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Deference to the Executive in the United States after September 11: Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel

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Deference to the Executive in the United States after September 11: Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel

Summary

According to the "deference thesis," legislatures, courts, and other government institutions should defer to the executive's policy decisions during national security emergencies. The essay addresses two criticisms of the deference thesis.

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