AIG: Where is the Taxpayers' Money Going?

U.S. House of Representatives: Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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AIG: WHERE IS THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY GOING?

WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2009

House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edolphus Towns (chairman of the committee) presiding.


Staff present: Beverly Britton, counsel; Kwane Drabo, investigator; Brian Eiler, investigative counsel; Linda Good, deputy chief clerk; Jean Gosa, clerk; Adam Hodge, deputy press secretary; Carla Hultberg, chief clerk; Marc Johnson and Ophelia Rivas, assistant clerks; Phyllis Love and Christopher Sanders, professional staff members; Mike McCarthy, deputy staff director; Jesse McCollum, senior advisor; Amy Miller, special assistant; Leah Perry, senior counsel; Jenny Rosenberg, director of communications; Joanne Royce, senior investigative counsel; Ron Stroman, staff director; Lawrence Brady, minority staff director; John Cuaderes, minority deputy staff director; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief counsel for oversight and investigations; Frederick Hill, minority director of communications; Dan Blankenburg, minority director of outreach and senior advisor; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Kurt Bardella, minority press secretary; Christopher Hixon, minority senior counsel; Ashley Callen, minority counsel; and Brien Beattie and Molly Boyl, minority professional staff members.

Chairman Towns. The committee will come to order.

Good morning and thank you for being here today. Eight months ago the American taxpayers came to the rescue of AIG with an $85 billion bail-out.

That was followed by more money in November, more again in December, and more money still in March. The taxpayers have now provided more than $180 billion in financial assistance to the AIG. Yet, much of what has been done with that money has been done in the dark. In fact, the one thing that stands out most...
about the collapse and Federal rescue of AIG is the shroud of secrecy that has blanketed the entire sequence of events. This secrecy has only made the situation worse.

I get the sense when I talk to people back home in Brooklyn that they simply don't understand what happened. And, let me point out they don't like the idea that their tax dollars are being used to bail out a big business. They want to believe that this Federal bailout is necessary, but they wonder whether the money is being used wisely and they want assurances that ultimately they want to get their money back. What is the plan to repay the American people, and does it have a realistic chance of working?

Are the trustees adequately protecting the interest of the American people? In my view, AIG needs to demonstrate that it is headed in the right direction. We need to understand what the long-range plan is for AIG. Are you going to liquidate it or are you going to restructure it in such a way as to return it to profitability and repay the taxpayers' investment?

According to testimony we will hear today, AIG plans to liquidate much of the company and spinoff its insurance assets. Does liquidating the assets in the midst of a bear market make sense? Will this plan maximize the returns of the company in today's economic client?

We know AIG agreed to sell their auto insurance unit. We hear they are negotiating the sale of their Tokyo headquarters building, a unique property adjacent to the Imperial Palace. Will the taxpayers get the best return on their investment by selling a premier property during the worst commercial real estate market in years?

A few days ago we learned that AIG has put together a plan called "Project Destiny." "Project Destiny" is described as a multi-year roadmap for the restructuring of AIG. I requested a copy of this plan, but AIG says that disclosing the plan would undermine its efforts to achieve its goal for the benefit of American taxpayers. AIG says it is consulting on the issue with the New York Feds. In other words, "Trust us. Don't rush us." Everything will be all right, but everything is not all right.

People in my district and throughout the country are hurting, yet AIG has spent millions of dollars on high-priced PR firms and big time lawyers to attack its critics. AIG is paying PR executives as much as $600 an hour in taxpayer dollars. Clearly, AIG is making sure its lawyers and PR firms are watching its back, but who is watching the backs of the American people? The taxpayers.

What should the American people think, when millions of dollars in bonuses are paid to the very people who caused AIG problems in the first place? Less than a week ago, the AIG trustees still felt it necessary to write to Mr. Liddy and urge him to get executive compensation under control. I am surprised and disappointed to see that AIG continues to argue for secrecy. And in his testimony, Mr. Liddy seems to argue that criticism of AIG will somehow hurt the company.

Again, we are hearing "trust us," but we are not willing to let $180 billion go on "trust us." We will question. We will inquire. We will verify and we will not hesitate to probe every aspect of AIG's management and operations to protect the taxpayers' investment.

It is our responsibility to ensure that those public moneys are spent wisely, legally, and in the best interest of the American people. And we will continue to do just that. The question we are raising today should be easy enough to answer,
but unfortunately AIG has failed to fully respond to straightforward requests for information. This cannot continue. As AIG moves forward it has to know that Main Street is just as important as Wall Street.

I am looking forward to hearing today from Mr. Liddy and also the AIG Trustees. On that note, I now yield to the ranking member, Congressman Issa from the State of California.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Edolphus E. Towns follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Issa. Maybe Florida someday, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for facilitating this hearing today over the administration's management of $190 billion in bail-out money.

I think it's reasonable to say that most Americans, even Bill Gates, cannot break $190 billion down into a meaningful increment. So, hopefully, accurately, I divided the 300 million or so Americans into that and found it's about $633 for every man, woman and child in this country, plus or minus the latest census.

Mr. Chairman, I voted against these bail-outs; however, I am in the minority, so I have to accept the policies given to me until the American people get their chance to vote on a different policy. And I have an opportunity as the ranking member to demand transparency and accountability on behalf of the American people who have a right to know how their money is being spent. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for being an equal partner in ensuring that we have that opportunity on a bipartisan basis in this important investigation.

Ensuring transparency and accountability for the more than $190 billion of taxpayers money injected into AIG is a key component of this committee's responsibilities. Just last week we learned AIG paid $454 million in bonuses to its employees in 2008, while in March we were told it was only $120 million. While I understand that there is confusion and it may be that in fact the blame is based on different questions asked to different people in the process of getting the information, this confusion illustrates as much the serious problem in government trying to manage a company this large and this complex.

The continued lack of transparency in this administration's bail-outs adventures, and I just admit much like the previous administration caused me to say, "How dare we find out drip by drip by drip that our government has no ability to say how much money has been spent or on what? How much longer can the American people tolerate the lack of transparency?"

I am pleased that Mr. Liddy is here today and I want to acknowledge that he did not create the problems at AIG, but instead has taken on the very difficult challenge of unwinding an incredibly complex company while facing tremendous scrutiny from the public and from those of us here in Congress. I want to personally say to Mr. Liddy today we will make every effort to make this about how we can work together; how we can achieve the transparency the American people are entitled to; and how we can do no harm to your efforts to maximize the return to all the stockholders of AIG; and, particularly, we are going to be asking about 80 percent that the American people own.

Mr. Chairman, President Obama has promised the American
people an unprecedented level of transparency and accountability, and I see our role on the committee as one of holding the President to that promise; and, that includes understanding the role of the three powerful individuals who now head the AIG trust. As designed by Treasury Secretary Geithner, when he ran the New York Fed, I believe that this trust is inherently unconstitutional, unaccountable entity that manages the taxpayers' investments in AIG, not for the taxpayers, but in the interest of the Federal Government, specifically the U.S. Treasury.

It is important to remember, Mr. Chairman, that those two things are not one and the same. The U.S. Treasury is in fact not the same as the American people who have invested $633 for every man, woman, and child into this company. I want to acknowledge also that for the second panel, the trustees, they did not create this problem, and they will not be held accountable for what was created. However, since they now control 80 percent of the stock of AIG on behalf of, I believe should be the American people and not just the best interest of the Treasury, we must question why AIG trustees are immune from legal liability, so long as they act in the best interest of the Treasury and are indemnified against any lost cost or expense of any kind or character whatsoever.

Who can tell, Mr. Chairman, in light of recent public bullying of Chrysler bondholders who were derided as speculators by President Obama that these causes insulate the trustees from the normal accountability and transparency we demand of all our representatives. The `New York Times' recently reported that this unprecedented trust structure provides cover for officials, who despite the government's large stake in various banks, want to preserve the notion that neither the Treasury or the Fed owns AIG or controls any banks.

Mr. Chairman, I would submit that this is inappropriate for regulators and bureaucrats to use this legal sleight of hand to obscure the influence in running the U.S. financial sector. The American people have a right to know what is being done with their money and how these companies are being run.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our witnesses. I appreciate your indulgence, and would ask that additional material be placed in the record so as to preserve time and yield back.

Chairman Towns. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much, Congressman Issa.

I now ask unanimous consent to leave the record open to Members who may submit their opening remarks and questions for the record, and I will leave the record open for that. At this time, I would like to ask the witnesses to please stand, and swear in all of our witnesses.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman Towns. Let the record reflect that they answered in the affirmative. You may be seated. I'm sorry. We have the lights here. When we start out, it's on green. Then it goes to yellow, and then it's red. So when it gets on yellow you can start trying to wrap up, which will allow all the Members an opportunity to raise questions. And maybe something that you didn't say you will get a chance to say it during the question period.

OK. You may begin.
Mic was off.

Mr. Liddy. Let me start over.

Mr. Issa. You'll never be misquoted until you turn it on.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD M. LIDDY, CHAIRMAN AND CEO OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.

Mr. Liddy. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Issa, members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today.

I appreciate the opportunity to describe for the committee the business plan we are executing in order to put AIG's troubles behind it, to repay the moneys that we owe the American taxpayer, and to secure an outcome that helps to put the American economy back on track. We are working hard to determine the destiny of the component parts of AIG.

Our plan contemplates that AIG's best businesses will establish separate identities from the parent holding company. The parent company will become smaller. The Financial Products unit will cease to exist. How long the plan will ultimately take will very much depend on how quickly and how strongly the global economy recovers, but let me be clear.

Our plan is explicitly designed to avoid having to divest AIG assets at fire sale prices. Just the opposite is true. We intend for taxpayers to realize the fullest possible value from every asset disposition, and we have already made substantial progress in this restructuring. We have reduced but not yet eliminated the systemic risk that AIG presents to the global financial system. We are selling assets where possible despite adverse conditions in global financial markets.

We are stabilizing AIG's liquidity so that we do not need support beyond those amounts already authorized by the government; although, as I said, the economy will be a factor in this. And we are restructuring some businesses for public offerings. We are restructuring other businesses for later disposition or to be wound down so that future losses can be mitigated or avoided. Across these four areas we have in recent weeks achieved a number of important milestones.

We are transferring two major foreign life insurance companies, ALICO and AIA, into special purpose vehicles in exchange for a substantial reduction in AIG's debt to the Federal Reserve. We expect to complete the contractual arrangements for these transfers in the near future. We are also transferring the global property and casualty insurance franchise, known as AIU holdings, into an SPV, a special purpose vehicle. This will secure the value of that very substantial business in preparation for the potential sale of a minority stake, which ultimately may include a public offering of shares, again depending upon market conditions. And we continue to make significant progress in winding down AIG Financial Products. We have reduced the FP risk positions from 44,000 to 27,000 and we have reduced the notional exposure from a peak of approximately $2.7 trillion to just under $1.5 trillion today.

We continue to weigh every action with several criteria in mind. Will it reduce systemic risk? Is it the best use of Federal assistance? Will it enhance our ability to pay back the government? Does it keep our insurance businesses strong and well-capitalized? And does it protect our policyholders?

We are working hard to improve governance at the company. AIG is an incredibly complex entity with over 4,000 legal entities, cross-ownership and a myriad of special purpose
structures. Our restructuring plan must make AIG less complicated, less risky, and more transparent. The infusion of government capital to AIG brought with it a substantial new set of relationships with the American taxpayer as AIG's largest single shareholder with the taxpayers' representatives here in Congress, with the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury; and, more recently, with the Trustees also appearing today. These relationships are new and in many ways unprecedented.

We work closely with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the U.S. Treasury; representatives of the Fed and Treasury and their advisors are engaged with various AIG offices every day. We view them as our partners. We also consult closely with the Trustees, and we appreciate the time they have devoted to understanding our restructuring plan and other critical issues. Their mature business judgment is a major asset.

I have led AIG now for 8 months, almost 8 months, and I want to assure you that the people at AIG today are working as hard as we can to serve our policyholders, our customers, and taxpayers. We need your help as well. It's critical to remember that we are partners. When we at AIG make mistakes, we expect to be criticized, but rampant, unwarranted criticism of AIG serves only to diminish the value of our businesses around the world, the businesses we are attempting to sell to repay the American taxpayer.

We continue to welcome a frank and open dialog with Congress so that you can be in a position to support our efforts. This support is essential and will benefit AIG stakeholders, the American taxpayer most of all. We cannot control the market conditions that will partly determine the timing of AIG's restructuring, but we are confident that our approach is right and that if we do this together we can demonstrate to the world that responsible government and capitalism still strive in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today; and, I am happy to answer questions that you or the committee might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Liddy follows:]

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much for your testimony. You know, AIG has received over $180 million in financial assistance. Can you provide this committee with assurances that AIG will not require any additional Federal money?

Mr. Liddy. Congressman, the assurance I can give you is we will do everything we can to not require additional Federal money. But the answer to that question, as I said in my prepared remarks, is so dependent upon what happens to the world economic conditions; and, perhaps more particularly, the world financial markets; we think the money that's been dedicated to us thus far—that's $40 billion of TARP money and approximately $43 billion of Federal Reserve borrowings, when coupled with another $30 billion of TARP, just under $30 billion of TARP that is available to us and the balance of the Federal Reserve borrowing—we think in today's marketplace that is sufficient and we will not need additional money. But that answer is very dependent upon what happens to the overall economic conditions and financial marketplace around the globe.

Chairman Towns. Well, can you assure us that the taxpayers will get their money back?

Mr. Liddy. Again, I'll assure you we're doing everything we
can. We have what we think is a terrific plan, a viable plan that's not as dependent on the capital markets as other plans might have been. But asset values have to stay strong. There has to be a capital market that enables us to take businesses public. I think that will happen, but I can't give you a guarantee on that. I can't control what happens in the worldwide financial marketplace.

Chairman Towns. Does ``Project Destiny'' provide that the taxpayers will recover 100 percent of their money?

Mr. Liddy. It does. Project Destiny, as you indicated in your remarks, basically provides a strategy for each business that comprises AIG, and if the marketplace holds the way it is right now, we think that the American taxpayer will be fully repaid. Again, that's very conditioned upon, the assumption that the world economy and the world financial markets stay where they are or improve as opposed to deteriorating.

Chairman Towns. Right. Last week I wrote to you requesting a copy of your plan for the future of AIG called ``Project Destiny.'' Your outside lawyers sent me a letter on Monday saying it was too sensitive to give to the committee and you were discussing it with the New York Feds. Are you trying to hide something? I mean, why can't we get it?

Mr. Liddy. No. I'm prepared to share with you the broad brush strokes of that plan for as long as you'd like. When we get into the operating details, that is commercially sensitive material. There's a lot of people with whom we compete in the United States and around the globe. And to the extent they have access to that information it would impair our ability to operate those assets and sell those assets for the benefit of the taxpayer.

Chairman Towns. Let me ask one other question. Who's in charge of AIG, you or the New York Fed?

Mr. Liddy. AIG is a shareholder-owned company and we operate according to that, because the largest single shareholder we have is the American public through an 80 percent ownership. The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury are our partners. We don't do anything without reviewing it with them, making certain that they are in concurrence with it. So it is very much a partnership in terms of the way we think about making decisions.

Chairman Towns. Right. So for the record, Mr. Liddy, I want your commitment that you will provide us with a copy of ``Project Destiny'' by the close of the business day.

Mr. Liddy. I'll talk to my lawyers about it, sir. I want to provide you everything that you need to understand ``Project Destiny,'' but we are told and the Federal Reserve has asked us to be very careful with the amount of detail we describe. Because that information, as I said, could be very commercially sensitive in the hands of our competitors and it could destroy our ability to pay back the American taxpayer.

So if you will let me please consult with our attorneys about what we can do with that, we will work with you and your staff to provide you what is feasible as quickly as we can.

Chairman Towns. Yeah, that kind of goes to a comment that was made by the ranking member. You know, we were talking about transparency. I mean, in some instances some of this we just can't quite understand why we can't have it. And I want you to know that's a big issue as we walk the street. You know, people are saying that they're doing things in secrecy. They're talking about the bonuses that people are getting. And I think that's something that you have to be concerned about in terms of the image of AIG as well.
Mr. Liddy. I'm very sensitive to it, sir, and that's why we share with the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury everything that we're doing. There are no secrets. Everything that we are doing we share with them. I'm just uncomfortable that if all of the operating details of Project Destiny were to be made public, that it would put us at a severe disadvantage in terms of trying to realize value for the benefit of the American taxpayer.

Chairman Towns. Do you honestly believe that you have a right to prevent Congress from reviewing how the taxpayers' money is being spent?

Mr. Liddy. No. As I said, I'm delighted. I will share as much of the overall broad brushstrokes as I possibly can and I think that will satisfy you. It's the operating details of that plan that I am more concerned about.

Chairman Towns. Thank you. My time is expired.

I yield to the ranking member from California.

Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would let you go on as long as you wanted to. You were doing extremely well.

Mr. Liddy. I'm going to pick up where the chairman left off, because I think he's on the right track. Did you share this project in its entirety with individuals working for the New York Fed or Treasury?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, we did.

Mr. Issa. And was that in camera? And, if so, how did you make that determination that what you shared with them was not going to be shared with your competitors?

Mr. Liddy. Well, the Federal Reserve is present at every one of our strategic discussions at all of our board meetings and all of our committee meetings.

Mr. Issa. No. I appreciate what you're saying, but let me move to the point. The point is they're not stockholders. They're sitting as members of the board, members of your executive committee. They're operating your company in the sense that they're insiders. I sit on the board of a public company even today. I'm very familiar with the fact that what you're telling us you can't give us; and, you did tell us you couldn't give it to us, because you said you'd give us the broad brush, the overview.

Basically, you said I won't share with you what I'm sharing with the Treasury. I'm going to ask you in a different way. I know you're going to talk to your lawyers, and Mr. Boggs back there is about the best in town. So maybe you just reach over your shoulder when you get a chance.

Will you, given the same protections from disclosure to your competitors, make available to Congress the information? I understand the information is insider information, and people who have access to it need to understand they can't trade in the stock. They can't do other investments. Given those assurances, will you make that available to designated people from Congress?

Mr. Liddy. Congressman, I will talk to my lawyer.

Mr. Issa. Tommy's shaking his head no, so----

Mr. Liddy. At some point in time, so he'll tell me what we can and cannot do and what we should and should not do.

Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, can we suspend for a moment to give them a chance to talk to counsel?

Chairman Towns. I'd be delighted to do so.

Mr. Issa. Thank you.

[Brief conference held.]

Chairman Towns. Yes, you may continue.

Mr. Liddy. Congressman, there is commercially sensitive
information in there. My attorney advises me will work with you to provide everything that we possibly can. The material that goes to the Fed or Treasury goes pursuant to a confidentiality agreement; and, what we are concerned about, if it goes to Congress, does it give free access to our competitors. If we can find a solution to that, we'll provide it to you.

Mr. Issa. And I appreciate that, so I'll rephrase the question for counsel.

Assuming that we provide for in camera for lack of a better term review by individuals who have signed onto the confidentiality agreement a limited amount, not Congress as a whole, are you prepared to turn over to this committee's designated people for their evaluation, and we would presume. We would probably have knowledgeable people outside this.

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mr. Issa. The answer is yes?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, again, exactly the way you worded it, as long as we can get assurances that it doesn't go beyond that group.

Mr. Issa. OK, well, the chairman and I, I'm sure, will work together to find a way that happen because it is important that this branch of government have the same transparency as the other branch of government currently has on your government-owned entity.

Let me just go through one or two more quick things. If I read the arithmetic roughly right, 80 percent of your company was bought for $40 billion by converting preferred to common. Is that roughly right?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, except another $30 billion or just under $30 billion is available if we need it. So you need to decide whether you want to include that in the calculation or not.

Mr. Issa. But that would further dilute the stock?

Mr. Liddy. Well, it would keep the ownership at 80 percent, so you don't go above the 799.

Mr. Issa. OK, so getting mark to market, if we will, what is the current value of your stock as an enterprise, your market cap?

Mr. Liddy. It would be approximately $5 to $6 billion.

Mr. Issa. So we spent $40 billion, agreed to spend $70 billion to buy $5 billion?

Mr. Liddy. Well, it's $5 billion plus what it can be worth at the end, if the "Project Destiny" execution goes well and the marketplace cooperates.

Mr. Issa. But you are a publicly-traded company, so you are worth what you are worth on a given day. Your classic mark to market justification: you're worth $5 billion today; if I went into the market to buy I wouldn't have to pay $30 billion to get no more. I wouldn't have to pay $70 billion to get 79 percent. I would pay a fraction of that if I bought into the other side of the equation. Is that right?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. The company is worth as you say, the company is worth about $5 to $6 billion.

Mr. Issa. OK. Additionally, the last point I'll make on the finances, the government lowered your rate to LIBOR plus one, roughly; or, no, LIBOR plus three. Your 3\1/2\, 4 percent cost of money on a big part of what the government has loaned you. Is that right?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.
Mr. Liddy. Yes. I don't know whether half is the right number, but it's substantially less than what the rate would be if we were trying to borrow on our own.

Mr. Issa. The BB&T's preferreds now are trading at par, at 9 percent.

Mr. Liddy. Right.

Mr. Issa. So you're getting about half that.

Mr. Liddy. Yes, it's extensions.

Mr. Issa. So the government is not losing money on the loan, but in fact you're getting a preferential treatment which hopefully comes back in the stock.

Mr. Liddy. Correct.

Mr. Issa. OK, Mr. Chairman, I hope we have a second round, but thank you for the indulgence.

Chairman Towns. We will. We will have a second round.

I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Liddy.

Mr. Liddy. Good morning.

Mr. Kanjorski. Since you last appeared before Congress, and that was several months ago, at that time you had indicated that when you took command at AIG it had counter-party obligations of approximately $2.7 trillion and you would reduce that to approximately $1.7 trillion at the last time you testified. Could you give us any indication where that exposure is today?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, at its zenith, that number was $2.7 trillion. At the end of the first quarter, at the end of April, it was down just below $1.5 trillion. So we continue to make progress. We continue to make good progress.

Mr. Kanjorski. Do you have any timeframe in mind as to when you will get down to the level that there will not be systemic risk exposure to the taxpayers of the United States?

Mr. Liddy. I do. First, we'd like to make progress and not every single month and every single quarter, but we think by the end of the year that $1.7 trillion and the 27,000 trades that exist will be materially smaller. The challenge is if you go too fast you wind up settling those trades at a disadvantage to us; and, therefore, it costs the American taxpayer more. So trying to do that with a little balance in the system is appropriate. We think we can get the right balance and make material progress by the end of the year.

Mr. Kanjorski. Right, thank you.

Did I detect in your response to the chairman and the ranking member in regard to providing your bailout plan of your plan of final execution that you have recorded or indicated exposure to Federal Reserve and Treasury—but have not made it available to the committee staff—is that because you may be suspicious of the congressional billboard company that we have up here on the Hill?

Mr. Liddy. No, it reflects really just my concern that if that information gets out and gets in the hand of our competitors and it tells them what our roadmap is to resolve AIG's difficulties that they will use it against us, and it will make it even harder to achieve the success that we want to achieve. It's as simple as that.

Mr. Kanjorski. I'm not criticizing your judgment in humor of the chairman's and the ranking member.

The one thing I'm interested in, and you can be very helpful to us, you know, I am involved in another committee and we are writing and deciding on what we're going to do at the insurance industry; and, when you analyze AIG, you recognize,
for all intents and purposes it was a wonderful and very successful insurance company, except it had, as some people call, rogue organizations or offshore organizations, the London group, the financial products division of AIG in London.

They were really the organization that in getting involved in taking positions as counter-parties that they made the great opportunity of risk and weren't the best purchaser of those documents or situations, now that was not regulated, I take it, very stringently by your New York State regulator. Is that correct?

Mr. Liddy. The financial products business was not regulated by any of the insurance regulators, because it wasn't an insurance subsidiary. It was regulated by the OTS.

Mr. Kanjorski. OK, now, does OTS have a history or real experience with regulating that type of offshore operation to ICE success in your estimation?

Mr. Liddy. I think not. I think the last time I was before Congress, I was part of a panel that included the interim director of the OTS and I think he said as much. They simply lack the capacity and the ability to adequately supervise businesses that were in Connecticut, London, Paris, Tokyo, what have you, dealing in these very complicated financial instruments.

Mr. Kanjorski. After 9 months now, that's a short period of time relatively speaking to get the total lay of the land to understand the culture, but would you feel qualified to render an opinion at this point, that looking at the existence of not only AIG but several insurance companies that have the opportunities to do what they did in getting them to the offshore operation in London and getting into derivatives.

Do you have any opinion as to whether or not it would be helpful and more protective to the American taxpayer to avoid their exposure and to the economy to avoid systemic risk if in some way we developed a Federal insurance charter that would be a regulator of that operation and much more closely involved than the present regulators have been. Can you render that opinion, first; and, if you can't, will you?

Mr. Liddy. I can give you some preliminary thoughts. I don't know if it's a Federal insurance regulator as much as there needs to be someone who looks at systemic risk across large organizations, so in my judgment, it should have been a great insurance company and should have stuck to that knitting. It should not have gone off into the financial products world. Once it did, I think it would have been helpful if there was an overseer or regulator. Once a company gets to a certain size or engages in certain kinds of products, that company ought to be subject to some broad brush-stroke regulation, which I think right now does not exist.

I saw that the individual, Sheila Bair, who heads up the FDIC, had a proposal where you bring together the heads of the Federal Reserve and Treasury, and FDIC, and they would share common knowledge about which institutions perhaps are engaging, either are too large or have too much systemic risk or are engaging in practices that could cause difficulty.

That struck me as a sensible way of using the current regulatory environment, but getting more emphasis on those businesses that simply have become either too large or are engaging things that are outside of their core skills.

Mr. Kanjorski. I think you are referring to Senator Collins' proposal in the Senate. Is that correct?

Mr. Liddy. Yeah, I'm sorry. I don't know. When I first read it I thought it was part of an FDIC, part of Sheila Bair's
recommendation, but I could have that entirely wrong.

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. Congressman Bilbray from California.

Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The chairman was rightfully saying the concerns of transparency and how far we can go with that just sort of reminded me of the fact that if you had a proposal for major bonuses for your executives, the proposal had billions of dollars out there. Would you ever propose to present them with that argument at midnight and expect them to vote on the commitment within by noon the next day?

Mr. Liddy. No. I think my approach generally is to provide the people the information they need in order to make an informed judgment.

Mr. Bilbray. Well, do you think the 12 hours for a 1,000-page proposal would be appropriate time for consideration?

Mr. Liddy. Well, as I said, I want to work with the Congress. I want to work with what you've asked for. I just want to make sure that I protect the interest of the American taxpayer at the back end of this process.

Mr. Bilbray. I just pointed out, frankly, is that the representatives of the taxpayers, we were actually asked by our chief administrative officer of Congress to ask us to vote to make that kind of commitment within that short a period of time, where I don't think any executive for any company would ask their board of directors do that. But we were asked to do that, and that's when all-hell broke loose when they realized there was a whole lot in that proposal that wasn't there.

Mr. Liddy. I understand.

Mr. Bilbray. This issue of hyper-inflation coming down the pike is something we haven't talked about, and I just want to sort of get reassured that with all the hyper-spending that we are seeing the Federal Government do in the last few months and the projects were going to continue to do it, most economists feel there's a great threat that we'll go into hyperinflation.

If hyperinflation kicks in, what are the results on our payback? Now, I assume that we will not be going dollar-for-dollar. It will be value to some degree, but will it be dollar for dollar, and will hyperinflation then reduce the net value of what was paid back to the Treasurer?

Mr. Liddy. It's a great question. It's a very difficult one to answer, because hyperinflation would be accompanied by a lot of other factors, so you'd have to kind of go through a string of events. What would hyperinflation unleash?

You know, if you owned real assets, fixed assets in a hyperinflationary period, that could be a good thing, because the value of those goes up, but there's nobody around that has any money in order to buy it. So you'd really have to step back and look at it. You know, our plan takes anywhere from 3 to 5 years to fully unfold, given current market conditions.

How quickly a hyperinflation scenario, if it were to occur, how quickly it would occur, don't know. So we could be well down the path toward realizing the repayment of the American taxpayer before any hyperinflationary situation were to occur.

Mr. Bilbray. So in other words, you're hoping to be able to pay back the taxpayers before the ceiling falls in on the inflationary spiral?

Mr. Liddy. Well, I'd like to make some major inroads into repaying the American taxpayer and I'm not so sure the ceiling falls in. As I said, hyperinflation will be one element. There could be a host of other things and some offsetting that come
with that.

Mr. Bilbray. OK. Here's the catch. The follow-up question here is how long you anticipate AIG to take to pay off the debts of the taxpayers.

Mr. Liddy. Well, I think it will take somewhere between 3 and 5 years; and, what makes the answer so difficult is in formulating a response you have to make a judgment about how strong will the economy be worldwide and how good will the capital markets be worldwide. If they stay about where they are or get better, it's that 3- to 5-year timeframe. If they were to get worse, it could get elongated.

Mr. Bilbray. Has the administration given you any guidelines on when to start repaying AIG staff?

Mr. Liddy. They have not given us any guidelines. We work with the Federal Reserve. Any time we use any of the dollars that have been allocated to us, we have to get a waiver from the Federal Reserve. It's our intent to try to start repaying that as quickly as possible. As I mentioned in my oral testimony, we want to take some of our largest assets, and put them in a special purpose vehicle. When we do that, the amount of debt that we've borrowed from the Federal reserve will be reduced proportionately. So we can do that in a matter of months, assuming we can get all the regulatory approvals for these special purpose vehicles done in that timeframe.

Mr. Bilbray. To what extent have Federal Reserve officials been involved in the strategy of how to pay back this?

Mr. Liddy. They have been very involved in it. As I said, we treat them as a full partner. We don't do anything without getting involved.

Mr. Bilbray. So they're involved in day-to-day decisions involved here or is it just general policy?

Mr. Liddy. No. I wouldn't say day-to-day decisions. I would say more strategy and policy. Sometimes it's hard to tell when you moved from strategy to a policy to a decision, but we just don't want them to be caught off-guard by anything that we are working on.

Mr. Bilbray. OK. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time is expired.

Congressman Cummings from Maryland.

Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Liddy.

Mr. Liddy. Good morning.

Mr. Cummings. First of all I want to thank you for your comments about being concerned about the taxpayers.

We too are concerned, and I heard your comments about criticism. Let me say this. When anyone is getting $182 billion of taxpayers' money, many of those taxpayers who have lost their jobs, savings, health insurance, you are going to get some criticism, no matter what. But let me go to something that Mr. Bernanke said, Fed Chair Bernanke said just a week ago; he said he had no problem with people receiving high paychecks. He said, but there should be a pay system that prevents excessive risk-taking and at the same time is directly related to performance. Do you agree with that?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, I do.

Mr. Cummings. And, so, I know that you have come under, AIG has come under criticism for these retention payments and the bonuses and whatever. What is being done consistent with Bernanke's statement that I just quoted to address that issue, if anything?
Mr. Liddy. It's a great question, Congressman.

Mr. Cummings. Thank you.

Mr. Liddy. I would say the most important thing we can do is not allow a situation like AIG FP to ever get started again. So when AIG FP, the participants in that business generally got 30 to 35 percent of the profits, that can encourage some risk-taking that simply is out of bounds. So the winding down of FP and the comp programs that we have in place up there right now are not nearly as lucrative.

They are specifically targeted so that you get paid if you achieve certain objectives. So I think that is right on point with Chairman Bernanke's view that there's got to be a risk reward and a pay for performance standpoint. So I think we are making good progress on that. In the basic operations at AIG, we have almost always had that, you know, that is much more traditional-looking in terms of the leverage than there is on a bonus plan, how much of a relationship there is between a base salary and a performance-based bonus, and they are very performance-based. So in most areas at AIG I think we are in pretty good shape. It was more in the AIG FP area where I think the compensation systems got out of bounds.

Mr. Cummings. So let me make sure I understand now. We had bonuses and retention payments, I think, in more than just FP. Right?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. I was trying to respond to the specific part of Mr. Bernanke's comment that there ought to be a tradeoff between risks and rewards.

Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, what can the American people expect as owners of 79 percent of this company with regard to bonuses and retention payments in, say, the next year? After all, and I am going to say this over and over again wherever I go, to losing their jobs, to losing their homes, to losing everything. And so they have no sympathy for AIG.

So I'm just wondering what can you tell them? They're watching you, about what they can expect to see as they're seeing the foreclosure signs go up in front of their houses. What can they expect to see in the 'New York Times' and 'The Washington Post' about bonuses and retention payments at AIG?

Mr. Liddy. Specifically, with retention payments we are trying to recast as many of those as we can to make them performance-based so that you have to earn them, not simply stay for a certain period of time. As I am told there are Treasury regulations which will be forthcoming that will be very specific about how much you can pay, what base salaries are, what bonuses can be, how those bonuses can be paid. As soon as we get that material, we will revise our comp systems to be in 100 percent compliance with those regulations.

Mr. Cummings. Last question: did AIG write swaps on any debt held by creditors to General Motors or Chrysler? And, if so, what can you tell me about those swaps?

Mr. Liddy. I don't know. I saw that question someplace and I just don't have any information on it.

Mr. Cummings. It is a very important question.

Mr. Liddy. I'd be delighted to get the information.

Mr. Cummings. How soon do you think we can get it?

Mr. Liddy. We'll do it as quickly as we can, sir.

Mr. Cummings. Yeah, we want to look into that very carefully; and, let me ask you this. On January 15th you told me when we met that you expected to be able to pay back the debt within 5 years. At that time, of course, I didn't know that AIG would have its largest loss in the history of any company in the world when we lost. What's your project today?
Mr. Liddy. As I answered this Congressman over here, I think the answer is 3 to 5 years, but it is very dependent upon what happens to the capital markets. And that loss, as I have attempted to explain in the past to many of you, that loss had two major components. One was worldwide asset values plummeted in the fourth quarter.

When asset values go down, we have to reflect that loss in our P&L and that's what drove that loss. Second, when you're worried about the components of your business, you have things like good will and deferred tax assets. You aren't going to be able to realize those and you write them off. Those two things alone were the major drivers of that loss.

I think the answer, we will be able to repay the taxpayer in that 3- to 5-year timeframe, but it is heavily dependent upon what happens with the worldwide economic situation, the success of the stimulus programs that all of the world's governments are bringing to bear, and the condition of the financial markets. We are not an island and those issues play such a large role in our ability to make progress paying back the taxpayer.

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time is expired.

I yield 5 minutes to Mr. Fortenberry.

Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If you decide to start a subcommittee on oversight of AIG I will volunteer to serve on it.

Chairman Towns. That's good to know.

Mr. Fortenberry. Mr. Liddy, thank you for coming. You are in a difficult position. I understand you are basically not paid for this. You have taken this on to restructure the company.

In that regard I appreciate your willingness to do it. You very much understand though the cynicism with which very often your testimony is not because of the pent-up anger, and particularly in Congress, but more specifically among the American people about the reckless actions of this company previously.

And in that regard I'd like to take a step back if we could and trace a process by starting with just a general question. Can you explain to the American people who is AIG? You were formerly organized as a thrift holding company. The various business components of that, the business sector or one of those components that went bad in terms of the creation of exotic financial instruments, and then how are you suggesting a restructuring of the company and management to deal with it?

Mr. Liddy. Sure. AIG consists of a number of component parts, and let's just think about it as a string. There are property casualty businesses. There are worldwide life and savings businesses. There are domestic life and savings businesses. There's a couple of large businesses like International Lease Finance.

I think we own more airplanes than any other entity in the world. And in that general area there's also the AIG Financial Products. So most of what I tried to describe very briefly just now is it's an insurance company with a few exceptions.

One of those large exceptions was starting in about 1987 or so AIG got into a non-insurance business called AIG Financial Products, FP for short. And that's where we wrote very sophisticated derivatives, credit default swaps, hedges and things of that nature. The credit default swaps generally performed well until the complete liquidity collapse that occurred in 2007. Many of the credit default swaps, the multi-sector credit default swaps that were written by AIG were tied
to the housing market. When the housing market collapsed, those credit default swaps called for the posting of collateral. We had to keep ensuring the value of those instruments and we ran into a severe liquidity squeeze.

That's when the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury came forward and the first rescue package was essentially a loan of up to $85 billion extended to us by the Federal Reserve. While that solved one problem, it created another problem because we didn't have enough equity to support the $85 billion, so that then was subsequently redone to include a balance of equity from TARP and debt from the Federal Reserve.

Mr. Fortenberry. You stated that the default swaps performed well; that, however, the reserves underlying the risk to manage those default swaps were clearly not there, which begs the earlier question about the overall structure under which AIG was operating, a thrift holding company and lack of regulatory oversight there.

Mr. Liddy. Yeah. As you know, Congressman, I was not there. I had been at the helm for 8 months, and so my time and energy is focused on today, tomorrow, and less on yesterday. What I do appreciate after being on the job for almost 8 months is I don't think the financial products business belonged or attached to AIG in any way, shape or form.

And so when Congressman Kanjorski asked me the question about oversight, I think there needs to be substantially greater oversight of financial institutions. And maybe we can do that with any existing regulators to make sure that those that are either very large or pose systemic risk really get monitored on a regular basis so you can't have this kind of event occur again.

Mr. Fortenberry. Let's quickly move to an issue of the bonuses. We were told earlier it was $120 million. In 2008 new information has come out that it is $450 million. Why the discrepancy?

Mr. Liddy. We apologize for any confusion. We are asked so many questions on bonuses and each person wants it sliced a slightly different way. The first question we were asked was corporate bonuses. To us that means bonuses paid at the corporate center or paid from the corporation. That was the $121 million. We were then asked a separate question, a subsequent question. Well, how many bonuses were paid corporate wide anywhere in the company, worldwide, in Japan, in South America or whatever.

That's a different question and that's the larger number, so we're trying to slice the information in accordance with each individual request that we get. We get them from Congress. We get them from the Senate. We get them from regulators and from the Fed and Treasury. We're being as cooperative as we can. Sometimes, we are drowning in requests.

Mr. Fortenberry. Back to the earlier question about your plans for management restructuring. For management restructuring we have divided the business into three categories. The three largest and most valuable businesses that we have we intend to take public or sell a minority stake in. That will generate much of the funds we need in order to repay the taxpayer. Some of the businesses will be held and we will wait for a better day to sell them. Another section of the business is maybe a part of AIG going forward. It will take, we think, 3 to 4 to 5 years, if the marketplace stays where it is today or gets better in order to repay the taxpayer, but we have a strategy to do exactly that.

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I yield now 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I am asking these questions on behalf of my constituents in Ohio who are policemen, firemen, teachers and other public employees in Ohio, who AIG defrauded, defrauded their pension funds. These are people who protect our neighborhoods, teach our children, dedicate themselves to public service, and AIG cheated them out of $96 million.

Now, AIG has admitted on multiple occasions to guilty pleas and restatements of 24 transactions that the company defrauded investors and lied to regulators. My question to Mr. Liddy: Does your business plan include settlement of lawsuits against AIG for bid rigging, accounting fraud, and market manipulation of AIG stock prices?

We know that you paid an $800 million settlement to the SEC and $375 million to the New York Attorney General. And, if it does include it, why after receiving $85 billion on September 16, 2008, and after you assumed the duties of CEO of AIG on September 18, 2008, why is it that AIG has cutoff communications with representatives of a class action which includes police, firefighters, teachers and other public employees in Ohio whose pension funds AIG defrauded? And, how can you tell this committee that those 8 months which have passed, which are contemporaneous with you becoming CEO, that you did not direct AIG to basically stall and continue the defrauding of these public employees in Ohio? Mr. Liddy.

Mr. Liddy. Congressman. I'm sorry. I just am not familiar with all the particulars of the particular suit that you have just referenced.

Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me help you. On March 26th you sat in front of a Financial Services Committee when this issue was asked. I want the members of this committee to follow this now. You were asked about this before. You told the committee you would look into it, do everything you can to make sure it gets resolved. Now you said you would do everything on March 26th. This was after people had already been waiting for months to hear whether their pensions were going to be secure. Can you name one thing?

Just name one thing that you've done to get this matter resolved with respect to defrauding policemen, firemen, teachers and the public employees in the State of Ohio defrauding the pension fund. Can you name one thing that you as the CEO have done about this?

Mr. Liddy. Anything involving legal settlements or legal challenges I depend on our very substantial legal department to resolve. I believe that they have been in either negotiation or contacts. I don't know but we will meet with you. I will personally meet with you to make sure that we advance the situation.

Mr. Kucinich. Well, that's fine. I want the committee to be aware of this. AIG repaid counter parties one to one. Counter parties in England, in Germany, in France. Dollar-for-dollar you repaid them, but when it comes to police and firefighters and teachers in Ohio, zero for the dollars they invested. This is during your watch. You can't say this is about some other CEO. This is not acceptable, Mr. Liddy. You cannot get $182 billion, as my friend Mr. Cummings pointed out, and say, well, we want to be spared criticism. Yes, this is criticism. AIG cheated police, firefighters, teachers, and public employees in Ohio out of $96 million. That may not seem like a
lot of money to a firm that's used to dealing in trillions. But you cheated people who save lives, who teach our children, and I want to know right now what you're going to do about it. What are you going to do about this?

Mr. Liddy. Well, as I said, we will meet, and I will meet with you right after this meeting if you'd like and we can begin to understand exactly where we are. I just don't have the information on it. All of the things that you've mentioned, I'm very sensitive to them. They did all occur before my watch, but I am prepared to take responsibility to decide whether they should be resolved; and, if so, how.

Mr. Kucinich. Well, you know, we know the two other parties have already been settled in the class action case: Price Waterhouse and General Reinsurance Corp. Do you just feel that when it comes to public employees you can roll them? You can just dismiss them? Is this your attitude? You haven't resolved this, Mr. Liddy, on your watch.

Mr. Liddy. We will work with you and do everything we can to get it resolved, sir.

Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Liddy, I am the chairman of the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy; and until this matter is resolved, you are going to keep getting called in front of Congress to explain why it's OK for AIG to cheat police, firemen, teachers and public employees. We're not going to let you go, Mr. Liddy, and I will talk to you after the meeting, but you are not going to roll this Member, guaranteed.

Mr. Liddy. Yes. We will get together after the meeting. We do everything we can to make sure we resolve it.

Mr. Kucinich. You said that on March 26th. I have your quote.

[Audience member sneezes.]

Mr. Kucinich. God bless you. Mr. Liddy, thanks for being here, but there is a moment here of truth and you are going to have to remember these police, firefighters, and teachers. Mr. Chairman, I came to this Congress not to represent these people on Wall Street who have been shafting the American people. I came here to represent my constituents and that is who I am speaking on behalf of right now. Not going to let you go. Not going to let you get away with it.

Thank you.

Chairman Towns. Thank you, and the gentleman's time is expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. McHenry, 5 minutes.

Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Liddy, thank you from coming back before Congress and I know this is not one of the more joyful days of your life. When did you receive the honor of being CEO of AIG?

Mr. Liddy. When did I?

Mr. McHenry. Yes.

Mr. Liddy. Middle of September; September 18th, I think was the date.

Mr. McHenry. September 18th, OK. And in the whole run-up there's a Washington Post story today, which I am sure you caught this morning about AIG entitled, ``Officials knew of AIG bonuses a month before fire storm.''

Now, I just want to touch on this.

You have received enough in the way of questions on this and I think you have answered everything to the fullest extent you could, but documents show that senior officials of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York received details about the bonuses more than 5 months before the fire storm erupted and were deeply engaged with AIG as well as outside lawyers,
auditors, and public relations firms about the potential controversy.

But, the New York Fed did not raise an alarm with the Obama administration until the end of February. So, interestingly enough, the New York Fed was very engaged and well-informed on this matter long before it came to public light. Is that true?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, the AIG FP bonuses were a topic of great consideration starting in about the end of October, beginning of November.

Mr. McHenry. Was the chairman of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of New York informed of these bonuses?

Mr. Liddy. I can't answer that.

Mr. McHenry. Did you have a conversation with the chairman of the Federal Reserve or the Bank of New York?

Mr. Liddy. No. I did not. I don't think so.

Mr. McHenry. In the fall you never had a discussion?

Mr. Liddy. The conversations as I remember them would have been more with the people that we interface with at the Federal Reserve on a regular basis; but there would not, if you mean by chairman, you mean Chairman Bernanke, no. There would have been no conversation with him and I don't think there was any.

Mr. McHenry. What about the head of the New York Fed?

Mr. Liddy. Yeah, I just don't recall who the conversations were with.

Mr. McHenry. Did you have any conversations in the fall with Timothy Geithner?

Mr. Liddy. Not in the fall. I don't believe so. No.

Mr. McHenry. OK, so you had no conversations.

Mr. Liddy. No. Mr. Geithner had pretty much recused himself from many of these activities because either they were considering him for the spot of the Treasury Secretary or he had already been nominated.

Mr. McHenry. Well, when some of these actions took place, there wasn't even a President-elect at the time. So you didn't have any conversations with Timothy Geithner during September or October of last year?

Mr. Liddy. Not on this topic. I don't remember that, but I'd have to go back and check. I don't think so. No.

Mr. McHenry. OK. If you could submit that to the committee I'd certainly appreciate it. So you are saying you didn't have any? Apparently, you are saying you didn't have any conversations with him whatsoever?

Mr. Liddy. Oh, on bonuses you mean, or in general?

Mr. McHenry. If you listen to me specifically, did you have any conversations with a Mr. Timothy Geithner in September, October, November or December of last year?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, I would say in October or November preceding the revision of the original bail-out program, I would have met with Mr. Geithner.

Mr. McHenry. Did you have any mention of the word bonus with Mr. Geithner?

Mr. Liddy. No. Not in those meetings. No.

Mr. McHenry. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Geithner in September, October, November or December in any way, shape, or form regarding anything to do with the word bonus or what a bonus means?

Mr. Liddy. No. I don't believe so.

Mr. McHenry. OK. Thank you. I'm not an attorney, but it seems a little slippery the way you are trying to answer this so I want to make sure we have that on the record.

Recent data about commercial real estate predictions for this coming year and the following year, this is the substance
of what I'd like to talk about. And I am sorry we had to belabor that and it was painful for me as well to try to ask that question and get a direct answer from you. But increasing vacancies, we have a discussion about the real estate industry, and specifically with the commercial real estate industry this year and next regarding increasing vacancies, and perhaps loan defaults, as liquidity for refinancing remains very scarce.

We see a lot of troubles in the CNBS market, obviously, so we talk about AIG’s commercial real estate portfolio and loan exposure, and how you think this portfolio will hold up if it were subjected to a stress test style of assessment that the 19 largest banks went through, if you could touch on commercial real estate in your loan portfolio and your exposure there.

Mr. Liddy. We have a substantial commercial real estate portfolio either in owned real estate or CNBS's as you refer to them. Those things lost substantial value in the fourth quarter and our write-down of those in fact was what contributed to our very large loss in the fourth quarter.

You know, I am worried about that portfolio. I am worried about real estate in general. If there is a lack of economic activity, I think it does not go well for commercial real estate at all. If the stimulus money that's being brought to bear on our economic travails does in fact work, then I think we could work our way out of that.

I do not have a sense of what that timing would be, but I think commercial mortgages and CNBS's in general, which a lot of insurers invest in, because they are long-dated assets that match long-dated liabilities. I think that those asset classes could be under some stress for a while.

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired.

I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Congressman Tierney.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Liddy, for being here with us today.

Let me ask you. About November 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York established Maiden Lane 3, a financing agency. And correct me if I'm wrong. Was that the agency that provided the money for AIG to then go out and purchase some of the underlying subprime securities, about $27 billion?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mr. Tierney. Now, you did that and you canceled the contracts that you had with those counterparties. Am I right?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mr. Tierney. OK. Would you provide copies of those contracts to this committee?

Mr. Liddy. The Federal Reserve would have to do that, because the Federal Reserve did that. So let me just explain. While we were the counterparty, we would fight tooth and nail with them. Once the Federal Reserve decided that we would put money into a financing entity, a special purpose vehicle, then the Federal Reserve took over the responsibility for the negotiation of those settlements and the cancellation of the contracts. They would have to provide those. So they took them all.

Mr. Tierney. All right, thank you. The special purpose entity, will you explain to me how that was structured?

Mr. Liddy. AIG put in the equity. AIG sold the underlying assets at some cents on the dollar. I don't remember the exact number, 45 or 50.

Mr. Tierney. To raise the equity?

Mr. Liddy. No. The equity came from money that the U.S. Treasury had provided us, but then we sold the assets and the
sale of those assets went into Maiden Lane 3.

Mr. Tierney. So, I'm just trying to learn here. So the sale of the assets were the subprime instruments?

Mr. Liddy. It was the underlying assets that were valued at, as I said, 45 or 50 cents on the dollar. The Federal Reserve then bought them and that money went into the funding of Maiden Lane 3.

Mr. Tierney. The reports are that you paid full value for the subprime securities. Is that accurate?

Mr. Liddy. Again, the Federal Reserve did that.

Mr. Tierney. They paid full value for that?

Mr. Liddy. Yeah, the Federal Reserve did that. In fact, we don't even know what they did because we were out of that process.

Mr. Tierney. Before that all happened, AIG had been having serious collateral disputes with Goldman Sachs over certain values involved in their portfolios. Correct?

Mr. Liddy. Oh, it was any counterparty, not just Goldman Sachs. It was any counterparty. It gets to the root of mark to market. You and I can look at the same set of facts and you can take it as one value. I can take it as another.

Mr. Tierney. And, I guess, Mr. Chairman, we would need to go and get those contracts from the Fed.

The question here, Mr. Liddy, obviously is why we paid full value when there was legitimate disputes as to the value and that's why we didn't negotiate a better arrangement on that. And you're telling us that it's the Fed we should speak to and not you, because you weren't involved in that.

Mr. Liddy. Yes, we were asked to step aside once those financing vehicles were set up; and, I believe the Federal Reserve had the responsibility for those.

Mr. Tierney. OK. Now, Mr. Kanjorski asked you a question about regulation going forward and you answered on that. Why wouldn't we favor some sort of a regulatory system that disallowed entities like this from getting too large and too diverse as opposed to just having somebody oversee them and sort of watch over them?

Why wouldn't we go back to something in the nature of Glass Steagall and that type of operation where we just simply say you can't get that diverse and that large. Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. Liddy. You know, I would. I'm not so sure it's the issue of large. It's a matter of breadth. So if you are in one product line and you are really muscular in it, and you are very good at it and you know it, that's one thing. But if you are in 20 different product lines, and that's the definition of large, that seems to me to have a different level of risk. So I think it's probably the center point for a debate that ought to occur. I just don't think a situation where an AIG of really a primary insurance company should have a Financial Products business attached to it.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you for that. You had another $43.7 billion between September 2008 and December 2008 that was from the public that used to satisfy financial counterparties with respect to the securities lending operations of AIG. Were there any negotiations involved in those payments, or were they contractually obligated for the amount that you paid?

Mr. Liddy. No. That's a whole different situation. It's where we have to pay a dollar back to somebody who's got our assets. If we want our assets back, we have to give them a dollar. But the investments we had invested are a dollar and had declined, so it's a much different situation than a credit
default swap.

Mr. Tierney. All right. Would you be able to make those contracts available?

Mr. Liddy. I assume I will ask our general counsel and I'm always worried about who's on the other end and did we sign a confidentiality agreement that we won't make anything available if you will give us the time to research whether we can do that. We will come right back to you.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields.

The gentleman from Arizona, Congressman Flake.

Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Liddy, can you tell us what the administration's plans are moving forward with AIG?

Mr. Liddy. I cannot. I don't have any idea. I think I know what my marching orders are and that is to run the company as well as we can and in a way that is responsible. It gives us a chance to pay back the American taxpayer, preserves the jobs, and that's what we are trying to do.

Mr. Flake. Well, great. I didn't think you could answer that question. I just asked that to point out that the minority has asked for an administration witness for quite a while. It would be helpful to know what the administration has planned, but we are unable to ascertain that and I appreciate that's not your job to answer that question. It was just difficult from our side.

We don't know what the administration has planned and I hope that we have some hearings coming up where we can find that out. I would ask, though. There has been some talk that AIG, in its effort to come back, is undercutting competition offering insurance products under value and making it difficult for competition. Who are your main competitors?

Mr. Liddy. Domestically, Ace, Zurich, OCSA, Alliance, Travelers; I would also say that a number of organizations have looked at that issue. The GAO looked at it and they commented on it the last time I was here before Congress. The Federal Reserve has commissioned its own study of that, and we just don't do that. We don't put the Federal money into the property casualty businesses and then use that as a competitive advantage. And I think any analysis that's been done would support that. Brokers have done that same kind of analysis, and there doesn't appear to be much validity to it.

Mr. Flake. So any allegation that is taking place has no basis in reality?

Mr. Liddy. I don't believe so. You know, it's a very competitive marketplace, and like most areas of business people fight tooth and nail, but in terms of us appropriately or inappropriately pricing our product, we do not do that. What I don't want to do is have this company get out of the mess that it's in, and then find out that the book of business that we have is underpriced and we've got insurance issues. We are just not going to do that.

Mr. Flake. Right. Well, you can see why some might be concerned about that whenever government is backing someone. We've seen it with the GSEs. There's simply less care taken.

Mr. Liddy. Yes. No, I understand it 100 percent. Again, I'd say if you look at the early results of the GAO study or some work done by the Federal Reserve or work done by Brokers, I think you'll find little, if any, validity to that issue.

Mr. Flake. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Towns. Five minutes.
Mr. Clay. Thank you.
Mr. Liddy, welcome back. AIG continues to pose significant losses, despite infusions of taxpayer dollars amounts to over $180 billion. Just last month AIG experienced a shocking $61.7 billion loss, a quarterly loss, which was the highest in U.S. corporate history. Is AIG really too big to fail and hasn't it already failed?
Mr. Liddy. Well, as I explained earlier, there were reasons for that loss. It had to do with market valuations and then writing off assets on our balance sheet which we thought did not have as much value as we were carrying them on.
I would point out to you that just last week we reported our results for the first quarter and that loss was not $62 billion. It was $4.3 billion, which was substantially less than the loss was in the first quarter of 2008. So we believe we are making some progress. I don't think that AIG has failed. I think, as I've attempted to say in my oral remarks and in response to several questions, it's a very complicated institution. It's a very complicated situation.
We have a good plan to work our way out of this and hopefully to repay the American taxpayer, but it is heavily dependent upon economic recovery and the capital markets staying where they are or improving.
Mr. Clay. Now given these jaw-dropping figures, I am concerned that any taxpayer investment in AIG can be equated to throwing money into a bottomless pit. It appeared that taxpayers are simply propping AIG up. Is AIG in effect a sinkhole?
Mr. Liddy. No. As I said, I don't believe so. I think we have a good plan that we will be able to pay the American taxpayer. Some very vital businesses will emerge from AIG, will be a much smaller, more transparent, more nimble company, so I would not categorize it as a sinkhole.
Mr. Clay. Let me ask you about the AIG Financial Products Division. Did AIG retain any of the executives in its Financial Products Division that ran AIG into the ground?
Mr. Liddy. The short answer is no. The top three, four or five people are folks that I would say I characterize as the architects and builders of the multi-sector, credit default swap, those people are gone. Do we have people who do credit analysis or trade on securities, yes; but, they weren't the architects and builders and engineers of that program.
Mr. Clay. So you are not working with a completely new team at the Financial Products Division?
Mr. Liddy. We are working with a completely new leadership team. Many of the folks who are executing on those contracts are the same, but they are executing under different standards, and different leadership, and different requirements.
Mr. Clay. You know, all of the losses that we have talked about today have occurred under your watch as CEO. So tell the committee what exactly you are doing today that is so different from what you have done in the past few months so you will better protect taxpayers' investment in AIG and ensure a return on their investment.
Mr. Liddy. Well, we are trying very hard, and I think making good progress to wind down the AIG financial progress, which posed the systemic risk that we represented to the U.S. financial system. And we've made good progress on it. If asset values continue to go down, we could continue to record losses. Hopefully, that does not occur.
Mr. Clay. Thank you for your answers.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Towns. Thank you very much.
As you know, we have votes on the floor and what I would like to do is recess until 12:15 and return. And of course that would give us enough time to have the three votes plus get a drink of water. So we will recess until 12:15.
[Recess.]
Chairman Towns. I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also thank the ranking member in his absence for holding this hearing, and I want to thank Mr. Liddy for appearing before this committee again to help us with our work.
Mr. Liddy, the title of today's hearing is `AIG: Where Is the Taxpayer Money Going?' And, in addition to that, in the letter of invitation that was sent to you and discussed with your counsel, in part, we asked you to respond to the question where is the Federal financial assistance going. Where is the taxpayer money going?
Regrettably, in your written testimony, we gave you ample opportunity to provide a written response of reasonable length to that question, where is the Federal money, where is the taxpayer money going. You did not respond to that in any significant fashion. There's not a sentence in there that addresses the central questions of where is the taxpayer money going. And, look. I am trying to work with you.
I understand that you came out of retirement to do this. I understand you are working for a dollar a year. I understand all that, but we are not getting the responses that we expect. I don't think there's a majority shareholder in this country--only 80 percent of any company--that is being treated like the American taxpayer is in this case. It's a plain fact that AIG would have gone bankrupt but for the goodness of the American people to step forward and rescue this company. That should have been a game changer on your side. That should have signaled a shift that this company is now 80 percent or 79.9 percent owned by the taxpayer, and it is a new ball game, one of transparency and accountability to the American taxpayer.
I have not seen that happen. I did not see that happen in the bonus controversy, which continues, because the numbers are different now than the last time you were here. And this lack of information that will get back to you--I'll have somebody dig up those documents for you--and a complete absence of any response to the central question of where the taxpayer money is in your opening statement or in the written testimony that we asked you to provide.
I am disappointed at that. I would love to work with you. You know, I am not here to be contentious, but I am here to do my job on behalf of the American taxpayer. And I associate myself strongly with the words of Mr. Kucinich earlier today. I feel like you're trying to roll us and you're trying to obfuscate things and obstruct us from doing the job that we need to do.
You did mention in your statement the fact that AIG has reduced their nominal exposure from $2.7 trillion to $1.5 trillion. So let me ask you about that, since you haven't responded to the central question of the hearing. Let me ask you about that and reduce the nominal issues and the notional exposure from $2.7 trillion to $1.5 trillion. But, how much of that reduction have you accomplished by shifting the exposure to the American people, either through the Fed to Treasury,
through Maiden Lane, or through any of these TALF or any of these other federally or taxpayer-backed entities?

Mr. Liddy. Little if any of that reduction to notional exposure would have anything to do with the number of items that you just mentioned. That notional exposure had been reduced by settling those trades, selling the books of business, and just overall downsizing of the business known as AIG FP.

Mr. Lynch. Well, let me ask you. I know the Treasury approved up to $52.5 billion in loans in order to purchase troubled assets that were formerly owned by AIG, now owned by the U.S. Government. Wouldn't that result in a shift from AIG to the Government?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, that would have. And, I'm sorry. I was trying to draw a reference to the last time we had a conversation about this what has changed. So Maiden Lane was put in place in November 2008 and you are absolutely correct. Some of those assets would have been transferred into the Federal Reserve after they did a very thorough valuation analysis of what their potential would be. Since then, any reduction in the notional value has not been as the result of a transfer.

Mr. Lynch. OK. There's also up to $34.5 billion in Fed loans retired by securities and equity interest provided to the government by AIG. That's on top of the $52.5 billion that I first mentioned.

Mr. Liddy. Those were all items that were a part of Maiden Lane, either 2 or 3, and go back to November. Since then we haven't transferred any additional risk to the American public.

Mr. Lynch. So you are basically saying this is right then. The $87 billion here went from AIG to the U.S. Government here.

Mr. Liddy. Well, assets. Assets with real values got transferred to the Federal Reserve, and they got transferred at--I don't remember the exact number--45.

Mr. Lynch. Are these?

Mr. Liddy. No. The assets got transferred to the Federal Reserve at cents on the dollar. Let's say 50 cents on the dollar, so the Federal Reserve has the opportunity and the American public has the opportunity to benefit from any appreciation or recovery in those asset values. That's what Maiden Lane 2 and 3 are all about.

Mr. Lynch. I don't have enough time. I wish you had in your testimony outlined where the taxpayers' money has gone.

Mr. Liddy. Congressman, can I address that? The last time I was here, we provided a very exhaustive document that showed exactly where all of the taxpayer money has gone. So of the $82 billion, $40 billion of TARP and roughly $42 or $43 billion of a loan from the Federal Reserve, it's a very exhaustive analysis.

It breaks it down into how much went to the counterparties, how much went to municipalities to protect the guaranteed investment contracts, how much to pay off debt that was called because we'd lost our ratings. How much went to securities lending? There's a very exhaustive analysis that's a part of the record that explains that in some detail. We aren't trying to obfuscate anything. We thought we had already provided that. And, if you like, we will provide you another copy, but I think it will answer all your questions.

Mr. Lynch. Well, I think when we titled this hearing "Where did the money go," and we send you an invitation, and we say, "Tell us what you did with the Federal financial assistance," I think that sort of is asking that. And so now
we have this hearing and we have you up here and we don't have any response, and that bothers me to no end. You know?

We are going to have to have you back up here. You know, I'm with Kucinich on this. We're not going to be rolled on this and when we ask you a question and we get all these people together and we have a hearing, and we ask you a specific question to address on your testimony, by God we want the answer.

We own 80 percent of your company. You exist because the American taxpayer purchased, you know, 79.9 percent of your shares. And so there's an obligation due here. There's a transparency that's owed to the American taxpayer and we don't see it, and it is particularly frustrating. Let me ask you.

I did see some of the counterparty obligations here that when the first money went into AIG, one of the top beneficiaries was Goldman Sachs at $12.4 billion. Now the person who arranged that deal was Secretary Paulson, formerly of, associated with that firm. Did you feel any pressure or anything in terms of the order in which you had to compensate or provide those funds to those individual firms? Did you feel any conflict there?

Mr. Liddy. I did not. And the final resolution, the final determination of who got what, was made by the Federal Reserve, not by people at AIG.

Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, that explains a lot. OK. But again I'm going to ask that the committee reinvite you to another hearing at which you actually can get into that central question of where that taxpayer money went. Maybe we could do that in conjunction with Mr. Kucinich and the questions he had. But at this point, I will yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Liddy. And Congressman, I will provide to you within the next couple days a fresh copy of what we provided the previous committee that I was at, which goes into great detail as to where the money went.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much.

Congressman Connolly from Virginia.

Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; Mr. Liddy.

Welcome, Mr. Liddy. A couple of questions. Your predecessor, Mr. Greenberg, testified before this committee a few weeks ago, and he indicated that he would now favor Federal regulation of credit defaults, swap instruments and derivatives, for that matter.

Do you share that opinion that the Federal Government needs to regulate those financial instruments?

Mr. Liddy. Yeah. I think they need to be put on an exchange. I think they need to be standardized, and there needs to be a lot more transparency. And if there was Federal regulation, you would get all of those.

Mr. Connolly. And if I understood your testimony this morning, Mr. Liddy, you believe that in retrospect, where AIG went wrong was frankly branching out into such financial instruments in the form of AIG FP, specifically.

Mr. Liddy. Yes. Those instruments are more appropriate for large commercial banks and investment banks that have the skill sets, a more refined skill set to handle them. It's not appropriate for an insurance company, in my judgment.

Mr. Connolly. Right.

Could you just review for me the figures I thought I heard you give in your testimony this morning. How much did AIG get pumped into the company directly from appropriated dollars from
Mr. Liddy. As we stand right now, the money that's been advanced to the company is $40 billion out of TARP, out of the Treasury program, and about $43 billion in loans from the Federal Reserve.

Mr. Connolly. Got you.

Mr. Liddy. Now, in addition to that--let me just finish--in addition to that, there's another $30 billion of TARP that we can draw on if we need it; and there's an additional $17 billion to top the $43 billion off to $60 billion, that we could draw from as a loan from the Federal Reserve.

Mr. Connolly. OK. Thank you.

Now, with respect to governance, if I understand it correctly, there are three federally appointed trustees?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mr. Connolly. All of them are appointed by the Federal Reserve, is that correct?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. You should ask them. They represent Treasury as the owner of the $79.9. I think they were appointed by the Federal Reserve, because the Federal Reserve delegated that responsibility by Treasury.

But I'm not involved in that process.

Mr. Connolly. Right. But with respect to the trustees, I mean, their names are Jill Considine, Chester Feldberg, and Douglas Foshee. That ring a bell?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. Yes.

Mr. Connolly. Those are all Federal Reserve appointees, aren't they?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. But I'm sorry, where I'm stumbling, because I'm just not involved in it, as I think they represent the Treasury's interest, the ownership interest----

Mr. Connolly. You say you're not involved----

Mr. Liddy. In the selection and role of the trustees.

Mr. Connolly. In the selection. But you certainly are involved in interaction with----

Mr. Liddy. Oh, absolutely, yes.

Mr. Connolly. Are there any other Federal trustees?

Mr. Liddy. No.

Mr. Connolly. So, for example, there are no elected officials or anyone appointed by this elected body as a trustee of AIG?

Mr. Liddy. No. Certainly not that I'm aware of.

Mr. Connolly. Hmm. They don't attend board meetings, is that correct?

Mr. Liddy. They do not. The Federal Reserve has delegates at every building meeting and every committee meeting.

Mr. Connolly. And is the board still pretty much a private sector-like board?

Mr. Liddy. Private sector?

Mr. Connolly. Well, what I'm asking is, is there a clear delineation between the public trustees representing Federal interests of almost 80 percent and the board of directors that apparently, I'm asking, stays pretty much privately controlled and appointed?

Mr. Liddy. There is a delineation, but again the linchpin of that would be the representatives from the Federal Reserve, who are observers and overseers at every board meeting, every committee meeting, every strategy meeting, every discussion that we have.

Mr. Connolly. So representatives of the Federal Reserve sit in on board meetings?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, they do.
Mr. Connolly. Got you. Unlike these trustees?
Mr. Liddy. Correct.
Mr. Connolly. Going back to the governance question, what is the distinction, then, between the role of these trustees and those members of the Federal Reserve who sit on board meetings, overseeing that procedure?
Mr. Liddy. I'm going to answer, and then I think you should address that to the trustees.
The trustees are the protectors of the 79.9 percent ownership and the value that we'd like to create for that. The Federal Reserve is representing its interests as a lender, and has in the past been asked by the Treasury to also kind of coordinate Treasury's interaction with the company, so that there can be only one organization doing it instead of splitting it.
We have 360-degree oversight with an awful lot of people wanting to understand what our strategy is, and what our execution is. The Fed has been asked to try to coordinate that 360-degree oversight.
Mr. Connolly. My time is probably running out. But let me ask a final question. With respect to bonuses, one of the rationales, in the public record anyhow, for bonuses, was recruitment and retention. How many folks--with respect to the bonuses in question--how many folks left the company, who received bonuses?
Mr. Liddy. Yeah. I would say very few.
Mr. Connolly. Now are you talking about--and here's where it's very easy to get off the track--you're talking FP retention bonuses, or overall company bonuses? Or what----
Mr. Liddy. Well, I'll gladly go with the FP bonuses for a minute. On the FP sector, we had about maybe 10 to 12 to 15 resignations. We've had several of those people rescind those resignations and stay with us, even as they worked to return their bonuses.
I don't know if the resignations are over yet. Some have said, you know, "I'm going to help you wind this down and be as professional as I can, but then I want to get on with my life, and I want to resign."
So I don't know that my answer is reflective of what will eventually happen.
Mr. Connolly. If it's possible to get us data for the record in terms of that list of people who qualified for bonuses and/or got bonuses, and how many of them left the company or stayed with the company?
Mr. Liddy. OK.
Mr. Connolly. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Liddy. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Towns. Thank you.
I yield 5 minutes to Mr. Westmoreland, gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Liddy, how many lawsuits are currently pending between AIG and CV Star, Star International, and/or Mr. Hank Greenberg?
Mr. Liddy. I can't give you an exact number, but several, and there are several that are quite large. I try to keep a finger on the pulse of the largest ones, but then I rely upon our general counsel and our legal department to handle those issues.
Mr. Westmoreland. How much money has AIG spent on these lawsuits and legal fees so far? And how long do you think this could go on? And how much money has AIG set aside or projected
for the future cost of these lawsuits?

Mr. Liddy. I don't have the details, sir. We can provide them to you. But I would say the largest one and largest lawsuits we have involves a lawsuit with Seco, and it has a $4 billion potential recovery attached to it.

And so working to get that money so that it can be used for the benefit of the taxpayers, we think makes some sense.

Mr. Westmoreland. OK. But you know, from what I've been reading or told is that this could take 3 or 4 years and tens of millions of dollars to get these lawsuits settled, with CV Star or Mr. Greenberg or Star International.

Mr. Liddy. Well, the first of those lawsuits is scheduled to go to trial on June 15th of this year.

Mr. Westmoreland. OK.

Mr. Liddy. And the start of that lawsuit would go back to, oh, 2005, 2006. So an awful lot of work has already been done with respect to it. So the issue becomes: Do you continue to pursue it, because you're not very close to what you think will be a legal victory involving a fair amount of money.

Mr. Westmoreland. But that's one of the lawsuits. You said you didn't know exactly how many are pending.

Mr. Liddy. No. I know that one, because it's one of the larger. Then there's a suit against Mr. Greenberg to the tune of about $1.6 billion to recover the fines and penalties that the company paid as a result of his behavior, that was determined. That's what we had to do in order to pay the attorney general of the State of New York.

Mr. Westmoreland. OK. But you will get us the information about how many lawsuits are pending?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. And where they're at in the legal process, if you don't mind?

Mr. Liddy. With respect to Mr. Greenberg?

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes. That would be fine.

According to the news reports--and I want to ask you if this is true--that Mr. Greenberg has offered to submit all these matters to a mandatory arbitration. Are those news accounts true?

Mr. Liddy. We've gone through various forms of either mediation or arbitration in the past, generally without any successful conclusion. And now that all the work has been done and this trial is ready to start, and the judge who is going to hear it has been briefed and is knowledgeable on it, most of those activities are no longer ongoing, but we certainly have engaged in those discussions before.

Mr. Westmoreland. But I think my question is: Are the news reports true that it would be mandatory arbitration? Binding arbitration?

Mr. Liddy. Yeah. I don't think so. No. Again, we're going to quickly exhaust my level of expertise in terms of exactly what that would be. And that's what I----

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, could you get that information too? To find out if these news reports are true that it would be a binding arbitration that he has suggested that he and AIG go through?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. Because, you know, to be honest with you, Mr. Liddy, now that AIG is about 80 percent taxpayer owned, I would think that if this binding arbitration was an offer that was out there for both sides to do, that it might be in the best interests of the American taxpayer to get these things settled, rather than going on for years and years and years,
paying these legal fees.
And I'm sure that binding arbitration with whoever the
arbiter would be could, in fact, in the end result, bring this
to a close and save the taxpayers, myself, and my kids and
grand kids millions of dollars over this period of time.
You mentioned yourself that this had been going on since
2005 in this one case. And so if there's more than one case,
how much longer could it go on? How much more money are we
going to spend on lawyers? And what would be the harm in going
to a binding arbitration?
Mr. Liddy. Well, as I said, we have attempted to do that on
numerous occasions with Mr. Greenberg on at least one suit, and
probably others.
And now all of the work and effort has been teed up to
actually take this to trial. So we think we have an excellent
chance to----
Mr. Westmoreland. So you've never been to binding
arbitration is what you're saying?
Mr. Liddy. I'll provide you the detail. I just don't know.
Mr. Westmoreland. OK. Because I mean, if you've been to
binding arbitration, it looks like it will be binding. I don't
want to badger you, and I'm not trying to----
Mr. Liddy. No--I've been through several rounds of
mediation----
Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I would like to know the details on
that, because I feel like since, you know, we now own 80
percent of the company, that we do have an interest in that,
and an ongoing litigation that could cost millions of dollars--
--
Mr. Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Westmoreland. I will.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Liddy, earlier I asked you about the current stock
value, you know, of your stock. But I didn't ask you about your
portfolio in its entirety. As an enterprise value, what would
you say the fairly stated enterprise value of the going concern
you run today is? Not what could liquidate it for, but what the
enterprise value is? So that we could decide what you believe
it is worth in a fair market. Not what it's going to earn over
years in which you get artificially low loans and stock, which
is paying no dividend; but what do you believe the enterprise
is worth today?
Mr. Liddy. I would go back to the discussion we had
earlier. I think it's the equity value. It's about 2.7 billion
shares, I think, at approximately $2 a share. Because it's not
just the assets that you have to value. It's all the
liabilities.
It's the $40 billion that we want to pay----
Mr. Issa. Well, that's why I asked for the enterprise
value----
Mr. Liddy. There's $250 billion of other debt that we owe.
So I think the enterprise value is at most what the equity
value is worth today.
Mr. Issa. So you're saying you're worth $5 billion, and
you've got $190 billion of the stockholders' investment?
Mr. Liddy. Well, again, the key is to be able to manage
this situation over time, so that we can liquidate the
liabilities, pay back everything, and then have a value
retained, which the trustees are the guardians of.
Chairman Towns. Thank you, gentlemen. The time is expired.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman--and I'll yield back my time--but I
would like to make a request that we do get this information
from Mr. Liddy and AIG as far as the future liability that could be imposed upon the taxpayers.

Chairman Towns. Without objection, and we will hold the record open for the information.

The Gentlewoman from Ohio, Ms. Kaptur.

[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Ms. Kaptur. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Liddy.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to place in the record, as I begin my questioning here, the list of the current board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as well as the list of primary dealers with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the amount of funds that have been provided to the different institutions that are primary dealers, as being counterparties to some of the funds that were received through AIG.

Chairman Towns. Without objection.

Ms. Kaptur. I thank you.

Mr. Liddy, may I ask you, what is the actual address at which AIG is headquartered?

Mr. Liddy. 70 Pine Street.

Ms. Kaptur. 70 what?

Mr. Liddy. Pine. P-i-n-e. in New York.

Ms. Kaptur. P-i-n-e. Is that in New York City?

Mr. Liddy. Yes, it is.

Ms. Kaptur. OK. Where in New York City is it? Is it part of the Wall Street Community?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. It's lower Manhattan.

Ms. Kaptur. It's lower Manhattan. Who would be your closest financial neighbors there?

Mr. Liddy. The Federal Reserve is two blocks away.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. Thank you.

The American people have now given AIG nearly $200 billion, and I guess others have stated we own about 79.9 percent of AIG. Have you paid the taxpayers back any of the money that they have lent you to date?

Mr. Liddy. We have. We're required--whenever we sell an asset, we're required to take the proceeds of that asset, to the extent we can get out of the insurance companies whatever's been sold, we pay it back to the Federal Reserve.

Ms. Kaptur. And how much have you paid back to the taxpayers of the United States?

Mr. Liddy. Several billion dollars. I don't have the exact----

Ms. Kaptur. Billion? Several billion?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Ms. Kaptur. So it was paid to the Federal Reserve. That doesn't necessarily mean it's deposited in the Treasury to be refunded to the American people, I take it?

Mr. Liddy. That's correct. It's in satisfaction of the debt that we owe to the Federal Reserve.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. So you could provide more accurate numbers, dates, and amounts returned to the Federal Reserve----

Mr. Liddy. Yes----

Ms. Kaptur. Since the original infusions to AIG?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Ms. Kaptur. And could you also submit for the record, a list of your board of directors, please?
Mr. Liddy. Sure.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.

Next question. Approximately how much have you paid out to your employees in bonuses and dividends to your shareholders over the last 6 months?

Mr. Liddy. We've paid no dividends to shareholders. We're not allowed to do that. As soon as we received help from the Federal Reserve, all dividends to the shareholders were not allowed.

Bonuses. There are so many ways to slice this number. I just can't answer it. If you would give us the time to respond in writing, that's a better way to do that, and we will do that shortly.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. We would very much appreciate that as soon as you can give it to us.

Let me ask you, the funds AIG has been given by the American people, 40 percent of it was then redirected to other Wall Street firms, as I understand it. And the largest recipient was Goldman Sachs, that received $12.9 billion. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. There are two or three firms that received double-digit—you know, $10, $11, $12, $13 billion in settlement of legal contracts.

Ms. Kaptur. Yes. And at least five of those that received these funds are the worst offenders in the subprime market, including JP Morgan Chase, Wachovia, Citigroup, HSBC, Bank of America. It's very interesting to see who got funds, when they're responsible for three-quarters of the subprime mess in the housing market that this country is facing.

I would ask you to use your power, since you've given them money, to get them to do loan workouts at the local level, where citizens are outraged that companies like JP Morgan Chase, which is the top of my bad-boys list for not returning phone calls.

Thousands and thousands of families in places like Ohio are affected by their recalcitrance, and arrogance. And it offends me to see that they get money and they perform so poorly.

But my question in regards to Goldman Sachs. Could you clarify your relationship with Goldman Sachs, the largest recipient of these counterparty funds through AIG, $12.9 billion? What years did you serve as a member of the board of Goldman Sachs, please?

Mr. Liddy. I was on the board for approximately 5\1/2\ years. Don't remember the year exactly I went on, but I exited that relationship as soon as I became the chairman and CEO of AIG back in September 2008.

Ms. Kaptur. September 2008. Is there a specific date?

Mr. Liddy. Tendered my resignation as soon as I could get to it, within a week or 10 days of my being appointed.

Ms. Kaptur. Did you leave in early September or late September?

Mr. Liddy. It would be after September 18th, but before September 30th.

Ms. Kaptur. After September 18th. Thank you. Is it true that you served as chairman of the audit committee of the Goldman Sachs?

Mr. Liddy. I did for the last year of my service.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. So you would have done that through middle-to-late September last year?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. Bloomberg News reported on April 17th that you currently own 27,129 shares of Goldman Sachs
stock. Is that true?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. Could you please estimate the market value of that to date?

Mr. Liddy. $3-plus million.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. And you currently hold that?

Mr. Liddy. No, I don't. I own about 8,000 shares outright, which I bought when Goldman Sachs went public in 2000-2001, and the rest of it I receive as compensation as a director. I did not take any cash. I took it in deferred stock, the deferred stock you can't get at until you retire from the board. And some time in May or June that would be available to me. So it's been restricted.

Ms. Kaptur. But in any case, you have a direct interest in Goldman Sachs. You have a financial interest in Goldman Sachs. And I understand you may also have some other type of agreement with them, where you were paid some type of lump sum?

Mr. Liddy. I don't have any other type of agreement with--

Ms. Kaptur. So your only interest would be the stock then?

Several million dollars?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Chairman Towns. The gentlewoman's time is expired.

Ms. Kaptur. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. Congressman Souder from Indiana?

Mr. Souder. Thank you. I'm going to yield to the ranking member in a minute. I didn't want to repeat questions when I was over at Homeland Security earlier.

But I have a question on the bonuses. What on bonuses at AIG, what percent of a normal salary typically before all this happened would bonuses be? In other words, is it an integral part of someone's pay or is it intermittent? Is it a small amount, 5 percent? Is it----

Mr. Liddy. It's literally all over the lot. There's 115,000 people who work at AIG, so typically that bonus as a percentage of the base would be lower, at the lower ends of the organization, and higher as you work higher into the organization.

Mr. Souder. And since, just like at Goldman Sachs you were getting stock dividends, that was as a trustee, did AIG get stock dividends, or were they always cash?

Mr. Liddy. No. At AIG you could have a base salary. You could have an annual performance bonus and then there'd be a long-term bonus. The long-term bonus would be stock, and at the time you were expected to hold that stock until you retired from the company, and if you left before you retired, you could lose it.

Mr. Souder. And my understanding as we've gone through these different hearings is the argument for the bonuses was, is that we needed to retain personnel. The company could fold, and particularly keep personnel.

Is that----

Mr. Liddy. Again----

Mr. Souder. Not the last round on the legal argument, but this has been going--AIG has had these problems way back before December. And the question is that in the bonus round, part of the feeling was, and what my question is to follow that--and you can explain if that's not true--is that right now there's not a lot of whole lot of other types of jobs available, certainly with the resume coming off of some of the problems at AIG, it would be a very difficult time to do that.

In my district, we're getting hammered by unemployment.
They're looking at the bonuses, and they're saying "We don't get bonuses when our company goes down. We get laid off."

And it becomes problematic as to why AIG would need the bonuses to retain personnel, why AIG would be paying such huge bonuses, when I have some companies in my district where bonuses can be 40 percent of their normal salary, and they're not getting any bonuses.

Why is it unique in your industry and firm? Are they like commissions? And I'd just like to hear a little bit more of an explanation.

Mr. Liddy. Sure.

Mr. Souder. Because I don't know how to explain it, because I haven't heard a good explanation anybody's buying.

Mr. Liddy. Mm-hmm. I think we need to be careful with how we use that word, bonus, because it can represent so many different things, and it's what's caused members of this committee some frustration, so let me see if I can quickly explain it.

There are normal annual performance bonuses; if you do a good job on this, in addition to your salary you'll get 15, 20, 25, 40 percent over and above that.

So I guess you could look at it as a commission, but it's in our industry. It really is a performance based bonus.

That was earlier in the day we had the conversation about that total, about $450-some million paid over the entire breadth of our company and against a payroll of some $7.5 to $8 billion in size.

So that's one form of a bonus, an annual variable pay or a performance bonus.

Then there were retention bonuses put in place. I think the ones you were referring to are at AIG FP. They were designed in 2007, put in place in 2008.

And when we decided and knew that we were going wind that business down, we asked people to stay, to not leave until they accomplished certain things: Sell a book of business, make it less risky. To the extent they did that, they were paid a retention bonus or an award, again, for some level of performance.

So it depends upon which area of that you're really poking at.

Mr. Souder. In other words, I understand the basic choices. I've been in the middle of companies before I came to Congress that had all those different ranges. Sometimes things like annual performance bonuses don't become performance bonuses. They become expected. And that my question is so were dividends, yet your dividends are zero.

So why would the company have made decisions to continue, at any level, things that are supposed to be performance based? Did you have a big exodus of employees at different times, indeed? Was it critical to the survival of the company? Because it seems odd that you were saying to the people who invested--many of whom were trust funds and retired people, people who owned that--that you get nothing, but we're going to continue things that are supposed to be performance-based, when the performance of AIG was not good for an extended period of time, not just the last few months.

Mr. Liddy. Well, I think, Congressman, you have to break it down into pieces, so the total performance of the business as a whole may not have looked good because it was severely damaged by one or two enterprises--but then there were a host of other enterprises that performed well.

And to the extent that those people who work in those
businesses earned those performance bonuses, they would have been paid. If they didn't earn them, they would have gotten zero.

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. Souder. It's an interesting thing that people with the stock didn't get treated the same way.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much.

Gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Liddy.

I think you obviously heard a great deal of frustration from many people here, because obviously we represent our constituents, who are undergoing a great deal of economic struggle, and as you no doubt understand yourself, are very frustrated just with their own economic circumstance, and after having seen the travails of the financial system, are questioning the very basic foundation of our financial system in every form.

And that's the reason why these questions seem so directed at you, but please understand, we understand that your goal is to try to get the best deal possible for the taxpayer. And believe me, in doing so, it will be for the best interest of all of our constituents that AIG is able to pay back the taxpayer, and certainly I think all of us are interested in that.

And certainly taking your expertise to be able to do that will be something that we're all interested in seeing being fruitful and successful.

One of the things that I think will be of a great deal of concern, I know, for all of our constituents down the road, as you've heard echoed over and over again with respect to these bonuses, is this notion of transparency.

And when you started in your remarks talking about how, you know, AIG is the parent company, and you talked about separating off various other entities from AIG, I think that what it raised in terms of questions with respect to Project Destiny and how you're going to move forward, is when we as a Congress passed limitations on, you know, future bonuses, you know, from being used out of the TARP, the question is, is whether these future, if you will, special purpose vehicles, these separate entities that are no longer part of "AIG proper" are going to be considered TARP recipients for purposes of the rules and governance of these bonuses.

And as such, you know, all I know is that if my constituents here a couple years down the line, that there's a subsidiary of a TARP recipient whose CEO is pulling down some huge bonus, albeit it's a successful subsidiary and you know, it's helping to kick back the dollars that we need for the taxpayers overall, it's just going to drive them nuts.

And so, what I need to get an answer from you now is: are these kind of separate companies, are they going to be under the same governance for purposes of the TARP regulations that AIG is under?

Mr. Liddy. If they're still owned by AIG and a part of AIG, yes, it's our understanding they absolutely will be. There will come a point in time when they're completely disassociated from AIG. They're totally separate companies.

That will be a good day, because that means we will have gotten dollars, and we've used those dollars to repay the Federal Government--either the loan to the Federal Reserve or the TARP dollars.

I suspect when that occurs, because they will not be TARP-related at all, then they would not be subject to it. But that
would be a good thing. As long as they're owned by AIG and a part of AIG, and AIG is subject to TARP dollars, then the subsidiary and pieces of AIG are subject too.

Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I'd just call your attention to this. I think it's going to be a fine line where we're going to have to watch. Because I guarantee it's going to come back and bite us all in the behind, if we're not careful in terms of what constitutes something that's owned by AIG or something that's now no longer part of AIG, because it's been spun off by AIG.

American people aren't going to look at it so clearly as, you know, maybe lawyers might. And we all are going to be in the soup politically, if we're not careful. And I just would like to make sure that we are very sensitive to that.

For purposes of the fact that down the road, we're going to need to go back to the taxpayer on occasion to get them to, you know, have their confidence in their Federal Government. And if they don't have confidence that we were true to our word at the beginning, and if they perceive that there was some kind of shades of gray here that we're held back and not fully forthcoming, they are going to feel as if nothing was on the level.

And I just worry about the kind of perception that it's going to create, in terms of future efforts on our part to get any kind of support in the future for our financial system, which, of course, as you know, has been key to our being able to recover the confidence that we needed in order to keep this financial system from going completely belly up.

I'd also like to ask just----

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. Kennedy. OK.

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. Kennedy. Thanks.

Chairman Towns. Congressman Turner.

Mr. Turner. Thank you, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Ranking member, I appreciate your continued focus on the issue of the financial crisis that we've had, and how that we look further into holding people accountable.

My community has been significantly impacted by the mortgage foreclosure crisis, which was a precursor of the financial meltdown that we saw in our financial industry.

My primary county in my district of Montgomery County, with a population of approximately around 500,000, since I have been in Congress for 6\1/2\ years, has had 27,000 foreclosures, 27,000 foreclosures in an area of about 500,000 people.

Most recently, last week, this Congress moved forward with calling for a commission that would look at the mortgage foreclosure crisis and its contributions to the financial crisis.

When the financial crisis was first identified, there was a discussion of the issue of toxic assets, which people described as mortgage-backed securities. And we know that AIG had issues with mortgage-backed securities, and also credit default swaps that were related to mortgage-backed securities.

From the experience in my community, where we had the mortgage foreclosure crisis, what we saw with those individuals at the Fair Housing Lending Center saw, and others who tried to impact this and to assist families that were going through it, is that the loan-to-value ratio of loans that the families received, primarily through refinancing started with the family being underwater--meaning that the value of the loan that the family was given exceeded the value of the property.
I'm from Ohio. We're not an area that has had wild speculation in property values and escalation, modest appreciation. So that a loan-to-value ratio where you're underwater, where you start the loan underwater, structurally is a loan that if there's any difficulty at all is going to go to foreclosure.

The asset, of course, is not valued high enough to back the loan as collateral, and the family is left with leaving the home sometimes to abandonment, and to the financial institutions.

This commission that's moving forward is going to take a look at this issue. It's going to take a look at the issue of how did we get into this problem of the mortgages that were granted?

And I believe that what we're going to see is probably the largest theft or fraud in history, where there was a systematic effort to give people loans that either exceeded the value of their property or were in such a high loan-to-value ratio that the loan itself was likely to result in foreclosure.

So, sir, what I want to ask you is: I'm looking for documents where our financial institutions had knowledge or knew that this process was happening.

I believe that if there were mortgage-backed securities that were issued, where the issuers knew that the collateral was insufficient to support the value of the loan, that's fraud.

I believe that if the loan-to-value ratios are not disclosed to subsequent purchasers, that it affects the very level of the risk for the mortgage-backed securities, and therefore, I think that also is fraud.

And it certainly affects the value of the underlying mortgage and the suspicion that it would have a higher likelihood for default.

I understand you have a very big organization, but I am assuming that somewhere along the way, someone in your organization--an analyst, someone who is reviewing the processes of the trading of mortgage-backed securities, the issuing of them, the issuing of mortgages--someone who is looking at this, may have brought to the attention of the company, or others that there was a problem with the loan-to-value ratios that were being packaged and then traded.

Because I can tell you that in my community, on the ground, the problem existed.

So my question to you is: Has anyone ever discussed this issue with you that there was a problem with the loan-to-value ratio of the underlying mortgages inherent in the mortgage-backed securities that were subject to credit default swaps?

And also, would you be willing to share with this committee, for the purposes of sharing with the commission that's going to be empaneled, any documents or information that you have, where there is a discussion of how that loan-to-value ratio affects the level of risk for the mortgage-backed securities, with it being out of whack?

In other words, any documents that you have where someone says,``I have a concern that this loan-to-value ratio is such that the loan exceeds the value of the asset, that the collateral is insufficient to support the value of the loan, the mortgage, that lack of collateral value and that excessive loan-to-value ratio affects the level of risk for these mortgage-backed securities, and therefore their ultimate value?''

Mr. Liddy. Yes. I would add one thing to what you just
said. In AIG's--particularly AIG FP's situation, we ensured those values. So it wasn't just one individual home. They all went into a pool, and different institutions would aggregate those pools. So what would come out of it, you'd have 100,000 loans.

So you didn't get to look at the loan-to-value ratio at each one of those. You'd look at the rating. Many of those were rated triple-A by the rating agencies, and when the AIG FP people underwrote them, they took at face value that they were triple-A rated.

So we have some of the same angst over the situation, as you do. We'll help you in whatever you'd like and any way we can. I just caution you that we're kind of down at the bottom of the food chain as well, and by the time we looked at these things, they had been aggregated to a point where we didn't look at loan-to-value ratios on an individual house; we looked at them, at a whole pool of items.

So we may not be a source of information that you're seeking. If we are, we'll help you with it. But we could be a source, at a minimum, equally frustrated. Because we assumed, we took at face value that these were triple-A rated. They were not.

Mr. Turner. And that's why I'm asking for your help. Because if we have this commission empaneled and they're given the responsibility to look at it, this is going to be like pulling threads to get to what was, I believe ultimately a systematic process for this to occur.

And you might have information that helps lead us in the right direction.

Mr. Liddy. And if we do, we'll be delighted to share it with you.

Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time is expired.

The gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman Speier?

Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Liddy, for appearing before the committee and answering our questions.

Let me just at the outset underscore something you said now a couple of times. Today and once before the hearing before the Financial Services Committee. And then one way or another, you said AIG should return to its core operations, to its knitting, as you put it.

That would suggest that we should reinstate the Glass Steagall Act, doesn't it?

Mr. Liddy. I'm not sure if we should go back to it, but we should sure have a very rigorous debate between whether what we've allowed to happen has gone too far.

Ms. Speier. Well, you, by your own admission today, said you should never have been involved in derivatives. It was Glass Steagall that gave you the opportunity to get involved in derivatives.

Had you been just an old-fashioned insurance company with reserves that you had to maintain, none of this would have happened, correct?

Mr. Liddy. Oh, with respect to AIG and our insurance operations versus AIG FP, correct. But I don't necessarily--my response to you was meant to suggest I don't necessarily know that I would generalize from our situation to the overall Glass Steagall situation.

Ms. Speier. All right. Let's kind of talk about where we are. When Secretary Paulson came before us, he said we're going to get all of our money back from AIG; in fact, we'll make money.

We spend a lot of time around here talking about a 79
percent interest that we own AIG; except for the fact that we have no say.

And that's the big problem. The taxpayers are absolutely apoplectic about the fact that there were hundreds of bonuses of a million dollars or more given to AIG employees, who brought this company down, and the taxpayers are picking up the tab.

Now, my question to you is: On the heels of what the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa asked earlier: Can we really ever expect that the taxpayers are going to be repaid? I mean, if in fact you're talking about $70 billion in TARP money, another $50 billion that we paid for Maiden Lane, and another $60 billion in a loan from the Fed. And you're worth $5 billion.

I mean, we've all got to be scratching our heads. How can you possibly repay the taxpayers?

Mr. Liddy. Well, the $5 billion is what's worth after you've sold many of the good assets and paid off many of your liabilities, including the Federal Reserve and all the other debt that we have.

So some of the businesses that I've mentioned in the course of our discussion today, a business like AIA, it's probably got a value of $25 billion. A business like ALICO, it probably has a value of 18. Our property casualty business has a book value of $35 or $38 billion.

So you just keep going down the list, and there's great opportunity for the taxpayer to be repaid. But--sorry to be repetitive--it's very much a function of what happens to the economy and what happens to the capital markets.

Ms. Speier. How much did the Financial Products Unit pay in taxes? Or did it pay anything in taxes since it was located in London?

Mr. Liddy. The taxes would have been, their earnings would have been added in with all the other earnings of the businesses that comprise AIG to get an aggregate number, and we would have paid taxes to the appropriate jurisdiction on that aggregate number.

So if that's important to you, we'll get you the number in terms of what we've paid in taxes over the last couple of years. But AIG FP would have just been a piece of it.

Ms. Speier. But if it was located in London, I mean, it could have been a tax haven for AIG, could it not? And all of the profits just retained in AIG FP and not brought back to the United States, and therefore taxes not paid on it.

Mr. Liddy. Yeah. It would depend upon where those taxes were recognized. And as we sit here right now, I just don't have the answer to that.

Ms. Speier. Would you report back to the committee on precisely how much AIG paid in total in taxes, and then if in fact AIG FP paid any taxes at all?

Mr. Liddy. Mm-hmm.

Ms. Speier. The GAO recently came out with a report in April, recommending that all the contracts be renegotiated regarding executive compensation at a AIG, if and when the $30 billion was sought by AIG.

I presume you've seen that report, and I'd like you to comment on it.

Mr. Liddy. You, we are trying to do that in many cases, particularly with respect to FP. We're going back to the contractual arrangements that were entered into at the end of 2007, beginning of 2008. They call for retention payments in 2010. We are working now to restructure those payments to make
them more performance oriented. We're going to comply with whatever the rules and regulations are that come out when the Treasury promulgates them.

Ms. Speier. And I guess my final question--although my time is now up--I will yield back.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much.

We're not going to have a second round. But if you have a question, I will recognize you to ask your question.

Congressman Kucinich.

Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Liddy.

The AIG had a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission recently, in which was included a letter that you sent to individuals who were to receive bonuses. If you need to, I have a copy of the letter to refresh your memory.

Now in this letter--this letter by the way was sent 4 days after you became the CEO, you became the CEO on the 18th, the letter was sent on the 22nd--it was a little more than a week after AIG received $85 billion from the Fed.

And what you write--and after you called for transparency, you wrote a letter to employees who were disclosed the company's recent SEC report, saying, "As this special award is being made to a very select group of executives, I ask that you treat it as confidential."

The letter goes on to assure this select group that "in the event the AIG entity that is your employer, the company, experiences a change in control that is consummation of a merger, consolidation, statutory share exchange and similar form of corporate transaction involving the sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the company's assets to an entity that is not in an affiliate of the company, AIG guarantees the payment of the 2008 special cash retention award on the dates and under the conditions specified above.''

First of all, you are familiar with that letter, are you not?

Mr. Liddy. I haven't read it in quite a while, so I'm familiar with the issue, yes.

Mr. Kucinich. OK. Based on that letter is it true that even if the United States took over AIG 100 percent that these bonuses would be awarded?

Mr. Liddy. No. In fact, many of them have not. Many of them have been restructured, or they have been--the payment of them has been delayed, and we're looking at revising them and trying to figure out how do we pay them? How do we keep people that we need to run these businesses? But how do we honor both the spirit and the intent of what comes out with the Treasury regulations?

Mr. Kucinich. So you're telling this committee that it is the position of AIG management, of which you're the CEO, that this letter that you sent, that's part of your SEC filing, is no longer operative?

Mr. Liddy. No. It's what causes us such difficulty, Congressman. We have that letter, which can be viewed as a contract; but we have a new set of events, which says it's going to take a lot longer to pay back the American taxpayer. How do we balance those two? How do we balance a commitment that we made, with the understanding that we have right now, that the fact that it's going to take us longer to repay the American taxpayer?

It's difficult. We need the leadership of this business, of our businesses, if we're going to keep them viable, sell them, and pay back the taxpayer. So that's where there's great
tension in the system right now. How do you keep the leadership, pay them competitive wages, honor a commitment like that, but still be responsive to whatever new legislation is put in place?

Mr. Kucinich. So do you intend to honor the commitment that you made in the letter?

Mr. Liddy. I'm going to wait to see what comes forward from the Treasury to see if those kinds of payments are permitted, if they need to be restructured, if they need to be more performance-based. I just don't have enough information to answer the question. And I'm told that those rules and regulations will be forthcoming in a number of weeks.

Mr. Kucinich. Will you be able to let this committee know whether or not you intend to honor the letter that says that you're going to pay bonuses to people, essentially that they'd be able to collect bonuses at taxpayers' expense, even if the government has a bigger stake?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. Many of those dollars, to the extent they go to people that are senior executives, that would have to be reported, we'd have to make an 8-K filing or a 10-Q filing. You'll know it.

Mr. Kucinich. Well, because the reason why I ask if we'd know, Mr. Chairman, is because you had asked the previous recipients of this letter to keep the matter confidential. So are we to expect a more forthcoming approach, more transparency in the dealings with this committee? Or are you going to have the confidential relationships with your employees to pass on bonuses to them, without this committee being aware of it?

Mr. Liddy. No. We intend to be transparent in everything that we do.

Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. All right. Let me just say this before I recognize Congressman Tierney. You know, Mr. Liddy, I hope you recognize what people on the street are saying. You know, like when I go home to Brooklyn, they are saying, ''How do you pay a person, give him a bonus, when they have failed? They put us in this mess, and now you're going to give him a bonus for it.''

I mean, I don't know how we answer people when we hear that. So I think that you need to really keep that in mind, as you move forward, because that's the thing that the people out there are so angry about.

And then of course when they say it's a retention, why would you want to retain them? You know. And that's what we're hearing in the street.

And I don't know whether or not, you know, you're getting this as you talk to people, but that's the thing that we're really, really getting.

And then the other one is they say to us, you know, ''Why would you give them, you know, a retention bonus? First of all, they've failed. And the fact that the economy is so messed, where can they go?''

I mean, these are issues that are being raised. So I just think, you know, so you can sort of get a feel from our frustration up here, as we deal with our constituents in terms of how we answer this.

And believe me, that's an issue that's been raised, you know, day in and day out.

I yield to the Congressman from Massachusetts, Congressman Tierney.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Liddy, when Hank Greenberg was in front of this committee, I asked him whether or not he believed that AIG
should have been allowed to go bankrupt, or whether they should have been bailed out. And his answer was that he thought that the company should have been allowed to go bankrupt, that would not have created a systemic problem.

What's your response to that? What do you believe to be the case?

Mr. Liddy. I wasn't there when that decision was made, and neither was Hank, so that----

Mr. Tierney. No----

Mr. Liddy. That was the decision that the Treasury and Federal Reserve made. You know, as I examine the situation, I think it would not have been good if it had gone bankrupt.

And the reason I think that is first, the institutional shock wave at that time—I mean, those were dark days in the middle of September when people were very concerned about the survivability of the worldwide financial system.

So we had had Fannie and Freddie being taken over. We had had Bear Stearns several months before that. We had WAMU, we had the failure of Lehman Brothers. I think if AIG had gone bankrupt, it really would have sent shockwaves through the system.

So I think the passage of time has led me to conclude it would not have been a good idea to do that.

AIG also, not just institutionally, from a retail standpoint, an individual customer standpoint, we have 81 million policies. Life insurance, pensions, retirement and savings plans. The difficulty of managing something that large in 130 different countries, regulated by 400 regulators, would have been something the world has never seen.

So I think it would have created much more difficulty than the current situation that we find ourselves would have.

Mr. Tierney. And yet we could still end up there?

Mr. Liddy. You know, we have a plan that we don't think puts us there. You just, you never know what's going to happen. As I've said many times, we are so dependent upon what happens with the economic recovery and what happens to the values of our assets, which are driven by the capital markets.

We think we have a plan that prevents that, it's a good plan. It takes time to implement.

Mr. Tierney. I just note there's a distinct possibility to me that would not have been good, which I think the way you phrase it, and whether or not it still should have been allowed to go bankrupt, because, you know, no bankruptcy situation is good.

The question really would have been: Would it have been catastrophic or would it have been systemic?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mr. Tierney. And your belief is that it would have?

Mr. Liddy. I think it would have been catastrophic and systemic. As I said, the folks that had to make that decision, they were making that decision not in a vacuum, but in the context of an awful lot of other moving pieces. And people I think were genuinely afraid of the damage that an AIG bankruptcy could do on top of the heels of the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much.

Yes, Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Going back to Goldman Sachs, Mr. Liddy, as a member of the board of Goldman Sachs through last September, were you
involved in any of the meetings or discussions leading up to
the disposition of Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, during
which time advice was given to Treasury Secretary Paulson, the
former chairman of Goldman Sachs, on those institutions' disposition?

Mr. Liddy. Yes. Anything that would have transpired before
whenever I resigned, which I think is the 23rd, 24th, 25th, if
there were board meetings on those subjects, I would have
participated in those meetings.

Ms. Kaptur. Yes. And how would we obtain minutes of those
meetings, and a full understanding of your role?

Mr. Liddy. I don't keep any records like that. You'd have
to go to the Goldman Sachs general counsel and ask them for
that.

Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, I would very much like to ask
that the committee use its subpoena power to obtain those
records.

Let me ask this. Today there are many people staffing you.
We recognize some of their faces. And I'm wondering if for the
record, those individuals who currently are working for AIG
directly or on contract to AIG, could stand up in the audience
and provide for the record the organizations or firms for which
they work and the terms of their contract? For those
individuals that are currently under contract or working
directly for AIG, could you please stand up?

Thank you. Anyone else? Anyone else?

All right. I'd appreciate it very much if those firms and
the contracts could be made a part of the public record, Mr.
Chairman.

Chairman Towns. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. Kaptur. I thank the gentleman very much, and I have two
additional requests for information. One, Mr. Liddy, can you
provide for the record the names of individuals who in late
1998 or thereabouts worked for and ran the AIG Financial
Products Division, created it actually, and developed and
issued the first credit default swaps, and also any internal
documents related to the initiation and development of AIG's
credit default swap and route of activity, from its inception?

Mr. Liddy. Congresswoman, what was the year, I'm sorry? The
year was?

Ms. Kaptur. When it started. You referenced the year 1998?

Mr. Liddy. Oh, AIG FP started in 1987.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. When did the credit default swap
piece of it get started?

Mr. Liddy. Well, I'll have to get you the exact date. I
understand your request, so whenever they started----

Ms. Kaptur. I want the historical development of that
division. It appears to be very important. When you appeared
before Congress a couple of weeks ago, you said only 20 people
worked for that division. Is that possible?

Mr. Liddy. No. There were 400 people in that division. The
folks that worked in the credit default swap area, there were
probably 20 of them. But there were only three or four who
derived the multi-sector credit default swaps that caused us
the difficulty that we're in.

Ms. Kaptur. Well, I think it's important for us to unwind
back to the beginning of what happened. So we would look for
the information about that inside of AIG. And if goes back to
1987, then let's see when it morphed, and when it became
something other than what it was originally, and who actually
did that.

I understand, did that occur in England, or in this
country, the actual creation of the idea to do that?

Mr. Liddy. I think Mr. Greenberg started it in 1987 and then it got ramped up to a greater extent in the late 1990's and early 2000's, and it would have been simultaneously in Connecticut and London.

Ms. Kaptur. I think it's very important for us to understand what happened. And I think seeing who worked for that instrumentality inside of AIG from inception through the morphing that happened after Glass Steagall's upturning by these Congress would be most interesting.

Also to provide for the record all materials your firm possesses on the $2.2 billion diverted to Dresdner Kleinwort in Germany, and particularly the financial assessments made to justify their receipt of funds, how does Dresdner Kleinwort get involved in all this, particularly since they have been in deep trouble in Germany, and are being acquired by Commerce Bank and by Allianz Insurance Group in Germany?

I'm very interested in how you got involved in Dresdner Kleinwort. Do you wish to comment for the record on that at this point?

Mr. Liddy. No. That was all before my time. I don't have any sense of it at all.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. It's my understanding that Dresdner Kleinwort, through some process I would like to unravel, became the possessor of a great deal of subprime housing paper from this country. I would like to know how it was transferred to them? Through which firms and what years? And what caused them to collapse?

Mr. Liddy. Yeah. I just don't know that we have any information on that whatsoever. To the extent we had a relationship with them, we'll provide you the material.

Ms. Kaptur. Well, you've given them $2.2 billion.

Mr. Liddy. Right----

Ms. Kaptur. You must have some kind of relationship with them.

Mr. Liddy. But I would assume that will be satis--in some sort of a credit default swap contract, or what have you. But all the other information, you know, how much did they participate in subprime lending, we wouldn't have that information.

Chairman Towns. The gentlewoman's time is expired.

Ms. Kaptur. Were you ordered to give them the $2.2 billion by the Federal Reserve?

Mr. Liddy. The Federal Reserve, when we set up Maiden Lane 3, took responsibility for the settlement of all of those credit default swap contracts.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.

Chairman Towns. Yes. Thank you very much.

Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Liddy.

Boy, I've got a couple of ones that I know are sort of like you've heard before. But what I wanted to say first was, please consider taking this $400-plus million in bonuses, breaking it down, not necessarily just for one member, but for the public, into those people who were generating EBIT in sections of the company that are providing positive cash-flow and positive EBIT.

And let people understand that these are performers who are delivering real value, who should be rewarded because you need that profit as part of your going concern.

And then whatever's left, we can argue about. But I'm hoping for the sake of all of us on the--and for the public, we make it very clear that even in a company that's having bad
times, even when a car dealership is only selling 12 cars, you still pay a commission to the guy that sold 11 of them.

OK. You pay a bonus to the guy that sold 11 out of the 12 cars.

Mr. Liddy. Mm-hmm.

Mr. Issa. So to the extent that you have those individuals, whatever dollars, I think those performers--maybe not by name, but by category, should be identified so the American people don't see a big number and assume that this was all just a giveaway.

I spent too long in business to not understand your problem of keeping good people that can keep the ship afloat, particularly the ones that are producing in divisions that are producing.

I want to get to one closing set of questions, though. Your predecessor, I guess two ago, Mr. Greenberg, when he came to us, he not only told us that you should have filed bankruptcy, but he basically led me to believe that you had an obligation to file bankruptcy. The Treasury had an obligation. Everyone had an obligation.

When you had a going concern opinion, you stop working for the stockholders and you start working for the secured creditors. That's just a reality of your board, that as viable going concern, you maximize shareholder value. As soon as you are not a going concern, you have to look to your in-order preferred creditors, secured creditors, and you have an obligation to them.

Mr. Greenberg led us to believe--and I've checked with bankruptcy experts, and it appears he's right--that tens of billions of dollars were paid out that had your firm filed bankruptcy, would not have been paid, because the corpus that was bankrupt was firewall from other parts of the company; therefore, yes, FP would have gone bankrupt. It would have delivered whatever assets it had. Other claims against the company to the extent they existed, would have been cleared in bankruptcy.

But huge parts, some of the very companies you're talking about that have large value, would have been fire-walled from that.

How do you respond to that?

Mr. Liddy. I think the regulators in those 130 countries that we do business would have grabbed those insurance assets and would have held onto them and wouldn't have released them to anybody.

And there would have been a very substantial debate internationally about who owned and who controlled those assets.

Mr. Issa. So what you're saying is you couldn't count on the rule of law, so that's why the Treasury ordered you to pay moneys to people like Goldman Sachs, who you paid with dollars that were put into the corpus and paid out of the corpus in excess of any kind of value that it had, but are burdened to the parent company around what otherwise what would have been a firewall?

Mr. Liddy. Well, once a decision was made not to declare bankruptcy, that sets in motion a whole series of events. You have to honor the contracts. The Federal Reserve decided that we should pay 100 cents on the dollar. That 100 cents on the dollar should be paid in the settlement of those various----

Mr. Issa. Yeah, but these were credit default swaps that I could have bought for a fraction of that on an open market to the extent that somebody was floating them at the time, right?
So we paid more than their current value at the time we paid them off.

Mr. Liddy. I believe that's what the Federal Reserve decided was in the best interests of the financial system.

Mr. Issa. OK. So the Federal Reserve paid a premium. I just want to make sure we have it, because we have three trustees we're entrusting with our money, going forward.

The Federal Reserve paid a known premium, and they paid it not to FP--so that we're all talking about FP--they paid it to the parent company and caused you to take onto your balance sheet and your stockholders to be diluted, based on a decision the Treasury made for you not to file bankruptcy, and in fact for you to go down there way.

And as you said, they made the decision. You got your instructions from the Fed and Treasury. That's what you've said here, right?

Mr. Liddy. Well, the Federal Reserve, it's not just getting instructions. The Federal Reserve handled those discussions and negotiations to settle those counterpart----

Mr. Issa. Right. So the question I'm going to be asking the trustees, going forward--because they're in a similar situation, but a little different than you--your board and you had an independent responsibility to your stockholders, now 20 percent, used to be 100 percent, and to other creditors, that when the decision was made outside of your company not to go into bankruptcy, and the decision was made to take all of the assets otherwise not encumbered in a normal firewalled situation, and put them in, your company today, whatever it's worth, owes this money to the Treasury, to the American people, but it owes it based on decisions that were made, that were not prudent on their face for your company.

May have been prudent for the world, may have been prudent for the financial markets, but they weren't prudent for your company in the ordinary course of you get to make the decision.

Mr. Liddy. Well, Congressman, it could turn out that they were very prudent. It's all a matter of whether, at the end of this whole situation, we're able to pay back the American public all the money that's been either loaned to or invested in AIG.

Mr. Issa. But I just asked you what your enterprise value is worth in the last round.

Mr. Liddy. Right.

Mr. Issa. And I asked you so you'd have an opportunity to take the $35 billion here, the $40 billion here, and say `These enterprises, after we get into a good situation, are worth X amount--'

Mr. Liddy. Mm-hmm----

Mr. Issa. Offsetting, you know, 100 percent of the debt potentially, and returning--because a year ago, a year and a half ago, you could have been worth $100 billion for your stock price--I agree that our investment of $40 to $70 billion at the height of your stock in the last 2 years would have been whole.

My question to you, though, was--and I'd like you answer for the record--is: Break down what you believe the enterprise value is today. Mr. Kashkari, when he was before this committee, told us he didn't know what he paid for things and he didn't know what they were worth, and he couldn't answer it, but he'd give us a report in 30 days. He resigned in roughly 29 days, apparently, so he's not back.

Mr. Liddy. Mm-hmm.

Mr. Issa. Please do not think that you're not going to be back before us, if you can't answer what you believe today the
enterprise value is, so that given a static economy—not pie in the sky and not future earnings, but the real value of your enterprise, what it's worth. What have the American people bought for $190 billion?

Mr. Liddy. Mm-hmm. The assets minus the liabilities, including all the money that we owe, either to the Federal Reserve or to TARP, that number is what's left over, and that's what represented in that 2.7 billion shares at $1.85 or so a share. But that's after you settle all of the obligations.

Mr. Issa. So your answer today is: We're completely solvent, other than our $40 billion has become 70 percent of $4 billion? That's where we are. That's that answer you're giving me here today when you answer that way, is that assets and liabilities balance in the enterprise value. What's left is the hypothetical market, that the market is saying, which is $4 billion. And that's $40 billion of our money and the rest is the shareholders'.

So that says we have a loss, in your statement, of that delta, call it $38 billion.

If that's what you believe, fine----

Mr. Liddy. No, no----

Mr. Issa. But that's what the market is marking your stock for. What I asked you for was your real belief of your enterprises, individual enterprises value.

You know, you can normalize them for multiples of EBIT—what their PEs would be in an orderly market, what their PEs would be on a separate company basis. You know all the ways to value it.

I just think this committee should have an understanding of today what you believe the enterprise, which you're running and the trustees are overseeing, is worth, in a way that we can have some understanding of why you think you'll pay us back over and above what you gave us here today.

And I appreciate the fact that the stock is whatever it is on a given day. What I want to know—and I think the chairman and I both want to know—is just how you value these assets normalized.

We understand you may not realize them for 2 years; but we have been asking for those kinds of numbers since the previous president and previous everybody in this cycle.

Mr. Liddy. Mm-hmm. And I'll just take one more crack at it. Those assets, if you take the assets that I just talked about earlier and added them all up, they'll add up to, whatever $80 or $90 million. I can't do the math that fast. And that should be enough to satisfy the $83 billion that we actually owe to either the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury now.

To the extent we have to use more of the $30 billion, we hope that we'll be able to get, recover that value by having even higher asset values, because we plug an asset hole, or what have you.

So the asset values should be sufficient to satisfy what all of the obligations of the company are, and keep the taxpayer whole. If the marketplace stays strong. That leaves only the stub residual value, which right now is that $5 or $6 billion. And hopefully this all works out well, and that's worth more and more.

Chairman Towns. I thank you very much, Mr. Liddy. Thank you. Thank you very much for your testimony, and you can see, based on the questions here, that we are frustrated. And people—gentlewoman? Yes. Just a moment. I was getting ready to let you go, but we have Congresswoman Maloney.

Mrs. Maloney. Well, first of all, I want to thank you for
your public service and for coming in to help out.

Why did AIG meet the criteria of systemic risk while Lehman Brothers did not?

Mr. Liddy. Congresswoman, you'd have to ask the Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve, the New York Federal Reserve individual that made that decision at the time.

Mrs. Maloney. Mm-hmm. They made determinations that municipalities and foreign governments were of systemic importance to the U.S. banking system. Do you share that belief?

Mr. Liddy. I think the totality of AIG represented systemic risk, not just to counterparties, but the guaranteed investment contracts, and all of the policyholders that we have, I think had that failed, I think it would have created a real problem.

Mrs. Maloney. What proportion of the AIG counterparties would have faced bankruptcy, without Federal bailout of AIG?

Mr. Liddy. I do not know.

Mrs. Maloney. And have you seen or could you provide the committee with any analysis of the impact of the ownership of the residential mortgage-backed securities by AIG's life insurance companies, including whether problems in AIG's life insurance business, as a result of their purchase of these played a role in the decision to provide the bailout?

Basically, I have heard that the life insurance portion of AIG was regulated and was solvent. Is that true or not, that the life insurance portion did not receive, nor did it need bailout, that it was properly managed?

Mr. Liddy. It was regulated and it was solvent. But as values of the residential mortgage-backed securities went down--because that was part of the investment that they had, it created a hole, and that hole has been, we've plugged some of that hole with money from the Federal Reserve.

Mrs. Maloney. So Federal Reserve money has gone into that?

Mr. Liddy. Yes.

Mrs. Maloney. And AIG argued that the bailout was necessary because of potential problems in the life insurance business. And you believe that is true.

Mr. Liddy. I do.

Mrs. Maloney. How much went into the life insurance division, roughly?

Mr. Liddy. It was somewhere between $17 and $20 billion----

Mrs. Maloney. Really----

Mr. Liddy. To make up for the loss in asset values.

Mrs. Maloney. Really?

And going forward--I read in the paper that AIG does not need another infusion of public money. Do you foresee that in the future you will not need any public money, additional public money?

Mr. Liddy. Congresswoman, I certainly hope so, as I've said many times. We think what we have, we have a good plan that will enable us to repay the American taxpayer. But it's very dependent upon what happens with the economy and what happens with global financial markets. If they were to go south, the way they did in the fourth quarter, that could change. If they remain stable or improved, the way they appear to be doing, that would be good news for our efforts.

Mrs. Maloney. Well, let's hope they remain moving in the right direction.

Again, I want to thank you for coming in as public service to help restructure one of America's great businesses.

And finally, some employees of AIG are questioning the breakup of the company. They're saying that this is really not...
good for the future of a competitive business in America. And could you comment on the breakup and the selling off of assets at AIG?

Mr. Liddy. I think in many of those companies that are going to receive separate identities and will be spun off company, those people are excited about that prospect. So in an AIA or an ALICO, there's great excitement about those businesses.

With respect to our property casualty business, where we'll sell at least a minority interest in it and will separate from the AIG name, there's great excitement there.

Mrs. Maloney. Mm-hmm.

Mr. Liddy. If you work maybe in a technology area or an operations area, in the corporate core, you might have a different thought about it, because your job could be eliminated or you could get picked up by one of those companies as they get spun off.

Mrs. Maloney. And finally, the insurance division was regulated, but also the risky products division was regulated under the Office of Thrift Supervision, the regulator that AIG selected because they had a small portion of their company that was an S&L.

Could you comment on the quality of regulation coming out of the Office of Thrift Supervision, on the so-called risky products AIG financial products?

Mr. Liddy. Congresswoman, I can't. Although the last time I was before Congress, there was an individual from the OTS, who if I remember his testimony, said, you know, they just didn't have the wherewithal to be able to regulate something as massive and complicated as AIG Financial Products.

Mrs. Maloney. Again, thank you for your public service and we appreciate it. Thank you.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. And I also thank you, Mr. Liddy, for your time. And of course we appreciate you coming. And thank you so much for the information that you've given us.

But as you can see on this side, there's a tremendous amount of frustration, and that we're trying to answer questions that are being raised, and at the same time, we also are trying to protect the American people's tax dollars, which is also very important.

So we thank you very, very much for coming today.

Mr. Liddy. Thank you.

Chairman Towns. Now I'd like to welcome the second panel. But let me say it's a longstanding tradition here that we swear our witnesses in first. So, if you would please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman Towns. Thank you. You may be seated. Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative.

Let me suggest an order. Why don't we go in this order: Mr. Feldberg will go first, and then of course Ms. Considine, and then Mr. Foshee would be next. And then Professor Verret.

So why don't we just proceed right down the line.

Mr. Issa. If you could pull the mic up and turn it on, please? Thank you.

Chairman Towns. Let me just----

Mr. Feldberg. How about----

Chairman Towns. Just yield for a second. I guess I need to probably talk about your background a little bit for the members of the committee.
Ms. Jill Considine, who currently serves as chairwoman of the Board of Fulcrum Group, a fund administrator for the hedge fund industry. In 2004 Ms. Considine ended her 6-year term as a member of the Board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where she served as chairwoman of the Audit and Operational Risk Committee.

We also have Mr. Chester Feldberg. Mr. Feldberg served for 9 years as Senior Official at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He served as chairman of Barclays America from 2000 to 2008.

Mr. Douglas Foshee is currently CEO of El Paso Corp., a natural gas producer. Mr. Foshee served as executive vice president chief operating officer for Halliburton Corp. prior to joining El Paso in 2003. Mr. Foshee also serves as chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Houston Branch.

Our final witness is Professor J.W. Verret, a senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Professor Verret will share his concerns about the AIG trust agreement.

So with that, we can move forward. Mr. Feldberg.

STATEMENTS OF CHESTER B. FELDBERG, TRUSTEE, AIG CREDIT FACILITY TRUST; JILL M. CONSIDINE, TRUSTEE, AIG CREDIT FACILITY TRUST; DOUGLAS L. FOSHEE, TRUSTEE, AIG CREDIT FACILITY TRUST; AND PROFESSOR J.W. VERRET, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

STATEMENT OF CHESTER B. FELDBERG

Mr. Feldberg. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Issa and members of the committee. My name is Chet Feldberg, and I'm a trustee of the AIG Credit Facility Trust. I'm appearing today with Jill Considine and Doug Foshee, my fellow trustees, at the request of the committee, in connection with its hearing on the collapse and Federal rescue of AIG.

We've submitted a joint written statement, which speaks for all of us. As trustees, we operate collectively. While each of us will make brief oral statements addressing different aspects of our work, I would stress the collaborative nature of our efforts and of our decisionmaking process.

I was going to comment next on my background and experience, but the chairman has covered that, so I will move forward. The chairman's letter to each of us posed the question, `Is the U.S. taxpayer investment in AIG being properly protected?'

This is the critical question. It motivates all of our deliberations, and all of our actions.

Let me now turn to the background of the trust arrangement. The trust was established by the New York Fed for the purpose of acquiring, holding, and ultimately disposing of approximately 77.9 percent of the voting stock of AIG. Under the terms of the trust agreement, we the trustees are charged with exercising the voting rights of the AIG shares held in the trust in the best interests of the U.S. Treasury, and with a view toward maximizing the value of that stock.

As we understand it, the rationale for establishing a trust arrangement administered by independent trustees was concern by the Fed and the Treasury regarding potential conflicts of interest if the controlling interest was held by either governmental entity.

Each of us was contacted last fall by representatives of the New York Fed and asked to serve as a trustee of the proposed trust. After much reflection, each of us ultimately
decided to accept this challenge and responsibility.

On January 16, 2009, we were appointed as trustees by the New York Fed and entered into the trust agreement, which we are attaching as part of our written testimony.

We immediately began organizational work in educating ourselves about the task that lay ahead. But it was not until March 4th that AIG issued stock to the trust, and we commenced our formal responsibilities as trustees.

Since then we've been impressed with the extraordinary challenges we face in exercising our responsibilities. In fact, many of the factors relevant to whether the value of the taxpayer's stock can be--maximized are not within our control.

Such factors include what the market and the economy will look like when company assets are sold or restructured, what decisions the Federal Reserve or the Treasury will make concerning ongoing financial assistance to the company, what constraints will be imposed by new legislation or regulation on the company's ability or obtain the people needed to keep the company running and effectively implement the restructuring plan; and finally whether continuing adverse publicity will affect the company's ability to maintain the value of its businesses.

Each of these factors individually or in combination will have great influence on the ultimate value of the enterprise. And no one can confidently predict the final outcome at this time.

The trustees are committed to seeing through the next chapter in the company's history in the best interests of the Treasury and the taxpayers of this nation.

We're under no illusions that our task will be easy. Indeed, it may be the most challenging task any of us has undertaken in our professional careers.

In carrying out our role, we will be guided by our independent assessment and judgment as to what course of action will best protect the interests of the beneficial owners of the trust, the U.S. Treasury, and the U.S. taxpayer.

We know that to be successful, we will need the ongoing support of the Congressman, the administration, and the Federal Reserve. In the end, we are all working toward the same goal.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. My colleague, Jill Considine, will not explain our duties and limitations under the trust agreement in more detail.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldberg, Mr. Foshee and Ms. Considine follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Towns. OK.

Ms. Considine, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JILL CONSIDINE

Ms Considine. Mr. Chairman, ranking member, my name is Jill Considine, and I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify and share information pertaining to the responsibilities as a trustee of the AIG Credit Facility Trust.

I'd like to begin by describing a little bit my experience in both government and in the financial services industry. I served as a banker, a banking regulator and as the chief
executive officer of systemically important financial institutions. Each of these experiences has proven invaluable as I participate with the other trustees to execute our responsibilities and maximize the government's investment in AIG, and most importantly, protect the interests of the American taxpayer.

I previously served as CEO of the First Women's Bank, was the New York State Banking Superintendent, and served as president of the New York Clearinghouse Association. In addition, I was the chairman of the CEO of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., and as was mentioned, was a member of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

I agreed to serve as a trustee, understanding the importance and urgency of the mission we were being asked to undertake, and with a sense of duty to the taxpayers, whose interest to shareholders in AIG we were asked to represent. Now with respect to the particular role we had been assigned, we know that we're in uncharted waters. There is no history, no precedent to which we can look for guidance. Our anchor is the trust agreement itself, which describes our roles, our responsibilities and also our limitations.

The primary responsibility on the trust agreement is to vote the stock that we hold at all meetings of the stockholders, and most importantly in connection with the election of directors of AIG; to develop and execute a plan to sell or otherwise dispose of the trust stock in a value-maximizing manner, and of course to work with senior management and the board of directors of AIG to ensure that corporate governance procedures are satisfactory to us.

However, equally important, the trust agreement says what we should not do, and we cannot directly or indirectly become directors of AIG or be responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of AIG or any of its subsidiaries. Explicitly, by the terms of the trust, we must leave the day-to-day direction and management of AIG to the senior officers of the company and its board of directors.

Now there's been a lot of conversation today and in the past about the congressional and public concern over bonuses paid, and we share these concerns about the payments of large bonuses at the time when AIG was failing and being rescued by the taxpayers. However, we are committed to ensuring that issues of compensation at AIG going forward are addressed in a thoughtful, prudent and fair manner. It is essential that the board of directors focus on compensation because a fair and effective compensation system is truly necessary to ensure the successful restructuring of AIG and the recovery of the taxpayers' investment. In our view, compensation should be designed to be performance-based, to reward long-term, sustainable value creation, and align employees' compensation with those of the shareholder over the long term. It should not be structured to encourage and reward undue risk taking or short-term results.

To these ends, we've asked Mr. Liddy, together with senior management at AIG, the board and the appropriate committees, to undertake a broad review of the compensation programs currently in place throughout AIG and to develop a comprehensive compensation program that applies to AIG as a whole. I'm honored to serve with my colleagues, Mr. Feldberg and Mr. Foshee in this important role. Mr. Foshee will now describe other aspects of our work, particularly with respect to the board of directors.

Mr. Clay [presiding]. Mr. Foshee, you're recognized for 5
Mr. Foshee. Ranking Member Issa and members of the committee, I'm Doug Foshee. I'll begin my testimony by providing you with some brief information on my background and experience. I've spent 27 years in business. I was a banker in Texas for almost a decade, have been employed by two global companies and have served in leadership roles in so-called turnaround situations. I serve on the boards of two Fortune 500 companies, and as mentioned, serve as chair of the Houston branch of the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank.

Perhaps my most relevant experience as it relates to AIG, though, is my current full-time job as chairman and CEO of El Paso Corp. I came to El Paso in the wake of a tumultuous time for the company. Stock prices falling precipitously, employees indicted and convicted, credit downgrades leading to cash collateral calls, and a trading company that included over 40,000 trades, inadequate risk management systems, more than one restated financial statement, rumored bankruptcy, a highly publicized proxy fight that forced a replacement of management, and substantial change in the board, innumerable government investigations, and tragically, the loss of morale of its long-time committed employees, most of whom had nothing to do with the decisions that led to the near demise of this great 80-year-old company.

I joined El Paso in 2003 to try, along with a very committed and talented group of employees to turn all this around. Since then, the team has divested over $17.5 billion in assets, reduced debt by half, returned our pipelines investment grade rating, and the company has been recognized by Fortune magazine as one of its most admired companies in 2008. The statistic we're most proud of, though, is that in our 2008 biennial employee survey, 91 percent of our employees said they're proud to work for our company as relates to 40 percent in 2004.

I'm serving as a trustee simply because I believe that to whom much is given, much is expected. I feel a deep sense of obligation to the U.S. taxpayers to act as a good steward of the investment that has been made in AIG, and I'm honored to serve in this capacity with my two co-trustees.

One of our most important responsibilities as trustees is to ensure that AIG has an effective, independent and capable board, and that this board is focused on recruiting and maintaining a strong and effective management team dedicated to prosecuting the company's long-term plan. This allocation of responsibility between us on the one hand and the board and management on the other, in addition to being set forth explicitly in the trust agreement, replicates what is the accepted standard for good corporate governance for public companies in America.

For these reasons, we've spent considerable effort focused on AIG's board of directors, how it functions, what skills the board members have, and how those skills fit with the needs of a company in AIG's extraordinary circumstances. We've come to the conclusion that if AIG is to succeed it needs a fresh start, a reset if you will, a reset in the eyes of Congress, the American public and other important constituencies.

We've recommended five new highly competent, highly capable, independent candidates to the board. We expect that the board will approve those candidates soon, that their names
will appear in the proxy statement that the company will be issuing within a week, and that they will be elected at the upcoming shareholders meeting. These five additions plus Mr. Dammerman, Ms. Nora Johnson and Mr. Liddy, and another new director proposed by the company, will give the company effectively nine new board members. We believe that this action is wholly consistent with our overriding objective as trustees to maximize the long-term value of the equity held by the AIG trust, and we look forward to supporting the newly constituted board as it carries out its tasks.

In closing, let me say that as trustees, we recognize there are many, many constituencies that have a perspective on, in many cases a stake in, the outcome of AIG. Most of them wish it to succeed. Some do not. In the end, though, our focus is on maximizing the long-term value of the equity that the AIG trust holds. It is through this lens that we see two constituencies to be of significant underappreciated importance—the customers of AIG and the employees of AIG. If we all as taxpayers wish to recover our investment in AIG, then everything begins with them. They watch TV and they read the newspapers. Every day, AIG's employees have a choice about where to work, and every day AIG's customers have a choice about where they buy their insurance and other financial products. If they don't choose AIG, then it is a mathematical certainty that the value of this asset, that we now all own collectively a piece of, will go down. We need to keep these constituencies in mind when the rest of us, the trustees, and respectfully, the Treasury Department, the New York Fed, and the Congress decide how best to proceed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clay. Thank you.

And Mr. Verret, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR J.W. VERRET

Mr. Verret. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Issa and other distinguished members of the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is J.W. Verret. I am an assistant professor of law at George Mason Law School and also a senior scholar at the Mercatus Center Financial Markets Working Group. I also serve as the lead investigator for the Corporate Federalism Initiative, a network of scholars dedicated to studying the intersection of State and Federal authority in corporate governance.

My focus today will be the trust document set up by the New York Federal Reserve Bank to manage the U.S. taxpayers' investment in AIG. Make no mistake, this document represents a grave risk to the American taxpayers' $180 billion investment in AIG. I'm also concerned by the AIG trust because of the precedent it sets. Secretary Geithner has announced his intention to create another trust to manage the Treasury's investment in Citigroup as well as other TARP participants. If the AIG trust, crafted during the Secretary's tenure as president of the New York Fed, is used as a model for these new entities, the risk to taxpayers will be multiplied many times over.

My concerns are structural and in no way directed at the trustees themselves. By all accounts, they are professionals of the highest caliber, and their nation owes them a debt of gratitude for their generous service in this time of economic crisis. Today my focus will be the three most troubling provisions of the AIG trust. One requires the trustees to
manage the trust in the best interest of the Treasury rather than the U.S. taxpayer specifically. Another offers generous protection against liability for the trustees, and a third permits the trustees to invest personally in investment opportunities that may otherwise belong to AIG.

The first dangerous provision is Section 3.03(a). That section defines the fiduciary duty of the trustees as being to manage the investment in AIG, `in or not opposed to the best interests of the Treasury.' In other financial entities tasked with managing wealth on behalf of others, the fiduciaries must manage that wealth to maximize value for their beneficiaries. This is true for mutual fund trustees, ERISA retirement plan trustees, and boards of directors of publicly traded companies. This provision threatens the entire purpose of the trust itself, which is to create an independent buffer between the short-term political interests of an administration and the long-term health of the nation's financial system. Maintaining this buffer between short-term political interests and long-term financial soundness is critical.

The economic evidence from around the globe is overwhelmingly clear. Political ownership in private banks and financial companies results in lower GDP growth, increased need for subsequent government bailout, and politicized lending practices. For instance, in Italy, banks with government ownership lend at lower rates in the south since that area is politically important to the ruling coalition in parliament. I am concerned about the temptation that we may someday see TARP banks and other financial companies encouraged to subsidize lending, for instance, in battleground States. This is why requiring the trustees to manage the trust in the best interest of the Treasury and not the U.S. taxpayer is so very dangerous.

A second provision in the trust that I find troubling is the corporate opportunity provision located in Section 3.05(b). Typically, fiduciaries are prohibited from stealing investment opportunities that they learn about through their performance as a fiduciary or trustee and using those opportunities for themselves. The AIG trust permits the AIG trustees to potentially secretly invest personally in investment opportunities they learn about through their performance as trustees without the necessity to even inform or seek permission from AIG or the Treasury or the Federal Reserve. This strikes me as unnecessary and particularly dangerous given the potential for the AIG trust to serve as a model for other similar documents.

A third threat to the American taxpayer located in this trust document are the indemnity and immunity provisions of Sections 3.03(a) and 3.03(d). These stand out as the most generous liability protections I have ever seen offered to managers of wealth and represent significant deviations from standard and best practice in corporate governance.

Under no circumstances are public companies permitted to indemnify directors for bad faith actions or actions not in the best interests of their beneficiaries. The AIG trust has no such limitation on trustee indemnification. I am aware of no ERISA or mutual fund trustee or director of a public company granted such a generous immunity from liability to their beneficiaries as the AIG trustees are in fact afforded. And I can see no good reason why those best practices should not apply here.

In short, a trust in which the trustees cannot be held accountable by their beneficiaries isn't much of a trust at all. It is vital that when an organization manages wealth on
behalf of others, the ship's compass always point in the right direction, no matter who stands at the helm. For this reason, I am recommending that the flaws in this document be revised and at the very least not repeated in future trusts set up by the Treasury. I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Verret follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Issa. You finished exactly at 5 minutes on the button. Thank you so much, Professor. Let me start this round of questions. Can I ask you, when is your next shareholders' meeting? Mr. Foshee.

Mr. Foshee. The shareholders meeting hasn't been set. It's expected that the company will file its preliminary proxy within about the next week, and following that I believe within about 10 days, a final proxy, and then following that, a shareholders' meeting which I think we would expect would be toward the end of June.

Mr. Clay. Are some of the items that will be discussed at this meeting include your executive compensation proposal and revamping the composition of the board?

Mr. Foshee. Certainly the five independent directors that we've recommended to the board and the one new director that the company has recommended to the board will be the subject of a subsequent vote by the board of AIG, and we expect their names to be included in the preliminary proxy filed within about a week.

Mr. Clay. How about the executive compensation proposal?

Ms. Considine. If I may address that. The executive compensation, the letter that we sent requested the board and management and the relevant board committees to come up with a well defined compensation program. That does not go before the shareholders. But in it we would want pay for performance, we would want to have an overarching compensation philosophy, reward of long-term, focus on eliminating short-term risk that is rewarded, and also benchmarking the compensation packages that are going to be recommended to other companies that are in similar circumstances, size and complexity and ask for periodic updates to the trustees so that we can track to make certain that we have a comprehensive, well architected compensation program from all of AIG.

Mr. Clay. Out of curiosity, what is the compensation of current or former board members? And is that in line with other corporations?

Ms. Considine. Well, let me remark on that. Initially the board members were paid in board fees, retainer and also in shares, and I would say prior to the financial crisis were making between $200,000 and $300,000 a year per director. This year the directors voted to decrease their compensation to $75,000.

Mr. Clay. I see. Thank you for that.

Mr. Foshee. I just would add, which is substantially less, probably less by more than half, than the average Fortune 50 company, public company.

Mr. Clay. Let me ask the three of you, how do you plan on voting on these matters? And are other issues up for a vote? I mean on the item of revamping the compensation or revamping the composition of the board, how do you--Mr. Feldberg.

Mr. Feldberg. Essentially, that proposal is our proposal.
mean, we've been working very hard for the last month or two to put together this package of five new exceptional directors for the company, so we will be enthusiastically supporting that at the shareholders meeting.

Mr. Clay. In your opinion, is AIG too big to fail?

Mr. Feldberg. If you go back to when the decision was made by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury that it was too big to fail, I don't have all the information today that they had when they were making that decision. But if you ask me my best judgment as to what the situation was then, I would have said yes, it was too big to fail.

Mr. Clay. OK.

Mr. Feldberg. Now whether it should have gotten to that point, you know, is a totally different issue. But where things sat at the point that they felt they had to act, if I had still been in that seat, I think I would have been arguing the same case.

Mr. Clay. As far as the trustee model that you all operate under, and this is the first time that we can find that this model has been put in place by the U.S. Government, what is your opinion of the trustee model? Is it a well-oiled machine or one that needs to be thoroughly revamped and revisited, and if so, how?

Mr. Feldberg. I think these are early days and I would emphasize that. I would also say that we didn't have anything to do with the decision by the Fed and the Treasury to develop the trustee model. So, you know, it wasn't invented here. I understand the problem that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve had that gave rise to their looking for a mechanism that would permit the stock to be voted in the best interests of the government but without the potential for conflict of interest. And I think this is a reasonable model to do it.

We've been working together as a team since the end of January, and intensely since we got the stock. I think the three-trustee model and the way the trust authorizes the three trustees to proceed has so far been an exceptional model. It expects us to act through a consensus, and to the maximum extent possible to act in unanimity. It does provide a mechanism so that if we cannot agree, two of the three trustees could go forward. To this point, I think I can say without hesitation that we have been able to talk things out and operate on every decision we've made, and there haven't been all that many, but every decision has been----

Mr. Clay. I hate to cut you off. Any other panelists?

Ms. Considine. Yeah. Let me just take up on that because, you know, we were involved in crafting the mission as it was reflected by the trust agreement. You know, we didn't set up the structure initially, but we really believe that it can work. We've been working with it. We've been working under it, and we sometimes ask ourselves what else, what's the alternative? And perhaps if you looked at it, the only alternative would have been direct government control, and that would have been nationalization, and that was not the intent of this.

So we serve as the trustees. We're maximizing the value for the taxpayer, and we believe that it has functioned well, and we're pleased with it so far.

Mr. Clay. Thank you.

Mr. Foshee. I just--I feel some obligation to----

Mr. Clay. You aren't compelled to answer, Mr. Foshee. If you want to, you can.

Mr. Foshee. I just feel like we probably need to rebut some
of the things that were said by my colleague to the left, because we disagree with him. The beneficiary of the trust is in fact not the U.S. Treasury Department. It is in fact the U.S. Treasury. Now I'm not a lawyer, but as a lay person, I can tell you what I believe, and I believe that is the U.S. taxpayer.

Second, with regard to some ability to secretly take a business opportunity, there is in fact a provision in the trust that says that we cannot take a business opportunity away from AIG, but the fact is we all have other jobs, and if I have an opportunity for El Paso Corp., what the trust says is I don't have to share that business opportunity from El Paso with AIG, which I would think most people would think would be pretty reasonable.

And last, we would just respectfully disagree that the indemnification agreement provided in the trust is inappropriate, and in fact it complies with Delaware law and many other States and we're, as trustees, more than happy to put our reputational risk in front of this committee and act on behalf of the U.S. taxpayers. We feel responsible to each other in addition to the taxpayers, and to all of you. And we thought and still believe that the indemnification provided was appropriate.

Mr. Clay. Thank you for that.

Mr. Verret. Mr. Chairman, if I may----

Mr. Clay. Mr. Verret, I'm going to let you have some brief comments, so you may proceed.

Mr. Verret. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, with respect to the definition of what treasury means in this document, unfortunately it's particularly unclear. Treasury Department is a defined term which in corporate legal drafting is something we do to make sure that every time we use a term in a document, the definition is consistent. So we put it in bold, we put it in parentheses, we highlight it as much as possible. So Treasury Department is defined as the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Treasury, though, as mentioned in the applicable standard of care section is not a defined term. It's not in bold, and it's very vague about its definition.

Now I think it is perfectly consistent to understand that it might mean the Treasury Department. That might also mean treasury, as in the general fund, in which case it still doesn't necessarily mean the same thing as maximizing shareholder value. Anything that might be good for the general fund, for treasury's expenses, maybe they want to do something discretionary but they can get AIG to fund it instead as a subsidy on AIG's books, could be in the best interests of the treasury, in the general fund, but not in the best interest of maximizing the taxpayers' investment.

Second, with respect to the corporate opportunity provision, I would offer only quickly that it would permit them to take opportunities that would otherwise belong to AIG. It's crafted specifically that way. And third, just with respect to indemnification, as a former clerk for the Delaware Court of Chancery, I can offer my professional opinion with respect to Delaware law that this indemnification in here is not legal under Delaware law. It's not permitted by the Delaware general corporation.

Mr. Clay. All right. Thank you for that. And we are going to go to Mr. Kucinich. We're going to be a little lopsided for a minute.

Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Feldberg, how often do trustees meet? And could you speak into
the mic, please?

Mr. Feldberg. Yes. We have decided as a matter of discipline that we will meet at least once a week, and at least one of those meetings a month will be in person. So the absolute minimum has been a meeting a week.

Mr. Kucinich. So you meet telephonically then at least----

Mr. Feldberg. At least a telephonic meeting a week and one in-person meeting a month. However, that's the minimum. Without having numbers, hard numbers I can give you, I would say that we probably met in person at least twice a month since we've been operating.

Mr. Kucinich. Are minutes kept of your meetings?
Mr. Feldberg. Yes.

Mr. Kucinich. Can you make available to this committee the minutes of your meetings?

Mr. Feldberg. Those minutes, under the terms of the trust agreement I believe, are provided to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and I think are their property. I suspect that you'd have to go to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York to get them.

Mr. Kucinich. So the minutes of your meetings are not your property, they're the property of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York?

Mr. Feldberg. That may be a little strong.

Mr. Kucinich. Well, that's what you just said.

Mr. Feldberg. I know, and I may have been a little strong in saying that. But it is my understanding that the minutes belong to the Federal Reserve. I could probably use the advice of counsel to be sure I've got it right, because I don't want to mislead you.

Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I think that in order to be able to evaluate the work of these trustees, I think it's imperative that this committee get the minutes of their meetings and get their phone logs so we can know what they talk about.

Now, Mr. Feldberg, when did you become a trustee?

Mr. Feldberg. When the trust agreement was first signed in----

Mr. Kucinich. What was the date?

Mr. Feldberg [continuing]. In January. The specific date? January 16th of this year.

Mr. Kucinich. So you never had any discussions, then, with anybody at the New York Fed regarding the $8.5 billion in payments to Barclays as a counterparty?

Mr. Feldberg. Absolutely none, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Kucinich. And do you--so your decisions really are not transparent then? We really don't know what you do as a trustee if we don't get--if you can't produce minutes.

Mr. Feldberg. Well, I didn't say we can't produce minutes, sir. I said that I think we need to check with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York before committing to something.

Mr. Kucinich. Well, you worked for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Is that correct?

Mr. Feldberg. I did, yes.

Mr. Kucinich. And how long did you work for them?

Mr. Feldberg. Thirty-six years.

Mr. Kucinich. OK. And were you asked by officials of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be a trustee?

Mr. Feldberg. Yes I was.

Mr. Kucinich. OK. And Ms. Considine, you worked for the--you were a member of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Is that correct?
Ms. Considine. That's correct.

Mr. Kucinich. And were you asked by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be a trustee?

Ms. Considine. Yes I was.

Mr. Kucinich. And who made that request of you?

Ms. Considine. Tom Baxter, who is the general counsel.

Mr. Kucinich. And Mr. Feldberg.

Mr. Feldberg. The same, Tom Baxter.

Mr. Kucinich. And do you report to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on a regular basis?

Mr. Feldberg. I would say that we have conversations with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on----

Mr. Kucinich. On a regular basis?

Mr. Feldberg [continuing]. On a regular basis. I would not characterize it as our reporting to them. It is really a vehicle for us to exchange views and information and analysis. It's very much a two-way street.

Mr. Kucinich. Isn't it true that Section 4.01 of the trust agreement calls for the trustees to provide the New York Fed with monthly custodial reports, quarterly summary of significant actions, quarterly report summarizing the efforts and activities to effect a sale or distribution of trust stock or other trust asset, minutes of any meeting, divestiture plan as amended time to time by the trustees? Isn't that true?

Mr. Feldberg. Yes.

Mr. Kucinich. So would it be fair to assume that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has a significant role in monitoring the work of the trustees?

Mr. Feldberg. Yeah. I would say that they have a significant interest in the work of the trustees.

Mr. Kucinich. Are you trustees on behalf of the Federal Reserve Bank or are you trustees on behalf of the U.S. Treasury?

Mr. Foshee. We're trustees on behalf of the trust that holds the 79 percent equity on behalf of the U.S. Treasury.

Mr. Kucinich. And then can you explain to this committee why do you respond to the Fed, why is this trust agreement structured so that your accountability is to the Fed?

Ms. Considine. I don't think that's the reading that I would give to it, because No. 1, in terms of visibility of our responsibility, our responsibility is to act as the shareholder, and that is to vote the shares. Now when the annual meeting occurs of AIG, we will be voting for the directors, we'll vote the trust for the directors, we will vote for the auditors and we will vote for any other proposals that are coming before the shareholders. That will be absolutely open and public. As part of the agreement, yes, we are to provide minutes and of course expenses back to the Fed. But we were selected to be totally independent trustees, and I believe that's the way we function.

Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I'm going to need to ask questions along these lines if I may as a followup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. I'd be delighted. Recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.

Mr. Issa. I want to thank you all for being here and I want to thank you for your service. And I said to most of you, or two of you beforehand, this committee is not questioning your honesty and your effort to live under the trust agreement you've been given, which, Mr. Feldberg, you made very clear, you didn't draw it up. You know, this is sort of the job you got hired for, and the conditions of the job were already set.
And I think it's important that the public understand that if there were mistakes made or if we are sending you in the wrong direction, it is not because you made that determination. And since your contract was signed, the trust was created on January 16th, then the previous president was still in place and the previous secretary of the treasury was still in place, so we'll accept for a moment that this is a two-administration decision.

I'm going to go to Mr. Verret first. And specifically about the new administration, President Obama has said that he believes that we should actually have the Iraq and Afghan wars on the books. He thinks that should be part of the national debt. The various TARP injections and particularly the guarantees totally trillions of dollars, what would be the effect if we--should we put those onto the national debt since they are obligations of the Federal Government, and what would be the effect?

Mr. Verret. Well, I can tell you the effect of when the United Kingdom took--bailed out its two largest banks, when it bailed out the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyd's. They put that $2.1 trillion of debt on those banks' private bank budget onto the national budget, and I think this was a consistent decision by Chancellor Darling that under the accounting rules, government accounting or private accounting, when you control an entity and you back up an entity, you're responsible for their debt, so you need to consolidate their debt onto your books.

So when Chancellor Darling consolidated the debt of those two banks onto the U.K.'s national debt, the U.K.'s national debt doubled. It literally doubled overnight. And if we were to put Citigroup, for instance, debt onto the national debt, which I think would be appropriate, because we now own a controlling stake, a 36 percent controlling stake in Citigroup, which even under the Treasury Department's own regulations about reviewing foreign investments in the United States is defined specifically as control--they define it as control at 10 percent. We've got 36 percent under Delaware corporate law, that's control. Under the securities laws, that's control. So we, I think, to be consistent should put Citigroup's national debt--Citigroup's private bank debt--onto our national debt. That would, I think, increase--by back-of-the-envelope calculation--it would increase our national debt by about 15 percent, just Citigroup alone. Other TARP participants, the national debt would increase by significantly more. So right now it's effectively sort of a shadow national debt that we have unrecognized.

Mr. Issa. OK. Well, I appreciate that and I may send a reminder to the President that he supported that. Ms. Considine, I'm going to ask you, but the others are free to answer, my understanding is that you represent, you three are for all practical purposes the stockholders for 79.9 percent of the company and you act as prudent stockholders should act in your day-to-day business. That's your charge, when we get past the legal contract. Is that right?


Mr. Issa. So regardless of whether it's the Treasury or the treasurer or whoever, do you believe that your job is to maximize the stockholder value on behalf of whoever the owner is?


Mr. Issa. You're all saying yes?

Mr. Foshee. Yes.
Mr. Feldberg. Yes. I thought I made that clear in my opening----

Mr. Issa. OK. And what's important to me to go down this road is, any--well, first of all, the New York Times has said that if they don't like what you're doing, the Fed will fire you. Do you believe you can be fired by the Fed even though you're maximizing the stockholder value?

Mr. Feldberg. I think the Fed could remove us for cause, but only----

Mr. Issa. OK. Well, let's go down that for a second. The Fed is sitting there with tens of billions of dollars that it's owed on the other side of the ledger, but if as stockholders you want to maximize stockholder value, wouldn't you consider doing through your board, through the operational, through Mr. Liddy, consider doing a lot of things that maximize value? For example, spinning off the healthy companies into new public companies in which you would have an 80 percent share, and that stock would trade unimpaired and immediately rise to its fair value, and determine that the debt that Treasury put on belongs to the corpus in London, not to the corporation that you're spinning off, and as a result, leave it where it would be. Now wouldn't that be a prudent thing for the board to do on behalf of this money that Mr. Liddy admitted was injected by the Treasury and given to other companies, including ones overseas, because of factors outside the best interest directly of the company? So as stockholders, are you free to do that? Can you do that even though, in fact, you probably would be increasing stockholder value here, and Treasury may not like it because they may have to admit that what they did was--well the term is urinate I guess--we don't say the other word anymore--a whole bunch of the taxpayers' dollars into foreign banks and other corporations that have slid right out of your company, one division of your company, which you did not have an obligation to pay, but if they gave you the money and you paid it out anyway? A complex question. Yes?

Mr. Foshee. Congressman Issa, if I could answer that question, I think that you just articulated the primary reason that there is a trust, because the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York couldn't be effectively lender----

Mr. Issa. It couldn't be both fiduciaries.

Mr. Foshee [continuing]. Lender, regulator and equity holder. And so the very thing that you're talking about, which is a lender wanting the company to take an act which is not in the best interests of the shareholders, especially to the extent that act required a shareholder vote, is exactly why the three of us are sitting here in front of you today, and our responsibility would be to act in the long-term best interest of the shareholders.

Mr. Issa. OK. Ms. Considine, I'll let you all answer if the chairman will indulge me, but the other two parts of the question were, are those other acts which would maximize the value, which are available to you today at your disposal, and would all of those acts be outside what you could be fired for since they may very much leave this corpus with a negative balance while in fact maximizing stockholder value?

Ms. Considine. They would be outside of what we would be fired for.

Mr. Issa. So you could do that if it's determined to maximize the value for the company as stockholders, as--and working with your board?

Ms. Considine. Well, I think there's two issues. No. 1, the cause for which we could be fired, and No. 2, what is the
roles, responsibilities and limitations of the trust. And I think it's something that we'd have to think about, and as we said, this is unchartered waters, because we need to respect corporate governance, we need to respect the role of the board of directors, who are duly elected by the shareholders. But that's the balance that we have here. You've got the debt holders on one side, the equity holders on the other. Maximizing long-term value versus trying to get repaid for loans that have been made. And that's why I think this trust is such a unique instrument but is probably perfectly tailored to the situation in which we found ourselves.

Mr. Issa. Yeah. And Mr. Verret wanted to answer briefly.

Mr. Verret. I just want to briefly add just to cite Section 2.04(d), if that's useful to the discussion. It says clearly here that in exercising their discretion with respect to the trust, the trustees are advised that it is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's view that, "the company being managed in a manner that would not disrupt financial market conditions is consistent with maximizing the value of the stock," even though maybe technically that might not be the case. So it seems like they are afforded the discretion, at least as I read the trust, to do things consistent with helping general market conditions even though it might not maximize the value of the stock.

Mr. Feldberg. I believe that clause was put in by the Federal Reserve to express their desire that issue be considered in the course of the trustees' deliberations. It was explicitly done in a way that it does not direct the trustees to do anything.

Mr. Issa. So none of you feel bound by that provision if in fact you have to choose between stockholder value and----

Mr. Feldberg. No.

Mr. Issa [continuing]. And, "disruption of some market?"

Mr. Foshee. We feel bound to consider that, but we don't feel bound to follow that, no.

Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. Let me just take my round. First of all, let me thank you for being here.

Mr. Feldberg. Yes.

Mr. Foshee. Just to be clear, we're responsible for overseeing the equity held by the shareholders, the shares held by the trust.

Chairman Towns. Right. I would like to provide a copy, let me put it this way, do you have a plan?

Ms. Considine. I think you're probably discussing the plan, the disposition plan that we're responsible for putting together.

Chairman Towns. Yes. Are you the project, are you involved in Project Destiny?

Ms. Considine. Oh, no, no.

Chairman Towns. You're not involved in that at all?

Ms. Considine. We've looked at Project Destiny, we've discussed it with the senior staff at AIG, we've given some comments. We've seen it on the high level in terms of the plan.

Chairman Towns. Right.

Mr. Feldberg. If I might add, I think that plan is a good example of the intersections between management, the trustees and the Treasury and the Fed. The plan, which Mr. Liddy talked about earlier today, is AIG's plan. But in order to implement the plan, it will require a buy in by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve and, you know, could conceivably involve a change in, or an increase in the financing provided by the
Chairman Towns. Let me ask you, go ahead.

Mr. Feldberg. The role of the trustees in connection with that plan has been to provide our business judgment and experience in reviewing the plan and telling the Treasury and the Fed where we think the plan could be enhanced if we saw areas where that was possible, and in fact, we have given them positive input in a number of areas in connection with the analysis and review of the plan. But at the end of the day, it's AIG's plan and it will only go into effect if the Federal Reserve and the Treasury buy into it. At least, that's my understanding.

Chairman Towns. Right. Let me ask you this, then. What is your view of Project Destiny? What do you think of it?

Ms. Considine. Let me start off. I think it's a workable plan. There are issues that need to be addressed in terms of the timing of the plan. And also, the timing has to do with many of the risks that are out there in terms of the economy, the capital markets, and the ability to dispose of or get financing for the disposition of these assets.

Mr. Foshee. Yes, I think based on what we've seen, Mr. Chairman, the plan makes sense. I think one of the challenges that AIG faces is, you don't want, in this kind of a market to go take these sort of crown jewel assets and sell them in a market where there aren't capital markets for buyers to pay full value. The other problem, of course, is that the AIG brand has been damaged and I think the company views, and we would concur, that taking the three, in particular, the three large insurance assets and making those separate public entities does a number of things. The first thing it does is, of course, get them out from under the negative halo of the AIG brand. It also re-energizes the employees of those companies because they now feel like they have a future with a brand new, very large public company at some point. And then, I think the third thing, as a practical matter, is to the extent there are entities out there that would want to acquire an insurance company or something like that. It creates a certain amount of valuation that is apparent by issuing it in the public market.

Chairman Towns. All right.

Ms. Considine. And I think, just to followup on that, that was one of the reasons that we, as trustees, sent the letter in terms of having a comprehensive compensation philosophy in place there. Because if you're going to be having different companies, you're going to need management out there, and they need the ability to attract and retain people to come in and be able to manage these and get them into the shape that they're going to be able to maximize the value when they're disposed of, either through sale or an IPO.

Chairman Towns. AIG has received billions in tax dollars but continues to post losses with the largest in history--over $60 billion was posted just 2 months ago. What can we do to turn this around? Have you made suggestions or recommendations to them, or are you just, saying, look, that's the way it is and that's what's going to happen. What is your role in trying to turn this around? Or do you have a role in it?

Mr. Foshee. Well, I think one of the things, one of the most prominent roles that I believe we can play as trustees, is ensuring that AIG has the best, most qualified, independent board of directors that it can have, overseeing the management team and ensuring that there's a management team there that is properly motivated and can execute the plan. So, I think in that, one of our primary tasks, we feel good about the
successes we've had in being able to attract those kind of people to come be the board members of AIG. And it is that group, the board and the management team, that have the responsibility for directing this company and getting it through this mess. I think our input, I believe that it's valued by the company and by the Federal Reserve, to the extent we have conversations with them. And so, I do believe we're playing an active role in that.

Chairman Towns. Do you have a plan that you submitted to AIG? I know you get together, you indicated that, but did you submit a plan as a group saying you think this is something that should happen or this is something that we should move forward and that maybe instead of 3 to 5 years, giving the taxpayers their money back, we can do it in a shorter period of time? Do you have a plan? Anything on paper that you can give us?

Mr. Foshee. No. In fact, the trust doesn't charge us with creating a plan other than for the disposition, the ultimate disposition of the shares of AIG that we are entrusted to be stewards of. And we would expect, as we sit here today, that's probably years away in terms of maximizing the shareholder value.

Ms. Considine. And we can't dispose of those shares until the loan that was extended by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is repaid. Now, that doesn't mean we're going to wait until the "repayment" to come up with a plan. But, I think it's a little premature to be working on a plan for disposition of the shares that we hold at this time.

Mr. Foshee. And it really isn't our role to create, nor could we, the three of us, this, one of the largest companies in the world, create our own plan for what AIG should do with its business. What we do do, though, is we talk to the company's management team, the company's outside advisors, their outside auditor, the head of internal audit, the Federal Reserve, and its outside advisors, and develop our own business judgments so that we can react to plans that are presented by the company.

Chairman Towns. You know, I'm just thinking that, if you, a trustee of a company that has set a record in losses, it seems to me that you should have something to say. Should put something somewhere. I mean, if you're not, you should feel extremely guilty. You know, because the point of that, I mean, they've set a record, posted in the last 2 months, in terms of their losses, and so, I mean, seem to be that based on your background and you're being involved in business and, of course, that you should be able to say to them, we need to move in a different direction, let's try this. I mean, I would like to see something on paper that you've given them as a suggestion, a recommendation, knowing that it's not your final decision, but my God, I mean, this kind of loss, somebody ought to say something and somebody ought to do something.

Mr. Foshee. Yeah, well, I'm sorry, go ahead.

Mr. Feldberg. As I think has been said, there is a plan. In the first instance, it was put forth by AIG. It's a massive document. I mean, the number of man-hours that have gone into its preparation----

Chairman Towns. Are you referring to Project Destiny?

Mr. Foshee. Yes.

Mr. Feldberg. I'm referring to Project Destiny. And that plan has been submitted to the Federal Reserve and the Treasury for their review and buy in. And the role we have played is to have access to the plan and an opportunity to provide our
input. And we have done that informally in discussions with AIG and the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. And those discussions are ongoing.

Chairman Towns. So, there's no input in writing. You haven't written anything down.

Mr. Feldberg. Mr. Chairman, at the moment, we are basically a staff of three, the three trustees. We have opted not to hire our own analytical resources, not to engage outside consultants, investment bankers, or whatever to assist us. There may be a point in the future where we will decide to do that and certainly when we get to the point of having to come up with a plan for the disposition of the stock, we will do that. But at this point, we have a law firm advising us to make sure that we comply with all the legal requirements of the trust and anything else that's relevant. And we've got somebody to help us deal with the press, but that basically is it and there are the three of us. And what we are trying to do, is provide from the top down, our business judgment and experience in reviewing the plans that have been prepared.

Ms. Considine. I think in this case leverage is good. We are trying to leverage the board, the management, the outside firms that they are using, be they investment banks, auditors, internal auditors and all the resources, and bringing that together and then coming in and offer, based on our collective business judgment, feedback and comments.

Mr. Foshee. I think our business judgment is that, frankly, the last thing AIG needs now is another set of outside advisors. The company has internal staff, it has external advisors, the Federal Reserve Bank has internal staff, it has outside advisors. We've chosen, rather than to spend the taxpayers' dollars on another set of investment bankers at this point, not to do that and leverage what already exists. But we have a, I think, we have had a significant amount of input into the direction of the company and I would say, not only are we not embarrassed, we're proud that from a standing start at the beginning of March, we're able to announce to you today that we've put forward five really capable, really independent directors that we expect to be elected at the shareholders' meeting now close to a month away. Because we know, if AIG has the best board it can get, and that board is directing the best management team it could get, therefore, you're going to end up with the best outcome you can have for the U.S. taxpayer.

Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. I yield to Congressman Tierney from Massachusetts.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do your minutes reflect conversations you've had amongst yourselves about Project Destiny?

Mr. Foshee. To the extent it was during a trustee meeting, I think the answer to that would be yes, though I haven't gone back and reviewed all of those.

Mr. Tierney. Are you having conversations amongst yourselves about Project Destiny on occasions when you would not term it a trustee meeting?

Ms. Considine. I think we've had the conversations on Project Destiny when it's been with the AIG management, with AIG management and the Fed, and AIG management, the Fed and Treasury.

Mr. Tierney. Do your minutes reflect those conversations and dialog with those individuals?

Ms. Considine. Well, they wouldn't be the minutes of the trustees. They would have been the group conversation.

Mr. Tierney. Well, but there is no record, in other words,
of the trustees, of dialog that they've had with third parties on the issue of Project Destiny?

Ms. Considine. Project Destiny.

Mr. Tierney. You don't go back and make a report or keep any record of what conversations you had or whatever?

Mr. Foshee. Probably not.

Ms. Considine. These are real working sessions.

Mr. Tierney. What is the value of the stocks that you hold right now?

Ms. Considine. Well, if you----

Mr. Tierney. Best estimate.

Ms. Considine. The value of the stocks that you hold right now is another question.

Mr. Foshee. Whether that's the long term value of those shares is another question.

Ms. Considine. That's present value.

Mr. Tierney. Now, there's conversation that this Project Destiny really looks like a way of selling off bad assets, of restructuring and selling profitable units, in an attempt to wind down the company. There are some people that believe that's what's going on here. And, is that your impression, and if it is, aren't we just looking at bankruptcy by another name?

Ms. Considine. Well, I would say that it's looking to sell off good assets. And there are some very, very valuable assets within the AIG umbrella: the insurance assets. And I believe, as Mr. Liddy talked about, ALICO, AIU, and AIA are three of, sort of, the gems that are being looked at. Part of the plan is to, you know, continue the wind down of the financial products division. So, I think what you'd be left with would be a much smaller AIG, reconstituted, which would probably be, in some respects, almost an investment company that would be holding the shares in these other companies until they were finally disposed of, whether a total sale, an IPO, or if only portions of it were sold.

Mr. Tierney. Couldn't we have kept $185 billion in the Treasury and just gone right to that by having a bankruptcy proceeding at the very outset of this?

Mr. Feldberg. You probably could have, but that gets into the question of systemic risk and what would the implications of that have been, more broadly.

Ms. Considine. You know, I was just on another panel last night and when you think back on what was going on that weekend of September 13th, this fall, where you had Merrill Lynch and you had Lehman Brothers and then, you know, within 24 hours, you had an end issue with AIG, I think the impact would have been beyond what we could even imagine, even after what we've all seen. So, I think, you know, maybe 20 years from now, academics can look at it and really have some time and some distance. But I think acting within that 48 hour time span, what was done was probably the thing that had to be done, given the systemic consequences that were out there.
Mr. Tierney. You're familiar with the Black Rock contract with the Fed?
Ms. Considine. Not familiar with it, but aware of it, yeah.
Mr. Tierney. I'm sorry?
Mr. Feldberg. We're aware of it.
Ms. Considine. We're aware of it.
Mr. Tierney. Does that impact your role at all? I mean, that they've actually been, sort of, charged with the oversight and monitoring of what's been, what's going on within the company for a bit. Does that, the impact, are you getting in touch with them at all and sharing notes, or----

Mr. Foshee. We have not had conversations either with Black Rock or, I believe, Black Stone, who is also an advisory to the company or to the Fed. I think our view is that so far as we know, those are good things, not bad things, because as everyone knows, the financial products group in particular, has been under a tremendous amount of stress, still represents a tremendous amount of exposure to the company and having another set of eyes in there to assist, we would view, on its face, as a good thing from the perspective of protecting the taxpayers' interest.

Chairman Towns. Will the gentleman yield at this time? We have a vote on and I'd like to move to Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur and then we will be able to conclude. Congresswoman Kaptur.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Foshee, who is El Paso Corp.'s chief banker?
Mr. Foshee. El Paso Corp.'s chief banker, we have relationships with half a dozen of the top, of the largest financial institutions in the world.
Ms. Kaptur. And they would be?
Mr. Foshee. Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, I'm going to get in trouble for leaving one out, by them. Royal Bank of Scotland, a whole litany of banks around the world that are service providers to El Paso.
Ms. Kaptur. Many and also many of which, most of which, have gotten counter-party funds through the AIG transactions through the Fed. You would agree to that?
Mr. Foshee. You know, again, specifically, I'm sure that many of them did, because we do business with many of the banks around the world.
Ms. Kaptur. Well, J.P. Morgan Chase got $1.6 billion, Bank of American got $12 billion, Citigroup got $2.3 billion. Interesting to look down the list. Let me ask you, when you served as CEO of Halliburton, were you a party to the no-bid contracts that were initiated at the beginning of the Iraq war for the oil security in Iraq?
Mr. Foshee. First of all, I was never CEO of Halliburton. I worked for Halliburton for 24 months. I was hired on the heels of the asbestos crisis as a Chief Financial Officer in what would have been characterized as a turnaround mode when the stock went from $56 to $6. Of the 24 months I was there, I spent most of that time as the Chief Financial Officer, so I would not have had a role in that.
Ms. Kaptur. All right, this says chief operating officer, executive vice president, so.
Mr. Foshee. And the last 6, yes, and the last 6 months I was with the company, I was the Chief Operating Officer.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. Through what years? Through 2003?
Mr. Foshee. That would have been, I believe I left in early to middle 2003. So the last 6 months prior to that.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. So, you would have been there at the
beginning of the Iraq war?

Mr. Foshee. Yes.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Feldberg and Ms. Considine, when people wish to write you, in your position as trustees, which address do they write you?

Ms. Considine. 399 Park Avenue, New York, NY, and the Zip is 10022.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. And how do they address that?

Ms. Considine. Care of Arnold and Porter. We have a trust office at Arnold and Porter at 399 Park.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. Mr. Feldberg, through 2008, you were chairman of Barclays America, is that right?

Mr. Feldberg. Yes.

Ms. Kaptur. OK, do you own stock in that bank?

Mr. Feldberg. Yes, I do.

Ms. Kaptur. You do? What is the relationship between that and Barclay Capital, that was in receipt of $8.5 billion through the AIG counter-party arrangement with the Fed?

Mr. Feldberg. Barclays Capital is a business unit of Barclays Bank and----

Ms. Kaptur. So, they are related.

Mr. Feldberg. They are related, yes.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. And when you worked at the Fed, what did you do? You were a senior official. What did you do?

Mr. Feldberg. Well, I did a number of different things, but----

Ms. Kaptur. What was your title?

Mr. Feldberg. Executive vice president at the time I retired.

Ms. Kaptur. All right.

Mr. Feldberg. I spent about 10 years running the discount window, the Fed's lending operation. And the last 9 years I was there, I was executive vice president, responsible for bank supervision.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. And where is Barclays that you worked for, headquartered in our country? Where is it?

Mr. Feldberg. In New York City.

Ms. Kaptur. And what street?

Mr. Feldberg. Well, it's moved, but at the time, it was 200, well, when I left it was 200 Park Avenue.

Ms. Kaptur. Park Avenue. So, you're close neighbors there. And Ms. Considine, I wanted to ask you, Butterfield Fulcrum, it's a hedge fund management industry. Who are your major clients?

Ms. Considine. Mainly hedge funds, such as, well, very small ones, they wouldn't be on your radar screen, I mean.

Ms. Kaptur. Could you provide those for the record, please? Just pick one. Pick two. Pick three. You must know who your clients are.

Ms. Considine. Yes, I am. The thing is, we are a private company and we usually don't come out with our clients' names, so I would just have to check with it. The other thing is, it is not a U.S. company, so I would just like to go and get clearance on that.

Ms. Kaptur. Uh, Butterfield Fulcrum?

Ms. Considine. Butterfield Fulcrum.

Ms. Kaptur. It is based in what country, then?

Ms. Considine. It's a Bermuda company. It was founded 20 years ago in Bermuda. It was bought out about 2 years ago by a UK company and then in the past year, we merged with the arm of Butterfield Bank, which is a 150 year old Bermuda bank. So, it's a global company. It is incorporated in Bermuda. Its
senior management is located in the UK.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. I thank you for stating that. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.

Chairman Towns. Thank you. We have a vote on, so, we have three votes on, so I'd hope we'd be able to make it----

Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, may I just say, you know, as I've listened today, I get more and more concerned when I represent a part of our country that is being devastated by what these New York institutions and New York headquarters institutions have done to America and have done to places like I represent. You have no conceivable idea of the damage you have done and are doing. I could go into a lot of detail here and I know Mr. Chairman will have followup hearings. The way this whole thing is structured, it's an inside deal from the beginning. Every single witness we've had is headquartered in one place. You all know one another, you work together all the time and I'll tell you, what you've done to middle America is a sacrilege. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Foshee. For the record, I'm from Texas. Our headquarters are in Texas.

Ms. Kaptur. Oh, but your bankers aren't. They follow right up the street.

Chairman Towns. Let me, you know, it's not clear, to me and other Members here exactly what you do, in terms of the role that you're playing in this. So, if you'll be kind enough to submit to the committee, some minutes of your meetings, so that we can get a feel for what you're doing, because it's not clear to us up here. And we've been sort of like, whispering to ourselves and passing notes, you know, to ourselves, about your real role.

And so, if you could help us with that, well, I'll hold the record open for some minutes to get a feel for what you're doing and maybe we'll understand, why you're doing that.

Thank you so much. We appreciate you coming today.

[Whereupon, at approximately 2 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]