha_i D_{1,i}$ must satisfy:

$$\left( \frac{m_\alpha}{\sqrt{r} + 1} - \frac{(\kappa^2 - 1) \lambda m_\alpha}{(\sqrt{r} - 1) \sqrt{r} (r + 1) m_\beta} \right) \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_i D_{1,i} + \frac{\lambda (\sqrt{r} + 1)}{\sqrt{r}} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i D_{1,i} + \frac{am_\alpha m_\beta}{\kappa + 1} + \frac{a \lambda m_\alpha (\kappa + r)}{r + 1} = 0. \quad (70)$$

Now we can solve for $\sum_i \alpha_i D_{1,i}$ and $\sum_i \beta_i D_{1,i}$, using (68) and (70). Plugging in the solutions in (66), we get a rational expression in $\lambda$, whose denominator is

$$(\kappa + 1)(r + 1)^2 (\sqrt{r} - 1) \sqrt{r} (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 m_{\alpha \beta} (\kappa + r) + (\kappa + 1) \lambda (r + 1) (\sqrt{r} + 1)^3 (r - \kappa) (\kappa + r)^2,$$

and whose numerator is

$$-a (r + 1)^2 (\sqrt{r} - \kappa) (m_\alpha m_\beta (\kappa + r)^2 - (\kappa + 1)m_{\alpha \beta}^2 (\kappa + 2r - 1)) + 4a (\kappa + 1) \lambda (r + 1) \sqrt{r} (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 m_{\alpha \beta} (\sqrt{r} - \kappa) (\kappa + r) + a (\kappa + 1)^2 \lambda^2 (\sqrt{r} + 1)^4 (\sqrt{r} - \kappa) (\kappa + r)^2.$$

We observe that the numerator, which must equal zero, yields a quadratic equation in $\lambda$,

$$a \left( \sqrt{r} - \kappa \right) \left( A \lambda^2 + B \lambda + C \right) = 0, \quad (71)$$
where:

\[
A := (\kappa + 1)^2(\kappa + r)^2 (\sqrt{r} + 1)^4 ,
\]

\[
B := 4(\kappa + 1)(\kappa + r) (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 \sqrt{r}(r + 1)m_{\alpha\beta} ,
\]

\[
C := -(r + 1)^2 \left( m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa + r)^2 - (\kappa + 1)m_{\alpha\beta}(\kappa + 2r - 1) \right) ,
\]

\[
= -(r + 1)^2 \left( (\kappa + r)^2 (m_{\alpha\beta} - m_{\alpha\beta}^2) + (1 - r)^2 m_{\alpha\beta}^2 \right) .
\]

Next, we have that \( A > 0 \), and also that \( C < 0 \), which owes to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality \( m_{\alpha\beta}m_{\beta\alpha} \geq m_{\alpha\beta}^2 \) and to \( \kappa > 1 \). Hence, there are two real roots of (71), one negative, and one positive. As \( B > 0 \) and we have established that \( \lambda < 0 \), it follows that

\[
\lambda = \frac{-B + \sqrt{B^2 - 4AC}}{2A} ,
\]

which, after simplification, reduces to

\[
\lambda = -\frac{(r + 1) \left( \sqrt{\Delta} + 2\sqrt{r}m_{\alpha\beta} \right)}{(\kappa + 1) (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (\kappa + r)} ,
\]

with \( \Delta := (r + \kappa)^2(m_{\alpha\beta}m_{\beta\alpha} - m_{\alpha\beta}^2) + (1 + r)^2 m_{\alpha\beta}^2 \).

Finally, (67) and (68) yield a linear equation that determines \( D_{1,k} \):

\[
D_{1,k} = -\frac{a\sqrt{r}(r + 1)m_{\beta} (\sqrt{r} - \kappa) (\kappa + r)}{(\kappa + 1) \left( (r^2 - 1) \sqrt{r}m_{\alpha\beta} + \lambda (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (r^2 - \kappa^2) \right) \sigma_k^2} \alpha_k
\]

\[-\frac{a(r + 1)\sqrt{r}m_{\alpha\beta} (\kappa + r - \sqrt{r} - 1) + a\lambda (r - \sqrt{r}) (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (\kappa + r) \beta_k}{\left( (r^2 - 1) \sqrt{r}m_{\alpha\beta} + \lambda (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (r^2 - \kappa^2) \right) \sigma_k^2} .
\]

Letting \( \tilde{\lambda} := (\kappa - 1)\sqrt{r}(1 + r)m_{\alpha\beta} + (\kappa - r)\sqrt{\Delta} \), we can make further simplifications, and express the solution in a form similar to that of the confidential case. We have

\[
u_k(t) = ad_k \frac{\sqrt{r}}{\lambda} e^{-\sqrt{r}t} + a\frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} e^{-\kappa t} ,
\]

with

\[
d_k = \frac{\kappa - \sqrt{r}}{\kappa - r} c_k + \tilde{\lambda} \frac{\sqrt{r} - 1}{\kappa - r} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} ,
\]

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and, as in the confidential setting,

$$c_k = (\kappa^2 - r^2)m_\beta \frac{\alpha_k}{\sigma_k^2} + (1 - \kappa^2)m_{\alpha\beta} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2},$$  \hspace{1cm} (72)

As in the case of confidential ratings, because a rating process induces the same effort level up to scaling, all constant multipliers $a$ yield the same effort level. We can use, for example, $a = 1$ in the preceding expressions.

If

$$a = \frac{(\kappa - 1) \left((\kappa - 1)m_{\alpha\beta}(r + 1)\sqrt{r} + \sqrt{\Delta(\kappa - r)}\right)}{\sqrt{\Delta m_\beta (\sqrt{r} + 1)}(\sqrt{r} - \kappa)},$$

then it can be verified that the corresponding rating process satisfies the conditions of Lemma C.4 so is a market belief for a public information structure.

**D.2.2 Part II: Verification**

As for the case of confidential ratings described in Section D.1.2, we verify that the candidate rating of Section D.2.1 is optimal among all ratings. We use the same auxiliary setting described in Section D.1.2, with the same variables and notation, except for the principal’s payoff instantaneous payoff function $H$.

To define the principal’s payoff, we introduce an extra state variable, $\Lambda$, with initial value $\Lambda_0 = 0$, and which evolves as

$$d\Lambda_t = -r\Lambda_t dt + Y_t dt.$$ \hspace{1cm} (73)

Instead of using $H$ as in equation (54), we let

$$H_t = c'(A_t) - \phi_1 Y_t(Y_t - \nu_t) - \phi_2 Y_t \left(\frac{Y_t}{1+r} - \Lambda_t\right),$$

where

$$\phi_1 = \frac{2\sqrt{\Delta}}{(1+r)(\kappa - 1)(\kappa + r)},$$

$$\phi_2 = \frac{\sqrt{\Delta}(r - 1)}{(\kappa - 1)(\kappa + r)},$$

and $\Delta = (r + \kappa)^2(m_\alpha m_\beta - m_{\alpha\beta}^2) + (1 + r)^2m_{\alpha\beta}^2$, as defined in Section 3.2.

Compared to the case of the confidential exclusive setting described in Sec-
tion D.1.2, we now require two penalty terms to ensure that the principal’s payoff (in the auxiliary setting) and the intermediary’s objective (in the original setting) are comparable. As in the confidential exclusive case, the term \( \phi_1 Y_t (Y_t - \nu_t) \) can be interpreted as a Lagrangian penalty term to bring the optimal transfer for the principal close to a market belief (belief in the sense of the original setting). The second term, \( \phi_2 Y_t \left( \frac{Y_t}{1+r} - \Lambda_t \right) \), is new. It captures the public constraint: together with the first term, it ensures that the transfer for the principal is close to a market belief derived from public information structures. Indeed, recall that any public market belief \( \mu \) satisfies \( \text{Cov} [\mu_t, \mu_{t+\tau}] = \text{Var} [\mu_t] e^{-\tau} \), by Lemma 2.8. If \( \Lambda_t = \int_0^t e^{-r(t-s)} \mu_s \, ds \), it is immediate that \( \Lambda \) satisfies (73) for \( Y = \mu \) and, as

\[
\mathbb{E} [\mu_t \Lambda_t] = \int_0^t e^{-r(t-s)} \text{Cov} [\mu_s, \mu_t] \, ds = \frac{\text{Var} [\mu_t]}{1 + r} \left( 1 - e^{-(1+r)t} \right),
\]

thus,

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \mu_t \left( \frac{\mu_t}{1+r} - \Lambda_t \right) \right] = \frac{\text{Var} [\mu_t]}{1 + r} e^{-(1+r)t}.
\]

As opposed to the first penalty term, this expectation does not vanish for finite values of \( t \), because \( \Lambda_0 = 0 \) (more generally, as long as \( \Lambda_0 \) is set independently of the contract, the above expectation cannot be zero for every market belief). However, it converges exponentially to zero as \( t \) grows, and this turns out to be sufficient for our purposes. The specific values for \( \phi_1 \) and \( \phi_2 \) are carefully selected using the conjectured optimal rating derived from the Euler-Lagrange necessary conditions in Section D.2.1.

The principal’s problem is then an optimal control problem with three natural state variables: the agent’s estimate of his ability, \( \nu \), the state associated with the public constraint, \( \Lambda \), and the agent’s continuation transfer, \( J \). We have the following equations for the evolution of the state variables:

\[
\begin{align*}
d\nu_t &= -\kappa \nu_t \, dt + \frac{\kappa - 1}{m_\beta} \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} [dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_t \, dt], \\
dW_t &= (rW_t - Y_t) \, dt + \sum_{k=1}^K \left( \frac{\xi_k}{m_\beta} \frac{\kappa - 1}{\sigma_k^2} + C_k \right) [dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) \, dt], \\
dZ_t &= -rZ_t \, dt + Y_t \, dt.
\end{align*}
\]
As in the confidential exclusive setting considered in Section D.1, the principal’s problem can be restated as follows: the principal seeks to find a stationary linear contract \((A, Y)\), along with processes \(\hat{C}_k\), \(k = 1, \ldots, K\), such that, for all \(t\), the principal maximizes 

\[
E \left[ \int_t^\infty \rho e^{-\rho(s-t)} \left( c'(A_s) - \phi_1 Y_s (Y_s - \nu_s) - \phi_2 Y_s \left( \frac{Y_s}{1 + r} - \Lambda_s \right) \right) \, ds \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right]
\]

subject to:

1. Incentive compatibility: \(c'(A_t) = \hat{\xi}_\alpha\), where \(\hat{\xi}_\alpha := \sum_k \alpha_k \hat{C}_k\).
2. The evolution of the agent’s belief \(\nu\), given by 

\[
d\nu_t = -\kappa \nu_t \, dt + \frac{\kappa - 1}{m_\beta} \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} [dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_s \, ds].
\]
3. The evolution of the state \(\Lambda\), given by

\[
d\Lambda_t = -r \Lambda_t \, dt + Y_t \, dt.
\]
4. The evolution of the agent’s continuation transfer \(J\), given by

\[
dJ_t = (r J_t - Y_t) \, dt + \sum_{k=1}^K \left( \hat{\xi}_{\beta,t} \frac{\gamma^2}{(1 + \kappa)(1 + r)} \frac{\beta_k}{\sigma_k^2} + \hat{C}_{k,t} \right) [dS_{k,t} - (\alpha_k A_t + \beta_k \nu_t) \, dt],
\]

where \(\hat{\xi}_{\beta} := \sum_k \beta_k \hat{C}_k\).
5. The following transversality conditions 

\[
\lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho\tau} J_{t+\tau} \mid \mathcal{G}_t] = 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{\tau \to +\infty} E[e^{-\rho\tau} J^2_{t+\tau} \mid \mathcal{G}_t] = 0.
\]

We use dynamic programming to solve the principal’s problem. The principal maximizes

\[
E \left[ \int_t^\infty \rho e^{-\rho(s-t)} \left( \hat{\xi}_{\alpha,s} - \phi_1 Y_s (Y_s - \nu_s) - \phi_2 Y_s \left( \frac{Y_s}{1 + r} - \Lambda_s \right) \right) \, ds \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right],
\]
for every $t$, subject to the evolution of the different state variables and the transversality conditions. As before, we solve the principal’s problem without imposing the restriction that transfer processes be stationary linear, and verify \textit{ex post} that the optimal transfer in this relaxed problem is indeed stationary linear.

Assume the principal’s value function $V$, as a function of the three states $J, \nu$ and $\Lambda$, is $C^1(\mathbb{R}^3)$. By standard arguments, an application of Itô’s Lemma yields the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for $V$:

$$\rho V = \sup_{y, c_1, \ldots, c_K} \rho \xi_\alpha - \rho \phi_1 y(y - \nu) - \rho \phi_2 y \left( \frac{y}{1 + r} - \Lambda \right)$$

$$- \nu V_\nu + (r J - y) V_J + (-r \Lambda + y) V_\Lambda$$

$$+ \frac{\xi_\beta (\kappa - 1)(\kappa + r)}{m_\beta} V_{\nu J} + \frac{(\kappa - 1)^2}{2m_\beta} V_{\nu \nu}$$

$$+ \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( \frac{\xi_\beta \kappa - 1 \beta_k}{m_\beta 1 + r \sigma_k} + \sigma_k c_k \right)^2 V_{JJ},$$

where, as before, to shorten notation, we have used the subscript notation for the (partial) derivatives of $V$, and have abused notation by using $\xi_\alpha$ and $\xi_\beta$ to denote $\sum_k \alpha_k c_k$ and $\sum_k \beta_k c_k$, respectively.

We conjecture a quadratic value function $V$ of the form

$$V(J, \nu, \Lambda) = a_0 + a_1 \nu + a_2 J + a_3 \Lambda$$

$$+ a_4 \nu J + a_5 \nu \Lambda + a_6 J \Lambda$$

$$+ a_7 \nu^2 + a_8 J^2 + a_9 \Lambda^2.$$  

We plug (75) into the dynamic programming equation (74) and solve for the optimal control variables $y, c_1, \ldots, c_K$.

The equation is quadratic in $(y, c_1, \ldots, c_K)$. The second-order conditions are

$$\phi_1 + \frac{\phi_2}{1 + r} > 0, \text{ and}$$

$$a_8 < 0.$$  

That condition (76) is satisfied is immediate by the definition of $\phi_1$ and $\phi_2$. Assuming
momentarily that (77) holds, the first-order conditions yield as maximizers

\[ y(J, \Lambda, \nu) = \frac{(a_6 - 2a_8)}{2\rho ((r + 1)\phi_1 + \phi_2)} (r + 1) - a_6 + 2a_9 + \rho \phi_2 \Lambda \]

\[ + \frac{(r + 1) (-a_4 + a_5 + \rho \phi_1)}{2\rho ((r + 1)\phi_1 + \phi_2)} \nu + \frac{(a_3 - a_2)}{2\rho ((r + 1)\phi_1 + \phi_2)}, \]

\[ c_k(J, \Lambda, \nu) = \frac{(k - 1) (m_3 \rho (\kappa + 2r + 1) - a_4 (r + 1)(\kappa + r))}{2a_8 m_3 (\kappa + r)^2} \cdot \frac{\beta_k - \rho}{2a_8} \cdot \frac{\alpha_k}{\sigma_k^2}. \] (79)

Note that \( y \) is affine in the three state variables, and every \( c_k \) is constant.

Define

\[ \bar{\rho} = \sqrt{(\rho + 2)(\rho + 2r)}. \]

We then plug the optimal controls in (74) to identify the coefficients \( a_0, \ldots, a_9 \). Contrary to the confidential exclusive case, the system is linear-quadratic. There are two sets of coefficients that satisfy the equality (74) and the second-order conditions. However, only one set of coefficients yields a state \( J \) that satisfies the transversality condition. Keeping that set of coefficients, we get:

\[ a_1 = a_2 = a_3 = 0, \]

\[ a_4 = \frac{\sqrt{\Delta} \rho (2r - \rho)(\rho + r + 1)(\rho(\rho + 2) + (r - 1 - \rho) \bar{\rho})}{(k - 1)(\rho + 2)(r - 1)r(r + 1)^2(\kappa + r)}, \]

\[ a_5 = \frac{\sqrt{\Delta} \rho^2 ((\rho + 2)(r - 1 - \rho)(\rho + 2r) + (\rho - r + 1)(\rho + r + 1) \bar{\rho})}{(k - 1)(\rho + 2)(r - 1)r(r + 1)^2(\kappa + r)}, \]

\[ a_6 = \frac{\sqrt{\Delta} \rho (2r - \rho)(2r^2 - (\rho + 2)r + \rho (\bar{\rho} - \rho - 1))}{4(\kappa - 1)r^2(\kappa + r)}, \]

\[ a_7 = \frac{2\sqrt{\Delta} \rho (\rho - r + 1)^2(\rho + r + 1)^2 (\rho - \bar{\rho} + r + 1)}{(k - 1)(\rho + 2)^2(r - 1)^2(r + 1)^4(\kappa + r)}, \]

\[ a_8 = -\frac{\sqrt{\Delta} \rho (2r - \rho)(\rho^2 + \rho - \rho r + 2r(r + 1))}{8(\kappa - 1)r^2(\kappa + r)} - \frac{\sqrt{\Delta} \rho \bar{\rho} (\rho - 2r)^2}{8(\kappa - 1)r^2(\kappa + r)}. \]
\[ a_9 = \frac{\sqrt{\Delta} \rho^3 (\rho - \bar{\rho} + r + 1)}{8(\kappa - 1)r^2(\kappa + r)}. \]

The expression for the coefficient \( a_9 \) is lengthy and does not impact the calculations that follow. Therefore, it is omitted. Note that, if \( \rho < r \), the coefficient \( a_8 \) is negative, hence (77) is satisfied, and the maximizers are determined by the first-order condition.

After inserting the coefficients \( a_1, \ldots, a_9 \) into (78) and (79), we obtain the optimal processes \( \hat{C}_k \), which are constant (and whose expression is lengthy and omitted), as well as the optimal transfer at time \( t \), \( Y_t \), as a linear function of the state variables \( J_t, \nu_t, \Lambda_t \):

\[
Y_t = \begin{bmatrix} b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} J_t \\ \Lambda_t \\ \nu_t \end{bmatrix},
\]

with

\[
b_1 := \frac{(2r - \rho)(\bar{\rho} - \rho + 2r)}{4r},
\]

\[
b_2 := \frac{\rho(\rho - \bar{\rho} + 2r)}{4r},
\]

\[
b_3 := \frac{(\rho + 1)^2 - r^2}{(\rho + 2)(r - 1)(r + 1)^2}.\]

We insert the expression of the optimal control \( Y_t \) back into the equations that determine the evolution of the state variables. Doing so yields a linear three-dimensional stochastic differential equation for the state variables, namely

\[
d \begin{bmatrix} J_t \\ \Lambda_t \\ \nu_t \end{bmatrix} = M \begin{bmatrix} J_t \\ \Lambda_t \\ \nu_t \end{bmatrix} + \sum_{k=1}^{\kappa} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{\xi}_{\beta,t} \gamma^2 (1 + \kappa)(1 + r) \beta_k \sigma_k^2 + \hat{C}_{k,t} \\ 0 \\ \kappa - 1 \beta_k \frac{m_{\beta}}{\sigma_k^2} \end{bmatrix} [dS_{k,t} - \alpha_{k,A,t} dt],
\]

where

\[
M := \begin{bmatrix} r - b_1 & -b_2 & -\hat{\xi}_{\beta} \frac{\kappa + r}{1 + r} - b_3 \\ b_1 & -r + b_2 & \frac{b_3}{\beta_k} \\ 0 & 0 & -\kappa \end{bmatrix}.
\]
The matrix \( M \) has three eigenvalues,
\[
\delta_f := \frac{1}{4} \left(3\rho - \bar{\rho} - \sqrt{2}\sqrt{\rho(\rho + \bar{\rho} + 1)} + 2r^2 - r(\rho + 2\bar{\rho} - 2) - 2r\right),
\]
\[
\delta_g := \frac{1}{4} \left(3\rho - \bar{\rho} + \sqrt{2}\sqrt{\rho(\rho + \bar{\rho} + 1)} + 2r^2 - r(\rho + 2\bar{\rho} - 2) - 2r\right),
\]
\[
\delta_h := -\kappa.
\]

Note that, as \( \rho \to 0 \), \( \delta_f \to -\sqrt{r} \), and \( \delta_g \to -r \). Hence, if \( \rho \) is close enough to zero (i.e., \( \rho < \rho_0 \), for some \( \rho_0 > 0 \)), the eigenvalues of the matrix \( M \) are all distinct and negative. We can write
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
J_t \\
\Lambda_t \\
\nu_t
\end{bmatrix} = K \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} \left( f_k e^{\delta_f (t-s)} + g_k e^{\delta_g (t-s)} + h_k e^{\delta_h (t-s)} \right) \left[ dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_t \, dt \right],
\]
where \( f_k, g_k \) and \( h_k \) are three-dimensional vectors that can be expressed in closed form as a function of the parameters of the model (the expressions for \( \rho > 0 \) are lengthy and omitted). From (80), we get
\[
Y_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u_k(t - s) \left[ dS_{k,t} - \alpha_k A_t \, dt \right],
\]
with
\[
u_k(\tau) = F_k e^{\delta_f \tau} + G_k e^{\delta_g \tau} + H_k e^{\delta_h \tau},
\]
for some constants \( F_k, G_k, H_k, k = 1, \ldots, K \) that depend on the parameters of the model, and, in particular, on \( \rho \). As \( \rho \to 0 \), we can simplify these constants as
\[
F_k \to \frac{(\kappa - 1)m_\beta \left(\sqrt{\rho} - \kappa\right) \left(\rho + r\right) \alpha_k}{m_\beta \left(\sqrt{\rho} + 1\right) \sqrt{\frac{\Delta}{\kappa}} \left(\sqrt{\rho} - \kappa\right) \sigma_k^2} + \frac{(\kappa - 1) \left(\sqrt{\Delta} + (\kappa - 1)m_\alpha \beta \left(\rho + r - \sqrt{\rho} + 1\right) \sqrt{\Delta r} \right) \beta_k}{m_\beta \left(\sqrt{\rho} + 1\right) \sqrt{\frac{\Delta}{\kappa}} \left(\sqrt{\rho} - \kappa\right) \sigma_k^2},
\]
\[
G_k \to 0,
\]
\[
H_k \to -\frac{(\kappa - 1) \left(\kappa - 1 \right) m_\alpha \beta \left(\rho + 1\right) \sqrt{\rho} + \sqrt{\Delta (\kappa - r)} \right) \beta_k}{\sqrt{\Delta} m_\beta \left(\sqrt{\rho} + 1\right) \left(\sqrt{\rho} - \kappa\right) \sigma_k^2}.
\]
Also, as $\rho \to 0$,

$$\hat{C}_k \to \frac{m_\beta (k + r)^2}{\sqrt{\Delta m_\beta (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (k + r)}} \frac{\alpha_k}{\sigma^2_k} \frac{(k - 1) \left( 2\sqrt{\Delta r} - (k - 1)m_{\alpha\beta}(k + 2r + 1) \right)}{\beta_k} \frac{\sqrt{\Delta m_\beta (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (k + r)}}{\sigma^2_k}.$$ 

Thus,

$$\hat{\xi}_\alpha (= c'(A)) \to \frac{(k - 1) \left( m_\alpha m_\beta (k + r)^2 - (k - 1)m_{\alpha\beta}^2(k + 2r + 1) + 2m_{\alpha\beta}\sqrt{\Delta r} \right)}{\sqrt{\Delta m_\beta (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (k + r)}},$$

and so, after simplification,

$$c'(A_t) \to \frac{(k - 1) \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\sqrt{r} - 1}{\sqrt{r} + 1} \right)^2 \right) \left( 2m_{\alpha\beta} + \sqrt{\Delta r} \right)}{4m_\beta (k + r)}.$$ 

**Back to the original model.** We conclude the verification and make the connection between the auxiliary model and the original model. The procedure is analogous to the confidential case explained in the last part of Section D.1.2.

Let $(A^*, Y^*)$ be the incentive-compatible contract defined by

$$c'(A^*_t) = \frac{(k - 1) \left( m_\alpha m_\beta (k + r)^2 - (k - 1)m_{\alpha\beta}^2(k + 2r + 1) + 2m_{\alpha\beta}\sqrt{\Delta r} \right)}{\sqrt{\Delta m_\beta (\sqrt{r} + 1)^2 (k + r)}},$$

and

$$Y^*_t = -\frac{(k - 1) \left( (k - 1)m_{\alpha\beta}(r + 1)\sqrt{r} + \sqrt{\Delta}(k - r) \right)}{\sqrt{\Delta m_\beta (\sqrt{r} + 1)(\sqrt{r} - k)}} \cdot \sum_{k=1}^{K} \int_{s \leq t} u^p_k(t - s) \left[ dS_{k,s} - \alpha_k A^*_s \right].$$

Here, $Y^*_t$ is the market belief of the conjectured optimal rating of the original setting, and $A^*_t$ is the conjectured optimal action. Let $\hat{F}$ be a public information structure, generated by some rating process, which induces a constant action process $\hat{A}$. Let $\hat{Y} := E[\theta_t | \hat{F}_t]$, and observe that $(\hat{A}, \hat{Y})$ is an incentive-compatible stationary linear contract. We show that $c'(A^*) \geq c'(\hat{A})$. For $\rho < \rho_0$, let $(A^{(\rho)}, Y^{(\rho)})$ be the optimal
incentive-compatible stationary linear contract defined above.

Let $V^*$ be the principal’s expected payoff under contract $(A^*, Y^*)$, $\hat{V}$ be her expected payoff under $(\hat{A}, \hat{Y})$, and $V^{(\rho)}$ be her expected payoff $(A^{(\rho)}, Y^{(\rho)})$.

For every public exclusive information structure $\mathcal{F}$ generated by some rating process, the equilibrium market belief of the original setting, $\mu_t = E[\theta_t | \mathcal{F}_t]$, satisfies $
abla \mu_t, \mu_t = \nabla \mu_t, 1 + \tau \leq \nabla \mu_t$ for $\tau > 0$, by Lemma 2.8. Thus, under the contract $(\mu, A)$, where $A$ is the equilibrium action, the state variable $\Lambda$ is expressed as

$$\Lambda_t = \int_0^t e^{-r(t-s)} \mu_s \, ds,$$

and the principal’s payoff is

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left( c'(A) - \phi_1 \mu_t - \nu_t \right) \, dt = \frac{c'(A_t)}{\rho} - \phi_2 \frac{\nabla \mu_t}{1 + \rho (1 + r)}.$$

Hence, as $\rho \to 0$, $\rho V^* \to c'(A^*)$, and $\rho \hat{V} \to c'(\hat{A})$. For every $\rho$ small enough, $V^{(\rho)} \geq \hat{V}$ must hold, because $(A^{(\rho)}, Y^{(\rho)})$ is optimal. However, as $\rho \to 0$, $c'(A^{(\rho)}) \to c'(A^*)$, and the linear filter of $Y^{(\rho)}$ converges pointwise to the linear filter of $Y^*$. In particular, $\nabla Y^{(\rho)} - \nabla Y^* \to 0$, and, for every $\tau > 0$, $\nabla Y^{(\rho)} \to Y^* e^{-\tau} \to 0$. Together, these two limits imply that, as $\rho \to 0$,

$$\rho V^{(\rho)} - \rho V^* \to 0.$$

Thus, $\rho V^{(\rho)} \to c'(A^*)$, implying that $c'(A^*) \geq c'(\hat{A})$.

### D.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4

Fix a confidential or public information structure $\mathcal{F}$.

Given a rating process $Y$ that is proportional to a market belief induced by $\mathcal{F}$ and with linear filter $\{u_k\}_k$, the equilibrium marginal cost is given by

$$c'(A) = \frac{\nabla Y_t, \theta_t}{\nabla Y_t} \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k \int_0^\infty u_k(\tau) e^{-\tau} \, d\tau,$$
and the equilibrium market belief induced by the information structure is
\[
\mu_t = E[\theta_t | F_t] = E[\theta_t | Y_t] = \frac{Cov[Y_t, \theta_t]}{Var[Y_t]} Y_t,
\]
which follows from the projection formulas for jointly normal random variables, with
\[
Cov[Y_t, \theta_t] = \gamma_k^2 \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k \int_0^\infty u_k(\tau) e^{-\tau} d\tau,
\]
and
\[
Var[Y_t] = \sum_{k=1}^K \sigma_k^2 \int_0^\infty u_k(\tau)^2 d\tau + \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{k'=1}^K \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty u_k(s) u_{k'}(s') e^{-|s-s'|} ds ds'.
\]
Thus,
\[
Var[\mu_t] = \frac{Cov[Y_t, \theta_t]^2}{Var[Y_t]}.
\]

The expressions \(c'(A^c)\) and \(c'(A^p)\) given in the statement of Lemma 3.3 and the expressions \(Var[\mu^c]\) and \(Var[\mu^p]\) given in the statement of Lemma 3.4 follow by plugging in the expressions of the linear filters for the optimal ratings as described in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. The calculations are lengthy and omitted, a detailed proof being available upon request.

**Additional References**
