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The Re-Recruit: 
A Family History of American Media and the CIA in the First Decades of the Cold War

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have you all in my life, and really appreciate all the listening and fun you’ve granted me (and this essay) over the past year. Thanks for everything.
Last winter my aunt sent me a blue photo album in the mail. I had emailed her because I had to write an analysis of a photographic archive, any archive, for a class I was taking. We had been encouraged to find something personal, and my dad told me his sister, if anyone, had become the family historian: she had the pictures, the storage boxes, the stories. A few days later I got a package in the mail with the album bubble-wrapped inside. It looked inexpensive, like something you could pick up at a drugstore, with a cover made of crumbling blue construction paper decorated with two hand-stenciled blocks of text filled in with marker. “PLG” reads the first, my grandfather’s initials, and below it “1973!”: the year in which it was made and given, a fiftieth birthday present from his sister.

The pages hold black and white photos of my grandfather and his sisters sledding in Devon, Pennsylvania, the town where he grew up (and for which I’m named); lined up on ponies in a neighbor’s yard; standing with their parents on a steamerliner. There are letters my grandfather wrote her from Wyoming, where he worked on a ranch for a summer, and then pictures of him escorting dressed-up dates down staircases, with cryptic allusions to relationships gone wrong. She kept a newspaper clipping from his time at Yale, titled “90 Tapped at Yale In Traditional Rites of Senior Societies,” with his name listed under Elihu, and then postcards he sent her from Marine Corps. training camps and, later, his stations overseas. But the last letter was postmarked from 1948, and there’s nothing left until a final picture, which my aunt guesses comes from a few years later. In it my grandfather sits in a suit, smiling at the camera, with my great-aunt’s cursive written overhead: “Where am I?” in blue ink.¹

¹ See Appendix A.
I was curious about where he went, and why the album stopped, so I started looking around the internet. Up came a finding aid to the Philip L. Geyelin Papers housed at the Library of Congress, which held 127 boxes of files my grandmother donated in 2005, the year after his death. The third page held a short biographical note, written as a timeline. In 1943, it says, he graduated with a B.A. from Yale. 1943 to 1946, he served in the Marines. 1946 to 1947, he was a journalist for the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press. 1947 to 1967, he was a foreign correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal*. And then 1950-1951: “Worked for Central Intelligence Agency while on leave from *Wall Street Journal*. ” I’d had no idea.

I’d grown up knowing of my grandfather as a journalist, and an important journalist: an editorialist at the *Washington Post*, and the winner of the 1970 Pulitzer for his antiwar writing on Vietnam. He died when I was ten, so the best image I have of him comes from a poster my dad hung in the bathroom next to his kitchen, something the *Post* put it together after he won his Pulitzer. It’s a collage of black and white photographs featuring him in various poses: looking at the camera with a pipe in his mouth, wry behind his glasses; gesturing while on the phone, leaning back in his chair. A quote runs across it: “Some people say that the whole point of an editorial is where you wind up. I think the point is how you get there. If you do that part right, the conclusion suggests itself—you don’t have to shout it from a mountain top.”

My dad was a journalist, too; he met my mom, also a journalist, at the *St. Petersburg Times*; later, she met my stepdad at the *Bergen Record*, where he was an editor. So I grew up with the newspaper on the table in the mornings, where it stayed until I set the table for dinner. I remember the moral outrage over *A Million Little Pieces* or the Jayson Blair scandal—two breach-

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2 See Appendix B.
es of journalistic integrity—in the same way as I remember presidential elections, or talks of another unpopular war.

So I was shocked to read that my grandfather, an almost folkloric family icon of journalism at its hardest-hitting and most critical of the government, had worked for the CIA at the beginning of his reporting career. The two positions—journalist and CIA member, or employee, or agent—seemed violently opposed. Weren’t they, in a certain way, enemies? How could someone go from engaging with one to engaging with the other?

That last question fueled my next few weeks of obsessive combing through online conspiracy theories. If you Google “Phil Geyelin CIA,” the screen fills up with links to pages presenting him as part of a cohort of men tied together in a Venn diagram of media and intelligence, whose overlap is the manufacturing of Cold War propaganda distributed both in the U.S. and abroad. The first link took me to www.whokilledjfk.net, which told me CIA memos had listed my grandfather as “a CIA resource” and “a willing collaborator” during his almost twenty-year career at the Wall Street Journal. Later, it says, he protested Congressional efforts to police relationships between the CIA and the media.3 The next link took me to a page about All the Publisher’s Men, a “suppressed book” from the 1980s about Post publisher Katharine Graham’s ties to the agency. The page claimed “informed readers” could still observe my grandfather’s CIA-friendly filtration of the news in the writing he was still publishing by the eighties.4

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that the CIA began a “secret project,” Mockingbird, in the late forties, intending to buy influence at major media organizations. Journalists were paid to be spies, and to disseminate information; and one of the masterminds, its claims, was a Post publisher. That one devoted a whole paragraph to my grandfather.5

The websites were surprising—I’d never heard any mention of any of it—but they also looked like the sort of “evidence” cooked up for the same audience who posted on internet forums about UFO sightings, or assassination plots. I thought the details, if any were true, had to have been exaggerated, or taken out of context, or spun. What I knew about my grandfather from the fifties, sixties, and seventies was that he was a high-powered journalist at the Post credited with shifting the paper’s editorial stance against the Vietnam War; and that he’d supported the Post’s publication of the Pentagon Papers and Watergate investigations. I understood that work as quite explicitly anti-government, or at least not in the government’s interest.

That didn’t seem to fit a narrative of covert media manipulation, or corrupt government influence. At the same time, the images I have of him and my grandmother fit the images of the “old boy network” most of the theories put forward. I knew him to have been part of an elite D.C. social scene where ambassadors came for dinner parties, the women wore pearls, and the men came from the Ivy League. Other albums my aunt has since given me show pictures of him taking shots with dignitaries, or having picnics in linen suits all over the European countryside. My lasting images of my grandmother, who passed away in 2009, hold her orange-lipsticked and laughing at the head of the table: either in my memory, hosting my family, or in pictures, hosting

whoever they considered interesting and important. She was once featured in a *Vogue* spread with the headline, “12 people for dinner: 24 hours notice,” and the images show her in a head-scarf at the grocery store, and then holding court over a guest list including ambassadors and their wives. I know the family story where my teenaged dad and aunt convinced their parents to smoke weed with them, just once. My grandfather got high, and then Kissinger called the house, something that apparently wasn't atypical. I’m told they talked about foreign policy.

That image of an interwoven world of powerful men working in media, or the government, was corroborated by sources more reputable, to me, than online conspiracy forums. Recently published books—*The Georgetown Set*, *The Georgetown Ladies’ Social Club*—present a similar scene. So do members of my family, and the friends they grew up with. Women, I’m told, were charged with creating the environments where information could be shared. Dinner parties might have confidential-only tables. Media and government mingled. It was a big clique, they told me; but that doesn’t mean it was corrupt.

I’ve spent the past year trying to understand my grandfather in terms of that clique, and that time. I sat for hot D.C. weekdays in the Library of Congress, where I looked through the 127 boxes they kept of his old letters, memos, notes, drafts, and photographs; I read his published writing while sitting in Yale libraries he once sat in, too. I stayed for summer weekends at my aunt and uncle’s house in Virginia, looking through the boxes they kept in the attic, full of files no one donated to the Library. I went to the National Archives, to see what the CIA kept on him.

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7 See Appendices C and D.

8 Susan Braden, interview by Devon Geyelin, August 21, 2015.
in their CREST system. I opened boxes kept in the sub-basement of my grandfather’s old summer home in Maine. I have a duffel bag full of family photographs under my desk, in my bedroom, and I’ve organized more files than I can read.

Initially, I was running on the adrenaline that comes with suspicion. I wanted to delineate his entire relationship with the CIA from the moment he left official employment until the moment, in the mid-70s, when he became the subject of Washington rumors hatched in the incubator of broader CIA-media scandals (the ancestors of the questions posed by the forums I found). In some ways, I’ve constructed a narrative; I understand that narrative as a tentative thread in a pattern of doubt. I’ve stitched and un-stitched; changed my mind; tried to keep myself from embroidering, or adding embellishment. In many ways, my knowledge is limited by the pre-editing of materials. I have the files my grandfather kept, obsessively; I don’t have anything he threw out. I don’t have the names cut out from some of the papers I found; I don’t have the CIA files cut off in the CREST system. I filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the FBI and the CIA fourteen months ago; as of yet, I don’t have those, either. I have what people will tell me.

This essay tries to place my grandfather, and his work, in the context of his time. A lot changed in America between the early fifties and the mid-seventies. Patriotism, and patriotic journalism, meant different things between the time he began his career and the time his integrity came under question. He worked for the CIA, and began his career in journalism, as part of a generation of fresh World War Two victors envisioning themselves in the midst of their next war—the Cold War—in which the intentions, and practices, of the American government were largely trusted by a relatively unquestioning American population. Patriotism, then, seems less complicated. But I grew up on the other end of Vietnam and Watergate, Snowden and September 11th
and Wikileaks. I’ve been taught, implicitly and explicitly, not to trust my government: a clouded body I understand as a potentially adversarial Other who, I’m told, lies to me. That’s the mood from which I began my research. In some ways, my grandfather's work helped produce that change, as his writing argued against a war that sent early shocks—what he called "national convulsions"—through the American identity. This paper positions him within that shift, at a moment of national tension and scrutiny, in which he—an old boy—had to prove that he was not under the thumb of a government that dressed like he did.

In 1974, a Chicago newspaperman accused my grandfather and his writing of CIA taint. His work and his methods suddenly became a public moral question that he had to answer. For the past year, I’ve been trying to understand how he did that—to himself, to his readers, to his family—and to see where he and I agree. I’m named for the town he grew up in; I go to the school he graduated from; I’m writing as his granddaughter. I’m trying to understand, and to empathize.

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In 1974, journalist Seymour Hersh began publishing a series of articles in the New York Times that would lead to a national reckoning with the CIA’s practices in the twenty-seven years since its charter. The articles were quietly kicked off by a small piece that ran on December tenth, on page fifteen, next to an almost full-page ad for Saks Fifth Avenue. The drama of the article, “Senators Suggest Checks on Spying,” is overshadowed by the illustration of two well-dressed women about as tall, and three times as wide, as the article itself. Her armpit and elbow jut into the news: four witnesses had testified to a Senate Committee saying that Congress needed to expand its oversight of U.S. intelligence operations, both international and domestic. The
article quotes Senator Edmund S. Muskie, of Maine: “in recent years we have seen alarming evi-
dence that we may have created a monster.’’9

In a following series published on the front page close to every day from the end of De-
cember through the beginning of January, Hersh exposed the American public to the CIA’s pre-
viously un-publicized domestic surveillance tactics. Potentially-questionable CIA practices had
been written about before—Hersh, for example, had written just a few months prior about the
agency’s work to overthrow Chile’s Marxist president, Salvador Allende, in an article that ran
next to another coat ad—but previous coverage had either focused on the agency’s action, or al-
leged action, abroad, or didn’t ignite significant attention. The December 1974 series produced
national outcry with its accusation that the CIA was spying at home.10, 11

The first article ran on December 22 with the headline, in all italicized capitals, “HUGE
C.I.A. OPERATION REPORTED IN U.S. AGAINST ANTIWAR FORCES, OTHER DISSI-
DENTS IN NIXON YEARS.” Below it ran a subheading, “Files On Citizens,” and head shots
(looking almost like mug shots) of the three most recent Directors of Central Intelligence:
Richard Helms, James R. Schlesinger, and William E. Colby, who was the acting director at the
time of the article’s publication. Citing “well-placed government sources,” the article was located

Number=15.

10 Seymour Hersh, “C.I.A. Said to Have Asked Funds for Chile Rightists in ’73: A Reactionary
timesmachine/1974/10/21/issue.html.

11 Loch K. Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience
University of Georgia.
in the top-right corner of the front page, and it claimed that “The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States.” The agency had compiled more than 10,000 intelligence files on Americans through a unit under Richard Helms, whose term as Director of Central Intelligence lasted from 1966 through 1973; and further, evidence suggested that the unit had been conducting break-ins, wire-tappings, and the “surreptitious inspection of mail” since the nineteen-fifties. According to the terms by which the CIA had emerged from the aftermath of the second World War, in its six-paragraph outline within Truman's National Security Act of 1947, the agency was prohibited from acting with any “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions” over Americans in their home country. James Angleton, a CIA employee of thirty-one years whom the Times accused of directing the unit, announced his resignation the afternoon the article was published.

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Hersh’s articles were a capstone to a few years in which Americans were primed for further evidence that their trust in the U.S. government was misplaced, if not misguided. In 1974 the last American troops had just been withdrawn from Vietnam, where they had participated in a war remembered for both its international failure and the corresponding domestic turmoil as the public tuned in to media portrayal of government-sponsored carnage.\textsuperscript{16,17} The publication of the Pentagon Papers, revealing the military’s attempt to conceal the bombing of Cambodia, the My Lai massacre, and other secret horrors, had only contributed to the erosion of public faith in the motivation and mechanics of the American government.\textsuperscript{18} President Nixon had just resigned in August 1974, amid national outrage over the Watergate break-in and the ensuing cover-up, coverage of which added domestic depth to broad-sweeping cynicism about American politicians and the system within which they operated.\textsuperscript{19}

Hersh’s series continued into January with increasing conviction, as the story developed to include government officials and members, or former members, of the intelligence community corroborating some of the allegations printed in the Times. Hersh reported CIA spying on student groups, particularly antiwar protestors at Columbia University, as well as repeated infiltration of “various ethnic and émigré groups in large cities.”\textsuperscript{20} The presiding director of the CIA, William Colby, confirmed in a report to President Ford that the CIA had been collecting files on over

\textsuperscript{16} Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee,” 5.


\textsuperscript{18} Howard Bray, \textit{The Pillars of the Post: The Making of a News Empire in Washington} (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), 113-114.

\textsuperscript{19} Schulman, 47-48.

\textsuperscript{20} Hersh, “Underground for the C.I.A. in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on Students.”
9,000 American citizens. And E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate burglar who had already been released, was quoted as having testified that projects under the Domestic Operations Division had conducted the “subsidizing and manipulation” of certain American media organizations in the early sixties, and that the agency’s “questionable” (in Hersh’s terms) operations had been conducted since the Kennedy administration, earlier than initially alleged. Congress was swamped with thousands of letters from Americans worried that Watergate might have just foreshadowed new revelations of government misdoing at home.

In the next weeks, three governmental committees were established to investigate Hersh’s allegations: a presidential inquiry commission placed under Vice President Rockefeller, a Senate-based investigative committee (created after a near-unanimous affirmative vote) directed by Senator Frank Church, and a House committee, ultimately headed by Otis Pike. In total, the Rockefeller investigation lasted for half a year, the Pike review for nearly a full year, and the


Church Committee (formally titled the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) continued its examination for the next sixteen months. Ultimately, the Committee conducted over 126 meetings, 800 interviews, and more than 200 hearings, and compiled over 110,000 pages of documentation. There has never, before or since, been such a broad, comprehensive review of American intelligence agencies. Within two years of its completion, the committee evolved into a permanent body—the Senate Intelligence Committee—which had just released its December 2014 report on the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” at the time I began researching the committee’s creation.

As the American public learned from reports the committees published over 1975 and 1976, the government’s intelligence agencies had been habitually infiltrating domestic religious, academic, and activist organizations including the NAACP, the Socialist Workers Party, women’s groups aligned with the Women’s Liberation Movement, and universities where leftist culture had gained a foothold. Wiretaps, bugs, mail openings, and break-ins had been performed on thousands of civilians. The FBI’s COINTELPRO program had identified Martin Luther King, Jr., as a threat and had attempted to incite his suicide; the CIA had experimented with LSD on “un-

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27 LeRoy Ashby, “Chapter Five: The Church Committee’s history and relevance: Reflecting on Senator Church,” in *U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on Terror*, ed. Russell A. Miller (New York: Routledge, 2008), 63.


29 Frederick A. O. Schwarz, “Chapter Three: The Church Committee, then and now,” in *U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on Terror*, ed. Russell A. Miller (New York: Routledge, 2008), 22.

30 Schwarz, 34-36.
witting subjects” in an attempt to test the drug’s efficacy as a potential weapon against Soviets.\textsuperscript{31} There had been CIA attempts to assassinate at least six national leaders worldwide, including Fidel Castro; repeated attempts to overthrow foreign governments; the successful toppling of Chile's democratically-elected president. The CIA’s PHOENIX program had conducted systematic assassinations of thousands of Vietnamese civilians accused of cooperating with the Vietcong.\textsuperscript{32, 33}

As the Times stories and reports claimed, the intelligence programs had been designed and implemented by governments consumed with Cold War paranoia and bravado. Goals of defeating Soviet power and containing Communist influence seemed to justify, to those in command, tactics that came to scandalize an audience of American civilians predisposed for further disenchantment with their government.\textsuperscript{34} Loch K. Johnson, who served as special assistant to Senator Church, later deemed 1975 “the year of intelligence”—the year when the revelations brought forth by the Church, Pike, and Rockefeller committees “did nothing less than revolutionize America’s attitudes towards intelligence supervision.”\textsuperscript{35}

Along the turmoil over all the revelations involving intelligence-gathering on American civilians, covert efforts towards assassinations, and attempted governmental overthrows, the in-

\textsuperscript{31} Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., “The Church Committee and a new era of intelligence oversight,” \textit{Intelligence and National Security} 22, no. 2 (2007), \url{http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684520701303881}.

\textsuperscript{32} Hart, “Liberty and security,” 15-16.

\textsuperscript{33} Ashby, “Chapter Five: The Church Committee’s history and relevance: Reflecting on Senator Church,” 58-59.

\textsuperscript{34} Ashby, 58-59.

\textsuperscript{35} Johnson, “Establishment of modern intelligence accountability,” 38.
vestigations reported another form of intelligence overstep: the infiltration of the American media by members of the CIA.\textsuperscript{36} As found by the Church Committee, American journalists had, for decades, been collecting intelligence for the agency. They had also “devised and placed” propaganda, particularly in international media outlets (though that planted information could, and sometimes would, filter back to American sources).\textsuperscript{37}

According to the reports, over twelve American news organizations and commercial publishing houses had “provided cover” to agents abroad. Some of the organizations were unaware that their publications were providing agents cover, while some executives had facilitated the agents’ placement. Some of the journalists were salaried by the agency; some volunteered their time, or their page space, through “unpaid, occasional, covert contact.” The Church report claimed the CIA had maintained “covert relationships with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations” up until February 1976, when (partially due to pressure resulting from the various committee investigations) the agency announced a new policy claiming it would not “enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service.” \textsuperscript{38} Fewer than half of the fifty journa-

\textsuperscript{36} Johnson, “Establishment of modern intelligence accountability,” 39.


\textsuperscript{38} “The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Institutions,” 192.
ists already employed by the CIA, or involved in another form of covert relationship, would be “terminated” under the new guidelines.39

But the report’s information is sketchy and often vague. While the Committee claimed it was granted “full and unfettered access” to CIA documents and files relating to all of its pre-1967 activity, that access came with a “single exception: records on media relationships.” Names of individual agents were not provided to the Committee.40 Much of the pertinent language is italicized in the final report, denoting that the material had been “substantially abridge (sic) at the request of the executive agencies.” Following the claim that the CIA maintained covert relations with 50 American media members, the report italicized (or abridged) their context: “They are part of a network of several hundred foreign individuals who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial books publishers, and other foreign media outlets.”41 Of the American media members, former director William Colby described four general types of relationships to the Committee. The first three involved staff of general circulation U.S. news organizations, staff of smaller U.S. publications, or free-lancers, stringers, “propaganda writers,” and employees of American


40 “The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Institutions,” 180.

41 “The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Institutions,” 192.
publishing houses, all working under “cover” and paid by the CIA. The last category included “journalists with whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional, covert contact.”

According to Book I of the Church report (as well much of the later scholarship that contextualizes it), this type of “clandestine cooperation” originated within the context of the early Cold War, when “most Americans perceived a real threat of a communist imperium and were prepared to assist their government to counter that threat.” As the communists attempted to influence international opinions through control over international organizations, the United States tried to do the same, “involving American private institutions and individuals in the secret struggle over minds, institutions and ideas.” But the American public’s perception of legitimate communist threat had declined since the early fifties, meaning that any clandestine operations continued since then gave, in the words of the report, “increasing currency to doubts as to whether it made sense for a democracy to resort to practices such as the clandestine use of free American institutions and individuals.” In other words, when read in the political climate of the mid-seventies, “covert relationships” between the CIA and the American media were more likely to be read as duplicitous conspiracy, rather than respectable cooperation. And in the early December 2014 morning when I first read the report, tucked into a chair next to a still-dark window, I, too, was inclined towards suspicion.

This is what I knew: my grandfather had spent a year in the CIA before returning to the Wall Street Journal, where he covered American politics out of Washington before moving over-


seas by 1956 to write in and about the countries the U.S. government was dispensing propaganda to, or about. He was the Journal’s Chief European Correspondent, first in Paris, then in London, and his beat included much of Europe, especially Berlin, as well as a particular focus on the Middle East, including Egypt, the Suez, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. He stayed abroad until 1960, when he came back to Washington and was the Journal’s Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, mainly writing on Latin America, Europe, and Southeast Asia, and occasionally traveling on assignment. He had a lot of friends in the CIA, even if he wasn’t officially employed. A government document cryptically presented four types of relationships he could have had to the CIA, while italicizing or omitting the details, in passages whose language wasn’t so dissimilar from the online theories I was both obsessively filing and instinctually disbelieving. But I trusted the reports more than I trusted whokilledjfk.net.

I’d known my grandfather had written a book. Lyndon B. Johnson and the World focuses on President Johnson’s foreign policy, and was published in 1966, the year before the CIA limited its publishing program. By that point, it turned out, the program had already subsidized the publication of “well over a thousand books,” over a quarter of them in English. In a subsection on book publishing—“Two Issues: ‘Fallout and the Integrity of a Free Press’”—the Church report included one of the only proper names of the heavily edited chapter. E. Howard Hunt, the


46 “Philip L. Geyelin.” Brief bio found in the personal archives of Mary Sherman Willis, at her home, in folder labeled “P.L.G./BIO.” Author unknown.
man in charge of CIA relationships with American publishers in the late 1960s (and later one of the men convicted in the Watergate burglary) testified to the Committee that while most of the CIA books were written with foreign audiences in mind, and distributed outside of the United States, some of the books had been domestically circulated, and not necessarily accidentally. The Committee excerpted his testimony.

**Question.** Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept out of or away from the American reading public?

Mr. HUNT. It was impossible because Praeger was a commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be bought here, had to be read… the ultimate target was foreign, which was true, but how much of the Praeger output actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable. 47

Praeger published my grandfather’s book.

That doesn’t prove CIA sponsorship, or subsidization, or support, just as his presence in Europe in the mid-fifties doesn’t prove his covert Cold War cooperation with the American intelligence agencies who could have found him useful. But I was shocked to find what felt like reputable needles of doubt, poking holes in my image of a grandfather whose journalism expressly defied the government he had, it turned out, expressly been tied to—possibly for longer than publicly acknowledged.

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The Church and Pike reports didn't contain the first mentions of CIA infiltration of the American media, but their depth, weight, and extensive popular attention added gravity to previous coverage and claims that had gone relatively unnoticed prior to the Year of Intelligence. Stuart Loory, then a *New York Times* journalist who went on to edit the *Chicago Sun-Times*, had al-

47 “The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Institutions,” 199.
ready published an article in the Columbia Journalism Review titled “The CIA’s use of the press: a ‘mighty Wurlitzer’” on September 1, 1974, a few months before Seymour Hersh began publishing his Times series. The article examined what Loory found to be an odd phenomenon: by that point, there had been a handful of public disclosures of media ties to the CIA, and no one—neither the public, nor the mainstream media community—had bit. “Journalists themselves are involved,” reads the subheading, “and that may explain media neglect of the story.”48

Above the text sat an image of a clip of a Washington Star-News front-page story from November 30, 1973, by Oswald Johnston. It’s titled “Journalists doubling as CIA Contacts,” and claimed that as of the time of the article’s publication, the CIA payroll included 36 American journalists employed as undercover informants or full-time agents; and that 40 full-time reporters, free-lancers, and correspondents were listed by the CIA as regular undercover contacts who were routinely paid for their information. The revelations came about as a result of a review that new Director of Central Intelligence William Colby had ordered in 1973, in response to queries from the Times and Washington Star-News as to whether any of their own staff were being paid by the CIA. The queries had followed a short-lived media flurry over allegations that Seymour K. Freiden, a popular foreign correspondent for the Hearst newspapers, had worked for the CIA. “The use of foreign correspondents by the CIA has been quietly suspected—and feared—for years by legitimate reporters who have worked overseas,” wrote Johnston, in 1973. “But the suspicion has never been verifiable until now.” Johnston claimed that following the review, a surprised Colby “ordered a significant cutback” in CIA ties to journalists affiliated with major

media outlets. Underneath the image of Johnston's text, Loory wrote the caption, “The story that was not pursued.”

Loory claimed that the news that journalists themselves were on the CIA payroll, as reported by Johnston and a few others, “caused a brief stir, and then was dropped.” The New York Times, he said, had reprinted Johnston’s story on its front page on December 1; otherwise, it was ignored, besides that the Post “rewrote it, added some congressional reaction, and ran the story inside the paper.” But the Post also printed an earlier version of Loory’s Review article, as a short piece under Loory’s byline on the Post’s editorial page on January 13, 1974, eight months before the fuller-bodied exposition appeared in the Review. By that point, Geyelin had been working at the Post for nearly a decade, and had been running the paper’s editorial page for the past six years. Printing Loory’s early article was Geyelin’s choice to make.

Titled “Press Credibility and Journalist-Spies,” Loory's January op-ed asserted that in “the old days—the pre-Watergate days—when even small deceptions by the government, once revealed were considered scandalous, the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency was using American foreign correspondents as spies would have provoked an uproar.” Loory goes on to claim that the lackluster public response to the disclosures made a few weeks prior by DCI William Colby—that the CIA had 36 agents working abroad as foreign correspondents, or using

their positions for cover—was insufficient against the threat of a compromised press corps.\textsuperscript{50} The printing of the story on Geyelin’s page, even if it is only in the middle of the paper, provides a counterpoint to the decision-making Loory went on to criticize in the \textit{Review} piece: it represents a choice, at least, not to suppress a story. The choice ultimately proved ironic, because it was Loory’s \textit{Review} article the following fall that led fingers to point at Geyelin as one of the “journalist-spies” the article describes. Geyelin’s decision to print the early version of an article that implicated him could speak to a certain shrewdness—his own printing of the story could serve as a helpful safeguard against future accusations, should his own conduct ever come under scrutiny. But it also could have come from a blind innocence as to the turns the next year would take: he might not have ever considered that Loory would soon accuse him of being a "journalist-spy" himself.\textsuperscript{51}

Loory claimed the practice of using journalists was initiated, or invented, by Frank Wisner, the head of the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination and later the CIA’s Deputy Director of Plans. At the agency in the early fifties, he created what Loory calls a “wondrous machine,” what Wisner named his “mighty Wurlitzer”: a department that used a collection of instruments—labor unions, charities, publishing houses, student groups, media outlets—to play pro-America, anti-His framing of the issue—as something no one would pay attention to, given how unexceptional governmental duplicity had become in the public eye—is interesting, maybe ironic, given the national attention over the series by Seymour Hersh that would be published the next December, and the public response to the resulting investigations. While I read the 1974 public reaction to Hersh’s \textit{Times} series as a logical extension of the past few years of public outrage over clandestine, or covered-up, government action, Loory explains the preceding inattention as part of a growing public numbness to government scandal.  

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communist tune. Most often it invested in, or infiltrated, media and projects dispelled overseas—but not exclusively, and either way, propaganda fallout could easily reach American ears. While Loory asserted that many of the participating newsmen were foreign journalists, he claimed that the CIA also approached American correspondents, asking them to collect or plant information and sometimes paying them to do so. Some journalists rejected the propositions. But, reported Loory,

John A. Bross, a former deputy to the director of the CIA, says he knows of one American newsman who did not refuse the agency overtures. This newsman, while a young correspondent working in Western Europe, joined the CIA as a full-fledged clandestine agent. He was not merely an informant who received a small retainer, expenses or occasional fees for his services. He was as much at the beck and call of the CIA as his overt employer. His identity was such a deeply held secret that Bross had served for two years as director of a division carrying out clandestine operations in Eastern Europe before he learned the identity of the newsman-agent.

The newsman’s assignment was to keep tabs on Eastern European Communists traveling in Western Europe. “He’s in a very responsible position right now,” Bross says. Further than that Bross will not go.52

My grandfather kept a clip of this page in his files. These two paragraphs are underlined and bracketed in red. “John A. Bross” is circled in black, and “Eastern European Communists traveling” is underlined in black, too. Geyelin kept it because John A. Bross was talking about him.53

Sy Hersh published his series in the Times a few months after Loory’s article went to print. The Church, Pike, and Rockefeller committees followed. Unlike the Church report, the full Pike report was never officially published, facing Congressional pressure to keep it under wraps


(and, reported the *Village Voice*, especially strong pressure from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who opposed the report’s publication). But information was leaked. The *Village Voice* published a leaked draft in its February 16, 1976 issue, in 24-page special supplement titled “The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read.” Rumors, or details, got out.

During its investigation the committee had compiled a list of “suspected newsmen-spooks,” as Howard Bray called them in his 1980 *Washington Post* retrospective, *The Pillars of the Post*. They came up with about fifty names, one of them supplied by John A. Bross, who had run CIA clandestine operations in Eastern Europe and remembered a correspondent who had secretly “kept tabs for the CIA on Iron Curtain travelers in Western Europe.” His name was Phil Geyelin; and while Bross had refrained from giving Loory his name at the time he was researching his article, he didn’t withhold the information from the Pike researcher who asked him about it. The name got out to Washington. Some suspected that ties to the agency were keeping Geyelin's editorial page “soft” on the CIA; or that, in a related sense, they explained the editorial


55 Bray, 144.
page’s recent criticism of the way the Pike committee was handling its investigations. On April 13, 1976, Geyelin called Bross to address the rumors that had, by then, gained momentum in Washington. The next day, Bross wrote to Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 until 1973. Helms had served as chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff from 1951 until 1953, and then was promoted to Chief of Operations, a position he held for seven years. He was in charge of both intelligence collection and covert operations and the deputy to his friend, Frank Wisner, creator of the "Wurlitzer," who had killed himself in 1965. Bross

56 This was despite a Charles Seib editorial on the Post’s January 30, 1976, that references the 1973 admissions by Colby and the relatively subdued media and public response to the story (naming Loory’s Columbia Journalism Review piece as the notable exception). Seib’s piece, on Geyelin’s page, calls for journalists to be better this time around, even though congressional sources seemed to be “exceptionally tight-lipped” about leaks. “Nevertheless,” he wrote, “the press should not again let this matter sink from view until it resurfaces, a few months or years from now, with new figures but with the same basic fact: pollution of the news business by the spy business. The identities of the journalists should be made known, and soon. If publication could endanger some in foreign posts, the agency should be given time—a brief time—to get them out.” It seems unlikely that an editor concerned about a legitimately duplicitous relationship reaching public attention would want to publish another editorial on his editorial page calling for all press-C.I.A. ties to be publicly revealed; that said, as with the printing of Loory’s January 1974 article, I can’t speak to Geyelin’s motivations, or strategy, or innocence. (Charles B. Seib, “News Business, Spy Business,” Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), January 30, 1976, http://search.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/docview/146437349/2E032A1DD7EA449EPQ/1?accountid=15172.)


58 Bray, 144.


sent him a copy of the letter, which Geyelin kept, and which I found this summer in the Library of Congress in the first of the 127 boxes they’d kept of his files.

Addressed to “Dick,” it opened with a call Bross had gotten from Loory shortly after Bross had left “the Agency.” Loory had wanted to know about CIA relations with the press, generally, and had claimed to have evidence demonstrating a common CIA practice: using journalistic cover for their spies. But Bross told him that in his “entire career on the operational side of the Agency,” he only remembered one brief instance where a journalist was used. It was in the early 1950s, and the journalist was Phil Geyelin.

He knew, he said, that Geyelin had worked for Frank Wisner’s Office of Policy Coordination “in its earliest and wildest days.” But he also, he said, “was under the distinct impression that he had served the Agency during the course of his work for the Wall Street Journal in Europe by providing some coverage of Soviet or other subversive activities in Germany as it came to his attention.” Bross thought Helms had told him this in a conversation in the early fifties. But either way, he said, it seemed clear that Geyelin’s “service” had been very brief, if it existed at all. By the time he gave Geyelin’s name to the Pike Committee investigator in the summer of 1975, he wrote, Geyelin’s association with the agency was already “common gossip” anyway. Still, he wrote Helms, it was clear the leak was causing Geyelin “a lot of trouble.” There wasn’t any ambivalence over whether Geyelin had worked for the CIA; but Geyelin had called him, the day before, to root out the rumors he said were threatening his career.

Bross had told Geyelin on the phone, and Helms in the letter, that it was very possible that his memory was hazy, or wrong. He was happy to try and clear up what happened, given that it mattered to Geyelin. But, he wrote, he was “perplexed” about the current attitudes regarding
the press and the government. Geyelin, he wrote, seemed to feel that a journalist who chose to serve the CIA for espionage purposes would somehow be “morally contaminated.” If the allegation was untrue, he wrote, Geyelin was “certainly entitled to have his word substantiated”—but the motivation, or the concept, was something Bross failed to understand. “As I told Phil,” he wrote to Helms,

it has seemed wholly admirable, under certain circumstances, for journalists in general and him in particular to have served our government’s intelligence requirements—particularly in the early 50’s when many of us in Germany could practically hear Soviet tank treads churning around Berlin.

Fifty years ago it was considered fitting and proper for American journalists to report indications of potentially hostile foreign activity which came to their attention while serving abroad—in other words to serve intelligence purposes…. Given what was generally known about Soviet policy and practice in the post World War II period the distinction between war and peace seems to me to have no validity at all.

There is a basic paradox in all this. It is apparently all right for journalists to make their readers the beneficiaries of what is after all espionage carried out against the U.S. Government, but not all right to make the U.S. Government the beneficiary of coverage which they carry out against foreign countries. In both cases the role appropriate for a presumptively beneficient (sic), elected, representative government is very peculiar. 61

Bross’s response points to a confusion, or distaste, echoed by Helms in his response and other members of an earlier American generation. “What I totally fail to understand,” he ended, is the implication that journalists who choose to serve in this capacity are somehow morally contaminated. Phil Geylin (sic) seems to feel that this is the way it is, however. In any event if he never did work for the Agency, as he says, he is certainly entitled to have his word substantiated.

In his mind, journalists posted abroad were just Americans, posted abroad, in the early days of the Cold War. They were all, supposedly, on the same side. Bross implies that the journalistic

feats of the recent years—years of Vietnam, the Pentagon Papers, Watergate—had been products of “espionage carried out against the U.S. government.” Why, he asked, would that be less morally contaminated than espionage carried out against foreign countries—which, in the context of the Cold War, would benefit the American government, rather than bring it to its knees? In both cases—in which journalists spied on their country, or denied their country information—the American government appeared the adversary. To Bross, this was “peculiar.” But by the mid-seventies, that adversarial relationship didn’t seem so peculiar for those for whom Geyelin’s alleged relationship with the CIA was disconcerting. Given that those people were Geyelin’s readership, their opinions mattered. Whatever Geyelin had or hadn’t done, and had or hadn’t thought about it, his professional standing hinged on his readers’, and peers’, belief in his integrity. In the face of rumors, he was vulnerable to their imagination.

Helms wrote back to Bross a week later, from Tehran, where he was then posted as the American ambassador. He claimed he had no “independent recollection” of Geyelin’s association with the Agency—which wasn’t to say that he might not have known something in the early fifties, but that he at least didn’t remember anything anymore. As best as he could recollect, he said, he hadn’t heard until quite recently that Geyelin had, at one time, been identified with OPC. Regarding arrangements with the *Wall Street Journal*, he wrote, “My mind is a blank.” Frankly, he thought, he didn’t remember meeting Geyelin until the sixties, when he met him as he met many other newspapermen working in D.C. But either way, as to why it mattered, Helms said he shared Bross’s “perplexity” at Geyelin’s attitude. He chalked it up to time, implying that Geyelin’s present perceptions were tinting his hindsight. It seemed, wrote Helms, that Geyelin
was trapped in the recent scandals, press attention, and Congressional hearings that had recently been causing the “Intelligence Community” so much trouble. “After all,” he wrote,

we have been living during this past year with a sea change in the public’s view of what a secret service should be permitted to do. The national attitude in 1966 was obviously significantly different from that of 1975. Since man was not blessed with a capacity for clairvoyance, it is exceedingly difficult to anticipate at one state in one’s career how people might view actions many years later against a different background and in another context.62

The implication—whether or not it was true—is that Geyelin was panicking over previously understandable actions whose motivations were no longer legible against the backdrop of 1976. Helms claimed he couldn’t remember what Geyelin had, or hadn’t, done. But the tone of the letter points to a broader point: that even if Geyelin had committed acts he now denied, the denial was coming out of nothing more than a need to stay afloat in changing national waters. To the moral questions, Helms assigned no gravity.

Bross wrote to Phil on April 28th, attaching copies of the letters to and from Helms. He apologized for his memory, which he said was “undoubtedly to blame” for the embarrassment of the rumors. He might have, he wrote, simply remembered some kind of report from one of “our people” in Germany, or somewhere else in Europe, that passed on some information attributed to Geyelin. He’d assumed at the time, and since, that Geyelin had been working for the Agency; but that, he said, appeared to have been a mistake. “Our people abroad, or many of them, learned a lot from journalists and reported what they learned,” he wrote. “This is very likely what hap-

He was prepared, he said, to do anything he could to clear up any misconceptions.63

But by then, Geyelin was already doing what he could on his own: making plans to go to the CIA himself, and find out whatever it was they had kept on him. He brought his friend Joseph Califano, then the Post’s attorney, who had just helped another Post reporter carry out a similar investigation after facing similar rumors.64 “It was a time when everyone was looking for anything they could get on anybody in that connection in Washington,” Califano told me over the phone. Geyelin was concerned, said Califano, that the allegations would have a serious impact on Geyelin’s professional standing.65 Over the next two months, the men went on a series of visits to CIA headquarters with a twofold mission: they wanted to see what was in any files the agency had kept, and they wanted a letter from George H. W. Bush, then the Director of Central Intelligence, delineating what, exactly, the relationship had been. Preferably (or exclusively), it would be written in terms that excused Geyelin of any perceived misconduct. The best record I have of what they found comes from memos Califano wrote, and kept, following the meetings, which Geyelin kept next to the copies of the correspondence now housed at the Library.

Califano’s first memo is dated April 29, 1976. It says that he and Geyelin met with Richard Lansdale, then the acting general counsel of the CIA, who read to the men from what he called “Mr. Geyelin’s 201 file.” He wouldn’t let them read it themselves. The file was created in

63 Letter from John A. Bross to Philip L. Geyelin, April 28, 1976, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.


65 Joseph A. Califano, Jr., interview by Devon Geyelin, December 16, 2015.
November of 1957, and began with the personal history that Geyelin included in his job application from August 21, 1950. The agency couldn’t find, said Lansdale, the personnel action paper that would show when Geyelin was first employed, and when he left employment; but other papers, he told them, indicated that the period of employment had lasted from December 1950 to December 1951, the timeframe Geyelin had described. After that, all that I know comes from the notes in Califano’s memo, written from what Lansdale ostensibly read to them.

Much of the memo seems to include CIA talk about what Geyelin could potentially do for the agency while he was stationed abroad. There are a lot of requests for clearances, starting in 1954, when (in Califano’s words) “there was a request from one of the European Operating Divisions to obtain appropriate clearances for Geyelin in order to ‘use as a cover contact [?] in the developmental program in the international business field.’” The bracketed question mark is Califano’s own. The next sentence seems to try and clear it up—“Lansdale said that this was what the Agency did as a prelude to determining whether or not to try and use someone in civilian life”—but it doesn’t really explain how the Agency meant to “use” him. The clearance was approved, though, and Geyelin was told (here, Califano quotes the CIA) he was “not to represent himself nor is he to be represented as an employee of the CIA.”

The next year, the American Division approved Geyelin’s use in an “operational capacity” in Paris on “labor projects,” with talk of using him in Rome and Frankfurt on similar projects as well. In later years, he was given the telephone number and home address of the agency’s station chief in Paris; he was given clearance (or the CIA was granted clearance to “use” him) a number of other times; he was again admonished not to represent himself as a CIA employee. One cable asked for “continued clearance” of Geyelin, “including his potential use to obtain po-
litical information.” In March 1959, Washington told the London Station Chief that “operational approval for use of Geyelin in Paris” was still good in London. He was described as “well known” to the London station chief, who requested approval to use him as an occasional informant; and after a lunch with the Paris station chief, he was noted as potentially a “very reliable and discreet contact,” who respected the work the Agency was doing in Paris.

Many of the instances, which Califano separated into bullet-like paragraphs, make mention of where Geyelin would be traveling, primarily or ostensibly for his work as a journalist—“a brief assignment to the Middle East,” Germany, Warsaw. An October 1957 cable from Paris to Washington told headquarters that Geyelin was going to Poland for four to six weeks, and “wondered what Geyelin could do for them in Poland.” “According to Lansdale,” wrote Califano, “there were apparently exchanges of correspondence and/or cables between Europe and the U.S. about when Mr. Geyelin would be contacted.” I don’t have that correspondence, though, or those cables. I just have whatever Geyelin kept of what Califano noted of what Lansdale said.

The memos, though, seem to have been kept in their entirety. And many of the notes seem to point to the sort of relationship my grandfather would later defend. A 1956 memorandum containing (in a quote of Lansdale) “ruminations on possible operational use” indicated, in Califano’s terms, “that Geyelin agreed to help in France consistent with his obligations as a reporter.” Another from 1956 claimed that an “entirely spontaneous” contact between Geyelin and the Paris station chief indicated that “Geyelin seemed willing to cooperate ‘provided the task given him would not interfere with his responsibilities and loyalty to the Wall Street Journal.’” An earlier memo, from 1955, similarly noted that “arrangements were made” for a meeting with Geyelin, where he “indicated he was willing to provide information to the CIA ‘without interfer-
The “agent” who met with him, it said, “indicated that Geyelin was ‘definitely interested and willing.’” In all of those quotes, the internal quotations, written by Califano, seem to note a quote from Lansdale, or from the file, which maybe quoted an agent, or a younger Geyelin. And a memo noting an instance in 1958, in New York, when an agency member contacted Geyelin for a briefing on Paris, Bonn, and London, contained a bracketed note from Califano with Geyelin’s 1976 explanation: that “this apparently was when he was on home leave from the Wall Street Journal and that the Wall Street Journal had a practice of permitting the CIA to debrief and interview foreign correspondents.” The memo that noted Geyelin’s respect for the type of work the Agency was doing in France also noted that the station chief, who made the note, would give him a full briefing on what they were doing.

That last type of interaction—in which Geyelin was the one receiving the information—points to the sort of reciprocal relationship Geyelin would later argue to continue conducting, if under slightly different phrasing, in the mid-seventies. An October 1957 cable from Paris to Washington mentioned again the proposed trip to Poland; but rather than asking what Geyelin could do for the CIA, it forwarded Geyelin’s question of what the CIA could do for him. Geyelin, it said, was negotiating with the press officer of the Polish embassy, and (in quotes written by Califano) “asked if the station chief would be willing to provide him with a list of Polish officials and background information.” He’d asked for “rumors of impending shifts of Polish officials” and “hoped that the station chief would be able to help him ‘primarily by giving him some idea of what to look for.’” The memo in which the Paris station chief claimed Geyelin could be a “very reliable and discreet contact” also said the chief would give Geyelin a “full briefing on what was going on in France.” In those instances, according to the memo, Geyelin learned in-
formation for himself when he interacted with the agency. It sounds like what Bob Woodward, who worked with Geyelin at the Post, said to me a few weeks ago. “You know,” he said, “your grandfather was so smart, my suspicion is he used the CIA more than the CIA used him.”

The last example on Califano’s list referenced a trip Geyelin made to Cuba in 1964. Before then, all the examples had been concentrated in the 1950s, with the last reported contact before 1964 having taken place in 1959 (according to Califano’s memo). But a CIA memo written in December 1975—in response, said Lansdale, to a request to the Agency from the Pike Committee for “any information indicating that ‘Geyelin was a source of this office’”—noted that Geyelin was contacted in September of 1964, while stationed at the Washington Bureau of the Journal (having returned from his positions abroad). The contact was related to a trip Geyelin had recently taken to Cuba, and indicated, according to the memo, that Geyelin “had furnished two reports to the CIA contact.” Califano inserted a bracketed note: “[Geyelin said that he wrote no reports for the CIA. This later turned out to be true.]” Califano, the memo notes, asked Lansdale to check whether the “reports” had simply been articles Geyelin had published following his trip.

And then another man walked into the room. Califano left out his name, writing only “_____ _____,” whom he described as “occasionally acting general counsel of the CIA.” The men talked about the next letter, one Geyelin and Califano were requesting of the CIA, and which was meant to clarify (or clear) Geyelin’s relations to the Agency. Califano wanted a letter-

66 Bob Woodward, interview by Devon Geyelin, February 1, 2016.

ter indicating the year in which Geyelin was employed by the CIA—1950 to 1951—and affirming that Geyelin didn’t conform to any of the four categories of covert relationships listed in the Church report.

Califano read the man excerpts from the report describing the four types of relationships then-director Colby mentioned. All were described as "covert," but while the first three types involved full- or part-time journalists paid for their undercover work overseas, the last type included only “journalists with whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional, covert contact,” what the Committee termed “the kind of contact that journalists have with any other department of the U.S. Government in the routine performance of their journalistic duties…. The difference, of course, is that the relationship is covert.” As the Committee described it, that fourth type of relationship involved no exchange of money, and was typically contained to occasional phone calls, lunches, or interviews in which information would be “exchanged or verified.” The journalist would either volunteer information, or be requested by the CIA to provide some sort of information about people with whom he was in contact. Despite my reading of the material in Geyelin’s 201 file, at least as recorded by Califano, the unnamed man from the CIA said Geyelin “would not fit” into any of the four categories.68

Lansdale “expressed concern” that the agency might find itself having to provide similar letters to “every reporter in Washington,” should it provide one to Geyelin; Califano said Geyelin’s case was special, because of the “nasty rumors in Washington” about the Post’s editorial page being “soft on the CIA.” “The problem,” he recorded in the memo, “went to the integrity

of the editorial process.” They left with an agreement: Califano would provide a draft of a letter from the CIA, which could be in response to a drafted letter from Geyelin. Geyelin, he said, wouldn’t print his letter on the editorial page of the Post. He just wanted to show it to “those who made nasty and unfounded accusations about any relationship of his to the CIA” after the agreed-upon end date of his employment, in December 1951. Mr. Lansdale made a quip about how “everyone wanted to get away from the CIA.” Geyelin said no. He just wanted an accurate statement.

The two men went back to the CIA a few weeks later, on May 18, to meet with a representative of the domestic contact division, “Mr. Ziemer.” The memo from that meeting records entries from a CIA record similar to those Geyelin's “201 file,” but focused on contacts made to Geyelin while he was on American soil. In December 1957, the New York CIA office cabled the D.C. headquarters to say “a man named Phil Geyelin might be able to provide foreign intelligence for them.” He was met in March 1958 by a CIA domestic contact, but “nothing came of the conversation.” In April 1965, a CIA cable indicated that Geyelin should be contacted when he was available; in May 1968, there was a cable indicating the contact had never been made. In March of 1968, a cable noted “a decision that the CIA find out where Geyelin was,” since he might be worth contacting for a debriefing in Washington on his impressions of West Germany, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and France; the debriefing, though, never took place.

And the reports on Cuba? Lansdale said that, contrary to his previous comments, the CIA had no reports from him as a result of that trip. The “reports” were written by a CIA agent who had interviewed Geyelin about his trip to Cuba on September 18, 1964, at Geyelin’s home. The agent’s report said “he seemed friendly and cooperative and provided the interviewer with re-
portable information on the Cuban budget.” The Washington field office cited him as a source of its material on Cuba as a result of the report, but—and Califano took care to quote Lansdale directly in his memo—“These are the only reports that the CIA has any record of.”

Those memos are the most substantial information I have on what the CIA kept on my grandfather. My FOIA requests have been in for thirteen months; I’m told they might be fulfilled by this June. The rest that I have is conjecture, and small bits of other memories of the meeting. Califano wrote about the experience in his 2004 memoir. “We were astonished,” he wrote, at the cables suggesting Geyelin might have been able to provide foreign intelligence for the agency. “The cables were filled with agent reports of insignificant conversations blown all out of proportion.” And Howard Bray, who wrote a Post retrospective in 1980 for which Geyelin was interviewed, noted the issue of a cryptonym, or code name, assigned to Geyelin, and not mentioned in any of Califano’s memos. On the phone this year, Califano most strongly remembered “something to do with Cuba.”

Looking again at the memos this winter, I got caught up on the chronology. The first memo is dated April 29, 1976, though it doesn’t state the date of the meeting. From the tone and specificity, my impulse is to understand it as having been written soon after the meeting itself—if not on the day of the meeting, then only a few days later. The second memo is dated May 24,

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71 Bray, 145.

72 Califano, interview.
1976, and seems to be from the domestic counterpart to the earlier meeting, which focused on international contacts. But there’s a third memo, dated as having been written in between the two, on May 3, 1976, though it discusses a meeting that occurred a few weeks earlier: on April 16, before Califano and my grandfather went to the CIA together. At the time of the April 16 meeting, neither of the men had yet reviewed Geyelin’s file, and Califano was operating alone.

He met “Dick” Lansdale and Bush at the CIA for “approximately 30 minutes” to speak “on the subject of Phil Geyelin.” Califano, it says, told then-director Bush that “potential erroneous rumors” alleging Geyelin had worked for the CIA while a professional reporter might lead to charges that the *Post* was “soft on the CIA” because of Geyelin’s relationship to the Agency. Califano didn’t want to invoke Freedom of Information and Privacy Act procedures to get the records, because the Agency was a few months behind in responding to FOIA requests (a problem they don’t seem to have addressed), and the Geyelin issue, he said, demanded “immediate attention.” Califano wanted to see whatever they had. He also wanted a formal statement from the CIA stating the exact years of Geyelin’s employment, and that he “performed no services for the Agency” after that period. Lansdale explained that the Agency didn’t typically give “opinion letters of this type—especially when everyone is trying to run away” from the CIA. “Nevertheless,” wrote Califano, “Mr. Bush requested that Lansdale draft such a letter immediately.”

Though he’d just assured Califano that he’d receive a statement regarding Geyelin’s employment, Bush admitted that the Agency couldn’t, at that time, “locate Mr. Geyelin’s personnel file.” They had found a personnel card, which showed Geyelin had been employed from 1951 to 1952. Following a 48-hour check, Bush said no evidence had been found that Geyelin “ever performed services” for the CIA following 1951-1952. “In conclusion,” stated the memo, “the Di-
rector seemed prepared at the close of this meeting to provide the formal statement suggested by Mr. Califano, and he stated he would clear any statement through Mr. Califano when it was drafted.\textsuperscript{73}

This meeting must have happened before the meeting discussed in the April 29 memo, because Califano hadn’t yet reviewed the Agency’s records—he was there to demand permission to do so. It’s unsurprising that Califano would demand a letter clearing Geyelin’s name without, or before, knowing the CIA’s account of what had to be cleared. Califano was there on behalf of Geyelin, and Geyelin insisted he’d had no improper Agency contact since officially leaving employment (by his account, in 1951; by the Agency account mentioned here, in 1952). But it seems that the Agency hadn’t fully reviewed his file yet, either—only performing a 48-hour check—and still, it only took thirty minutes to convince Bush to write a letter outlining Geyelin’s conduct in words that fit Geyelin's mid-seventies motivations: in which any connections would be "cleared up," if not minimized, or erased.

To write that letter, Califano told me on the phone, was “an act of enormous decency” on the part of Bush. It wasn’t common practice. “They just never did things like that. That wasn’t the only issue we had with the CIA in terms of the Washington Post. I mean, we had plenty of issues in those days. The other relationships—I think, I don’t know, my knowledge is; I have no knowledge of his involvement with the CIA at any point, when he was in Paris or anywhere. But the only—I do vividly remember when that rumor started circulating Washington,” he said. “It

\textsuperscript{73} Joseph A. Califano, Jr., “Memorandum For File: Washington Post – Phil Geyelin,” May 3, 1976, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4. The memo includes the final note, “[This memorandum for the file was drafted by PBH after debriefing by Mr. Califano subsequent to the meeting.]” It’s signed “PBHamilton,” who seems to have been some sort of office assistant. See Appendix G.
would have been very damaging to him. He was the editorial page director of the *Washington Post.*”

I asked Califano why he believed my grandfather when he claimed not to have had any inappropriate contact with the Agency after he left employment. “Because I knew him!” he said. “And I knew if he said it wasn’t so, it wasn’t so. He wouldn’t lie to me. And I knew it could be very damaging to him professionally. He was just straight. And he would never have lied to me. And would never have asked me to do something unless he thought it was important.”

So Califano reached out to Director Bush in April of 1976. He remembers the conversation. “‘You know,’” he told Bush, “‘this is his life and his career.’” Bush, Califano remembers, said, “fine, I’ll do it.”

In late May and early June, Geyelin drafted a series of potential letters to Bush delineating his prior relationship to the Agency, as well as a series of versions of Bush’s response. Califano gave him edits. In the files Geyelin kept, there are copies of three drafts, and references to more. The specifics were important, sometimes subtle, and it was significant that any resulting letter from Bush would cover all the potential notes of contention. Geyelin acknowledged the need for nuance in a note he wrote to Califano on June 2nd, accompanying his latest “substantial re-write.” Califano, it seems, wanted him to cut it shorter; but, wrote Geyelin, “it seems to me impossible to ignore the background,” and necessary to “make some part of the case for writing me a letter,” given the preoccupation with setting a precedent. And, he said,

Finally, I am always leery of the blanket denial—‘no connection’—when the files, which may or may not see the light of day at some point, clearly record connections. That is why it seemed worthwhile trying to get into my letter, and

74 Califano, interview.
his, the distinction between normal journalistic contacts, however they may be viewed by CIA operatives, and any of the four working relationships set forth in Bush’s answer.

Anyway, let’s talk about it.\textsuperscript{75, 76}

His draft attempts to explain the difference between his rumored relationship with the CIA and the actual (and existent) nature of their interactions. Califano would edit out much of the exposition. The differences between the June 2\textsuperscript{nd} draft and the June 9\textsuperscript{th} draft (which was submitted to Lansdale, and Bush) will be noted with strikethroughs, for information written by Geyelin and deleted by Califano, and italics, for information added through Califano’s edits.

Dear Mr. Bush:

From December 1950 to December 1951, during the Korean War I was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency at a rather low level in Washington, on a leave of absence from the Wall Street Journal. At no time did I serve outside Washington and at no time after my resignation did I have any connection with the CIA other than open, professional contacts with news sources in the course of my duties as a foreign correspondent and, later, as a Washington diplomatic correspondent for the Journal; these contacts consisted of nothing more than the normal exchanges that take place between reporters and officials of any government agency and as reporters seeking confirmation of information they have gathered, or receiving briefings in advance of specific assignments, and as government officials, for their part, occasionally ask questions of their own.

Recently, however, there have been rumors circulating in Washington that I had some sort of a continuing working relationship with CIA after December, 1951, while I was employed as a newspaperman. In one specific instance, a retired official of the agency indicated to a journalist colleague and also to a staff member of the Pike Committee his “impression” that I had worked for the agency in Germany in the early 1950’s while simultaneously employed by the Wall Street Journal—an allegation that is false on its face since I was in the Washington Bureau of the Journal at that time.

Because of these rumors, I requested, as you know, \textit{I requested} an opportunity to review any files or records bearing on any relationship with CIA that

\textsuperscript{75} Here, I assume he meant to say Colby’s statement, as discussed previously in this paper and the memos with regard to the Church Committee reports.

\textsuperscript{76} Letter from Philip L. Geyelin to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., June 2, 1976, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.
somebody in the Agency might have thought I had after 1951. This review entirely conformed the fact that my connection with CIA terminated with my resignation in December 1951, apart from the contacts of a working reporter that which I have already described.

In the present atmosphere, however, it is not enough for me to know it this fact, and to assert it; the rumors apparently continue. Because I profoundly believe in the view, shared by most members of my profession, that any covert relationship with branch of government creates an intolerable and unprofessional conflict of interest for working journalists, these rumors offend me. They may even be damaging. These rumors deeply trouble me and may even be personally damaging. But my main reason for concern is that whatever damage they may do to me, they such rumors are potentially far more very damaging to the integrity and effectiveness of The Washington Post – an institution to which I have devoted the last ten years of my career and one whose reputation is of far more importance than mine — because, in my present capacity as Editor of the this newspaper’s Editorial Page, I am responsible for its opinions on a range of issues bearing on involving the CIA, including specifically the question of whether the Agency ought to have covert working relationships of any sort with the press.

For this reason, I would very much appreciate your checking the files personally and confirming that I, in fact, had no connection with the CIA after 1951, other than the ordinary contacts of any practicing journalist, so that I can put these rumors can be put to rest.\textsuperscript{77}

Califano struck through the suggestion that Geyelin might have supplied valuable information to the agency, deleting the note that government officials might, at points, ask journalists questions themselves, and deleting the allusion to Bross’s anecdotal evidence. He shifted the narrative away from one of personal redemption, and towards the institutional integrity of the Washington Post. He added the word “covert”—the common denominator between all four types of relationships presented by the Church report—as a descriptor of what the relationship (however it existed) was not. Given that the CIA documents explicitly demonstrated some sort of connection, which Geyelin didn’t later deny, I imagine the men took issue with that word, and especially

\textsuperscript{77} Draft included in letter to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., from Philip L. Geyelin, June 2, 1976, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.
its connotations of collusion, or consistency. At base, it seems Geyelin didn't want anyone him to imagine he'd had what he described as a "working relationship" with the agency.

Califano sent Lansdale a draft of Bush's response on June 11, 1976, underneath a cover letter:

Dear Dick:

Per our conversation, I am enclosing a proposed exchange of correspondence between Mr. Geyelin and Director Bush. Please give me a call when you have read them and we can discuss them.

The proposed letter claimed that Geyelin’s relationship with the Agency never resembled any of the types outlined by former CIA Director William Colby, on pages 195 to 197 of the Church Committee report. “While on one or two occasions,” the letter finished, “CIA representatives overtly contacted you to obtain your impressions of the nations you had visited, at no time since you left the employ of the Agency have you been involved in any of the covert relationships described in the Senate Select Committee’s Report.”

That letter, too, went through another series of drafts before Bush sent Geyelin an official response, on CIA stationary. The final draft is shorter, and more definite, hinging on the second of two paragraphs (the first of which only claims that Geyelin’s brief employment ended in 1951). “Additionally,” reads the second paragraph,

there has been a limited and intermittent association with you in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. As a foreign correspondent you were in touch with Agency representatives from time to time, in line with the not unusual practice of correspondents, but you were not an employee (since 1951), and received no compensation. Our records reveal no association contacts at all subsequent to 1964.78

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Bush’s final, official letter to Geyelin recycles Califano’s latest-draft language almost completely, sticking to the script he and Lansdale had discussed. And it absorbs Geyelin’s last-minute edit, written in blue pen: a replacement of “association” with “contacts,” a distinction I read as one of alliance versus engagement. Alliance would be unsupportable; engagement, Geyelin would later argue, is unavoidable.

Dear Mr. Geyelin:
Upon receipt of your recent request to me, I have caused a thorough search of Agency records to be made to determine the matter of your relationship with this Agency. I can confirm to you that the records indicate you were employed by this Agency some years ago for a brief period, from December 1950 to December 1951. There is no record of any employment since that time.

Additionally, there have been a limited and intermittent number of contacts with you in the 1950’s and early 1960’s in your role as a foreign correspondent and consistent with the usual practice of such correspondents, but you have not been an employee since 1951 and have received no compensation since then. Our records reveal no contact at all subsequent to 1964.

Sincerely,
George Bush
Director

The only difference between the last draft and the official letter is an affirmation, in the second paragraph, of Geyelin’s behavior as “consistent with the usual practice of such correspondents”—an even gentler evaluation than that of the draft, in which Geyelin’s conduct was described as “not unusual.” The rest is unchanged, beyond the addition of Bush’s signature.

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Meanwhile, Bross sent Geyelin a letter. It's dated June 2nd, 1976, by which point Geyelin was already drafting the letter Bush had promised to send him.

Bross wrote that after speaking with Geyelin and Helms, he concluded “that my memory has failed me or that I misunderstood whatever it was that I was told which suggested your association with the Agency overseas.” He explained his choice to give Geyelin’s name to the Pike committee with, “My point was that, in my time and area at least, it was not the practice to use journalists for various reasons which I explained. One exception, in my opinion, proved the rule.” His leak to the Committee was, as he understood, the source of the recent “various investigations” into Geyelin’s “possible connections”; and his misunderstanding, or memory, was “the whole story,” as far as he knew.

“Having said all this,” he wrote, “let me go on to reiterate my astonishment that a brief period of collaboration with the United States Government should create so much static.” In his day, and his area, he said, there was a policy against using journalists covering “communist or other unfriendly areas,” given that it might put them in danger. And given that people in the intelligence community could have read a newspaper, there was no real motivation to pay the journalists, besides that it might commit them to disclose their sources (a practice otherwise considered journalistically unethical). “Where information affecting national security is concerned,” he said, “this can hardly be said to be a bad thing. If journalists choose to recognize a higher obligation to their publishers than they do to the government of the Republic this is their prerogative.” There had never been any practice, he said, of forcing journalists to “work for their government” if they chose not to—but “it hardly follows,” he said, “that if they do choose to do so they are committing some kind of immoral or criminal act.” He went on, referencing and refuting a Charles Seib editorial, “News Business, Spy Business,” printed in the January 30, 1976 issue of the Post, that
called for strict self-policing of journalists towards their fellow journalists, and their potential, and unethical, ties to intelligence agencies.

Journalists and intelligence agents are both presumably concerned with obtaining factually accurate data. Both occasionally use methods which may look a little unscrupulous. Both are essential and enjoy and are entitled to certain measures of protection. Neither, as far as I can judge, deserves some kind of sacerdotal status.

Everybody wants a free press. Everybody recognizes the competence and dedication of a large section of the press, the brilliance and wisdom of some reporters and the fact that a good many reporters are dismally deficient in any or certainly all of these qualities. Everybody recognizes the public service rendered by the press in its coverage and analysis of the news and its value for entertainment purposes. Everybody also recognizes that the press is run by proprietors who are not averse to turning an honest penny for themselves or their employees.

None of this explains to me the charges of apostasy which are leveled against members of the press for agreeing, for example, to supply the government with information about the activities of Soviet agents, or suspected agents in West Germany. In a recent column Charles Seib wants to free not only the American press but all the press everywhere from the “taint” of CIA corruption. Thus all the press of the world, in a sort of ecumenical alliance, should band together against CIA (i.e. the US Government). Should the governments of the world perhaps band together against the press?

Mr. Seib, in his indignation, has got a lot of things mixed up. The fact that some journalists worked for CIA for intelligence purposes does not mean that they had anything to do with “polluting” the media. Assuming that by “polluting” Mr. Seib means inserting false information under false attribution into the media for the purpose of causing dissension between adversaries—the Soviets and the Cubans for example—this was actually, as far as I know or the record shows, a very minor part of the CIA’s activity. Nor, as far as can be determined, is there any evidence that the journalists, whose recruitment by CIA Seib complains about, were used for this purpose. Most of CIA’s informational dissemination activities were designed to promote the circulation of information about events which would otherwise be suppressed or misrepresented—particularly behind the Iron Curtain. RFE programs, for example, told it exactly as it was.

From Bill Colby’s and other testimony before Congressional committees I gather that use of journalists by CIA has increased in recent years. I understand that George Bush has ended the practice. For the practical reasons which I have suggested above I believe that this is the right decision.

I am sorry that quite unintentionally I have mislead (sic) people into believing that you at one time worked for CIA overseas, under journalistic cover. This has obviously caused you embarrassment which I sincerely regret. However,
the conduct which you are (falsely) accused of hardly justifies anathema. Or so it seems to me.

   With warm personal regards.
   Faithfully yours,
   John A. Bross

The letter reads as a hedged apology: Bross said he was sorry for the trouble he’s caused, but also that he didn’t believe there should have been any trouble. Everyone, he said, was over-reacting to a non-problem.

But the non-problem grew into a problem for Geyelin once the rumor of his “association” with the CIA—a phrasing Geyelin had deemed too dangerous to be included in the letter meant to re-affirm his reputation—was seriously considered by his colleagues, or social world, or readership. Bross redacted his memory, or rewrote it, as soon as Geyelin asked him to. He might really have thought himself to have misspoken. He might have considered himself, and Geyelin, victims of confused semantics whose significance had only recently begun to matter. Or it might just not have meant much to him to erase his accusations. Given that he disagreed with the premise of “moral contamination,” what was it to him to cleanse a man of a questionable, or false, contaminant?

Reading the online theories, and learning of the mid-seventies rumors to which my grandfather felt vulnerable, I was surprised, and suspicious—but suspicious both of him and of the rumors on which my suspicion rested. From what I’d grown up knowing about my grandfather’s journalism, his writing, especially in the late sixties and early seventies, was pretty explicitly counter to the government agenda. He was credited with turning the Post’s editorial page against

80 Letter from John A. Bross to Philip L. Geyelin, June 2, 1976, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.
the Vietnam War, and wrote anti-Vietnam editorials for which he won the 1970 Pulitzer Prize; he was involved in the Post’s publication of the Pentagon Papers; he supported Woodward and Bernstein as they stuck out the Watergate investigations amidst other journalists’ skepticism. If he were under the thumb of the CIA—which is to say, under the thumb of the American government—then how do I explain his work in the decades leading up to the Year of Intelligence?

Bross described the ordeal as an instance of faulty memory, and a mistake. But during my grandfather’s meetings at the agency, a 201 file was uncovered, and it did show a history of “contacts” that don’t seem completely innocuous, or random, at least from my reading of Califano’s memos. Agency members seem to have identified him as a potential source, repeatedly, or at least as someone useful. He did, according to the file, insist that his cooperation was contingent on not “interfering with or embarrassing the Journal”; but the Agency also repeatedly told him, in the fifties, that he was “not to represent himself as nor is he to be represented as an employee of the CIA.”

Geyelin called them “normal journalistic contacts” in his note to Califano, while they were drafting the letter for Bush to sign. He didn’t want to make a “blanket denial” that there was “no connection,” given that the files clearly recorded them. And in the final letter, the Agency formally stated that there were no “contacts” between the Agency and my grandfather after 1964, around when he began reporting on the escalating situation Vietnam. But even if those earlier visits were just social, or commonplace, the whole ordeal—both the files uncovered, and the way Geyelin and Califano handled the situation—speak to a general chumminess with the American


82 Califano, “Memorandum For File: Washington Post – Phil Geyelin.”
government that I find to be at odds with the understanding I always had of my grandfather: that
of a dissenter, a protester with a pen. Unless, of course, Vietnam changed Geyelin's own relation-
ship to the government, so that by the mid-seventies he couldn't relate to his earlier mindset, ei-
ther.

Maybe the contacts, as reported by the Agency, did end in 1964, twelve years after he
formally left the Agency. I haven’t found much to substantiate my suspicion that his book, *Lyn-
don B. Johnson and the World*, was CIA-sponsored, besides a few other people who have simi-
larly noticed the connection (and similarly not gotten much further). But on the whole, the books
I’ve read, the notes and letters and transcripts I’ve found, and the people I’ve spoken to point to
what, for me, has been a surprising intimacy. Why was it that in 1976, Califano could call “Dick”
Lansdale and get the Agency to perform what Califano called “an act of enormous decency,” an
atypical choice to write a letter on my grandfather’s terms, when the CIA “just never did things
like that”? Why actively preserve the public integrity of a man whose work caused them so much
trouble? What actually happened?

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I found Califano’s memos, and the letters between Bross, Geyelin, Helms, and Bush, in
Box 1 of the 127 boxes in the Philip L. Geyelin collection at the Library of Congress. It was the
first box I looked at, on my first day this summer sitting at a desk in the windowless Library.
Every time I went to the librarians’ desk, to request another box, I used a golf pencil to fill out
the index card: “Geyelin” for researcher, “Geyelin” for collection requested. Some of the librari-
ans liked that.
The boxes had been filed there by staff of the Library’s Manuscript Division. They designated the first eleven boxes to Geyelin’s “Personal File,” organizing the folders inside by alphabet. “Central Intelligence Agency” came after “Business Cards, Undated” and “Calendar, 1987.” Folders 4 and 5 held all of John Bross’s correspondence with Richard Helms, and Stuart Loory; all of Geyelin’s drafts, for George Bush to sign; clippings Geyelin annotated; scrawled notes to himself; a drawing of a “rogue elephant”; Congressional records; a Xerox from Book I of the Church report. I remember I went outside and called my boyfriend and said it felt weird, this whole project felt weird—why did he keep all these things? Why were they left where I could find them, on the first day? The alphabet alone didn’t seem like an answer.

I went back inside and photographed everything in the folders, and then started on the next one. “Correspondence.” Folder 6 had a letter he wrote his mom in 1937, when he worked for a summer on a ranch in Wyoming. “3 days ago we killed a ‘rattler’ (snake) up in the upper pasture,” he told her. “It was very exciting.” He signed it “Lots Of LOVE” with at least three underscores on each word and a heart in place of the Love’s O.83

This summer I was giving a woman named Susan Braden a ride from her house in D.C. out to Virginia, where my aunt and uncle live. They’re friends, from when they were kids. I was going there to look at boxes in the attic, but also to talk to her—she used to be in the CIA herself, as was her dad, Tom Braden, a friend of my grandfather’s, who similarly left the CIA for a career in journalism. I recently found their family picture in a photo album my grandmother made in the late fifties, mostly of their time in Europe: Braden, the future host of CNN’s Crossfire, sits with

six of his eight kids, the real-life inspiration for the network comedy *Eight is Enough*. Susan thinks their families met through the Alsops, Stewart and Joseph. Joe Alsop, too, later faced rumors of inappropriate ties to the CIA. Mr. and Mrs. Stewart Alsop show up in the table setting featured in the 1961 *Vogue* spread starring my grandmother, as she put together a dinner party for friends including the ambassador of Spain, the Alsops, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., then Special Assistant to the President. Braden and Alsop and Geyelin had all been in the same clique, she said, of friends and columnists “running American thought.” “What columnist has that kind of power anymore?” she asked me, rhetorically. “But they did, and they loved it.” She remembers them all sitting around, smoking cigars and drinking and holding the newspaper out, sharing information like they were “trading horses.” John A. Bross, the CIA man who leaked my grandfather’s name to the Pike committee, was Susan Braden’s godfather. I asked her about the letters, which I’d found a few weeks earlier. “Yeah,” she said. “That was a shitty thing he did.”

At a certain point it started pouring, raining so hard I was just following the red lights of the car in front of me on the highway. I remember pulling off, eventually, and the rain letting up, and driving through the wet green hills, talking about the CIA. “Oh, yeah,” she said, “I think your grandpa worked for my dad. That’s what he said.”

Sitting with Braden and my aunt on my aunt’s porch in Virginia that summer, I heard about them growing up and watching their parents’ social and professional lives intersect, and

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86 See Appendix D.
intertwine. They rattled off names of CIA friends of their parents; they talked about dinner parties with certain tables where shared information couldn’t leave the party. There were parties with Richard Helms; Henry Kissinger; Dick Holbrooke; other journalists. Big egos, competition; people who were in, people who were out. People who were “boring.” People who came from a certain social subset of the World War Two generation. “The people that ran the CIA,” Braden felt, “and that ran the United States, were white Anglo-Saxon Protestant men who all came from Ivy League schools and had a kind of fellowship with one another that they developed during the second world war. They were victorious in the war, so they had a very strong sense of their righteousness and their goodness and the purity of their thoughts and their way of life.”87 In the early years of the Cold War, they saw themselves as on the same side.

My aunt grew up after my grandfather had officially left the CIA. Braden’s father left a number of years later; but still, for most of her life she knew him as a journalist, rather than an agent. To both of them, their fathers were political writers who cared about disseminating information, not collaborating in its cover-up. That, in the mind of my aunt and Susan Braden, was why both their fathers eventually left the CIA: they didn’t like being on the side that kept the secrets. Braden repeated to me what her father had often told her: “It’s the government’s job to keep the secrets, and the media’s job to find them out.” Their fathers liked being the truth-seekers, they said. Their social ties to the Agency, and to the American government, helped them uncover the information they published. Communication was an asset.

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87 Interview with Susan Braden, August 20, 2015.
A few weeks later I was back in Washington and waiting at a sweaty shuttle stop to go to the National Archives. I wanted to use their CREST system, the CIA’s database of declassified material and other CIA files. With it I found, among other things, a transcript of a television appearance my grandfather made on October 29, 1977, over a year after his name-clearing trip to the CIA. He was a guest on *On the Record*, a show hosted by Sheila Raub Weidenfeld on WRC TV, Washington’s NBC-owned Channel Four. The episode featured Geyelin, Seymour Hersh (who had written the *Times* series), William Colby (the former CIA director who had first admitted to the media-CIA ties, and who had stepped down two years earlier, in 1975), and Jack Nelson (the Washington bureau chief of the *L.A. Times*), and invited them all to speak on air about the relationship between intelligence and the media. “Just what is the relationship between the CIA and the press?” asked the host. “To what extent does the CIA control the media? And are there secrets that should be kept?” 88 89

The episode aired at 7 p.m. nine days after Carl Bernstein, one half of the Woodward-Bernstein Watergate reporting duo, published an exposé in *Rolling Stone* on clandestine relationships between American journalists and intelligence agencies. After leaving the *Washington Post* earlier that year, where he had been a colleague of Geyelin’s, Bernstein had spent six months investigating a phenomenon of which he claimed the American public only knew a piece. Titled “The CIA and the Media: How America’s Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered it Up,” the article

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89 WRC TV, *On the Record*, October 29, 1977, 7 P.M., transcript provided by Radio TV Reports, Inc., located through the CREST system at the National Archives and Records Association.
claimed that the Committee had been persuaded by CIA director George Bush and former director Colby to restrict their investigations of press ties to the Agency, and then to misrepresent the scale of their findings in the published reports. The nine pages of Book I of the Church report in which press relations are explicitly tackled (and the pages defining the “covert relationships” Geyelin denied having participated in) were, in Bernstein’s words, “deliberately vague and sometimes misleading.” They didn’t, he wrote, report the number of journalists who actually performed covert operations for the Agency; and they didn't sufficiently describe newspaper executives’ complicity with the work.

In all, Bernstein claimed that over 400 American journalists “secretly carried out assignments” for the C.I.A. in the twenty-five years prior to the article’s population—not the fifty people claimed by the Church report. The report limited its number to fifty, said Bernstein, because the committee staff only had the resources to study fifty. Senator Gary Hart, who served on the committee, had told Bernstein that the material reported under “Covert Relationships with the United States Media” (the section from which I’ve quoted, in Book I), “hardly reflects what we found. There was a prolonged and elaborate negotiation [with the CIA] over what would be said.” One Agency official claimed “The Vietnam War tore everything to pieces—shredded the consensus and threw it in the air.” Another “Agency official” agreed. “Today, a lot of these guys vehemently deny they had any relationship with the Agency.” Most of the relationships had been terminated since 1973; but not all.

The lede features my grandfather’s friend, Joe Alsop. “In 1953,” it begins,

Joseph Alsop, then one of America’s leading syndicated columnists, went to the Philippines to cover an election. He did not go because he was asked to do so by
his syndicate. He did not go because he was asked to do so by the newspapers that printed his column. He went at the request of the CIA.\textsuperscript{90}

Bernstein claimed that the program had begun “during the earliest stages of the Cold War” under Allen Dulles, who ran covert operations as Deputy Director for Plans beginning in 1950, and became director of the Agency in 1953. Journalists, he thought, would be afforded more access and freedom of movement than agents would be able to obtain through typical types of cover. They are in the business of finding out information; they get to make long-term relationships with sources in his host country; they grow familiar with people in government, academia, the military, the scientific community. Most of the participating journalists, said Bernstein, acted as “eyes and ears” for the CIA, as they did for their publications. Some did more—planted information; hosted parties meant to introduce American spies to their foreign counterparts; distributed “black” propaganda; funneled CIA money and instructions to “controlled” members of foreign governments; used their offices or residences as “drops” for sensitive information traveling between agents.

Relationships often began informally, with a drink, or dinner. The formal relationships, if they came, would come later; sometimes a pledge of secrecy was required. And the relationships could benefit the journalists, as well—maybe they got some good stories from Agency contacts who could make suggestions for items of interest, or gossip. Beyond “cover,” Dulles created a “debriefing” protocol: American correspondents returning from abroad could offer their notes and impressions gathered during reporting tasks. Bernstein claimed that those procedures, at

\textsuperscript{90} Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media.”
least, were still continuing at the time of the article’s publication. The practice, on the whole, was most popular in Western Europe.

And American publishers, said Bernstein, were willing to offer up their employees in the fight against “global Communism”—so the infiltration wasn’t insidious on the part of the CIA, but rather a communal effort. He quoted Hugh Morrow, a former *Saturday Evening Post* correspondent, who was Vice President Rockefeller’s press secretary in 1977, on the 1950s practice of meeting media men: “There would be these guys from the CIA flashing ID cards and looking like they belonged to the Yale Club. It got to be so routine that you felt a little miffed if you weren’t asked.” Some were paid; many were strictly voluntary. Some of the involved journalists were Pulitzer winners.

Within the CIA, claimed Bernstein, many journalist-operatives enjoyed special status, given their social similarity to their Agency counterparts: similar pedigrees, similar schools, similar social circles, similarly fashionable liberalism, shared “‘old boy’ network that constituted something of an establishment elite in the media, politics and academia of postwar America.” They were there for national service, or out of patriotic compulsion. Bernstein quoted someone he identifies as an “Agency official”: they were “people who worked together during World War II and never got over it. Then in the Fifties and Sixties there was a national consensus about a national threat.”

Bernstein went on to list names of the few CIA deputies with full knowledge, at the time, of their operatives. Contacts with the news agencies were initiated by Agency men including Frank Wisner, Cord Meyer Jr., Richard Bissell, Desmond Fitzgerald, Tracy Barnes, Thomas Karamessines and Richard Helms. It’s a list heavy with names of my grandfather’s friends, col-
leagues, acquaintances. “The Founding Fathers [of the CIA] were close personal friends of ours,” said Alsop, who Bernstein claimed performed clandestine work for the Agency, as did his brother, columnist Stewart Alsop. “It was a social thing, my dear fellow. I never received a dollar…. I’ve done things for them when I thought they were the right thing to do.” “I’m proud they asked me and proud to have done it,” he’s quoted earlier. “The notion that a newspaperman doesn’t have a duty to his country is perfect balls.”

The article doesn’t mention the *Wall Street Journal* by name, but it does devote space to the *Washington Post* (which Bernstein had left earlier that year, prior to spending six months on this article). He described Phil Graham, the *Post*’s editor until 1963, as “somebody you could get help from,” quoting a former deputy director of the Agency. “Frank Wisner dealt with him,” claimed the deputy. Graham and Wisner were close friends. But Geyelin didn’t arrive at the *Post* until a few years later, when the paper was in Katharine’s hands, where it fell after Phil Graham committed suicide in 1963.91 “Information about Agency dealings with the *Washington Post* newspaper is extremely sketchy,” wrote Bernstein. CIA officials, he claimed, mentioned that some *Post* stringers had been CIA employees, but that they didn’t know if anyone in the *Post* management was aware, and they also make no statements that and *Post* staff members had maintained covert relationships with the CIA during their employment by the *Post*. He then included a footnote: “Philip Geyelin, editor of the *Post* editorial page, worked for the Agency before joining the *Post.*” Bernstein doesn’t seem to know what to do with the information. Either that, or he’s expecting his audience to make inferences.

Weidenfeld asked Geyelin about it a week later, on her primetime television show. But first, she posed a question to the group.

SHEILA RAUB WEIDENFELD: Okay, I have a question for everybody. Jack, just one second. How valid is Carl Bernstein’s contention that over 400, or approximately 400 members of the press worked, over the past 25 years, for the CIA?

WILLIAM COLBY: It’s nonsense.

WEIDENFELD: It’s nonsense?

COLBY: He destroys at least one of the 400 in his own account, where he says that Joe Alsop was talking to Des Fitzgerald and Des said, ‘Why don’t you go over to the Philippines to cover an election?’ And Joe decided to go. But is that working for the CIA?

WEIDENFELD: Well, now are you saying that Joe Alsop was not?

PHILIP GEYELIN: Well, that’s the weakness of the whole thing. It’s 400 apples and oranges and pears and grapefruits. It ranges all the way from people who had casual conversations with CIA officials and sources to people he claims were on the payroll; and you can’t lump all that. I mean you can reach 400 if you lump all that together, but it’s a meaningless total, I think.

COLBY: Absolutely. We certainly used the press. There’s no question about it. But the number is very much smaller than…

WEIDENFELD: You were used, Jack. Sy, even you were in…

COLBY: No, no, no. That’s a totally different thing.

WEIDENFELD: Well, that’s—all right. We’ll get into that in a second.

SEYMOUR HERSH: But you certainly have had contact with thousands of reporters.

COLBY: I used to run officers who were under journalistic cover in my younger days, sure. And I had only one rule: that I had nothing to say about what they submitted to their editors, their American editors. They did favors for me, they did jobs for me overseas, but they wrote to their editor was between him and the editor (sic). That’s just a rule we had.

JACK NELSON: Do you look back on that, though, now as something you just as soon not have done?

COLBY: No, I don’t see—as long as the government is not writing what American people read in the newspapers, I think…

GEYELIN: You don’t think it compromises a reporter to be on the government payroll?

COLBY: Not particularly. These are mostly stringers and free-lancers, and so forth. So in that sense, no. But in some cases they were staff people, in those days.

NELSON: Anybody from the Los Angeles Times?
COLBY: No, I don’t think there were any, and I’m not going to talk about particular…
NELSON: I’ve been asked to ask that, you know.
HERSH: Is it impossible that it’s 400? I don’t know. It could be.
COLBY: Oh, I’m pretty sure that’s—I mean if you throw in all the apples and oranges and if you add every newsmen who ever talked to a CIA station chief in a foreign country, then you’d probably get 800, 1,000.
HERSH: Did you get clearances on people that would just come in casually and talk?
COLBY: No.
HERSH: You didn’t get clearance without their knowledge?
COLBY: Not really. Some that you had some particular reason for having a clearance on ‘em, you’d get a clearance on ‘em. But I don’t think the 400 is set at that level.
NELSON: I don’t think, incidentally, many journalists would agree with you that that isn’t a real corrupting influence,…
COLBY: Well, I know that, but…
NELSON: … to have journalists actually serve with the CIA.
COLBY: … I happen to know a lot of very democratic countries where there’s a very close relationship between their journalism and their intelligence services. And it certainly hasn’t affected the independence and democracy of those countries. And I’m not going to identify them, but nonetheless.
GEYELIN: Without naming names, that charge has been made about the British government, and there are an awful lot of British newspapermen who feel very uncomfortable about those allegations, that are not precise, not specific. You know, if there are three of them, it compromises all of them.

The group went on to discuss newspaper discretion in publishing stories related to national security—essentially, whether a newspaper should refrain from publishing information if, for example, the CIA approached and requested the newspaper’s restraint. But midway through, Weidenfeld redirected to her opening question: “Just what is the relationship between the CIA and the press?” Geyelin, she seemed to think, might have the answer.

WEIDENFELD: I want to get back to the journalists. A lot of this has to do with the three of you and what you think of the CIA. I mean is the CIA an institution that you honor today? I mean do you think—how do you treat the CIA? Does it deserve respect, do you think?
HERSH: You’re asking that on public television? Are you kidding?
WEIDENFELD: Well, I’m going to ask Phil, because, Phil, you know the CIA better than most people know the CIA.

GEYELIN: If what you’re asking me is did I work for it once, the answer is I did, for 11 months in 1951, and I quit because I didn’t like the line of work.

WEIDENFELD: Was it the line of work or was it the institution, as it was set up?

GEYELIN: It’s so cellular that I couldn’t see the institution. I only saw what I was being asked to do.

WEIDENFELD: Which was what, Phil?

GEYELIN: Well, I’m not going to talk about it, because I took the same secrecy oath that – it’s not important. You can read all about it in the Saturday Evening Post in the piece by Tom Braden if you’re really that interested. But it was—that was the CIA 25 years ago. I don’t know what it’s like today.

WEIDENFELD: But you know the institution.

GEYELIN: I respected a lot of people who I met there. I knew, after I got out, a lot of them as news sources, and I respected a lot of them. I think it’s done terrific work, in some ways, and it’s had a very bad passage, in my opinion. But what it’s like today, I don’t know. They don’t tell us. That’s one of the problems.

WEIDENFELD: Well, let’s talk about it today when we get back in just a mo-

[Commercial break.]

I looked up the article Geyelin mentioned, written by his one-time boss, because I did want to know what he’d been doing. Titled “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral,’” Tom Braden had written it in response to a brief (and relatively minor, as compared to the uproar of 1975) scandal involving the disclosure that the CIA had secretly funded organizations such as the American Federation of Labor and the National Student Association. The article explained how Braden had created the department heading these projects, the International Organization Division, in the early fifties, formally under his boss Frank Wisner. Wisner had what Braden called “one of those purposefully obscure CIA titles,” Director of Policy Co-ordination, but “everyone knew” he had really run the CIA since it grew out of the war-time OSS, or Office of Strategic Services, the military intelligence agency created during World War Two. I met Wisner’s son, Ellis, this summer, with my aunt and uncle. They were family friends, too: his mom, he told me, had been very close
with my grandmother, and my grandfather had been nice enough to hire him as a sort of assistant in the early seventies.  

The article outlines the work, and mission, of the I.O.D.: increasing pro-Western sentiment in Europe through funding various projects and foundations meant to highlight the sort of creative liberty possible in a democratic (read: non-communist) society. In the article, Braden mentions sending the Boston Symphony Orchestra on tour to Paris; placing an agent in the European intellectual organization, the Congress for Cultural Freedom; and funding *Encounter*, a magazine “published in England and dedicated to the proposition that cultural achievement and political freedom were interdependent.” A CIA agent became an *Encounter* editor. “Was it ‘immoral,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘disgraceful’?” asked Braden. “Only in the sense that war itself is immoral, wrong and disgraceful. For the Cold War was and is a war, fought with ideas instead of bombs. And our country has a clear-cut choice: Either we win the war or lose it.” That was what my grandfather said to read, on air, in 1977, if I wanted to know what he was doing. It’s different from what he said later—to Harold Bray, for example, for Bray’s 1980 retrospective on the *Post*. He was “writing reports about Cuba,” Bray said. Geyelin told him he quit after eleven months because he “found the work dull.” His boss, Tom Braden, set up a farewell meeting with Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA, the man Bernstein claims initiated the program involving, or incorporating, journalists with the Agency. 

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92 Ellis Wisner, in discussion with Devon Geyelin, July 2015.


95 Bray, 145.
Braden’s *Saturday Evening Post* article doesn’t go much more in-depth into the connection between journalism and the CIA than the mention of the funding and staff-planting at *Encounter*. But the mention of the practice in the article my grandfather specifically cited as an explanation of his own work, while at the CIA, at least demonstrates that he knew how, in some cases, the CIA did sometimes use journalists, at least at the time that he left the Agency and re-entered the world of journalism himself (he had been on leave from the *Journal* during his eleven months of employment, and returned there after he quit). And Frank Wisner and Allen Dulles are two of the men most credited with designing, and implementing, the agency-press connections of the fifties.\(^{96}\) It’s Wisner’s propaganda machine that historian Hugh Wilford calls the “Mighty Wurlitzer.”

Privately, Geyelin didn’t deny contacts with the Agency. Really, he was quite clear about them, as seen in his unedited drafts to Bush: the “normal exchanges” that happen as “reporters seek confirmation of information they have gathered,” “receive briefings in advance of specific assignments,” and as “government officials, for their part, occasionally ask questions of their own.” Most of that was deleted, in later drafts; but it was there, initially, as he figured out how to phrase it. Its initial inclusion implies that maybe Geyelin, like Braden, didn’t think his practices were actually “immoral”—but the difference between the two journalists’ reactions to the allegations point to shifted contexts. Braden wrote a public statement of righteous indignation. Geyelin went to the Director of the CIA and asked the government to sign off on his absolution.

According to the 201 file (or Califano’s memo regarding it), the Agency has no record of CIA contacts with my grandfather after 1964. But that doesn’t mean he stopped being affiliated,

\(^{96}\) Wilford, 226.
at least socially, with the same sphere of Ivy-graduated media and intelligence men he had been immersed in through the fifties. A 1966 letter from someone whose signature I can’t read encloses what the sender calls “an extremely valuable document,” with a request at the end: “There is a price for this, actually. Will be in Washington for a few days about the end of October. Would like to see some China experts, especially your spooky friends, on both economic and political activities there. Perhaps you could drop a word on my behalf.”  

I have notecards for joking toasts my grandfather made on Joe Alsop’s behalf, in or past the 1970s (“Our subject tonight is a distinguished archeologist… a quintessential connoisseur or art and artifacts (sic)... a celebrated horticulturalist… a closet weight-watcher… very few of us have ever watched him watching his weight… just watch…”)

He wrote a 1975 recommendation letter to Maryland Lieutenant Governor on behalf of Frank Wisner’s son, Ellis Wisner, “whose family,” wrote Geyelin, “I have known for many years. His father, as you may know, was a fine man and a very important figure in this town.” Party guest lists he made in the eighties include the Alsops, and the Helmses.

He was friends with Cord Meyer, Jr., who graduated from Yale the year before my grandfather did, went on to fight as a Marine in World War Two, and later, claimed the New York Times, was the C.I.A. official in charge of the agency’s propaganda activities after he took the reins from


98 Notecards for toast on behalf of Joseph Alsop, by Philip L. Geyelin, in archives of Mary Sherman Willis at her home, in box labeled “PLG PERSONAL DOCS.”


100 Letter to Mr. Dominique de Villepin, from Philip L. Geyelin, November 10, 1988, in archives of Mary Sherman Willis at her home, in box labeled “PLG Personal Files, Hussein Book.”
Tom Braden.\textsuperscript{101, 102} And Colby does mention, here, that it wasn't normal practice to get clearances on reporters who would "just come in casually and talk"—rather, that "some that you had some particular reason for having a clearance on ‘em, you’d get a clearance on ‘em."

[Commercial break]

WEIDENFELD: Well, now, what should be mentioned?
NELSON: Well, the fact that, you know, here’s a guy who was in the CIA for 11 months in 1951?
GEYELIN: Yes.
NELSON: And, you know, people still say there’s a nest of CIA people over there at The Post. Phil Geyelin, hell, you know, the head of the editorial page of the Washington Post, he used to be in the CIA. And it’s a hard thing for people to sort of…
WEIDENFELD: That’s the Carl Bernstein thing. It’s the witch hunt that you’re afraid of, I suppose, isn’t it?
COLBY: Well, it is, very much so. It’s a kind of McCarthyism in reverse.
NELSON: Yes. Also, you know, it isn’t fair, I don’t think, to say that, you know, 400 people and so forth, when you’re talking about a lot of people who—I mean I’m sure Seymour Hersh has cooperated with the CIA when he found out something. He probably, maybe, has told them what he found out in return for them telling him something he found out.
HERSH: That’s what all reporters…
NELSON: That’s right. I mean I do that. I do…
GEYELIN: There’s another thing about it. If you’ve ever worked for the CIA, they never stop trying to re-recruit you, I think. I mean that certainly has been—was my experience. I mean there were all kinds of propositions. And I’m soon (sic) newspaper guys—most foreign correspondents have probably been approached in one way or another.
WEIDENFELD: For example? Even recently, would you say?
GEYELIN: Well, I’ll give you an example. I was in Paris once and I wanted to go to Warsaw, so I went and checked in with the embassy people there, including the CIA, and asked them, you know, who’s big in Warsaw and who should I talk to and what’s the big story in Poland right now. I figured the CIA would have some idea.


\textsuperscript{102} Mary Sherman Willis and Susan Braden, in discussion with Devon Geyelin, August 2015.
Well, I found out later that they cabled back to Washington and suggested maybe I could do some errands for them while I was there. But nothing came of it. I never heard about it again, but I’ve seen my files, so I know it’s there. It sounds as if I was working for them. As it turned out, something happened in the Middle East and I never went to Poland.

But they do that a lot. And I think they probably—you know, in that 400 that Carl is talking about, there are probably people who were on the payroll, people who were doing errands, and, I don’t know.

NELSON: But I must say that I really do think that the use of journalists as CIA officers, whether they’re part-time journalists or full-time journalists, is a really bad practice. Because I think it—I think that it certainly gives the appearance of the corrupting of journalists, if it didn’t actually corrupt them, and…

COLBY: Oh, I think that’s…

NELSON: I’ll tell you something else, though. It does endanger—it endangers the whole relationship of the press and government.

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“One doesn’t want it said five years from now that the Washington Post was either asleep or frightened if in fact the Nixon Administration is beginning a calculated campaign for controls on freedom of the press.” That was my grandfather, quoted in a 1970 Wall Street Journal article he clipped and kept in his personal files. The article claims the Post partially owed Geyelin for its recent rise to the upper echelon of newspaper publishing, due to the strength of both his editorials and the Post’s editorial page on the whole, which he took over in 1968, a year after joining the paper's staff.¹⁰³ I found the clip in my aunt’s attic, in a box labeled “PERSONAL DOCS,” alongside memorabilia from his service in the Marines in World War Two, an invitation to dinner with President Kennedy, pictures of him and his friends circa 1950, poems and toasts, and what looks like reporting from the trip that turned him staunchly against the Vietnam War, which he

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had already been writing about with suspicion when he first visited the troops in the mid-
sixties.\textsuperscript{104}

It’s my grandfather’s coverage of Vietnam that most deeply ensnares any narrative I
could write about his falling under (or remaining under) government influence. His writing was
pessimistic, caustic, and decidedly anti-war. I found a draft of one of his earlier stories on the war
in the same PERSONAL box in my aunt’s attic where I found his war pictures, from his two trips
on assignment for the \textit{Wall Street Journal} in 1965 and 1966.\textsuperscript{105} The report is typewritten in lan-
guage that looks like it’s meant to be read aloud, or telegraphed, to his editors back home, with
cross-outs and edits on thin paper.\textsuperscript{106}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{104} Philip L. Geyelin, “Vietnam Mission: Greater U.S. Effort There Unlikely to Bring Greater
at the Library of Congress, Box 126, Folder 8.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{105} Finding Guide to the Philip L. Geyelin Papers, Library of Congress.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{106} Philip L. Geyelin, draft, from the archives of Mary Sherman Willis at her home, in box la-
beled “PLG PERSONAL DOCS.” See Appendix H.
\end{quote}
That draft, when published in the *Journal*, ran under the headline, “Vietnam Vision: Will the War Ever End?”

Besides his drafts and notes, Geyelin brought back photographs from his trip. They seem to have been taken by a *Journal* photographer, because one shows Geyelin talking to a soldier, Lieutenant David Stout, who (a colleague told Geyelin) was wounded within the next few months and sent home to the U.S. Other photos he kept show U.S. troops crowded into a helicopter, sitting at the foot of a mountain, placing bodies in bags in tall grasses. A plane flies through a cloud of smoke pluming from the struck ground below, one of a family of fires. A sequence shows a young Vietnamese man, his hands tied behind his back: first he sits next to a truck. Then he’s blindfolded, his shirt halfway off. In the next two soldiers drag him along the ground. In the last he lies on his side on the ground, curled into himself, eyes toward the dirt.

*Post* publisher Katharine Graham hired Geyelin in 1967 as an editorialist and deputy editor of the editorial page, intending for him to shift the paper’s stance against the war he’d been reporting on from the ground. Her decision—to hire an anti-war reporter as an editorialist for a paper that had vigorously supported the war for the past few years—came, said Geyelin in a

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109 Photograph collection in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 75, Folder 1. See Appendix I.
1986 interview, because “she had a sense that the paper was wrong.” That, and the paper would soon need a successor for Russell Wiggins, the man then in charge of the paper’s editorial page, who was nearing retirement. Wiggins supported the war, and the two men began having near-daily ideological conflicts soon after Geyelin arrived at the Post in January of 1967. Geyelin advocated for a gradual shift in the paper’s position—an immediate turnaround, he said, could damage the paper’s credibility to its readers—but by mid-1968, the paper was demanding an end to American involvement. By that October, Geyelin was editor of the editorial page, and the paper was publishing arguments for withdrawal strategies.

His editorial page often contained fresh reporting, and its critiques on government action often brought criticism from those under scrutiny. Headlines from the editorial page under his management included “Vietnam—An Unlearned Lesson,” “Vietnam: A Long Way from Peace,”


111 Sinclair, 20-22.

112 Sinclair, 14-16.

113 Sinclair, 33.

and “Vietnam: No Happy Ending.” In 1970, he won the Pulitzer on the strength of his own editorials, which explained the paper’s turn, under his guidance, against the war. Publisher Katharine Graham described the Post of the late sixties and early seventies as almost completely under the control of Geyelin and his close friend, Ben Bradlee, the executive editor, a duo described as debonair, Ivy League, elegant. Bradlee oversaw the newsroom and Geyelin oversaw the opinions, and Graham told the Journal that the two men had almost complete freedom — “Ben and Phil,” she said, “are just very nice about talking to me and consulting me.”

I look at pictures of my grandfather at the time — laughing in a three-piece suit, walking down the street with Bradlee and a briefcase, smiling at a cocktail party — and he looks more like the administration facing national protests than he looks like my image of a protestor. Images of anti-war demonstrators show Vietnam veterans throwing their war medals onto the steps of the U.S. Capitol, or college-aged members of the Mayday Tribe marching through the streets of


118 Sullivan.

119 Sesser.

120 Mary Sherman Willis archives, Tarrytown, Virginia, 2015.

Washington, getting arrested in Potomac Park, chased by tear gas and overshadowed by helicopter patrols.\textsuperscript{122} Pictures of my grandfather show him behind a desk, with coffee and a typewriter and a tie. Bradlee’s line in Geyelin’s 2004 obituary—“He was witty. He was charming. He loved to dance. He was a figure about town.”—does not bring to mind the kind of dancing I imagine May Day protestors doing in the Park in 1971, before more than 12,000 demonstrators were arrested.\textsuperscript{123, 124} The next month he pushed the \textit{Post} to publish the Pentagon Papers after the \textit{New York Times} was forced, by the government, to halt its own publication of the material.\textsuperscript{125}

“He was the old boy of the old boys,” said Bob Woodward, the \textit{Post} reporter who broke the Watergate story with Carl Bernstein, and who remembers Geyelin from the newsroom. Geyelin dispatched Roger Wilkins to write editorials on behalf of the series during the early days of the investigation, when most were still regarding the reporting with suspicion. His support meant a lot, says Woodward, to the then-cub team of journalists, “like getting condoned by the old guard.”\textsuperscript{126} The editorials written under Geyelin’s eye—on the president’s accountability to tell the truth, on his abuse of government powers—contributed to the \textit{Post}’s 1973 Pulitzer for public service.\textsuperscript{127}


\textsuperscript{123} Sullivan.

\textsuperscript{124} Halloran.


\textsuperscript{126} Woodward, interview.

\textsuperscript{127} Sullivan.
The conspiracy theories and 1970s rumors don’t make sense, to me, when I read them against Geyelin's own writing, or his page. My discomfort, which I seemed to share with both some of his contemporaries and a broader, newer community of skeptics, speaks to a basic doubt of anyone’s ability to fully separate personal and professional obligations (or competing professional obligations, if I were to presume, against his account, that the CIA was paying him). To my modern eye, he was remarkably comfortable with the government he wrote against. But he defended that conflation—of social, professional, formal, personal—as useful, if not natural. For him, intimacy didn’t seem to merit insinuation.

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In October 1977, when Geyelin appeared on On the Record to discuss Carl Bernstein’s recent Rolling Stone exposé, the New York Times was already working on its own three-month investigation into the CIA’s relationship with the press. They published the three-part, front-page series, “C.I.A.: Secret Shaper Of Public Opinion” starting on Christmas Day. Unlike Seymour Hersh’s December 1974 series, which uncovered mail openings, wiretaps, infiltrations, and other efforts to spy on American civilians, the 1977 series explicitly focused on infiltration of foreign media, employment of American journalists, and dissemination of propaganda abroad. My grandfather kept Xeroxes of the full spreads in his files, along with a collection from the fresh surge of news stories and op-eds that other people wrote in response. His margin notes and underlines and brackets serve, for me, as a key to his mental map as he charted how he would come to articulate his own thinking on the issue.

He’s underlined the quotes he used, in the articles where they first appeared; he circled the paragraphs that gave him pause. Through his writing and his record-keeping—here, through
the whole project—I have learned from what he left for me to see. I’ve learned, too, that we are similar about sentences: obsessive, he scrawls them in full and re-works them, re-chews them, in iterations whose design I understand. I see sentences in his editorials and remember where I saw their fragments, or palimpsests, and I’m happy to know the heritage.

But I keep thinking about what he wrote, to Califano, as he drafted the letter for Bush. “I am always leery of the blanket denial—‘no connection’—when the files, which may or may not see the light of day at some point, clearly record connections.” The files he left are seeing the light of day because he left them, with easy access, for me; given that the CIA’s records are still out of my sight, my grandfather's records are all I really have. More than anything, I've read his well-annotated account of what happened. I can write here what I think he thought, and why I think he thought it, right now; but I’m a sketchy cartographer missing continents, and my compass keeps changing its mind.

The Times series didn’t contain a wild amount of new information, but it offered a cohesive, thorough account of the relationship between the press and the CIA over the past three decades in an easily accessible format, drawing on Bernstein’s reporting as well as other media and government sources of the past few years. Written for a Times-reading public home for the holidays, the series gave numbers, and context, essentially portraying the practice of developing "relationships" with American journalists and media organizations abroad as a product of Cold War attitudes. The implication was that journalistic ethics—or, at least, the American approach to them—had since changed. “Several of the journalists and CIA officials interviewed made the point that during the height of the Cold War it was acceptable to cooperate with the agency in ways both the CIA and the journalistic community now deem inappropriate,” read the third arti-
icle of the series. “‘The thing to do was cooperate,’ said one retired intelligence officer. ‘I guess that looks strange in 1977. But cooperation didn’t look strange then.’”\(^{128}\)

The agency, it claimed, had owned or subsidized over fifty news outlets (radio stations, newspapers, periodicals), primarily overseas, both for distributing propaganda and for providing agents international ‘cover.’ Unlike Bernstein’s article, the Times series included the Wall Street Journal in its list organizations that had employed American journalists simultaneously employed by the CIA. Overall, it estimated that between 30 and 100 American journalists had been employed by the C.I.A. while working as professional reporters, a number more conservative than Bernstein’s—but also, potentially, more damaging, as it only included those compensated for their services. At least 12 full-time agents, claimed the article, worked as reporters or employees of American-owned news organizations.

And then there was the network of as many as 800 “propaganda assets,” primarily foreign journalists and news outlets often told by the CIA, said William Colby, what to write or print. This included dissemination of information the Agency wanted to reach a larger audience, but also embellished stories, or lies. The “bogus news stories,” or “black propaganda,” were aimed abroad, but planted with the understanding that the American media might, and occasionally did, treat them as genuine stories. The agency described that consequence with invented terms: “blowback,” “replay,” “domestic fallout.” In a 1967 C.I.A. directive, that fallout was labeled “inevitable and consequently permissible.” The series emphasizes that for the most part, the in-

tended targets were an international audience; though some agents implied that certain propa-
ganda efforts during the Vietnam War were intended to eventually reach American eyes.¹²⁹

But officers cited in the series claimed that the agency was relatively reluctant to direct American journalists’ writing.¹³⁰ For the most part, the series claimed that few of the dozens of American journalists employed as agents overseas were used for propaganda. That was more centralized in a “separate and far more extensive network” of media outlets and foreign journalists over which the agency exerted control, or paid for influence: “Wisner’s Wurlitzer,” designed to play “whatever tune the CIA was in a mood to hear,” described the Times. It had two leaders: first Tom Braden, then Cord Meyer, Jr.¹³¹ It mentions the agency’s relationship with Frederick Praeger, the company that published my grandfather’s 1966 book on Lyndon B. Johnson.

Much of the Wurlitzer, claimed the Times, was dismantled by the time of the series’ publication. But still, I read the mentioned names, and hear how my grandfather conducted his social life, and know about the files the CIA kept on him, and know what he did while at the agency himself—work for Braden—and I’m sure he must have known about the operations, probably for a long time. My grandfather was only at the CIA for eleven months; but, as he said in On the Record, he was working in Braden’s department—in other words, publishing pro-Western propaganda, according to both the Braden article Geyelin pointed the On the Record audience to, and the Times series. A few years later, Geyelin told Howard Bray he’d spent his eleven months


¹³¹ Crewdson and Treaster, “Worldwide Propaganda Network Built and Controlled by the C.I.A.”
bored in Washington, writing reports about Cuba. He told Bray he “found the work dull”; he
told Sheila Weidenfeld “he didn’t like the line of work.” Those, to me, read as different things. I
could be wrong.

It could be true that he was aware, or present, or participatory, at the creation of the pro-
paganda program. It could also be true that he didn’t like it, quit, considered his relationship to
the agency broken, and was genuinely shocked to find, in 1976, the CIA’s record of his continued
contact with the agency. The *Times* series includes descriptions from former CIA station chiefs of
how local correspondents could be very useful to the agency, because of the access granted to
them as journalists. The agency, because of their own intelligence, could be useful to the journal-
ists. These journalistic contacts weren’t considered “agents,” and they weren’t necessarily paid,
and they weren’t necessarily initiated overseas—the relationships, or friendships, could have
been formed over earlier connections, and continued because of mutual utility, or just social ties.

“Many correspondents who have spent their careers in Washington have developed close friend-
ships with senior CIA officials,” reads the third article of the series. These men were called “as-
sets.” In the fifties and sixties, former agency officials claimed to the *Times*, CIA officers were
pressured to recruit as many “assets” as possible while they were working abroad. So there were
some men listed as assets who “didn’t even know they’d been recruited,” said a former officer.

“That could have been my grandfather in 1976: surprised to see that the agency thought anything of him hanging out, in Paris, London,

\[132\] Bray, 144-145.

\[133\] Crewdson and Treaster, “C.I.A. Established Many Links to Journalists in U.S. and Abroad.”
Beirut, with his friends; and surprised, too, to see that anyone cared. Or he might have reviewed his entire relationship with the Agency, it might have fit in with one of the relationships the Times described, and he might not have found anything wrong except the descriptor of "asset" and the allegiance it implied.

The House committee was already planning on holding late-December hearings on the press-intelligence connection when the Times series came out. In the fall, following Bernstein’s article, then-Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner had already issued a directive forbidding agency members from “entering into any relationships with full-time or part-time journalists (including so-called ‘stringers’) accredited by a U.S. news service.” But the directive contained loopholes: freelancers weren’t included, the directive was specific to American journalists, and exceptions were permitted “with the specific approval of the DCI.” It was a rule for the CIA made by the CIA. The question posed by the Congressional hearings of December, and that continued in the first half of the following year, asked whether something more was necessary: whether relationships between the press and intelligence should be regulated, or restricted, by law. Geyelin said no.

In the immediate weeks following the Times disclosures, Geyelin published an editorial written in the collective “we” of his editorial page. It’s not under his byline, unlike a longer,


more personal reflection he went on to publish in May. But it’s written in his tone (I know his syntax), and acknowledged, by one former CIA official who wrote to him in response, as Geyelin’s personal work. In some ways, it’s a response to other articles recently published on the Post’s pages. Charles B. Seib, the Post’s ombudsman, had just published an op-ed two days earlier called “CIA and the Press: No ‘Natural Affinity,’” in which he described the CIA and the press as two fundamentally distinct bodies. In the copy Geyelin kept, he bracketed a paragraph in which Seib described the CIA as the conductor of “deception and covert manipulation,” doing America’s “undercover dirty work”; the press, though, was meant to “inform the public, fully and without bias or restraint.” “The twain,” wrote Seib, “can never meet.” Geyelin disagreed, as he would fully explain in the editorial under his name five months later.

But first he wrote the shorter op-ed, speaking on behalf of the editorial page, using the voice of their “we.” He had the authority to do that: it was his editorial page; he was part of the paper’s old guard; he’d been with it as it rode what he called “a series of convulsions” in the late sixties and early seventies. But his voice emerges, too, with the authority of the broader, older generation Geyelin had come to represent. He sounds like a member of the old boys’ network through which he had been embedded, in the fifties, in the CIA practice he’s writing about. “In the Cold War,” he opens,

the Central Intelligence Agency enlisted the press, American and foreign, as part of a broad, presidentially directed, congressionally endorsed campaign to combat Communist influence around the globe. Few questions were raised. The American press pretty much shared as well as shaped the consensus underlying national policy. It took a series of convulsions, the war in Vietnam among them, to show the

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138 Seib, “The CIA and the Press: No ‘Natural Affinity.’”
American people—in a variety of ways, including the question of how to deal with internal dissenters—that it was not desirable or even necessary to undercut the basic institutions of their own society in order to protect the nation’s security.\(^{139}\)

Geyelin is able to write that few questions were raised, or that the American press “pretty much shared as well as shaped” the governing attitude, because that was him, at the time, raising or not raising questions. If I choose to read this with his connections to Braden, Wisner, and Meyer in mind, then he was one of the ones sharing and shaping the policy: maybe through his work at the CIA; maybe through his work after; or maybe through his knowledge of it, and his choice not to object. He is part of the generation of “American people” he mentions here, who were old enough to have their minds changed by the convulsions, and cemented enough in their earlier psychology for national “convulsions” to be necessary. If read in that light, this paragraph serves as an admission: he was once one of the men who thought it necessary to undercut the basic institution of his own society, in the name of his society. That changed, he’s saying; and while he was wrong then, his mistakes were the mistakes of a generation. If viewed in the context of his journalism—specifically on Vietnam—his mind might have been one of the earliest-changed.

His next paragraph outlines how the infiltration of foreign media, with information or agents, can’t be condoned any more than the infiltration of domestic media. The sentiment, in a broad scheme, speaks to a sense of immutable ethics; but elements of the passage speak, still, to a certain sense of dependence on context. “We find it enough to observe that,” he writes, “in current conditions if not in past ones, it is intolerable for an agency of a free and open society to use

its power secretly to create a false picture in another society.” In other times, he’s saying, international propaganda was excusable—or, at least, it's less excusable now. His statements, when read for their subtlety, contain an implication: past practices were understandable, or even condonable. They’re not condonable any longer; but, maybe, they were condonable then.

A journalist, he goes on, should never secretly serve the state as an intelligence operator. But to have the press and the CIA formally disentangled, by law, further than the CIA has already said it would restrain itself? He says no. “It is undignified,” he says, “and it gratuitously acknowledges dependency.” The CIA should be treated as any other news source, and the press should be trusted to regulate itself. His tone speaks to a belief in each party’s power to self-monitor, a belief that implies each agency’s equal strength. It also implies that he believes himself uncorrupted, and incorruptible. By then end of the op-ed, he ascribes that belief to his faith in his own journalism—a good journalist, he says, would know when he’s fed bad information, and a good man can’t be convinced or paid to print it anyway. “No source should be able to buy or to fool, at least for long, a good journalist. No regulation or law can save a bad one.”

After all, he had been using the CIA, and his friends in the CIA, as sources over his entire career. As much as the question of his conduct punctuated a national shift away from the climate of his earlier professional years, the actual threat of regulation could or would change how he worked. He kept one clipping from January 6, called “3 Editors Say CIA Should Stop Using Foreign Journalists,” and he underlined one quote from Gilbert Cranberg, the editorial page editor of The Des Moines Register-Tribune. Cranberg said the CIA “should be required to quit planting false and misleading stories abroad, not just to protect Americans from propaganda fallout, but to

140 “Disentangling the CIA and the Press.”
protect all readers from misinformation.” Geyelin underlined everything up to “Americans” and then wrote in the margin, “What if CIA is sometimes right when gov is wrong.” In some ways, it’s a strange question (besides its absent punctuation). In other writing, he describes the CIA as the government—it is, after all, the government—but in a quick, careless note, he describes it as a separate beast. How many times had he learned from the CIA what he couldn’t learn anywhere else? How many times had that difference been relevant, to him? How many times had the CIA been his best source? In another clipping he underlined Cranberg again. “I am concerned… about the possibility of being an unwitting mouthpiece for CIA propaganda,” wrote Cranberg. “I know many editorial page editors share my concern.” Did Geyelin? How much did he trust who he learned from? How much of his confidence was his faith in his journalism, and how much was his faith in his contacts?

I read his margin notes and underlines and published work as products of his background. His conviction that a journalist can regulate himself, in relation to the government, comes from an understanding of the two bodies as equal citizens, or as peers. It would be “undignified,” he wrote, to think of journalists as defenseless to the advances of the government; it “gratuitously acknowledges dependency.” That language presents the journalist as a child, or invalid, or as otherwise vulnerable to a governmental body presented as a powerful manipulator. Geyelin saw himself as too old, too smart, and too strong to be manipulated, and the suggestion otherwise was at best ill-informed; at worst, insulting. Geyelin, after all, was of their cohort. He and the CIA


142 “CIA Limits Spying on Media.”
had grown up together; they were childhood friends. They might have personal disagreements, or
fight, or write about each other; in the decades since they graduated college together, or fought in
the war together, or worked, their relationships had changed. But he was not inclined to see him-
self as needing a separate parental body to regulate his friendships; or, at least, the relationships
he had with men his own age. Journalists, he wrote, could take care of themselves.

The second-to-last paragraph of one clip he kept reads, “By using reporters as spies, the
CIA has abridged the First Amendment as effectively as any ‘law.'” He underlined up to “spies”
and drew a line to the margin, where he wrote: “And by allowing themselves to be used, what
have reporters said about the value they place on 1st Amendment rights.” He continued the
thought on the back of the facing page. “The 1st Amendment is not a grant of immunity for the
press against temptation,” he wrote. “We owe some responsibility to a system that has bestowed
upon us such sweeping protection against interference. We do not have a right under the 1st
Amendment to be saved from ourselves.”

But what, exactly, was the temptation? Money? Access? Power? The ability to help a
friend? For a man who both denied agency “association” and admitted to having been “re-re-
recruited,” over and over again—who turned a national paper against the Vietnam War and main-
tained friendships with the men who orchestrated it—I’m curious what tempted him.

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That January op-ed was assertive, but largely left him out of it: his name didn’t appear
under the title, or explicitly within his argument. But that May, he signed his name onto a longer
editorial in the Post’s Sunday Outlook section that explained himself, as a former agent, in a per-

143 Notes on “CIA journalists: the loophole game.”
sonal attack on pending legislation. The National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, which had grown out of congressional response to the December *Times* series, would formally regulate interactions between the press and American intelligence agencies. “It’s Up to the Press, Not Congress, To Police CIA Ties” is two pages long, running from a corner of the *Outlook* front page through the entirety of the second, with two illustrations: one of a detective peering down through a magnifying glass at D.C.’s monuments; the second of a detective, with a periscope, leaning out from where he stands inside a pen. Much of the writing is a version of the testimony he gave earlier that month, formally opposing the broad sweep of the legislation, in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: the permanent, still-standing outgrowth of the Church Committee.

In advance of his testimony, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines had sent Geyelin a letter confirming the arrangements of his scheduled May 4th, 1978 appearance.\(^\text{144}\) The Chairman included a copy of the legislation, pointing him to the pages that had to do with the press.\(^\text{145}\) Geyelin marked them up in red.

“Starts here,” he wrote, at section 132. He underlined (a): “No entity of the intelligence community may—” and then drew a line to section 3: “pay or provide other valuable consideration to any individual to engage in any intelligence activity for or on behalf of the United States or provide any intelligence information to any department or agency if such individual—”. The

\(^{144}\) Letter to Philip Geyelin from Walter D. Huddleston, Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 24, 1978, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 5.

\(^{145}\) National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, copy of draft, Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 1978, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 5. See Appendix K.
rest he bracketed. Next to the following passage, he wrote “NO,” meaning it had no place in legislation.

(A) is a journalist\textsuperscript{146} accredited to any United States media organization,
(B) is not an openly acknowledged officer, employee, or contractor of any entity of the intelligence community and regularly contributes material relating to politics, economics, international affairs, military, or scientific matters to any United States media organization,
(C) is regularly involved in the editing of material for any United States media organization, or
(D) acts to set policy for, or provide direction to any United States media organization;

The passing of a bill including that passage would have formally banned information exchanges between the intelligence community and the media. My grandfather’s margin question—“What if CIA is sometimes right when gov is wrong”—would have become irrelevant. His old lunches and dinners and drinks with friends in the CIA would no longer be legal, if either gave or took “any intelligence information.”

The testimony he gave on May 4\textsuperscript{th}, in which he urged the Committee to reconsider, reads as a prelude of the editorial he published later that month—the only piece of writing he attached his name to at the Post in all of 1978. It’s personal, and it’s very public, in some ways more public than his congressional testimony: just as the front-page Times series that December was probably more widely read, or at least made more easily accessible, than the hundred of pages of the Church report, Geyelin’s front-page Outlook editorial in the Sunday Post was probably a more public, and more vulnerable, form of public argument. It’s in his medium, in his paper. In some ways, it reads as a confession, and a personal justification; and it’s also presented as a dissent from the opinions of many newsmen. Reading it when I did—after finding the letters and memos

\textsuperscript{146}All underlines in this passage are his.
regarding the CIA trip; after seeing what he’d said on television, and told historians—felt like reading a narrative I’d put together run through a round of his own edits.

The editorial—personal essay, really—starts with an italicized epithet. “‘Congress shall make no law... to abridge the freedom of the press.’—from the First Amendment to the Constitution” sits above his opening, which introduces the Senate Intelligence Subcommittee’s efforts, at the time, to make a law he summarized as an attempt “to abridge the CIA, so to speak, from interfering, one way or another, with the free flow of news.” He calls the effort admirable, given what had become public in the past years, and understandable, given the “strong case” other media members had made about a “hyperactive and insensitive CIA” needing to be regulated by bodies outside of the CIA itself. “But,” he continues, in the last paragraph of the first page, “I am troubled by the idea of trying to manage anything as complex, subtle and diverse as the relations between the press and a clandestine intelligence service by passing laws.” The law could actually curtail, he argues, the press’s freedom.

The next page opens with a disclosure. “My doubts,” he says, “derive not only from some years as a newspaper reporter and editor but also from a brief encounter—or, rather, a series of spasmodic encounters—with the CIA.” He says he worked for the CIA in Washington, in 1951, on a leave of absence from the Journal; and that later, as a foreign correspondent and Washington diplomatic reporter for the Journal, he “frequently had the sort of contacts with CIA officials that news people have with any other sources.” Recently, he says, he “requested the opportunity” to find out whatever the CIA had on file under his name. The examples he gives allude to what I didn’t get to see, or hear read aloud: while I have Califano’s bulleted summaries, one-to-two sentences to item, it seems that the two men had heard long memos, and cables in their full lan-
guage. Geyelin's essay doesn't introduce entries I'd never heard of, but it alludes to their exten-
sion past what I've seen—either in Califano's memos, or in this longer article. What Geyelin does
choose to include, he edited, and phrased, to read gently.

“What I found, among other things,” he writes (to which I want to ask, of course, What
other things?),

were cables to Washington from unidentified overseas CIA operatives abroad, cit-
ing my earlier CIA employment and advancing various proposals to create some
sort of ‘agent’ relationship with me while I was working abroad—proposals never
acted upon or presented to me in any serious way. Also recorded were reports of
my end of the conversation in interviews and briefings that even then would have
struck me as being of astonishing insignificance, but apparently constituted ‘intel-
ligence’ to the CIA at the time.

As examples, he includes a “report of a conversation I dimly remember having with a
long-time friend, who happened to work for the CIA,” in which he mentioned the then-prime
minister of France having recently been impressed at a meeting with Eisenhower; a CIA memo
given to the Pike Committee claiming he had given two ‘economic reports’ to the agency after
visiting Cuba in 1964 (“these,” he follows, “turned out to be two observations, each one sentence
long, that I had made verbally to a Washington-based CIA intelligence analyst for the simple
purpose of soliciting reaction”); a reference to him as a “willing collaborator,” which turned out
to be “the CIA’s quaint way of describing ‘anybody who would knowingly talk to a CIA
official,’”; and a “judgment that my weak grasp of the French language made it doubtful that I
could be of much use to the agency in Paris—at the least, an unkind cut, if not actually a

This is an edited version of the list I’ve read, and included, from Califano’s memo. But to
my reading, it does contain the most potentially damning instances Califano noted, if it excludes
certain language—“agreed to help,” for example, or “definitely interested and willing.” That, though, could be Geyelin’s choice for concision, or clarity. He was, after all, an editor. My instinct is to understand his early admission as an author’s establishment of authority, with the reader, and transparency. It could also be the choice of a man tired of rumors, and the best way to control them was to write them himself.

It’s an interesting preface to his following section, which he begins with his first conclusion: that there would be “no very useful purpose” in the CIA granting full access, or publicly unveiling, all of their past records relating to their dealings with the media. “Having compared experiences with a number of colleagues, my guess is that the files on most foreign correspondents of long experience would invite as much misinterpretation—and uncomprehension—as my own.” Maybe fair. But it’s a striking follow-up to a passage in which he, if it’s honest, made himself transparent within his own terms. Maybe he really just doesn’t want to create similar ordeals for reporters who didn’t pursue meetings at the agency themselves (or who didn’t have the connections, or familiarity, or favors to pull, to get a letter from the DCI stating their stainlessness for the public record). Maybe, with a less generous reading, he wasn’t warm to the idea of his exposing his record bare, without the trim of his prose.

And his next argument, too, is strange given his status as an editorial page editor—“editorial page editors like to deal in pure principles,” he’d told the Senate committee earlier the same month. But the editorial briefly presents the question of interaction as an argument in relativism. As to whether the CIA-press relationship should be regulated by law, he argued, “the answer, it seems, to me, has something to do with how important—and distinctive—you think the CIA/press problem is in relation to all the other CIA excesses and abuses” recently brought be-
fore Congress. He lists assassination, subversion, coups, unacknowledged organizational “cover” in activist groups. “One could argue,” he argued, “that the question of what sort of dealings the CIA ought to have with the press is not a very big deal.” It’s only “a page or two” of the whole bill, he says, and not particularly different from questions about “cover” as they relate to other organizations and figures—students, priests, academics. The answer to those questions could be applied to the journalists—except, he says, for the press’s own constitutional protections. The First Amendment, he argues, rightfully sets the press apart.

But he understands, he says, why so many people seem to want the legislation. The recent numbers of media members who allegedly had past CIA connections—whatever reported numbers you believe—don’t matter, in their quantity; if it’s thought that any American news people are tied to a government agency, they’re all implicated in doubt. But third-party regulation, he argues, would be at best fruitless, and at worst prohibitive. The bulk of the rest of his rhetoric offers his proposed alternative: a restoration of trust in the press’s ability to govern itself. Reading it, I’m caught off-guard by his extended metaphor. “It is worth remembering,” he writes, “that in the relationship between the CIA and the press, we are not dealing with the journalistic equivalent of rape. We are dealing with transactions between consenting adults.”

The comparison implies a shift, over the past years, to an understanding of the CIA as a powerful, manipulative body with the ability to coerce a vulnerable press—a slightly different argument, as I read it, than one in which the press needs to guard against its own temptations. In his metaphor, he refutes that new cultural premise: that even if the CIA were cloudy, subversive, and malicious, it’s not strong enough to force the media into compliance. He’s recasting the frame, creating one within which the journalists have the power to be equally immoral. His fol-
lowing argument hinges on the faith that they won’t be, which hinges on his assertion that—however you frame his earlier relationship to the CIA—he hadn’t been.

His argument relies on the assumption that he, and all journalists, possess strength of a similar magnitude as that of the agency facing policing (because the legislation, to be clear, posed the agency as the actor, not the press). His self-image makes sense: given his past relationship to the CIA, and the men in it, he would understand himself as having experienced power (at least over himself) similar in magnitude, if not always operation, to that of the bodies facing legal restrictions. He might have been re-recruited, but he had the self-possession to refuse.

But his next sentences seem to attempt to excuse, or at least contextualize, earlier years in which he might have deployed that equal power for purposes some might misjudge, when looking back from 1978. In underscoring the concept of the press and the government as “consenting adults,” in the present moment, he provides a parallel to the decades prior, in which both agencies hadn’t yet grown into themselves (and, by that logic, shouldn’t be judged too harshly now for the earlier phases of their thinking). The maturation into “consenting adults” only followed the immaturity of earlier ages. “We are not dealing,” he wrote,

with the CIA of, let us say, 20, or 10, or even five years ago—the CIA as it is pictured in congressional intelligence committee reports and the memoirs of disaffected former agents: beyond effective control and oversight, caught up in a Cold War psychology, run by an old boy net of driven men, insulated from public sensibilities.

That was his CIA, and him—twenty years ago; now disaffected; having gotten over their early-Cold War paranoia. While he doesn’t include himself in the sentence, his earlier admissions place him within the frame: he, too, had grown up within a nation that came of age over a decade of mistrust. The press, in my reading, has aged into suspicion; it has also aged into responsibility.
Though they had always possessed the capacity to police themselves against government advances, they might not have always known that they should. Now, the press knew better: they should be wise enough to know they’re not partners, and that cooperation would be read as a partnership in crime. His next sub-section is titled “Good Reporters Resist.”

The CIA, he argues, is a piece of a larger intelligence network strung throughout the government. A law relating to conflicts of interest between the press and intelligence would not be very different, in nature, from conflicts regarding the press and the rest of the government. “The point,” he says, “is that newspaper organizations and those who work for them under the special protection of the First Amendment ought to have no working relationships of any kind with any part of the government that are not openly acknowledged as a part of the business of professional journalism.” Not for pay; not out of “some misguided sense of patriotism.” That phrase reads like a counter to Helms’s letter, or the confusion of Bross, over what they said they would have considered “patriotic” acts of Geyelin’s in the early fifties, had the allegations been true. The allegiance they alluded to—to a government fighting a Cold War, alongside its civilians, maybe in partnership with its journalists—is not an allegiance Geyelin would publicly condone in 1978. He mentions a Post article he’d clipped from that January, where former CIA official Ray S. Cline claimed the CIA and the press had a “natural affinity”—both agencies were “searching for nuggets of truth about the outside world.” While Geyelin agreed with that description, he rejected the term “affinity”: the press and the CIA, he argued, should have the same “natural adversary” relationship as the press has with any institution.

But as to whether the CIA should be prohibited, by law, from seeking out a relationship? “Surely when news organizations are compromised,” he wrote,
there has to be some element of willingness on somebody’s part to be compromised. And if this is so, it would seem to me to follow that when the press asks for legislation to protect itself from exploitation in one way or another by the CIA, what it is asking, really, is for the government to save it from itself.

They’re all, according to his argument, past the time of cooperation. The assumption is that, at this point, the press would not choose to collude with the government: a call to patriotism would be misguided; a call to money would be corrupt. He calls the proposed, protective legislation a “favor”—as in, “not a favor that the press should be asking of the government—along with just about any other conceivable favor.”

But it’s a strange line. If the press is, by this point, so morally mature that it would choose not to corruptly collaborate with the government, why would a Congressional safeguard protecting against its own decision-making be a “favor”? Most of his rhetoric flows from a high moral ground; but it poses the legislation as a defense against what he seems to argue would be a non-problem, if the press and the government do actually have the equal degrees of empowerment that he argues they do. His argument seems to define the problem as moot: journalists are strong enough and smart enough to protect themselves, so the proposed legislation would just be reinforcing an self-enforced defense.

But if the legislation were only an unnecessary adornment to a solved problem, he wouldn’t be taking so hard a line, testifying to both the Senate committee and his readership within the same month. Rather, his argument is a moral justification for what he really wants: the continued legality of the way he knows how to conduct his career, and his own dealings with the government. Legislation de-legalizing the exchange of information between the CIA and the press would outlaw the way he knows how to work.
When the Senate sub-committee sent him a letter confirming the date and time of his testimony, and a draft of the proposed bill, they included a set of questions meant to guide their discussion. Geyelin presents a few in his essay: *Should journalists be permitted to swap information with the CIA? Should they be permitted to get briefings before visiting a particularly foreign area? Should they be permitted to report voluntarily information they derive from such visits?*

His response, first, is “Permitted by whom?” Journalism, he argued both to the committee and in his *Post* piece, is not a game of Go Fish, where you ask your source to give over all its aces—it involves presenting information, often for comment and response. The journalist is doing his job, looking for answers; but the questions convey something to the intelligence source, too (his arguments exclude the mention of journalist-provided information beyond those written into a question). Statutory regulation can’t, or shouldn’t, forbid them, he argues; and while news organizations might have the power to do so, it wouldn’t be in their interest. It’s normal news gathering, what he’s been doing for decades, and only recently has anyone been asking questions about it.

The place for law-making, he says, is wherever the press has no control: if news agencies don’t know that the CIA has placed one of its agents under journalistic cover; if the CIA is covertly pumping propaganda into the U.S. system. As to the use of foreign newsmen, he is less definitive, though he thinks there’s “a good case” that the CIA shouldn’t treat foreigners any differently than American news organizations and news people, if “American values are to have any meaning.” And as to blowback into American news from CIA propaganda abroad? That, he says, would be difficult to enforce against; and, anyway, good American reporting should prohibit the publication of bad material—in other words, that falls under journalistic jurisdiction. That’s the
definition of where regulation should stop: whenever matters are subject to the American press’s control, or consent. Because, he finishes,

At best, what we are talking about most of the time, in connection with past abuses, excesses and conflicts of interest in the relationship between the press and the CIA, is seduction. A better way to put it might be prostitution. But if that’s what we’re talking about, it seems to me that we in the press are obliged to remember who it is, in these transactions, that is playing the part of the prostitute.

I will set aside our potentially conflicting understandings of the level of consent involved in prostitution, and focus on what I think, here, he’s trying to do: demonstrate the depth of moral culpability to which he would hold a journalist who accepts payment, or succumbs to the temptation of power, when acting as a CIA mouthpiece. This, he is arguing, never is, or never was, him. The article, on the whole, places him both inside and outside of the problem he’s writing on: I was in the CIA, it says, but only for a little; many journalists have been coerced, but I wasn’t one of them; the CIA is tempting, but I was able to resist. I was there, and I wasn’t. Don’t worry about it.

But, again, he ends on strange language, given the whitewashed history with which he paints himself. What, exactly, was so tempting? Did he mean only money?147

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In October my uncle came to visit me. He’d just been in Maine, at the summer house my grandparents built on Mount Desert Island. It was passed down to my dad’s generation, and now my aunt and uncle, the ones I had visited in Virginia, spend the most time there. My uncle and cousin had just finished repainting. He showed me pictures of the awning he’d re-roofed, over

the front door, and then he asked me if I’d ever been in the “sub-basement crawl space.” I said no.

He said he’d been down there, looking for tools or something, and he found this pile of boxes. He didn’t even touch them, he said, because he knew I’d be all over them—they looked like papers, with labels in my grandfather’s hand. One of them just said, “Kissinger.” I should go there, if I had time.

My friend and I drove up the last weekend of winter break. It was snowing, and she’s from California, so I was glad to have snow tires. It took a long time. There was one restaurant open in town—the winter is the off-season—and its windows were the only ones lit up as we drove in, past dark. I remembered my grandparents’ driveway from when I was younger. It’s long, and winds through pine trees on either side. No one had plowed it, so we moved the Prius as far off the road as possible and walked, tired and falling, in between white-hung evergreens whose weighted-down branches seemed to pull them, leaning, towards us. The snow was so thick the air felt soundproofed, but it might have just been that there wasn’t anyone else close nearby.

In the morning I woke up and went to find the key behind the garage. My grandparents had built two houses: one for them to sleep in, and one for their kids, or kids and grandkids. There’s a man, Ken, who lives in Maine and periodically checks on the houses over the winter, and he’d left the key to the second house under the doormat, which we’d dug out the night before. But I thought the basement my uncle had mentioned was somewhere in the house my grandparents used to sleep in, and Ken had said the key to that one was tucked into a wooden beam under the roof’s overhang out back. I found it with my fingers.
My grandparents’ house felt, inside, like a museum. All the curtains had been closed for the winter, and furniture piled in the middle of the main room. The air looked like dust and it was freezing, obviously. I didn’t really know what I was looking for, or how to find a sub-basement crawl space, so I spent the morning opening closets and looking for small doors. There was one I liked—it was half my height and blended into the wood paneling, and above it was a wooden sign (“ATTENTION: CHAT LUNATIQUE!”) that made me think of my grandmother. But inside was just old mousetraps and rat poison and heating insulation, and the sort of dust I felt like I shouldn’t touch.

So I went back to the house we’d slept in, thinking maybe I was wrong. And under the stairs I noticed the outline of a door I hadn’t noticed, in the same pattern of wooden planks as the rest of the floor. Underneath was an unlit basement shorter than I am. There were piles of old lawn furniture and boxes of upholstery fabric I recognized from my grandmother’s chairs, a weird bag of hair, or fake hair, crates of old records, and boxes and boxes of old clippings and folders and letters, in a pile towards the back. For the next day I carried them up and down the short ladder of stairs, putting down folders on the floor of the living room and looking through them as quickly as I could. It made me laugh to see that they’d kept some files in old cardboard boxes for André, the cheap champagne people still buy for college parties, the twin of a box I’d been using for my own files, back at school.

I didn’t have much time, so I took what I thought could be useful and put it in a cardboard box to carry back up the driveway and bring home. I’ve been keeping it in my bedroom. The papers in it are mostly yellowed, and smell like basement wet. I looked through them again the other day, and pulled out one of the folders I took in full: “CUBA-1964.”
As far as I can tell, it’s from the trip that came up in his 201 file at the CIA—the one where, afterward, he’d allegedly met with CIA contacts, and then provided them with reports (reports he denied having written, and which the agency later conceded he hadn’t). I don’t know, from the folders alone, whether he did or didn’t write them. But I remembered how one of the first things Califano brought up, on the phone in December, was accusations about “Cuba or something”; and I remembered Califano’s 1976 memo, in which he wrote that Geyelin, looking at his 201 file, was surprised to see it written that he “knew anything about the Cuban budget” in 1964. In the folder were two papers that I’m glad I looked at again during a week when I was so focused on his May 1978 editorial.

They’re both typewritten. The first is titled “ray kline:”. I hadn’t known who that was, and I still don’t. But I’m inclined to believe it’s a misspelling of Ray S. Cline, who my grandfa-ther quoted in his May editorial, and who had been the head of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, or analytical branch, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. From the notes, he and Geyelin talked about the Soviets’ ability to control “sam sites,” or surface-to-air missile sites; Castro, prices on sugar crops; western trade.

The second is just titled “des:”. It, too, is in the format of notes written after a meeting. I want to say it’s Desmond FitzGerald, which would make sense—he was the head CIA officer in charge of Cuba following the missile crisis, and he was based in Washington in 1964. Originally,

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149 See Appendix L.
he’d been hired by Frank Wisner near the start of the Korean War. In Stuart Loory’s Review article, FitzGerald is mentioned as one of a handful of former Deputy Directors of Plans, those in charge of approving the hiring or retention of American newsmen, along with Wisner and Helms. In Carl Bernstein’s article, FitzGerald was the CIA agent who urged Joe Alsop, my grandfather’s journalist friend, to go to the Philippines and report on the election. William Colby calls him “Des” when he references him on On the Record.

Obviously, I don’t know for sure. All it says is “des,” and a lot of language whose tone doesn’t sound like what I’m used to reading from my grandfather—it’s uglier, and sounds like the language of someone making plans, not reporting on them. They read, to me, as notes from someone else’s words. (An example: “if you could glass it off and keep castro’s influence away from rest of hemisphere, if you could forget about guat. and hon. and rest of Caribbean and brizola and the rest, and have cuba like an ant colony, i’d like to keep it forever. a showplace for us.” Or, at the bottom of the page: “fidel is everything, subtract him and a three way dog-fight. the undigested lump, the old communists, the 26th of july, which ran wide gamut, to the rich and the reasonable, to socialists, but not to communists, many not there; also the army which largely 26th of july. if bloodshed, oas [Organization of American States] would have to move in. hope to set stage for that.”) Near the top of the page is a three word sentence—“the alice principle.”—that Geyelin underlined.

Towards the middle of the page is a paragraph that caught my attention.

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150 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 239-240.
152 See Appendix M.
story idea: grab almost any economic string and follow it – a factory or whatever. Ask what price of sugar, dockside, manufacturing price. An interesting price, whatever they say, price per pound. Ask number of employees (sic), market, where get raw materials, what pay, etc. this would show gross inefficiency, even though some of the figures are meaningless.

Was this Geyelin’s story idea? Or Des’s? To me, this doesn’t read like my grandfather’s language. It would make more sense to me that Des, of the CIA, would be motivated to demonstrate communist inefficiency in Cuba, even if through “meaningless” figures. I don’t know, but it matters. Because if Geyelin wrote a story because a CIA official suggested so, and if it contained meaningless figures that showed what the CIA wanted, isn’t that CIA-directed propaganda?

There’s no date on the paper. It’s in a file titled “CUBA-1964” and seems consistent with that: it mentions the Barry Goldwater campaign, and recent high sugar prices. It seems to have come around or after July 26, because there’s mention of “the eder bit,” ostensibly the article Richard Eder wrote on Fidel Castro for the Times, published on July 26, 1964.153 “des,” however, could have easily known about the interview between Eder and Castro before the article was published, given his station as an intelligence officer focused on Cuba—my grandfather knew, at least, judging from a sentence in an article he published on July 27.154


That August and September, Geyelin published a four-part series in the *Wall Street Journal* on the current state of Cuba. I’m inclined to read his “des” notes as having been taken in a pre-departure meeting, where Geyelin could have been trying to get a sense of the country he was about to report on. Over the span of a few weeks, he participated in a Cuban government-led guided tour for about thirty-six American journalists touring the country on a trip authorized by the U.S. State Department. From the article, it seems that the trip (from the Cuban perspective) was meant to give a positive impression of the country under Castro’s communism. Judging from Geyelin’s series, they didn’t succeed.

The first three installments ran on the *Journal’s* front page, starting at the top of the left-most or right-most column; the last part ran on page 8. The first was written from Santiago, and the next three from Havana. I found pictures from the trip in the Library of Congress, taken by a documentarian, Robert Cohen, who was working on a film project called “Inside Castro’s Cuba.” The photos are black and white, of shirtless and white-undershirt-wearing laborers in a steel mill. A man in a woven hat holds machinery that looks, on quick glance, like a long rifle, his gaze serious and focused somewhere out of the camera’s sight. An older man in a wide-brimmed hat sits in front of a chained-off, crumbling brick wall, resting an actual rifle across his lap. One shows my grandfather in a short-sleeved pin-striped button-down, holding a clipboard and a pen, hand on hip while he watches a steel worker handle black metal chain dangling from the ceiling.\(^{155}\)

For front-page news articles, they’re more editorialized than I would expect. Most of the first is relatively temperate, and serves to set up the rest of the series: my grandfather was there

because Castro wanted to present a positive image of his country amidst American consternation, as a ploy to improve relations with the U.S. and maneuver himself out of the political and economic struggles facing the relatively new regime. The country was facing the consequences of a few years of poor sugar crops, a major export, and was almost completely dependent on trade with the Soviet bloc following the U.S. embargo. Farm output and industrial production had “sagged,” and a week before the article’s publication, the Organization of American States had imposed further trade restrictions.\footnote{Philip Geyelin. “Castro Calling.”}

The second article is less restrained. “After five-and-a-half years of Fidel Castro,” reads the first line, “Cuba is, by almost any standards, an economic mess, an ideological mish-mash, a misfit and a menace in the Western Hemisphere. It is also, of course, a ruthlessly-run police state, and a Soviet satellite.” “A visitor,” wrote Geyelin, “has no difficulty spotting evidence of decay and dissidence.” He commented on the ascension of “New Cubans” from “lowly status” to top-level executive positions, which were either created by the regime or left vacant by formerly middle-class professionals who had fled into exile or been imprisoned as counter-revolutionaries. “Untutored, and by any reasonable measurement unqualified for their jobs,” he wrote, “the ‘New Cubans’ must, in one sense, be counted a liability; in generous measure, they contribute to the gross mismanagement and inefficiency that has wreaked such havoc on Cuba’s potentially rich economy.” He deemed the government-sponsored education of students at Cuban universities “brainwashing,” and predicted that possible future miscalculations by Fidel and his “amateur Marxist economists” would mean “the economy could conceivably collapse.” (As, he wrote, “Some experts, including a good many U.S. officials, have high hopes this will happen, given
time.”) On the whole, the loyalty of the upwardly-mobile Fidelistas is presented as a temporary product of probably-doomed—or at least deplorable—policies.

While the tone was inflammatory, it could have just been a reflection of what the visiting journalists were observing. Emotional prose might have been more familiar in the context of the early-sixties Cold War than it is now, in terms of front page journalism. The third article is more challenging: Geyelin seemed to take “des” up on his story idea, and pretty explicitly. Follow almost any economic string, “des” had told him—a factory, or whatever—and find the price. It would show inefficiency, even if the figures don’t matter. “The alice principle.”

Geyelin went to the “Socialist Vanguard Factory,” what he calls “a dingy, cluttered steel mill” just outside Havana. It manufactured spare replacement parts for the rest of the Cuban industries—a necessary function, given that during the early period of Castro’s regime, “probably 90%” of Cuban factory and plant equipment was made in America. Since then, “aid from the Red bloc” had reduced that number to 70%; but still, the majority of Cuba’s sugar, nickel, cotton textile, cigar, bottling, and other plants, as well as oil refineries and the railroad, were dependent on American-made manufacturing. Since the U.S. had halted all exports to Cuba, the Cuban government had had to build a new plant focused on replacing the spare parts they could no longer import. For illustration, Geyelin includes some figures, which were potentially irrelevant by des’s metric. “At the H. Uppman cigar factory, for example, some 60% of production, now totaling 98,000 cigars a day, is done by 17 machines made by International Cigar Machinery of New Jersey.” Machinery breakdowns will keep the factory from fulfilling its projected “norms” for the year. The factory manager, he wrote, said there were enough spare parts orders to operate 24
hours a day; but the lack of skilled workers mean the factory was “functioning well below full capacity.” The next subsection he titled, “The Alice Principle.”

“To a good many students of current Cuban economics,” he wrote, “the boom in the Cuban spare parts business is graphic evidence of what one authority calls ‘the Alice principle—the need for Cuba to run at a feverish rate simply to stay in the same place.’ The spare parts factory—in which Cuban labor energy and expertise was focused, essentially, on hand-making replacement parts—was “a shining example of economic inefficiency.” He went on to other examples: the British buses made of Iron Curtain products unsuited for Havana’s humidity, giving them a life expectancy of a year and a half. Oil refineries dependent on Soviet petroleum, which traveled five times longer by sea than oil that could have been purchased within Cuba’s hemisphere (read: the U.S.), potentially explaining the recent doubling of Cuban gas prices. Government insurances preventing the firing of workers, resulting in frequent over-employment of workers for any particular job. “Socialist doctrine,” wrote Geyelin, “firmly fixed, contributes mightily to economic waste, as does the impulsive, or simply incompetent, policy-making of Mr. Castro and his crew.” The passage ends with “one high government official who obviously has yet to be fully converted to communism”: “Anything that smacks of capitalism is immediately equated with corruption,” he’s quoted as saying. “And yet,’ he adds ruefully, ‘I have yet to discover a better test of efficiency than money.’” In the next passage, Geyelin applied the Alice principle to sugar prices.

So what? I don’t know, for sure. I don’t even know that the story idea came from Desmond FitzGerald, though I find it likely—partially because the notes seem to have been filed just a few pages away from another top CIA expert, Ray S. Cline (pending that that’s who my
grandfather meant by “ray kline”). Partially because Geyelin references him in reference to the Alice principle (“one authority”), and FitzGerald would certainly be considered an authority, and certainly be motivated to portray the communist economy as fantastically self-limiting. And partially because Califano’s memos state that Geyelin met with CIA personnel stationed in Washington in September and October 1964, following his return from Cuba, visits that would make even more sense if he had a prior relationship with FitzGerald and Cline. A pre-trip meeting might not have been recorded in the CIA file because Geyelin was looking to them for background information, rather than giving them information after his trip. Or it could have been there, and Califano might not have noted the meeting in his memo.

So assume I’m right, and “des” was Desmond. Then what?

It’s possible that this would be one of the “contacts” my grandfather would have described as “normal,” or nothing. And maybe it’s really nothing. The articles, after all, weren’t entirely in the tone of anti-Communist propaganda—there were a few references in some of the articles to Castro’s regime’s ability to improvise moments of ingenuity, or creatively maneuver the obstacles of their system. “It is not quite safe to conclude,” reads the third line of the third article, “that it is doomed to collapse, or even that it may not stagger through its trials and errors to greater strength.” The CIA official could have provided a story idea that both demonstrated an objective truth—the regime’s economic inefficiency—and happened to support a pro-capitalist, pro-Western agenda. The fact that the thesis of the series follows the U.S. government’s party line—endorsing the power, and superiority, of an American capitalist system—does not necessarily mean that it’s an incorrect thesis, or that my grandfather wouldn’t have written along its lines anyway.
But it toes a line, if it doesn't cross it. My grandfather meets with Cuba-focused CIA officials before he goes on a journalistic trip to the country. I don’t know who initiated the meeting. The CIA has information, and a pro-America, Cuba-hostile agenda. They give him a “story idea”—either he gets the idea himself while talking to the CIA, or the CIA says, “Here’s a story idea”—that would demonstrate the economic inefficiency of Castro’s regime. Geyelin goes where they say to—a factory—and finds information to meet the idea, including figures, though he’s told by the CIA that “some of the figures are meaningless.” He ends up fitting his reporting within the framework presented by the meeting, which seems to have taken place before Geyelin left for Cuba. Or, the material he finds matches the ideas of the CIA, because their information is accurate, as well as to their advantage. His reporting might have fit naturally with the CIA’s idea; he might have worked to work it in. It might not have been work at all—he could have been on the same page as the CIA; the story that worked to their advantage could have been the story that was there.

The anecdote parallels the story with which Carl Bernstein led his 1977 exposé, which was meant to be damning enough to draw readers into a scandalized history. Joe Alsop, it reads, went to the Philippines to cover an election. “He went,” reads the final line of the introduction, “at the request of the CIA.” The statement is meant to be obviously outrageous enough to stand on its own. But later in the article, Alsop admits to it, casually—“Des FitzGerald urged me to go,” he says—while simultaneously insisting the Agency didn’t manipulate him. “What I wrote was true,” he said. “My view was to get the facts. If someone in the Agency was wrong, I
stopped talking to them.” The key, he said, was keeping yourself clear. “You can’t get entangled so they have leverage on you,” he said.157

So Geyelin might have gone because Des urged him to; he might just have met with him before he left. The CIA might have given him a story idea, and that idea might have served their interests; it might also have been a good idea, from any source. Geyelin might have written a story that served their agenda, or Geyelin might have had the same agenda they did. The information he found might have cooperated with their agenda without any intentional coercion, or wordplay. Where, in there, did he draw his ethical fault line? Did he think he was toeing it? Would his answer have changed between 1964 and 1978? What about the rest of the country’s?

And what about another line of Alsop’s, from the Bernstein article: “The analytical side of the Agency had been dead wrong about the war in Vietnam—they thought it couldn’t be won,” he said (apparently admitting a belief that the war was lost to misstep, rather than inevitable failure).158 “What if CIA is sometimes right when gov is wrong,” my grandfather wrote in a 1977 margin. What if the government and my grandfather were getting the same intelligence, but reporting it differently? And what if his anti-Vietnam editorializing grew from that CIA-sourced information, which the proposed 1978 legislation would have barred him from obtaining?

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I found another letter in my aunt and uncle’s attic last summer. My grandfather kept a copy of it in another box labeled “Personal files.” I don’t know why. It’s dated November 18,

157 Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media.”

158 Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media.”
2002, about fourteen months before he died. It’s addressed to Joe Califano. My understanding is that it was for Califano’s memoir.

Joe—This is a copy of George the First’s letter to me. I can’t find, and doubt I ever had a copy of the letter you crafted from me to him. I remember that I wanted something a bit more precise about the entirely professional reporter/source contacts I had with CIA people after leaving the agency—some of them unwittingly with covert operatives.

I also remember that Bush was pretty starchy about the whole thing, arguing that if he wrote such a letter for me it would set a bad precedent and he might wind up having to write one for ‘hundreds’ of correspondents who had similarly innocent encounters with Agency people.

I also recall that the material was pretty voluminous; that they had assigned me a code name and that the ‘reports’ to headquarters made no mention of the questions I was acting (sic) or of the questions that the CIA guys asked me, so that it appeared I was an “informant” volunteering “intelligence.”

I have recollections, still vivid, of how it all began with Bill Colby handling over (sic) tons of raw files to the Church and Pike committees, of the leaks from the thoroughly undisciplined staff of the Pike Committee, and the story in a Chicago newspaper that lead me (sic) to seek some sort of explanation from people I had known in the Agency, winding up with a letter from Dick Helms who argued that if I hadn’t collaborated with the CIA, I should have as a matter of patriotic duty. Please don’t ask me to look for that correspondence. The only letter I cared about was the one from Bush. If you’ll come to Washington and join me for lunch I’ll take you to the Cosmos Club where I’d have to pay. It would be good for your image.

Best to Hillary

As ever,
(his signature)\(^{159}\)

At this point he was almost eighty. I’ll use that to explain his typos, and his slips. Loory’s article didn’t appear in a Chicago paper, though he did write for the *Chicago Sun-Times*; I’ll choose to understand “acting” as an easy mix-up for “asking,” and not some telling Freudian

\(^{159}\) Letter to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., from Philip L. Geyelin, November 18, 2002, in the personal archives of Mary Sherman Willis, in a box labeled “P.L.G. Personal files.”
slip. I’m going to understand his tone of explanation (“I wanted something a bit more precise about the entirely professional reporter/source contacts I had with CIA people after leaving the agency—some of them unwittingly with covert operatives”) as a factor of his remembering out loud, to a friend writing a memoir, and not some eerie example of him knowing what I, his granddaughter, was looking to figure out, sitting on his daughter’s floor in the summer before I graduated from his alma mater.

But now I’m reading it again, and it’s a reminder of what I still don’t know. The code name, for example: he mentioned it in his Post essay in May, 1978, but Califano didn’t include it in his memo. What wasn’t mentioned in either? The files were, apparently, “voluminous.” I have the sentences and notes they chose to keep. Maybe there’s nothing else, or only things I could read dumb twenty-first century conspiracy into. I don’t know. But it’s a funny last line, before the sign-off. “It would be good for your image.”

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Now it’s almost sixteen months since I first looked at the blue album my aunt sent me. I know more, though some data’s still in the dark. What I do have is a more nuanced way of navigating the answers my grandfather might give me, if I were able to ask him questions.

Over the 1970s, my grandfather had to re-make his image within a new cultural frame. He needed to articulate himself as more modern than his history suggested, at least to some, by absolving himself of a scandalized, secretive past that suddenly implicated him. So he made personal and public efforts to both cleanse himself of a new generation’s idea of moral contamination, and to paint the context in which his old conduct would at least be understood—even if the image came out sketchier than some would like.
“No association” mixed with “normal contacts” mixed with the CIA’s attempts to “re-recruit.” His 1970s language gets confused, when it’s applied to old categories and relationships whose definitions and borderlines were blurrier, when first defined, than the public demanded them to be a few decades later. My suspicions might just live in the dark corners of semantics. In the light, they might dry out to what I believe was my grandfather’s basic argument: some of the things he did, and relationships he had, and places he worked, look bad to a later-day audience of government skeptics. But he was a good journalist who cared about printing what he believed to be the truth, and he’d built a career getting that truth from whatever sources he could. In hindsight, I can ask questions about his tactics; but maybe nothing he did ever really felt wrong, to him. And if he reported over decades in which national ethics changed, and patriotism changed, and his younger attitudes changed, too—can he blame his younger self for having been younger, and having lived in a younger country?

I’m Geyelin’s granddaughter, and I’ve grown up in a house built from the wreckage of a national moment he lived through. Its foundation is cemented in a certain suspicion of the government that he, at my age, was leaving college to go fight for. After finding what I’ve found, I don’t know how many of his real ethics I’ve inherited; but I’ve at least developed the image I’ve grown up with—that of my grandfather, with a pen, writing his understanding of the truth. I know, now, a more complicated person. Or, at least, I’ve constructed one.
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“Philip L. Geyelin.” Brief bio found in the personal archives of Mary Sherman Willis, at her home, in folder labeled “P.L.G./BIO.” Author unknown.


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WRC TV. *On the Record*, October 29, 1977, 7 P.M. Transcript provided by Radio TV Reports, Inc. and located through the CREST system at the National Archives and Records Association.

Appendix

Good days....... and bad days

Mrs. Joseph P. Snie, Jr.
8 Topeka Circle (?)
Chestnut Hill
Pennsylvania

Devon snow fabrics

International Edition
3 Tapped at Yale
In Traditional Rites
Of Senior Societies
New Members from Junior
Class Are Selected in
Annual Campus Ceremony

According to the Herald Tribune
NEW HAVEN, Conn., Dec. 4.—In the annual ten-day ceremonies this
afternoon thirty Yale University
juniors were admitted to the senior
societies. Admission to one of the
secret societies is considered one of
the chief distinctions which a Yale
student can achieve in his four years
on the campus.

The election list follows:

BOOK AND SNAKE
Aron Allen Weidemann, Lexington,
KY; Robert Von Maring, New York,
NY; John Menninger, Binghamton,
NY; Thomas E. Lawrence, New
York, NY; John J. Driscoll, New
York, NY; Robert J. Scully, New
York, NY; George M. L. Smith,
New York, NY; John J. Dwyer,
New York, NY; John O. Hannon,
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New York, NY; John O. Hannon,
Where am I?
C: Photographs from the archives of Mary Sherman Willis, daughter of Philip L. Geyelin.

Geyelin’s football team photo at Episcopal Academy, where he graduated in the class of 1940.

Geyelin and friends at Yale.
“12 people for dinner: 24 hours notice”

Starring MRS. PHILIP GEYELIN
OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Cast

MRS. PHILIP GEYELIN
MR. PHILIP GEYELIN
MRS. PHILIP GEYELIN
MARY SHEEHAN GEYELIN
MILO GEYELIN: 7 years old
MR. PHILIP GEYELIN: 5 years old
PHILIP GEYELIN: 10 years old
LILLIE GEYELIN: 2 years old

The Dinner Guests

HIS EXCELLENCY, THE AMBASSADOR OF SPAIN, AND MRS. DE YTEURALDE
SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL AND MRS. PELL
MR. CHARLES YOST, DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
MRS. RONALD TREE
MR. AND MRS. STEWART ALGOT
MRS. CHAUNCY PARKER
MR. AND MRS. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
MR. WILLIAM WALTON

The Plot

To prove the flexibility of a wife under entertaining pressure, Vogue played a game in which Mrs. Geyelin was asked to give a dinner party on twenty-four hours notice under stimulated conditions; Vogue asked Mr. Geyelin to play the part of a surprise-springing husband. But to insure the experiment, these guests were invited ten days in advance and were told that Vogue’s photographer, Cornell Capa, would take their photographs; the Geyelins’ part-time waitresses, Mrs. Dolly Russell and Mrs. Annie Donaldson, agreed to come that Friday evening. (More details and photographs on the next page.)

Photographs on these two pages:
MRS. GEYELIN GETTING THE NEWS ON THURSDAY MORNING;
MRS. GEYELIN SEATING THE GUESTS ON FRIDAY EVENING.

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“12 people for dinner: 24 hours notice” continued

Synopsis: Mrs. Gevelin organized the party, shopped for food, flowers, liquor, and cooked almost the entire dinner, arranged the flowers, set the table with the aid of her children, ironed her dress, and served, before the dinner party, some thirty-one meals in two days with the aid of a mother’s helper. At the party Mrs. Gevelin looked extraordinarily pretty and relaxed in a short printed chiffon dinner dress of blue and green.

Background music: Part of the time, radio going in the kitchen, more or less blasting out the song, “A Hundred Pounds of Clay,” with the last word sung as “Flesh.” To this sound were added Dolly Russell using the vacuum cleaner; Lili, the two-year-old, chattering; Philip and Milo in the basement arguing; Mrs. Gevelin whipping the homemade mayonnaise; and the Siamese cat, Yul, meowing in Siamese.

Continuity: The party started on Thursday morning at 10:15 when Mr. Gevelin, a staff reporter covering foreign affairs in Washington for the Wall Street Journal, telephoned his wife (by arrangement) to say he had twelve people coming for dinner the next night at 8. Mrs. Gevelin making up her own dialogue: “You dear creature, you must be out of your mind. Okay. Twelve. I really should shout you. Seated? Okay, okay.” She then went upstairs to her pale-blue bedroom, made out the menu, her shopping list, and made three telephone calls. First she called her two helpers; to Mrs. Russell she said: “Can you come? Bring your uniform. You’re free, not going dancing? You are wonderful.” Then she called Mrs. Donaldson. “Are you free? Annie, you’re an angel. What would I do without you?” Her next call was to Mr. Wolfe at Burk’s liquor dealers. “Mr. Wolfe, what about the Hermitage 1959? Not ’59, but ’57? I thought ’59 was the magic year. I can’t afford. Six bottles at 25.54 Cartwright and Bentley Scotch. One Kentucky Gold. One gin, not too expensive. Melrose? Good. One vodka, a fifth. Ballerina.”

A graceful woman, with light auburn hair and really enormous blue eyes, Mrs. Gevelin has the quick lightness of a dancer. (She spent four years before her marriage in 1956 with the Charles Weidman dancers. In those days she wore a pony tail, black tights, wild tops, put rouge on the tip of her nose, and listened for hours to Stan Kenton records. When Weidman took her into his troupe, he said, “You have a comical back of the neck.” Before she joined the troupe, she was graduated from St. Timothy’s School and went to George Washington University.)

That Thursday morning, finished with her telephone chores, she picked up her list, stopped to kiss Philip goodbye, asked him, “Who didn’t hang up their clothes?” to which he answered simply, “They fell down,” ignoring the fact that they were in the middle of the rug, and out she dashed to her red Austin for marketing. (More on the next pages.)
“12 people for dinner: 24 hours notice” continued

Mrs. Grayelio drove first to the Supermarket, bought vegetables, veal, the lady-fingers, staple supplies, whipped over to the section marked “Cheese, Magazines, Brooms,” for Parmesan and ricotta, rolled past Mrs. Walter Lippmann picking out string beans. The checker, as she paid her bill, asked: “How’re you doing with Shirer’s Third Reich?” She said: “I haven’t scratched the first chapter.” Later, after the florists, she drove to the French Market to discuss with Mr. Robert a choice of three pâtés and a galantine, ended with the Pâté Maison. As she paid, she told the cashier, “add on trois Boston lettuce,” asked him “Avez-vous du Campbell’s consommé?” Going out the door she called out, “Ça va, alors, okay.” And started for home.
Messenger brought wine, a guest who could not come sent flowers, and Mrs. Geyelin fixed the spinach, cut up the veal.

One of her flower arrangements. After the Supermarket she stopped at three florists, picked out laurel leaves, Sea Foam Statice, and three anemones.

In the basement, while Milo paraded in his Marine cap, Lili tottered around in sneakers, and Philip climbed a column, Mrs. Geyelin pressed her dress.

Home from school, Mary shows a good report in arithmetic, Milo a good in conduct.

Mrs. Geyelin said: "My best possessions, my hair dryer and the washing machine."

"The trick with homemade mayonnaise is the slow flow of the best oil."

Ten minutes before Zero Hour: the check-off.
"12 people for dinner: 24 hours notice" continued
The cream and green Geyelin dining room, like the living room, has a flavour of comfort, Regency and Directoire furniture, and an easy charm compounded partly of a variety of objects on which to rest the eyes—Lowestoft plates in a pickled pine cabinet, paintings of birds, flowers, horses, primitive portraits of children, perhaps by itinerant painters. For a snap of the contemporary in the dining room and entrance, the Geyelins put down black and white squares of vinyl which Mrs. Geyelin every two or three months scrubs down with Brillo and shines with something that looks like nail polish. As the Geyelins usually have a party like this one at least once a month, she followed her well-worked manual of arms. She said: "Just good food, good wines, good conversation, and the men feel safe and warm and secure in a pleasant room." As she looked over the table just before the guests arrived, she said: "I love my life."

The party swung like a balloon. Mrs. Geyelin said: "I wouldn't dream of telling my husband the work behind the scenes, he'd perish from boredom."

Her four children helping Mrs. Geyelin set the table on Thursday. (They think it is fun.) Milo wears his grandfather's Marine cap.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Washington Post - General - Geyelin

Phillip Geyelin and I met with Richard Lansdale, acting general counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The purpose of our meeting was to determine what material the CIA had in its files relating to Mr. Geyelin. Our stated objective is eventually to obtain a letter clearly stating the extent of that relationship and its termination.

Mr. Lansdale read from a folder he identified as "Mr. Geyelin's 201 file." He would not permit us to read it ourselves.

Lansdale said the CIA could not find the personnel action paper by which Geyelin was first employed and finally left employment. However, other papers indicated that the period of employment was from December, 1950 to December, 1951.

Beginning at the end (rather than the beginning) Mr. Lansdale said that there was a notice of December 1950 in which one of the department directors of the directorate of operations wrote that Mr. Geyelin's "former willing collaborator relationship [was] terminated." I asked Mr. Lansdale what was meant by that. Mr. Lansdale said that a "collaborator relationship" simply meant a person who was talking to the CIA.
Lansdale said that the "201" file on Mr. Geyelin was created in November 1957. He said it began with a personal history prepared by Geyelin which was in effect his application for a job, dated August 21, 1950.

In 1954 there was a request from one of the European Operating Divisions to obtain appropriate clearances for Geyelin in order to "use as a covert contact [?] in the developmental program in the international business field."

Lansdale said that this was what the Agency did as a prelude to determining whether or not to try and use someone in civilian life. [The report from which Lansdale read stated that Geyelin was in New York. This was not so.]

Lansdale then noted a paper in the file indicating that Mr. Geyelin was reprimanded in June 1951 for losing his badge. We had a light and brief exchange about the importance of badges.

In May 1954, the security clearance request was approved, with the caveat that "subject is not to represent himself as nor is he to be represented as an employee of the CIA."

In December 1955, the American Division approved the use of Mr. Geyelin in an operational capacity in Paris on labor projects. There was also some reference to using Geyelin in Rome and Frankfurt on such projects. An American Division paper noted that Geyelin was going to Europe.
In January 1956, there is a memorandum concerning "ruminations on possible operational use" signed by S. A. Edwards. According to Lansdale, this could have been either Shef or Sam Edwards. The memorandum indicated that Geyelin agreed to help in France consistent with his obligations as a reporter, that Geyelin presented a rare opportunity and that he should be utilized and referred to labor matters in Europe.

According to Lansdale there were apparently exchanges of correspondence and/or cables between Europe and the U.S. about when Mr. Geyelin would be contacted.

In January 1956, the Chief of the European Division in Paris indicated that during a spontaneous contact by the station chief in Paris, Geyelin seemed willing to cooperate "provided the task given him would not interfere with his responsibilities and loyalty to the Wall Street Journal" which was then Geyelin's employer. The contact with Mr. Geyelin was "entirely spontaneous" according to the CIA cable.

Another cable indicated that arrangements were made to meet Geyelin on December 22, 1955, and on that occasion Geyelin indicated he was willing to provide information to the CIA "without interfering with or embarrassing the Journal." The agent who met with Geyelin on that date indicated that Geyelin was "definitely interested and willing."

On January 9, 1956 (?) Geyelin was given the telephone number and home address of the station chief in Paris.
In January 1956 another clearance was given to Geyelin, again with the caveat that "he is not to represent himself as nor is he to be represented as an employee of the CIA."

In January 1956 the Paris station chief cabled that he had met and lunched with Geyelin after a long delay; that Geyelin had considerable difficulty with the French language and as a result of that Geyelin was having difficulty in making contacts. The station chief said that he believed that Geyelin had no particular knowledge that would be of help to them but that he could be very useful in the future. As the station chief put it, Geyelin could become "a very reliable and discreet contact." He said that Geyelin had respect for the type of work the Agency was doing in France and that he (the station chief) would give Geyelin a full briefing on what was going on in France.

In October 1957, Paris cabled Washington that Geyelin was to go to Poland for four to six weeks and wondered what Geyelin could do for them in Poland.

In October 1957, Paris cabled Washington that Geyelin was going on a brief assignment to the Middle East and expected to go to Paris when he returned.

In December 1957, Paris reported to Washington that Geyelin had returned from a trip to the Middle East and that "along with a thousand other journalists" Geyelin was attempting
to cover the NATO meetings in Paris; that the Warsaw trip had been postponed; that they would proceed to help provide Geyelin questions to ask and to urge him to be careful about people he should not be asked to contact.

The same cable indicated that Geyelin said that Gallard [sp.?] indicated he had a favorable view of Eisenhower and that this report from Geyelin had been put in the daily briefing provided to the Secretary of State while he was at the NATO meetings. The cable asked again for a continued clearance of Geyelin including his potential use to obtain political information.

In March 1958, a Washington to Paris cable granted full clearance, noted that Geyelin might be "an excellent informant on economic and political matters" but also noted that he was unlikely to be useful except as a "casual consultant."

In October 1958, in a cable from Paris to Washington indicated that Geyelin was supposed to report to the Wall Street Journal London Bureau on September 1, 1958, that he was well known to the London Station Chief and that perhaps he could be used there.

On October 21, 1958, in a Washington to London cable it was stated that, if the station chief had an interest in Geyelin, then he should request approval for a clearance.

In December 1958, a London to D.C. cable requested approval to use Geyelin, noting that Geyelin was well known to the station chief. The cable said that there were "no immediate
plans" to use Geyelin but that he might be used on an 
"occasional basis as an informant on economical and political 
matters."

In December 1958, a Paris to London cable said that 
Geyelin was in Paris to cover the NATO meetings. The cable 
indicated that Geyelin was becoming an expert on the Middle East; 
that he had debriefed the Paris Station Chief [?] on the 
Middle East and the problems of the U.S. there, that he was 
having dinner with Joe Alsop and Sulzberger and that Geyelin 
was "now considered something of an authority on the Middle East" 
and should be a "good source" on that area.

In March 1959, the London Station Chief was informed 
by Washington that the operational approval for use of Geyelin 
in Paris was still good in London.

In October 1957 [this series of cables was out of 
chronological order in Mr. Geyelin's 201 file] the Paris 
station reported to Washington that Geyelin had told them that 
the Wall Street Journal had asked him to report on current 
economic problems in Poland. The cable indicated that Geyelin 
had asked to be briefed on everything the station knew and 
was willing to tell him about the economic situation in Poland 
and the individuals he might see there.

On October 10, 1957, a Paris to Washington cable 
indicated that Geyelin was negotiating with the press officer 
of the Polish embassy and "asked if the station chief would be 
willling to provide him with a list of Polish officials and
background information." The cable also said Geyelin had asked for any rumors of impending shifts of Polish officials and hoped that the station chief would be able to help him "primarily by giving him some idea of what to look for."

In November 1957, a Paris to Washington cable reported that Geyelin would have to go to Warsaw before full operational approval could be completed and therefore wondered whether it would be possible to use Geyelin as a contact in Warsaw without such approval.

In December 1975, [papers in the file now returned to chronological order] a memorandum indicated that someone from the Agency contacted Geyelin in New York City in March, 1958. Geyelin briefed that individual on the foreign situations in Paris, Bonn and London [Geyelin noted that this apparently was when he was on home leave from the Wall Street Journal and that the Wall Street Journal had a practice of permitting the CIA to debrief and interview foreign correspondents].

The memorandum of December 1975 noted that Geyelin was next contacted in September 1964, when he was with the Washington Bureau of the Wall Street Journal. The contact related to a visit Geyelin had made to Cuba in December 1964, and indicated that Geyelin had furnished two reports to the CIA contact. [Geyelin said that he wrote no reports for the CIA. This later turned out to be true.]

At my request, Mr. Lansdale indicated that he would check to see whether the "reports" were indeed the same articles written by Mr. Geyelin.
I asked Mr. Lansdale what precipitated this December 1975 memorandum. Mr. Lansdale reported that the Agency received a request from the House Subcommittee on Intelligence for any information indicating that "Geyelin was a source of this office."

I noted that the material in the December 1975 memorandum appeared to relate to the domestic directorates and asked Mr. Lansdale if he would see whether there was anything in those files concerning Geyelin.

At the end of the meeting, another man, ____________, who was introduced as also occasionally acting general counsel of the CIA, entered the room. We talked about the letter we had requested from the CIA. I read the attached excerpts from the Senate Intelligence Committee report. Mr. Lansdale said that Geyelin would not fit into any of the four categories mentioned on p. ___ of the Church Committee report.

I said to Lansdale that we would like to have a letter from the CIA indicating the year in which Geyelin was employed (from December 1950 to December 1951) and we would also like to have that letter indicate that Geyelin did not fit into any of the four categories in the Senate Intelligence Committee report. I said to Lansdale that those categories appeared to be the four categories of the Agency as described by Director Colby in his testimony before the Senate Committee. Mr. Lansdale said that he thought the Agency might be able to provide such a letter, but he expressed concern that providing such a
letter to Mr. Geyelin would put the Agency in a position of having to provide similar letters to every reporter in Washington. I told Lansdale that I thought Geyelin's case was special in that there were nasty rumors in Washington about the editorial page of the Washington Post being "soft on the CIA" because Mr. Geyelin was affiliated in some way with the CIA.

Mr. Lansdale said it was hard to believe that the Washington Post was "soft on the CIA". I said the problem went to the integrity of the editorial process at the Post; there were indeed people who made such charges.

We ended this part of the discussion (which lasted about ten minutes) with an agreement that I would provide a draft letter from the CIA which might be in response to a draft from Mr. Geyelin. Mr. Geyelin indicated that he did not intend to print his letter on the editorial page of the Post. He wanted the letter to show to those who made nasty and unfounded accusations about any relationship of his to the CIA subsequent to the time his employment with the Agency was terminated in December, 1951.

Mr. Lansdale noted that everyone wanted to get away from the CIA. Mr. Geyelin said that this was not so, that as far as he was concerned, he simply wanted to get an accurate statement of his relationship with the CIA.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
May 24, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Washington Post - General - Geyelin

On Tuesday, May 18, 1976, Phil Geyelin and I met with Mr. Ziener, a representative of the domestic contact division of the CIA, and Richard Lansdale, acting general counsel of the CIA. The purpose of the meeting was to question Ziener and Lansdale and to review Geyelin's domestic CIA file.

The discussion began by Messrs. Ziener and Lansdale making reference to Mr. Geyelin's return from his trip to Cuba in 1964. Mr. Lansdale said that, contrary to his remarks in an earlier discussion, he wanted Mr. Geyelin to know that the CIA had no reports from him (Geyelin) as a result of that trip. The "reports" referred to in a subsequent memorandum (written in late 1975 or early 1976) were reports by a CIA agent that interviewed Mr. Geyelin about his trip to Cuba. "These are," Mr. Lansdale said, "the only reports that the CIA has any record of."

Going back through the file chronologically, Mr. Ziener said that the domestic contact file contained the following records:

-- In December 1957 the New York CIA office cabled headquarters saying that a man named Phil Geyelin might be
able to provide foreign intelligence for them. That same month headquarters suggested that certain specific questions be propounded to Geyelin. New York cabled CIA headquarters back, saying they were dissatisfied with the questions and asking that the questions be made more specific. In early January 1958 headquarters cabled New York back ordering them to use the original questions. In January 1958 New York cabled headquarters saying that Geyelin's date to return to the United States had been changed. In March 1958 Geyelin was met in New York by a CIA domestic contact, but nothing came out of the conversation.

-- On March 6, 1968, there was a cable indicating a decision that the CIA find out where Geyelin was and noting that he might be worth contacting for debriefing in Washington about his impressions of West Germany, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and France. In March 1958 headquarters asked New York when Geyelin would be in D.C. New York informed headquarters he was expected to be in D.C. on March 11. When Geyelin was not in D.C. on that day, headquarters urged New York to debrief him there. The debriefing never took place.

-- In April 1965 there was a CIA cable indicating that Geyelin should be contacted when he was available. In May 1968 there was a cable indicating that no one contacted Geyelin from the CIA.

-- In August 1964 the Washington field office noted that Geyelin had been to Cuba recently. A member of the
Washington field office interviewed Geyelin about the trip and as a result wrote two reports. Geyelin was interviewed on September 18, 1964 at his home at 4511 Cathedral Avenue, where it was reported that "he seemed friendly and cooperative and provided the interviewer with reportable information on the Cuban budget." [Geyelin was surprised that he knew anything about the Cuban budget.] In October 1964 the Washington field office cited Geyelin as one of its sources of its material on Cuba as a result of its interview.

-- In 1970 the CIA's file contains a notation that Geyelin is no longer with the Wall Street Journal.

-- In late 1975 there is the notation (apparently precipitated by the Pike Committee request) that Mr. Geyelin had made some reports to the CIA. This reference is to the interview by the CIA of him after his visit to Cuba. Geyelin made no reports to the CIA.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Memorandum For File
Washington Post - Phil Geyelin

May 3, 1976

On April 16, 1976, Mr. Califano met at the
Central Intelligence Agency with Director Bush and with
Acting General Counsel Dick Lansdale on the subject of
Phil Geyelin. The meeting lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Mr. Califano informed the Director that potential
erroneous rumors to the effect that Phil Geyelin worked
for the CIA while he was a professional reporter in 1953
might lead to charges that the Washington Post was soft
on the CIA because of the Agency's relationship with Geyelin.
Mr. Califano said that he didn't want to invoke
the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act procedures to
acquire any records held by the CIA relating to Mr. Geyelin
because the Agency is several months behind in responding
to FOI and Privacy Act requests and the Geyelin issue
demands immediate attention.

Mr. Califano explained that he would like to
see any files on Mr. Geyelin. In addition, he explained
that what is needed in this matter is a formal statement
by the CIA stating what years Mr. Geyelin worked for the
CIA, and further stating that he performed no services
for the Agency after that time.

Director Bush responded that the statement would
be provided, but Mr. Lansdale commented that the CIA did
not customarily give opinion letters of this type — especially now, when everyone is trying to run away from the Agency. Nevertheless, Mr. Bush requested that Lansdale draft such a letter immediately.

The Director informed Mr. Califano that the Agency could not at this time locate Mr. Geyelin's personnel file, but a personnel card was located showing that Mr. Geyelin was employed by the Agency in 1951 and 1952. The Director further stated that on the basis of a 48-hour check, there was absolutely no indication that Mr. Geyelin ever performed services for the CIA after 1951-1952.

In conclusion, the Director seemed prepared at the close of this meeting to provide the formal statement suggested by Mr. Califano, and he stated that he would clear any statement through Mr. Califano when it was drafted.

[This memorandum for the file was drafted by PBH after debriefing by Mr. Califano subsequent to the meeting.]

PBHilton
H: Philip L. Geyelin, draft, from the archives of Mary Sherman Willis at her home, in box labeled “PLG PERSONAL DOCS.”

Local da, south vietnam dash it was late in aye long, hot day at this special forces encampment on the edge of war zone cc, when all the pieces seemed to fall into place, presenting a sick surrealistic tableau, aye chilling vision of the war in vietnam could evolve, if it follows its present course, and not much more gose wrong than might reasonably be expected from its own past history. Graf

the vision was of eye never hyphen ending conflict in eye vietnam suffused and supported by eye growing umm ass military presence; of eye vietnam engaged, fitfully and inconclusively, in endless civic action programs for quote revolutionary development unquote, and shaken, periodically by recurrent domestic political crisis, fourth french republic hyphen style; of eye vietnam increasingly dependent for its safety and survival on quote pacification unquote efforts, by the big battalions in the jungles or squad hyphen sized patrols in the hamlets, but in any case, by umm ass troops. graf

it was only eye fleeting vision, quite possibly unprophetic, but curiously compelling and not all that far removed from harsh reality. graf

in the brigade command post tent, maj. gen. william ass dempsey, commander of the umm ass army first army division, sat back, cross legs, arms akimbo, studying eye huge battle map eye few feet away. eye tent, trim, buntam of eye man, he was every inch the professional contemplating eye job profession

ally done, and waiting with eye professionals patience, for what was to come. picked up that morning, he had dropped an entire battalion clearing in the almost incomer, triple canopied jungle, and dropped it in without opposition, in one of those carefully planned, masterfully executed maneuvers
whose massive force and split second execution make it so difficult to doubt that this war will be brought to an end by a few paces of the more optimistic modern military techniques. 

The firing of rockets and machine guns from helicopters darting overhead, and while the lumbering, twin propeller Chinook transport planes eased into view, fogging the battle until the enemy's fire. 

The massive force and split second execution make it so difficult to doubt that this war will be brought to an end by a few paces of the more optimistic modern military techniques.
I: Photograph collection in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 75, Folder 1. The first features Geyelin and Lieutenant David Stout; the following are a sequence of unnamed subjects. Geyelin was in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 on assignment for the *Wall Street Journal*, and it appears the photographs were taken by a companion on the trip. The photographer is unknown, though given Geyelin’s presence in many of the photographs, it’s unlikely that the photographer was Geyelin, and likely that the photographer was also employed by the *Journal*.
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate of such support.

(k) The National Security Council shall maintain a record of all written findings made by the President pursuant to subsection (d), (e), and (f).

(l) The Director shall submit a written report semiannually to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on all ongoing special activities and clandestine collection activities which, prior to initiation, required personal approval by the President or review by the National Security Council and notification of the President being carried out by, for, or on behalf of, the United States.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 132. (a) No entity of the intelligence community may—

(1) pay or provide other valuable consideration to any United States person following a full-time religious vocation to—

(A) engage in any intelligence activity for or on behalf of the United States, or

(B) provide any intelligence information to any department or agency;
(2) pay or provide other valuable consideration to any United States person whose travel to a foreign country is sponsored and supported by the United States as part of a United States Government program designed to promote education or the arts, humanities, or cultural affairs to—

(A) engage in any intelligence activity for or on behalf of the United States while such individual is—

(i) participating in any such program, and

(ii) traveling or temporarily residing in any foreign country;

(B) provide any intelligence information acquired while such individual was—

(i) participating in any such program, and

(ii) traveling or temporarily residing in any foreign country;

(3) pay or provide other valuable consideration to any individual to engage in any intelligence activity for or on behalf of the United States or provide any intelligence information to any department or agency if such individual—

(A) is a journalist accredited to any United States media organization,
(B) is not an openly acknowledged officer, employee, or contractor of any entity of the intelligence community and regularly contributes material relating to politics, economics, international affairs, military, or scientific matters to any United States media organization,

(C) is regularly involved in the editing of material for any United States media organization, or

(D) acts to set policy for, or provide direction to, any United States media organization;

(4) pay for or otherwise knowingly or intentionally support the distribution within the United States of any book, magazine, article, publication, film, or video or audio tape, unless such support is publicly announced;

(5) pay for or otherwise knowingly or intentionally support the distribution in any foreign country of any book, magazine, article, publication, film, or video or audio tape if the purpose of the distribution in such foreign country, or if the likely result of such distribution would be the substantial redistribution of such book, magazine, article, publication, film, or video or audio tape, as the case may be, within the United States unless such support is publicly announced;

(6) use, for the purpose of establishing, furnishing,
or maintaining cover for any officer, employee, or agent of such entity, an affiliation, real or ostensible, with any United States religious organization, United States media organization, United States academic institution, the Peace Corps, or any United States Government program designed to promote education, the arts, humanities, or cultural affairs through international exchanges.

(b) No entity of the intelligence community may use as a source of operational assistance in any clandestine intelligence activity in any foreign country, any individual who—

(1) is a permanent resident alien who has applied for United States citizenship, unless the head of the entity which proposes to use such alien for such purpose makes a written finding that the use of such alien for such purpose is necessary to an authorized intelligence activity of that entity; or

(2) is a United States person whose travel to such country is sponsored and supported by a United States academic institution unless the appropriate senior officials of such institution are notified that such person is being used for such purpose.

(c) No entity of the intelligence community may use any United States person, other than an officer, employee, or contractor of an entity of the intelligence community or an individual assigned or detailed to an entity of the intelli
L: “ray kline:” From “CUBA - 1964” folder, Geyelin archives, found in basement of home in Bass Harbor, Maine.

Ray Kline:

Soviets can't keep control of SAM sites without troops, several thousand. Not just question of key or complicated coupling of warheads to missiles, as with us in Europe. Expects Russians may turn over SAMS, so as to disengage from responsibility for their use or non-use, and as a gesture earning goodwill in other parts of the world where Russia might appear as guardian of Cuba. Castro will either make big noises about using SAMS to induce negotiations with the U.S., or actually shoot one down to induce negotiations, their own, but Cubans experts are split. Iraq, Indonesia, Egypt all have SAMS of/ or similar.

Sugar crop about the same as last year, but price coming down.

Banging away with SAMS could louse up trade with the west.

Economy in no danger of collapse, probably the same foreign exchange as last year. Castro has money.

May be able to hold Western trade at about present levels but worry about psychological impact. Air of permanence. We have some influence, if at all strategic. Has brought a major disruption of trade.

undigested lump of revolution, the 100,000 to 500,000 kids educated under castro, sold out completely to fidelismo, would take to hills after castro unless diverted by capework to new regime. never had it mm so good, eat better, they must be disillusioned, take three to four years, maybe longer, but time not on castro's side. the alce principle, if hits 10 million tons of sugar, drive price down to two cents, still running faster with more acreage, more machinery, to stay in same place, or worse, if you could glass it off and keep castro's influence away from rest of hemisphere, if you could forget about guat. and hcn. and rest of caribbean and brizola and the rest, and have cubs like an ant colony, i'd like to keep it forever, a showplace for us, the only plus for cubs is relative — the fellow who used to drive a mm cadillac and throw half-finished mm cigar butts out of the window is now queing up in the same lane as everybody else. (you will see the kids)

agrees there is new class, tough to integrate old technicians, middle class, professional people, even some of the rich who were vital to revolution, sick of the appearance of cubs, of the corruption. without them, castro would still be in the hills, should bring them back carefully, accepting only those needed, and with skills, not the price type. el precio, pin-wheeling crook, left and right.

castro an example for take-over, not for maintaining control. amalgamation of left, including old reds, for whom castro has great distaste, dissidents, all the malcontents, all the revolutionaries. this bad example for rest of hemisphere. but result, if they knew anything about it, would be good for us. trouble is that the revolutionary is not an economist, doesn't understand, doesn't even like because economists know it's far more difficult than the revolutionary types interested in power only, are ready to believe.

story idea: grab almost any economic string and follow it — a factory or whatever. ask what price of sugar, dockside, manufacturing price. an interesting price, whatever they say, price per pound. ask number of employees, market, where get raw materials, what pay, etc. this would show gross inefficiency, even though some of the figures are meaningless.

cubs was way ahead of rest of hemisphere, still is in not bad shape relative to rest. but not going anywhere. sooner or later the undigested lump will make the older brother didn't find heaven on graduation.

if oas, castro wouldn't have done the eder bit. for the long term, it's economic pressures, he's okay this year, but struck it rich, if had struck it as rich during 12 mos. when sugar price sky-high, maybe different. but lost his chance. is buying at high prices bits and pieces, will have to spend as much to make it all come out in coordinated way and keep on spending. will never have all the essentials without which all the purchases to date mean much less, much more than half of it is credit-rating, attempting to show europeans and others that he has a going concern, with a future, not entirely a ward of russians. in time russians may see this, too.

if goldwater loses, should put him in charge of assembling the exile govt.

the republican party wishes to recognize as part of its cuban policy. the "new class" is happy, but wouldn't fight for fidel.

fidel is everything, subtract him and a three way dog-fight. the undigested lump, the old communists, the 26th of july, which ran wide gamut, to the rich and the reasonable, to socialists, but not to communists, many not there; also the army which largely 26th of july. if mm bloodshed, oas would have to move in. hope to set stage for that.