


Winter 2008

## The Politic 2008 Winter

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# THE POLITIC

Winter 2008

AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

Volume LXI, Issue V

## UNMASKING EXTREMISM

### *Featuring*

**Dennis Ross**

*Former U.S. Diplomat*

**Bruce Hoffman**

*Counterterrorism Expert*

**Michael B. Oren**

*Author & Historian*

**Phillip Gordon**

*Brookings Institute*

**Boaz Ganor**

*International Policy  
Institute for Counter-Terrorism*

### *Also With*

**Joseph Nye**

*Kennedy School of Government*

**Amy Chua**

*Yale Law School*

**John Mearsheimer**

*University of Chicago*

**Robert Kaplan**


*Editor The Atlantic Monthly*

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

*Former U.S. National Security Advisor*

**Ron Paul**

*U.S. Presidential Candidate*



*The Socioeconomics  
Of Global Terrorism*

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**YALE UNIVERSITY**  
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT USA  
JULY 26 – AUGUST 10, 2008

# THE POLITIC

Winter 2008 - Volume LXI, Issue V

# UNMASKING EXTREMISM

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Dear Reader,

While the New Year brings fresh challenges to the world of foreign and domestic policy, existing conflicts have intensified. With the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a National Intelligence Estimate report on Iran that contradicts previous assumptions, and continued insurgency in Iraq, terrorism continues to plague the international community. This issue of *The Politic* explores global extremism and the multi-faceted "War on Terrorism," through the perspectives of politicians, policy experts, academics, and students.


Bruce Hoffman and Philip Gordon lend new insight into America's War on Terrorism, underscoring the political and ideological nature of this conflict. The ideological roots of terrorism are perhaps most difficult to pin down; in this issue, Boaz Ganor and Yale's own Martin Shubik elucidate terrorist ideology and the complex psychological factors that fuel terrorism worldwide. Offering the perspective of an experienced diplomat, Dennis Ross explores the "stick and carrot" approach to deterring terrorism in states like Syria. While terrorism is often portrayed as a new challenge for Americans, Michael Oren and Beverly Gage point to the long history of America's struggle with terrorism; they offer historical lessons that inform the future of America's national and international strategies for defeating terrorism.

The United States' success in the War on Terrorism will depend, in large part, on America's future leadership. In our National section, Congressman Ron Paul offers his views on terrorism, the War in Iraq, and the importance of young voter participation in his presidential campaign. John Fortier of the American Enterprise Institute analyzes Paul and the other Republican nominees for president, and David Halperin echoes Paul's views on the importance of young voters. Joe Erwin, former Chairman of the South Carolina Democratic Party, discusses the Democratic presidential candidates and the state of the Democratic Party.

Reflecting on America's role in the world, in our International section, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Joseph Nye critically examine the history and future of U.S. foreign policy. Amy Chua explains America's role as a "superpower" and the dangers associated with our current place in the international community. Robert Kaplan agrees with Chua's assessment, projecting that American "dominance" will decline in the decades to come. This decline, indeed, has immediate consequences and will shape America's effectiveness in the War on Terrorism.

As we begin another year, I hope this issue of *The Politic* sheds light on existing problems and raises new questions about the challenges facing this nation and our world.

Sincerely yours,



Maggie Goodlander

# The Evolution of Terrorism

An interview with Bruce Hoffman



Conducted by Rebecca Yergin

*Bruce Hoffman is a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service where he is an expert in terrorism and counterterrorism. He previously held the Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation, served as Director of RAND's Washington, D.C. Office and advised authorities in Iraq, as well as the members of the Baker-Hamilton Commission. In 2006, he revised and expanded his celebrated book, Inside Terrorism, originally published in 1998, which provides a historical perspective on the evolution of terrorism and terrorist motivations.*

**You begin *Inside Terrorism* by asking, "What is terrorism?" How would you define it?**

The most common accepted meaning of terrorism is that it is violence or a threat of violence undertaken in the pursuit of political change by a sub-state or nonstate actor. I think one of the problems in defining terrorism is that it is a very malleable concept because it has changed and evolved over time historically, and that has often affected the meaning. I think the important thing is to look at the act or the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrator because the identity of the perpetrator raises all sorts of subjective questions about whether you sympathize or identify with the perpetrator and his or her cause.

The problem is that you have to look at the act, not at the identity of the perpetrator because when you start to look at the identity of the perpetrator, you start to weigh whether they are legitimate, whether they are justified in using violence, but in point of fact is the act itself—bombing, shooting, kidnapping, hostage-taking—that should be the sole determinant of whether something is a terrorist act or not. These are all crimes and all violent acts. When they are done by a non-state actor in pursuit of political change, they are most commonly called terrorism.

I don't think that a definition of "terrorism" exclusively has to involve attacks on civilians. But, I do think that one of the main characteristics of modern terrorism has been that it does often deliberately target civilians.

**What did "terrorism" mean in its origins, and how has the meaning of "terrorism" changed over time? To what do you attribute the changes?**

The word itself, which emerged during the French Revolution, was ironically more closely associated with democracy

and the birth of democracy as part of efforts to deal with reactionary or recidivist elements. Its meaning has changed over time to where today terrorism is ineluctably seen as something that is inimical to democracy. "Terrorism," I think, has also assumed a distinctly pejorative meaning. It's one of the few words in the English language that evokes very visceral and emotional responses—rarely positive ones. You see this by the fact that, unlike previous eras in history, when terrorists—even if they didn't openly admit they were terrorists—would nonetheless describe the violence they engaged in as terroristic or as terrorist. Now, you never find any members of any terrorist group admitting that they are terrorists or that the violence they use is terroristic because they fear that whatever legitimacy or justice their cause may have would be instantly denuded. Accordingly, sophisticated or euphemistic alternatives are today employed by terrorists to describe themselves as "resistance fighters" and their violence as forms of "resistance." Personally, I think it is lamentable that both the media and much scholarly discourse have abetted this process of semantic obfuscation.

We often use "terrorist" as a negative label, something we attach to our enemies or something we attach to people we don't like. Often times it is justified, but sometimes it isn't. But, more so, I think, mainstream media reflexively now shies away from using the terms "terrorism" or "terrorist" at all because these words have become so pejorative and negatively value-laden. For acts that are demonstrably terrorism, the media will do rhetorical or intellectual gymnastics to avoid using that term. In my book, I point to the Beslan siege of 2004—to me, terrorists seizing a school with children and holding them as hostages in inhumane conditions—well, if that's not terrorism, what is? They used innocent people as a bargaining tool and a lever against the government and attacked innocents in pursuit of political change. In the end, if you look at all the mainstream American and British



newspapers—not just print, also television and radio—it was “Chechen guerillas, Chechen rebels, Chechen underground.” It’s as if they went through these rhetorical circumlocutions to do anything possible to avoid using that terms “terrorism” or “terrorist.” In fact, the only time either was used was when President Putin or one of his spokespersons was quoted, and then it was put in sort of double scare quotes in order to emphasize that this was a statement from a Russian leader or official spokesperson. I think that is very worrisome that we now habitually hesitate to call “terrorism” what it is.

Look at what exists in Iraq. It always amazes me that the term “insurgent” is used because classical insurgency is something very different from what we see in Iraq. We have shied away from using “terrorism” when that is exactly what the violence in Iraq has been. It has been the assassination of leading moderate political figures like Ayatollahs Khoie and Hakim and senior United Nations officials like Sergio Vieira de Mello; it has obviously been “terrorism” when massive car bombs have targeted Iraqi civilians. “Terrorism” is what I would call bombs that are enhanced with chlorine gas and other unconventional weapons also directed against civilian targets. It is “terrorism” when Iraqi and foreign civilians are kidnapped and in some cases brutally executed by beheading. If these things are not terrorism, then I’m not sure what is. But, you can see the impact of the aversion to this particular word by its conspicuous absence for all discourse. And, also, I think it is not just aversion, but it’s also become a form of politicization that has now led people to avoid using it. In other words, when the word “terrorism” is used, it’s immediately assumed that someone is making a judgment.

**How would individuals and organizations committing acts that we would label as “terrorism” describe what they do?**

The sort of buzz word that is favored now is “resistance,” which is also a horrible bastardization and twisting of that word. I was just watching a documentary last night about the two young women who died in a suicide attack in Israel in 2002. One was the suicide bomber, a Palestinian, and one was the victim. The father of the suicide bomber said that in the Palestinian context, violence can never be terrorism—it’s resistance. However one may agree or disagree or sympathize or not sympathize with the plight of the Palestinians—that to me is not the issue. The issue is that I don’t think there is any justification anywhere at any time for the innocent loss of life or the infliction of wanton bloodshed on innocent civilians—whether they are Israeli, Palestinian, American, Iraqi, Afghan, or otherwise. When violence like that is inflicted in combat, imperfect though the system is, it is still termed a war crime. We understand that inflicting deliberate violence on civilians in warfare is wrong, so why do we give terrorists a bye or a pass and allow them to call it “resistance”?

**You explain that the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today. To what would you attribute the emergence of these religiously motivated organizations? How has the religious aspect of their motivation—as opposed to more political aspects—changed the nature of their organizations’ structures and the threats they pose?**

Significantly, I think that the birth of terrorism 2,000 years ago had a central religious motive. One could argue that with the French Revolution, and then with the events in the 19th century, that terrorism changed from being predominantly motivated, at least in some realm, by religion. But then there was nationalism, the concept of the secular state and the liberal republic emerged, where the ruler was not ruling because of God’s will, or in other words, by divine right. Obviously terrorism in that period had more secular overtones, especially since this was a time when countries were being forged out of various nationalities; for example, this was the time of German and Italian unification. Conceptions of nationalism began to take hold in a much more prominent fashion, and you have terrorists attempting to use terrorism for its didactic potential: to highlight the existence of a revolutionary movement and seek to rally sympathy and support. By the end of the nineteenth century, you have the first stirrings of terrorism motivated by nationalism, especially in the Balkans with the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. You also have the People’s Will and other movements in Russia that were attempting to overthrow the Tsar. And you saw the anarchists and their nihilist agenda at the time, which was in response to modernity and to industrialization. Again, terrorism in this period became enormously secular, and it remained as such until the late twentieth century when nationalist, separatist, or irredentist ideological motivations predominated.

Around the 1980s, however, you see a revival in religious terrorism, largely in response to the revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran and brought the Ayatollah Khomeini and a theocracy to power in Iran and then Iran’s efforts to export the Revolution, especially in the years following to Lebanon with the Hezbollah. This was also the period that was really the twilight of the Cold War. In some respects it was, firstly, the discrediting of communism as an organizing principle or a global ideology in the 1980s that was then followed by a crisis of capitalism and the free market and liberalism in many newly democratized countries where the types of freedoms they had long hungered for were realized but did not provide either answers or a demonstrably viable alternative, and you saw this religious resurgence. What I bring out in the book, and what I always thought was fascinating, is that although we have almost an axiomatic response to religion and terrorism, we immediately think radical Islam, but we see the same phenomenon in the same period unfolding with



*An Iraqi police vehicle goes up in flames at the scene of a gunbattle between Iraqi policemen and insurgents in Buhriz, Iraq, Dec. 9, 2007. Hoffman explains that the violence seen in Iraq is very different from classical insurgency. (AFP/Getty Images)*

radical Sikh separatist movement and the Messianic Jewish terrorists amongst the settlers in the West Bank. Also, in the United States, Timothy McVeigh, himself, was not a religious terrorist, and his motivations were not theological—he was not justifying his violence based on scripture nor was he following the edicts of some clerical authority. At the same time, it is incontrovertible that he trafficked and traveled in those same circles as white supremacists, survivalists millennialists, and others who gathered in compounds to await the apocalypse—and, at least, drank in and imbibed an ideology that saw violence as not only necessary for political change, but as divinely decreed or ordained. Certainly other white supremacists in the United States have justified their violence using scripture.

As I argued in a paper I first wrote in 1987, the nature of terrorism was changing, that the ethical and moral foundations—in other words, the legitimization and justification of terrorism—was already changing in the 1980s, and that religious terrorism, embryonic though it was, was far more lethal because it embraced a much more open-ended category of enemies. The pathways of an individual becoming a terrorist were much more truncated because of the fact that God's telling them to do something; it is not a long path of having to convince oneself to take up violence when it is often communicated that when you are not engaging in these acts of violence, you are disobeying God. Then, in 1993, I took that argument further and said that the first terrorist incident that would involve an unconventional weapon—whether it was biological or a chemical weapon or a radiological or nuclear

one—would more likely involve a religious millennial cult that we weren't paying attention to than some of the more stereotypical, secular terrorists of that time. Then, two years later, with the attack on the Tokyo subway, that was proven accurate. It wasn't a great feat of prediction or prognostication or genius on my part. It was just looking at trends and seeing more and more terrorists who were using religious justification—often in millennialist or apocalyptic terms—that had led me to that conclusion. Then, the first edition of my book came out when various Palestinian groups motivated more prominently by

religion than in the past, were embarking on a suicide terrorism—admittedly a much more modest campaign than that which we have seen in the 21st century. But, nonetheless, I think it was all coming together that this wasn't, firstly, just an Islamic phenomenon, but it was one that was affecting religious movements around the world, and also one that had just as powerful an impact on mainstream religion as on cults and other religious movements on the periphery.

**You have just explained that the rise of religiously motivated terrorism is not just an Islamic phenomenon—that it is affecting the world and impacting mainstream religions, cults, and other movements on the periphery. What common strands unite the strategies and tactics of religiously motivated terrorism, and how do they differ?**

Not all terrorism today is religious, but for the United States right now, the most consequential forms are. When one looks at suicide terrorism, 90 percent of the groups using suicide terrorism justify their violence on religious basis—in many cases Islamic. But it's not something that is just restricted to Islam. Baruch Goldstein's attack on the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron in 1994, one could say, was a form of suicide terrorism. His death was not essential for the commission of the act, as in what we regard as suicide terrorists who strap bombs on themselves. But, clearly, when he opened fire with an M16 and, hurling hand grenades in a Mosque packed with worshippers, he would have known that it was very unlikely that he was going to emerge alive. Timothy McVeigh, for example, initially planned the Oklahoma City bombing as a suicide attack. He only dissuaded himself in doing so when on his reconnaissance at the Murrah building, he discovered that, firstly, there was no security, and, secondly, he could

park a van in this indented loading zone that was only 11 feet from the building, and he calculated that would be enough to take down to building, so in the end he did not have to resort to suicide terrorism. Certainly the Tamil Tigers have used suicide tactics and are a secular group, so it is not just a phenomena restricted to any one region of the world or any one religion.

What religious terrorism has in common—and this is what separates it from secular terrorism—is that the violence is justified and legitimized through scripture, through some holy text, it is communicated by some clerical authority, who is claiming to interpret that text or indeed in some cases to speak to God. The violence is a requirement; it is incumbent upon a true believer, in the sense that not undertaking the violence, one is disobeying his god or his belief system. There is usually an element of self-sacrifice involved in terrorism in general, but the concept of martyrdom, which is I think inextricably one that has strong religious overtones historically is also the other important motivation.

I think that what is also unique about religious terrorism is perhaps, even more than other forms of terrorism, is that there is a very Manichean mindset. Good and bad, black and white—there are no gradations, no grey area. Either you are a part of the religious movement or, you're not, you're a sub-human: a "kuffar" or a "mud person" or a "dog" or a "dirty Arab"—whatever coarse language is used—it's the deliberate dehumanizing of one's enemy.

**You attribute the increase in suicide attacks to the increasing trend of religiously motivated terrorism, and you also explain that individuals interviewed on the subject who had a "typical suicidal personality" were not the uneducated and poor individuals that much of the world perceives them to be—rather they were often middle class people with paying jobs. What constitutes this "typical suicidal personality," and how does it correlate with the rising religious component of terrorist activity?**

I think one of the problems is that there is not a typical personality of the suicide terrorist, much less the ordinary terrorists. The patterns we have seen defy simplification—suicide bombers have been young and old, male and female, married and single, deeply religious and recent converts, people from

some of the best universities in the world and the sons of millionaires as well as people drawn from the maw poverty who spend most of their life marred in crime. There almost is no profile. Based on what I know of suicide terrorism—what is the motivation? I think it is obviously this profoundly held, deep-seated grievance. I think it is the terrorists' belief that they are doing something fundamentally altruistic; they are surrendering their most precious possession, their lives for their cause. It is rarely, as is often depicted in the media, desperate, frustrated individuals with no other recourse and no place else to turn: that because of this intense anger, they are driven to suicide terrorism. I think it is a much more rational and calculated choice, and it is one that often is encouraged and manipulated by terrorist organizations that see suicide terrorism as an instrument of warfare. These organizations dress this strategic decision with a variety of personal incentives and theological justifications in order to attract recruits who are willing to blow themselves up.

**Why do you think there is this perception that terrorists are desperate, uneducated people?**

Well, that's the way we look at terrorists. We don't want to think that they can at all be like us. We want to think that they are monsters, in essence, and that is there is something



*A commuter treated before hospitalization in Tokyo on Mar. 20 1995 was one of over 3,000 individuals injured when a millennial cult unleashed sarin, a deadly nerve gas, into the city's subway system that day. Hoffman underscores that the trend towards religious terrorism—a much more lethal form of terrorism with open-ended enemies—is not just an Islamic phenomenon, and it has impacted mainstream religious as well as cults and religious movement on the periphery. (Junji Kurokawa/AFP/Getty Images)*

fundamentally psychologically unstable about them, that there is some flaw in their existence that is so extreme that it has driven them to commit these acts of violence. I think it defies our imaginations to think that, in many cases, these are very well-educated, very rational, highly articulate individuals that have made a conscious and deliberate choice to, in their eyes, martyr themselves.

**What impacts have Al-Qaeda's actions in Sept. 11—and Sept. 11, itself—had on Al-Qaeda and on other terrorist groups?**

Certainly, 9/11 remains one of the most stunning acts of deception ever perpetrated in any act of violence against any country because it was a very simple deception on which the whole operation was predicated—that, in the four aircraft full of passengers, the crews would assume this was an ordinary terrorist hijacking. Past experience had revealed that standard operating procedure said that the best way to survive is to cooperate with the hijackers and not try to resist, and on three of the four planes the passengers did. You had a more or less docile population. On the fourth plane, when the passengers heard this was not an ordinary hijacking but, rather, that their planes would be turned into human cruise missiles, they, of course, rebelled and foiled the terrorist plot.

So, 9/11—with the abilities of three out of the four attacks to strike at the continental United States as no terrorist organization and no adversary has since Washington was burned during the War of 1812—had an enormous and unfortunately very negative effect on world-wide events. If it was not proof that the terrorism worked—and it didn't work because the United States didn't collapse and didn't capitulate to the terrorist demands, so even if it showed terrorism did not work on a strategically tactical level—it showed how terrorism, as an asymmetric form of warfare can inflict nearly unbearable pain and suffering on an exponentially more powerful enemy.

Unfortunately, I think 9/11 has inspired and motivated terrorists elsewhere. And I think that is certainly bin Laden's message, that terrorism is a form of catharsis where you, too, can strike out against far more powerful enemies, even if you cannot defeat them; you can still gain the satisfaction of inflicting this pain and suffering on them and still causing them to change their behavior, which is one of the key intentions of the terrorist act. That is what terrorism is also designed to do—to cause profound changes in the targeted society and thereby undermine public will and confidence

in the ability of their political leaders and government to protect them.

The United States did not capitulate or crumble. It did not fall prey to the terrorists' intimidation. But, at the same time, Al-Qaeda sees their struggle fundamentally seen as a war of attrition, where over time they will slowly undermine us—enervate out military, distract us with attacks, undermine public support for authority, and cause the public to question their leaders. Al-Qaeda can take satisfaction in at least having achieved this singularly important transformation of America's sense of security and safety and well-being. I think this is what motivates and emboldens terrorists to carry on with their struggles: the belief, that these tactical victories—inflated out of all proportions—will inevitably led to the strategic collapse of their enemy.

So, in that sense, I think both Al-Qaeda's clever use of deception in dealing a stunning blow to the United States and the impact that they have been able to have on the United States and around the world in terms of perceptions safety and security lead to an illusion of power on the part of the terrorists that I think is divorced from reality. But, it is an illusion they cling to and believe with a fervor that impels them to continue with their struggles and engage in violence in the belief that eventually they will be triumphant.

**What resources allow Al-Qaeda to continue its struggle and engage in violence?**

One of the greatest resources terrorists have today, unfortunately, is anti-Americanism—the distrust of America. It is going to be imperative to counter that, and to reverse such misplaced views.


I think, though, the fact that they don't have to win in battle to defeat us—that they just have to raise the levels of pain and suffering—is also something that they have discovered in Iraq. Regardless of how Iraq ends up, it will be a lesson that terrorists around the world will adopt. If you look at Iraq, a bunch of guys with weapons no more sophisticated than cordless phones and garage door openers have been able to challenge—maybe not defeat, but challenge—not just the military of the world's remaining super power, but the most technologically advanced military in the history of mankind. I think that is a very important message of inspiration and power that is going to resonate beyond Iraq. This means the problems we face today are not just going to go away when Iraq is resolved. ■

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*“The terrorists have recognized and seized upon the internet as this tremendous vehicle for propaganda, publicity, proselytizing and so on.”*

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# Strength with Diplomacy: Lessons from the Barbary Wars



*A conversation with Michael B. Oren*

**By Maggie Goodlander**

*Maggie Goodlander is a junior in Berkeley College. She serves as Editor-in-Chief of The Politic.*

Through a series of conversations, seminars, and lectures around the world, Michael Oren has brought to life the early history of America's involvement in the Middle East. A Senior Fellow at the Shalem Center, a Jerusalem-based research facility, Oren specializes in the diplomatic and military history of the Middle East. Over the last three years, Oren has taught several courses at Yale and written extensively for the *New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The New Republic*, of which he is a contributing editor, and has been interviewed on CNN, Fox, *The Charlie Rose Show*, *The Daily Show*, and *Today Show*. Oren is currently the CBS Middle East expert. Last January, he published his third book, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776-2006*.

While modern historical memory might trace America's involvement in the Middle East to President Harry Truman's recognition of the state of Israel in 1948, Oren brings us back nearly two centuries earlier to America's first and longest overseas conflict: the Barbary Wars (1783-1815). Oren recounts how the first American soldiers to fight in an overseas battle were killed by "Arabic speaking hijackers," or "pirates"; perhaps by modern standards, we might deem "terrorists." By 1805, Jefferson had named the Middle East a top priority in American foreign policy.

Oren explains that, in the First Barbary War, Thomas Jefferson, then the Minister to France, learned an important diplomatic lesson that may be relevant to America's policies in the region today, particularly with respect to Iran. When the Dey of Algiers took two American ships hostage and asked for US \$60,000 in ransom, Jefferson—wildly unpopular at the

time, and, according to Oren, considered a "man of contradictions"—held firm in his belief that the spirit of the American people made them utterly incapable of yielding to blackmail. Oren recalls Jefferson's claim that Americans would rather "raise ships and men to fight the pirates into reason than money to bribe them."<sup>1</sup> Jefferson maintained that the tyrannical Barbary leaders would never live up to any agreements or treaties and that if Americans paid them off, they would sense American weakness and demand more. Jefferson hoped to establish "an erect and independent attitude" in America's early foreign policy, an attitude that would prevent the United States from falling

victim to pirates, hijackers, and terrorists for centuries to come.

Unfortunately, U.S. policy towards the Barbary pirates never fully integrated Jefferson's ideas. Troubled by domestic instability, America's early and inexperienced government paid Algiers the extraordinary ransom and continued to pay one million dollars each year for the next fifteen years to secure the return of hostages and the safe passage of American ships through the Mediterranean. By 1800, Oren reports, payments to the Barbary pirates amounted to 20 percent of the United States government's total


revenues.

The lessons from America's first encounters with Middle Eastern pirates in the late 18th century apply today in America's approach to terrorism, but we seem to have forgotten them. Oren points to the Iran-Contra Scandal as a moment in which Ronald Reagan failed to learn from Jefferson's central point: America cannot negotiate with hostage-takers in the Middle East and combat them at the same time.

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**“ Jefferson claimed that Americans would rather raise ships and men to fight the pirates into reason than money to bribe them. ”**

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President George W. Bush speaks to the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland about America's strategy in the Middle East. Oren argues that despite the recent NIE report, Bush must remain strong on Iran to ensure a true victory against the potential Iranian threat (Paul J. Richards/AFP/Getty Images).

Oren argues that, from the start, America has proven far more successful in combating terrorists than negotiating with them; he does not, however, deny the importance of dialogue. To negotiate successfully with state-sponsors of terrorism, the United States must find a delicate balance of diplomacy and strength. America, Oren argues, must conduct a dialogue with all major players—including Iran—but must balance this dialogue with threats and substantial force when necessary.

As the United States works to formulate a successful strategy for dealing with state sponsors of terrorism, Oren calls for bipartisan cooperation in Washington. The Middle East, he says, is a region of “invariable vicissitudes” that will remain connected with the United States indefinitely. America ought to continue investing in its troops’ presence, advanced intelligence, and active reinforcements in the region and approach diplomatic challenges with equal vigor.

Oren argues that, though Washington may believe that the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) undermines America’s military and diplomatic options against Iran, the

report must not render America impotent in the face Iran’s dangerous tendencies. Oren recalls that the NIE’s release just one week after the Annapolis Conference of November 27, 2007, trumped Israel’s attempts to forge an international consensus against the nuclearization of Iran at Annapolis, 49 countries and organizations rallied against Iran’s production of nuclear weapons, with America taking the lead on the issue.

If earnest diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions fail, America must turn to its credible military threat and use military force; in this instance, its use is not only justified, but mandatory. As Oren tells it, even Thomas Jefferson would agree. 

**“Ronald Reagan failed to learn from Jefferson’s central point; America cannot negotiate with hostage-takers and combat them at the same time.”**

<sup>1</sup> Oren, Michael, “The Middle East and the United States 1776 to 1815.” Speech at Columbia University. 3 November, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Oren, Michael. “Bush’s Mideast Muddle,” *The Wall Street Journal*. 9 January, 2008.

# Confronting Ideology

An interview with Philip Gordon



Conducted by Rebecca Yergin

*Philip Gordon is a Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution where he focuses on the United States' strategies for confronting global terrorism. Formerly a director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, Gordon's expertise lies in Europe as well as in the Middle East. His most recent book, *Winning the Right War: The Path to Security for America and the World*, offers a new strategy for United States' Foreign policy that challenges America to reconsider its understanding of the War on Terror.*

What is the struggle termed the “War on Terror”? What people, groups, and ideologies does the United States confront, and who are America’s greatest allies?

Let’s start with the idea of a “War on Terror.” A lot of people have criticized this notion, and they’re right. That phrase is highly problematic because the word “war” implies that we can win mostly by military means—that is how you win a traditional war—and the concept of “War on Terror” is misleading because you don’t go to war against a tactic. And what “terror”? When we declared this, we didn’t imply that we would go equally after the Irish Republican Army, terrorists in Colombia and Islamist terrorists. So, there is a real problem with that terminology.

Personally, however, I have decided not to fight the rhetorical battle but a substantive battle. In other words, my criticism is not so much focused on what we call it, but what we actually do. “War on Terror” is shorthand for a set of policies that the United States will adopt in order to confront challenges from Islamist extremists and the violence they use to pursue their political aims. In reality, we are not going to say that whole complicated definition every time we refer to this. I think we should focus on how we go about this task much more than what we call it.

And, now, what is the task? Clearly there are groups and individuals out there who want to and are prepared to use violence in order to pursue political or in some cases even nihilistic, religious, and theological aims. The United States needs to do two things at once: protect against acts of terrorism, while undermining the motivation behind it. Now that is a hugely challenging task, but it is a serious one, and it’s clearly one of the most important priorities of America’s foreign policy today.

In your most recent book *Winning the Right War*, you present a new way of thinking about the War on Terror. You talk about the debates that take place around it, and you

explain that there is no discussion of what a “victory” in the War on Terror would look like. How would you describe that victory?

Let me again start with the notion of war. My book is called *Winning the Right War*, so I am not rejecting this concept entirely, but rather focusing on how we go about it. By “right war” and “wrong war,” I first want to emphasize that the notion that this is a traditional war is highly counterproductive and will get us in trouble. And I have a real problem with these notions of World War III (or World War IV, as Norman Podhoretz’s book calls it, considering the Cold War to be World War III). I think that thinking about it like a traditional war, especially in the analogy to World War II, leads you down the wrong path. It leads you to believe that there is a single enemy out there that you can confront and defeat on a battle field with military force and then impose your political terms, and you win that way. That’s how you win a traditional war. And that is very different from what, I think, we’re facing now, and it leads to different conclusions about the way we go about it now.

I argue in the book that if there is any analogy that is useful, it is not at all World War II, but rather the Cold War because, like the War on Terror, the Cold War was mostly an ideological battle. We had to win over people, and it was much more about discrediting their ideology than defeating them on a battlefield. Thinking about this challenge that way is much more fruitful in terms of deciding what to do about it. Of course you protect yourself, you contain the threat, you deter as much as possible, and you try to undermine its underpinnings and win over people around the world to be on your side rather than on their side.

Last point on this, because you asked what victory looks like—I think it ends the same kind of way. It does not end when we defeat them on the battlefield, occupy their capital, and impose new leaders or something. It ends when they—whoever “they” are—decide that what they are fighting for is not worth

it, and they way they are fighting for it is not the right way. And they give up. That is essentially what Communists and potential Communists did during the Cold War, and that, frankly, is what I think has to happen this time as well.

**You just argued that we will achieve victory when “they” give up. Who is the “they”?**

That is a good question because there is more than one “they.” One of the problems with the way the Bush administration has been going about this is it has acted and spoken as if there is a single enemy out there, lumping together Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Al-Qaeda under Bin Laden, Hamas, and Hezbollah. In other words, the administration has been mixing together Persians and Arabs, Shia and Sunni, State and Non-state actors, all of which have different aims and agendas. We might not like any of them. So I’m not saying that you must pick and choose among Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Hezbollah, and Hamas—none of them have to be good—but you do have to understand that they have different aims, and therefore you have to deal with them in different ways. It is a colossal mistake to assume that there is one enemy there. And that is the same mistake, by the way, that we made early in the Cold War when we assumed there was one monolith, one single enemy, the Communists, and that there were not differences between the Soviets, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the socialists in Central America. It took us a while to understand that you had to deal with them in different ways.

I think the core enemy in this conflict that we are talking about is the Al-Qaeda organization, which is, of course, very loosely defined. But it covers the mostly Sunni, non-state group that believes in this violent ideology with the goal of restoring the Caliphate, imposing Sharia law, destroying Israel, attacking the United States, and driving it out of the Middle East. That is a fairly coherent enemy that is top priority in terms of who we are going after in the “War on Terror.”

**What would a victory look like for this amorphous enemy?**

It is important to understand what victory looks like for opponents so we can prevent it. I think that victory for them is that their violence leads us, meaning the United States and its allies around the world, to become so weary and so afraid that we withdraw from the Middle East and support for Israel and allow them to impose on their societies—Middle Eastern and mostly Muslim societies—a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam with Sharia law and all that goes with it. I think their path to victory involves us getting provoked into military actions in the Middle East, alienating Muslim publics and turning them against us, so that there is more sympathy for their worldview than either ours or those of moderate and other Muslims. And, I think, it is important to understand their path to victory so

that we do not fall into that trap and allow them to goad us and bate us into doing things like invading major Middle Eastern countries or employing torture and other detainee abuse, which we do in pursuit of our victory so we can protect ourselves, but the consequence is that it contributes towards their victory because we drive too many people into sympathizing with them. So, it is very helpful to think about what the path to our victory is, and what the path to their victory is, so that we can make sure the former is more likely.

**You maintain that the United States and its allies can win the War on Terror because of the liberties our nation values and because we are able to learn from our mistakes, while organizations such as Al-Qaeda are not. What mistakes have the U.S. and its allies made so far, and what changes have they made in the face of such mistakes?**

I have referred to a few already. I think the invasion of Iraq was a mistake; we thought this would be a relatively easy and straightforward way to spread democracy in the Middle East and show that people should be on our side. It turns out that it was a lot more difficult than that, a lot more costly, and with consequences that play into the hands of Al-Qaeda. I do not think we will make that mistake again. That is not to say that we will not consider using force again, but we will think about it differently next time, and most Americans have already come around to the view that it was a mistake.

I think we made mistakes in detainee treatment when we, again, took the view that we were attacked and therefore we are at war, and we are going to do all that we need to do. That was an understandable reaction, but it led to abuses in Guantanamo, Abu Gahriab, and, frankly, in our laws and interpretations that I think have also fueled support for our adversaries. That is a mistake I think we are learning from.

I think we made the mistake of thinking that because we were attacked, and we were powerful, we had the right to do whatever we wanted regardless of what the world thought of it. That lost us an awful lot of international support among traditional allies in Europe and potential allies in the Middle East. We’re learning from that too. I think the first Bush administration was guilty of that—in thinking that allies did not really matter. But, in the second, they have realized it is actually kind of important to do diplomacy with our allies, and they have changed a number of policies in that regard.

So, I think that ultimately, when historians look back on this, they will conclude that the U.S. was attacked in a horrible way on September 11, 2001. It reacted and probably overreacted but, for such a horrific event, maybe that was understandable. But then the U.S. started to think carefully about these things, started to make adjustments, and realized that in the end, our society and our values are far more appealing and should be far more appealing, and they should be weapons in this struggle. It is critically important that we preserve that society and those





On Nov. 29, 1989, Western Berliners crowd in front of the Berlin Wall, as East German border guards demolish a section of the wall. Gordon argues that the best analogy for winning the War on Terror is the end of the Cold War because victory comes from discrediting an ideology—not defeat on the battlefield. (Gerard Malie/Getty Images)

values if we are going to win. I think we did the same thing again in the Cold War when we were tempted, maybe, to have a military, industrial state, and even an autocracy in order to battle these Communists, but what we realized in the end that was most important was our values. Preserving them—that helped us win.

### What successes have and the U.S. and its allies achieved thus far in the “War on Terror”?

There have been successes. I think it is wrong to conclude or assume that we have gotten everything wrong and that it is only a question of failure; that’s not the case. We have significantly set back the Al-Qaeda association by killing a number of its top leaders and interfering with its finances. It is much more difficult for them to operate as a global conglomerate than

they once could. We got rid of a sanctuary in Afghanistan. The group that attacked us was training and planning unhindered in Afghanistan. At the time they were sheltered by the government of that country, the Taliban, and we got rid of that sanctuary. The reality is that there is an even greater sanctuary next door in Pakistan. But still, it has to be a plus to eliminate this place where they were training and planning freely. We sent a message to governments around the world that there is a price to pay for raising and blatantly supporting such a group.

The United States has not been attacked since 9/11. I think that this is a success you have to give the administration credit for. There are various possible explanations for that. I think we have improved our homeland security somewhat. Maybe it is just the case that it is very difficult for terrorists to infiltrate and act within the United States. Still, when the outcome is a relatively good one, I think you need to give the administration credit for that. I do not think that the balance sheet is unambiguously negative; I just think that it is more negative than it should be.

### How would you assess the way in which the U.S. government allocates funds in its quest to fight terrorism? What would you recommend in the future for spending on terrorism?

I think that it has not gotten the balance right between military spending and other types of spending in what, again, is going to be a long and not exclusively military conflict. It is impossible to calculate precisely the numbers, but we know that our annual military budget, aside from wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, is moving up towards 500 billion dollars a year. We know that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq themselves have cost at least another 500 billion dollars. At a minimum, we are talking hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars on the military side compared to tens of billions at most, in terms of diplomacy, development, international relations, things we can do to win over people to sympathize with the United States and so on. That balance just seems wrong to me. It is impossible to make the calculation exactly. We do know, for example—this sounds trivial, but I think it underscores the point—we have more members of our military marching bands than we have members of our foreign service. That strikes me as an imbalance. If you just shifted the balance, if you took ten percent of the Pentagon’s budget and put it into efforts of the sort that we did during the Cold War to win people over to our side, I think that would be much more helpful in the long run.

I will just take one example of many from that. In Pakistan we have given over ten billion dollars to the Musharraf government almost exclusively for military ties and military use. That is fine, but in the end, if we do not persuade the Pakistani people that we are on their side, we will lose Pakistan, and we will lose important cooperation. A reallocation of that funding, even if we do need to give military assistance that entails doing more

on the non-military side, is strongly in our interests.

**In your book, you talk about the political and economic stagnation in the Middle East from the War in Iraq, from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and other conflicts from Kashmir, Chechnya, etc., that leads to the humiliation and frustration that helps the terrorist cause. What specific policies can the US and its allies implement to combat this political and economic stagnation?**

That is a hard one, but there are things we can be doing. It is hard because simply giving economic aid doesn't deal with the problem, especially in regimes where such a disparity between the elites and the people exists because of oil revenues. I also think it is too simple to argue that there is a direct link between economic development and terrorism. There is not. Clearly, Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahri, Mohammed Atta—these are middle class, wealthy people who are not acting because they are poor. Many of them come from rich countries too, even if the wealth is unequally distributed. I do not want to buy into the simplistic notion that poverty leads to terrorism.

I do think, though, that the role of humiliation is important, and that is at a personal and a societal level. At a personal level, individuals from the Muslim world, who look at their countries, either feel the personal shame of falling behind, or they feel that on behalf of their whole country or civilization or religion. There, frankly, the Middle East, compared to all other regions of the world is being humiliated. They have looked around; their former colonial oppressors in America and Europe dominate them and dominate the geopolitical situation in Asia. They have seen Asian countries rise from poverty to become world players economically. Israel pops up in the region sixty years ago and then becomes far more successful and wealthy than they are. That is a factor of humiliation for many of these people. Therefore, efforts to help them develop, especially in a balanced way, would help ease some of that frustration and humiliation that they feel. So, I do think there is an economic component in all of this. Things we can do include developing industrial zones, creating jobs for Palestinians or Egyptians, lowering trade barriers so that their exports can come into this country, and Pakistani textile workers can do that and have jobs and feel good about themselves and develop that country in a gradual balanced way; it's not a quick fix, but it is certainly a helpful part of this long-term plan.

Anything that moves them away from where most of them are, which is just relying on digging oil out of the ground and letting the state to distribute that as it sees fit, would be good. One of the things we know about democracy is that it is helped by a balanced economic development and is hindered by these frontier states that just get their money from one commodity. There, too, any economic development not oil-based, would be good.

**You have written about a backlash among Muslims who do not want to be associated with terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. Although anti-American sentiments run high in many of the places in which these Muslims live, do you foresee the US working with such Muslim groups to fight terrorist organizations?**

One of the more promising paths towards the undermining of the Al-Qaeda ideology is the fact that it will generate backlash within Muslim society. In the end, they have no positive vision for the future that they are offering. Their violence not only kills Westerners, but it also kills Muslims and their fellow citizens. I do think in the long run, as we are already seeing some signs of it, Muslims, themselves, will get fed up with this and turn against it. We have seen that in some responses to some of the terrorist attacks in Jordan and Indonesia, for example, where people protested against these attacks that also killed Muslims and innocents, both of which are against principles in the Koran. We have seen it in places like Anbar province in Iraq, where the locals and the tribes got fed up with Al-Qaeda coming in and telling them who should marry whom and how their society should be run. We have seen it in opinion polls that show support for Bin Laden and suicide bombings declining. That is particularly the case in Pakistan, where there had been high support for suicide bombings. Now, especially, since you see more of them in Pakistan, there is opposition to it.

So, I think in the long-run, Muslims themselves will step forward and say this is not what they want to be associated with; it is not what they want to support and they will take it in their own hands to reject it. Frankly, in the end, I think that is the only solution because we Americans, especially, like to think that we can solve any problem because we are so powerful. But, this in the end has to be done by the Muslims themselves. We cannot go in and do it for them; we cannot create the democracies; and we cannot turn the people against this ideology. We can help; we can do what we can on the side, but in the end, they are going to have to decide that their seventh-century Sharia law is not exactly what they want for themselves.

**You have argued that all wars eventually end. But you also maintain that the War on Terror is not a traditional war. What makes you so confident that this war will end, and what timeline do you foresee for obtaining this end?**

That does sound like a flippant comment when I say that all wars eventually end. The truth in that comment is not just that it is true historically, but that the world changes. There are so many political, social, and economic factors that go into conflict, and in a world where those factors are changing all the time, it is reasonable to expect that things will change and lead to a new set of factors. It always has, and it always will, even when it takes a long time. That is why it is useful, as we said, to discuss this in terms as things change, whose victory looks more plausible,



*Pakistani Activists shout anti-Bush and anti-Musharraf slogans during a protest rally in Islamabad, Sep. 12, 2007. Gordon posits that the United States has given more than \$10 billion to Pakistan for military use, but not enough attention has been given to securing general Pakistani sympathies. (Aamir Qureshi/Getty Images)*

and how do we push things in that direction.

The Cold War also felt for a long time that it would never end. I point to an essay by John Lewis Gaddis in a 1987 Atlantic Monthly essay called, "How the Cold War Might End," which even at the time—40 years into the Cold War—was an exercise in great imagination. As Gaddis wrote in that essay, it just felt like, we were so used to it that we did not even think the world could be different. People who were adults by that time had lived their whole life during the Cold War and just never imagined that it could possibly go away. Of course, in that case, it did just two years after Gaddis was saying how used to it we had become. The great irony there, of course, is that for the thirty years before that, we were focused on how to win the Cold War. It was only when we gradually got around to concluding that it would never end, that it did. As I point out in the book, as late as mid-November 1989—that is to say after the Berlin Wall had fallen—public opinion polls here said Americans still did not believe the Cold War was over. They got in this mindset that things would never change.

Right now it feels like the War on Terror will never end. There are extremists from Morocco to Indonesia, and there is a sense of possible attack any day. We know that this could be a generational thing. And it might be. It might be one generation or two generations, and I think we have to accept that reality. But we also have to be open to the prospect that things will change, and if we do the right thing and discredit the ideology of terror, this war will end that way. And we have already spoken about some of the reasons why that might happen—backlash against violence in the Muslim world, a new opportunity for Muslims to change what is currently a feeling of anger and humiliation or resentment—and if we pursue these paths together, deny them their aims, give them other opportunities to pursue what they want out of life, and let them take actions that will back-

fire and undermine themselves, it is not that hard to imagine ten years from now or 20 years from now a new generation of Muslims coming along, looking at what Bin Laden's efforts have wrought and saying, "This is not the future."

Look at Communism, again, as one example. It was vibrant; it was rising. People believed it was the future everywhere from Buenos Aires to Paris to Beijing. But, over time, they started to conclude that this wasn't working, and it wasn't attractive. They gave other options, including liberalism and Western Capitalism that ended up being more attractive. So, I am confident of this. You cannot put a date on it; I guess it would happen sooner than many people may now feel—this sort of feels like it is going to be many generations—but I think there are sound reasons to believe that eventually that extremist, violent ideology will start to crumble and be replaced by something else.

**If you speak of winning the War on Terror sooner, rather than later, what effect do you think the next election will have on the War on Terror with a new administration in office?**

I think we're going to face a real choice in the next election. Some people argue that candidates on both sides are more or less the same, that it does not much matter, but because of all the differences being drawn between Democrats and Republicans, there is generally going to be, regardless of who wins each primary, a Democratic view of the "War on Terror" and a Republican view, and there will be differences between the two.

The Republican view will much more emphasize more of a willingness to use force, a commitment to stay in Iraq, and pushing the bounds of detainee treatment as necessary in order to win what they see as an offensive struggle on the War on Terror against a big, single enemy. I think Democrats will generally emphasize the need to re-establish moral authority, win over allies, use force when necessary, but in a very limited way, and create careful policies on Guantanamo, adhering to the Geneva Conventions.

These are entirely legitimate debates. This is a really hard issue, and it is good for the country to have such a debate between these two contrasting approaches to the War on Terror. My own view is that the Bush approach has been mostly counterproductive, and we need to rethink it and some of the elements of this offensive, militarized War on Terror. That would, actually, accelerate ultimate victory more than a continuation of the Bush approach would do.

But, let the country decide. We will have a year to debate these issues. We will have a year to reflect on the outcome of the Bush approach so far, and hopefully we will get it more right than wrong. **P**

# Remembering Domestic Terrorism

An interview with Beverly Gage



Conducted by Christopher Chen

*Professor Beverly Gage teaches 20th century American History at Yale, with a focus on U.S. politics. An established journalist who has contributed to such publications as the New York Times, The Nation and the Chicago Tribune, Gage is author of the forthcoming book *The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror*.*

**Much of your teaching and research deals with the evolution of American political ideologies and institutions. What political ideologies and institutions distinguish domestic terrorism from international terrorism?**

The first thing to say about terrorism is that it is a tactic. It's a tactic that has been used by many groups over time, within the U.S., outside of the U.S., against the U.S., and against a very wide variety of targets. That said, in the domestic United States, you've seen terrorism emerge since the mid-nineteenth century as a form of political violence that's used to, as the name suggests, create terror, through assassinations, bombings, and clandestine attacks. It's emerged from a very, very wide range of groups. Some have come from the right: organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, or more recently, for instance, someone like Timothy McVeigh of the Oklahoma City Bombing. In other cases, you've seen various forms of terrorism from the left. In the late nineteenth century, terrorism was something much-discussed and occasionally used by anarchists and left-wing revolutionaries. Similarly, in the late sixties and early seventies, you had a very wide range of discussion on the left about the use of violence.

**Your latest book *The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror*, focuses on the still-unexplained 1920 terrorist bombing that occurred in New York's financial district. How do you define America's first age of terror?**

In the title there, I use "the Age of Terror" to describe a period in which violence in the form of bombings and assassinations, primarily at the hands of various left-wing revolutionaries—anarchists, and in some cases, labor unions—led to what was the first substantial discussion in the United States of terrorism as a problem and a form of political violence. So in my book

I'm really talking about the period from the 1870s through the 1920s, although the book's focus is on this particular event in 1920 in which still unknown culprits, who were probably anarchists, set off a bomb on Wall Street.

**What do we know about the Wall Street explosion of 1920? What mysteries remain?**

On Sept. 16, 1920, just about a minute after noon, a bomb went off on Wall Street, killing 39 people and injuring hundreds more. You can picture what Wall Street would have looked like at the noon hour; even then, the financial district was a center of commerce. You had hundreds, if not thousands, of people out there on the streets, and a bomb went off in the midst of this. There was a question in the beginning about whether or not this was an accident or a bomb. What investigators eventually concluded was that dynamite had been set on Wall Street in a horse-drawn cart loaded with metal slugs intended to injure people in the crowd. The question became: if it was a bomb, who might have wanted to set this off on Wall Street? In 1920, there were many radical dissenters who opposed certain policies on Wall Street as well as capitalism in general, or particularly opposed the role the Morgan Bank had played in bringing the United States into World War I. There were many, many suspects, but attention quickly focused on anarchists and more generally on labor and left-wing radicals, although the case was never solved.

The interesting thing about the case and the fact that it was never solved is that it provides a window into what Americans thought about terrorism in that moment—about who might have committed it, about what kinds of policies you wanted to have in effect to prevent it, about whether or not it might be justified in certain circumstances of tyranny or oppression. And so what you get, in part because it was an unsolved bombing, is a pretty wide-ranging discussion on

everything from policy to suspicions about who might have carried out such an act. The last thing to say about the Wall Street bombing in its context is that it came in the midst of what is known as the “red scare” that followed the First World War. People tend to know a little more about McCarthyism, which was the second “red scare” of the twentieth century. But during and after World War I, there was an enormous wave of repression against left-wing radicals: members of the Industrial Workers of the World, anarchists, communists, all in the context of the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution. When this bomb went off in 1920, it also became a referendum on all of the policies that had been in place since the war to deal with revolutionary language and labor uprisings.

**What lessons about terrorism in America today can we draw from such episodes in America’s first age of terror?**

Well, it’s always a little tough to draw direct lessons from history. It’s important to talk first about some of the differences. A hundred years ago, we’re talking about a very different political context, a very different set of people and issues, a different government structure. We’re also talking about differences in technology. Terrorism in the late 19th century, even at its most extreme, was fairly small-scale in comparison to the sorts of things that we are unfortunately becoming used to today. That said, there are several commonalities that emerge. I think the most pronounced one is around the question of civil liberties and free speech. A lot of the debates that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were over the question of how

to deal with these acts of violence: do you treat them as purely criminal acts to the degree, go through a trial, prosecute them, and end the story? Or do you engage in a much more wide-ranging campaign against certain ideologies, certain groups, against people who might have spoken in favor of violence but had not actually committed it themselves? If you’re going to take on that sort of larger campaign, where exactly do you draw the line of responsibility? These were very hot questions in the late 19th and early 20th century, and in some cases they were settled in one way, in other cases, in another way. But that sort of discussion is one of those places that historical lessons are very useful to the present day. I think the

other, probably more basic, way in which looking historically is useful and interesting to the present day is simply in learning that terrorism is something that has a history. The political

language of the present day has been focused on the idea that nobody has ever experienced terrorism before or at least not in the way that we’re experiencing it today. Of course, to some degree this is true—the scale is different, the politics are different, etc. But, nonetheless, the fact remains that terrorism, like everything else, has a history, and that has to be part of our conversation too. In some ways, there is perhaps a comforting aspect to this, in the sense that societies have dealt with it in many other scenarios at many times in the past and have often seemed to come through okay. In other ways, I think you have a more troubling legacy in the sense that many of the responses, again, looking back at the late 19th and early 20th century to terrorism, went to pretty widespread campaigns against groups and individuals who were sometimes innocent of any sort of involvement in that kind of violence.

**In your opinion, how has the Patriot Act compared to the federal government’s response to previous terrorist attacks?**

In many ways, it’s pretty consistent with what you might’ve seen a hundred years ago. One of the stories that I tell in my book is about the development of a new law enforcement apparatus in an attempt to deal with this question of violence, of revolutionary sentiment, and of terrorism in particular. A hundred years ago, it really began with the buildup of police bomb squads, sometimes called labor or anarchist squads, in American cities. There was a real specialization of the police around attempts to conduct surveillance, to infiltrate, to disrupt these sorts of organizations—even very mainstream organizations like labor



*The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the most recent major act of domestic terrorism, killed 168 people. According to Professor Gage, however, Americans have a unique tendency to easily forget about terrorism. (Photo by Briah Harkin/Getty Images)*

unions and the American Civil Liberties Union in its very early years. So you saw a real professionalization of police on that level, and by the First World War, you saw the growth of agencies like the Bureau of Investigation, today known as the FBI, which was founded in 1908 but really came into its own during the First World War as the political surveillance unit of the federal government. Their move was very controversial at that time; there were all sorts of questions about warrants and wiretapping and civil liberties issues, and there was a big backlash against these new intrusions into American civil liberties by the federal government at the time. Of course, the larger story is that the Bureau continued to exist.

**How significant of a threat is domestic terrorism today?**

Well, that's a very hard question and one that I do not know the answer to. I will say that I think the assumption is that it is not as much of a threat. Timothy McVeigh is sort of an interesting figure in this respect. From what we can tell, he was acting more or less on his own initiative. Nonetheless, that was a really dramatic act, it was fairly recent in our history, and it has been surpassed obviously by 9/11 and international concerns. But the question remains whether or not this is something that's going to re-emerge. I wish I knew the answer. I wish I could say more about the future, but I'm a historian and I look at the past.

**How great of a social and economic effect do domestic terrorist attacks have on society today as opposed to the effects they have had in the past? What incidents, historical or contemporary, have been most influential on everyday life?**


One thing that I can say—and this is perhaps not the definitive answer—is that the idea of violence and terrorism on a smaller scale was much more widespread a hundred years ago. The frequency with which people dealt with it was actually much greater, at least in the United States. But I think the key to terrorism is that it's a form of violence designed to have a psychological effect—quite literally, to terrorize. So when you think about its impact, it really has much more to do with how people think about it and how they respond to it than necessarily the definitive, objective calculations on the ground. By its nature, terrorism has always been something that's committed by very, very small numbers of people—sometimes working together in organizations, other times taking

individual initiatives—but at any rate, it's always marginal. It's always unusual. I think the question is what the psychological impact is. Historically, there are some important moments to consider. The Haymarket affair of 1886, which certainly had a profound effect on American society, remains an unsolved bombing. The bombing of the *Los Angeles Times* in 1910 was again, kind of a watershed moment in its day. To jump to the present day, certainly Oklahoma City and 9/11, without question, have had really dramatic impacts. One thing that's interesting in the history of terrorism in America is that there's something of a lull in the middle of the 20th century, at least in the U.S. great question for historians and political scientists is exactly why that might be the case.

**What measures has the government taken to prevent large-scale domestic terrorist attacks since the Oklahoma City bombing?**

One of the interesting things about the Oklahoma City bombing was that it came two years after the first World Trade Center bombing. You had, in response, a real intertwining of domestic and international terrorism concerns. There was already legislation in the works in response to the first World Trade Center bombing. It was given great momentum by Oklahoma City but ended up focusing a lot more on international terrorism. One of the things just to note, a historical parallel, is that it's often much easier to pass legislation that addresses what's going to be done about people who are not American citizens who are involved in terrorism or terrorist organizations than it is to pass laws domestically because of the Constitution and because of questions about civil liberties, etcetera. That was the case a hundred years ago, and that's the case today.

**In comparison to domestic terrorism in other countries, what stands out about domestic terrorism in America?**

The first thing that I think stands out is that Americans tend to not remember the history of terrorism in this country. The historian Richard Hofstadter in the early 1970s wrote an essay on violence in the United States, asking why it was that Americans were so disinclined to remember violence as a part of their domestic political history. I don't have the definitive answer to that question, but I certainly think that this question of memory is one that stands out as a unique aspect of American history. 


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*“Americans [are] so disinclined to remember violence as a part of their domestic political history. ...I certainly think that this question of memory is one that stands out as a unique aspect of American history.”*

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# Piecing Together the Puzzle

An interview with Dr. Boaz Ganor



Conducted by Christopher Chen

*Dr. Boaz Ganor is the founder of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism and deputy dean of the Lauder School of Government and Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. He is the author of several books, most recently a work entitled The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. Dr. Ganor lectures on terrorism and counterterrorism at the High Command Academic Courses of the Israel's Defense Forces.*

**You argue that global jihadist terrorism is a substantial threat to the world because jihadist terrorists are motivated by what they believed to be a divine command. In your view, what can be done to combat religious fanaticism?**

I believe that certain steps have to be followed in order to be able to conduct an effective counter-campaign against global jihadist terrorism. First of all, you need to understand their rationale. Some people tend to believe that terrorists, the global jihadi, are irrational—I beg to differ. I believe that they are rational, but that they have their own rationality. In other terms, the rational decision-making process is a calculation of cost and benefit and choosing the alternative, which in the eye of the beholder, is more beneficial. This is exactly what terrorists in general are doing, and also what the global Jihadists are doing. When you are trying to understand the rationalities from a worse-than-rational point of view, then it seems like an irrational phenomenon. Once you understand their rationalities, you have to acknowledge the level of danger they present. As I believe, it's a global threat; the war is another kind of world war, but it's not a war between religions. First and foremost, it's a war within a religion—with global jihadists against the rest of the world—which includes the vast majority of the Muslims, who are referred to as infidels as well. Once you understand that these guys have their own rationality and that they see most of the world as their enemies, including the vast majority of Muslims like themselves, you understand the answer to your question. The way to deal with global jihadists is first and foremost an internal debate in the Muslim world. Only

Muslims can educate Muslims. Only Muslims can reach out to other Muslims. This is a war of ideas—the idea and culture of global jihadists versus other cultures versus Islam itself. So in my view, the way to combat the global jihadists is only by making new international alliances which will combine the efforts of the Muslim societies of several countries and all the Muslim countries together to jointly fight the common enemy.

**Examining the “Boomerang Effect” of increased terrorist retaliations in response to counterterrorism efforts, you contend that the effect exists when terror organizations**

**have both the motivational and operational capacity to retaliate. Are there any situations in which terror organizations have possessed both capacities but refrained from retaliating?**

In general, when a group of people has both the motivation to attack and the operational capability to metabolize this motivation, then a terrorist campaign will carry it out. So in general, the answer is no—if they have both factors, they will launch an attack. However, there are situations in which they may have operational capability and motivation to attack but still lack

**“Only Muslims can educate Muslims. Only Muslims can reach out to other Muslims. This is a war of ideas—the idea and culture of global jihadists versus other cultures versus Islam itself.”**

the operational or motivational capability to launch a certain type of attack, such as nonconventional terrorism. You might find an organization that has the motivation and operational capability to use regular terrorism, but is missing one of the factors for nonconventional terrorism. In general, if an organization has both types of capability, then the outcome is clear—you will suffer a terrorist attack. Still, there might be exceptions within this state-

ment of different organizations that might refrain from a specific type of attack, from attacking a specific target, and so forth.

**How do nonconventional terrorist attacks—such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks— affect society differently from conventional terrorist attacks?**

Well, I usually differentiate between two types of nonconventional attacks: limited nonconventional attacks and unlimited nonconventional attacks. Limited nonconventional attacks are those where you know where they start and you know where they end. If someone were to open an anthrax letter in an office, perhaps the whole floor will be contaminated, maybe the whole building, maybe the whole street. But still, it is a limited attack—the consequences are limited. An unlimited attack is an attack like a “smart bomb.” In many cases, you don’t know where it starts; you definitely don’t know where it’s going to end. The concepts of these two types of attacks are completely different. In general, I would say that limited nonconventional attacks are mainly chemical attacks and sometimes radiological attacks—these are being called “dirty bomb” attacks. Unlimited attacks are mainly biological, with some exceptions, such as anthrax letters. I would also refer to nuclear attacks as unlimited attacks because of the magnitude of these types of attacks. Modern terrorism strategy is meant to spread fear and anxiety within the overall population. That’s what modern terrorists are trying to achieve—not to kill as many people as possible but to spread fear and anxiety in the maximum number of people.

Limited nonconventional attacks are the most developed stage of modern terrorism because they are meant mainly to create fear and anxiety. An anthrax letter is not necessarily more dangerous than an explosive letter, but people are much more afraid of anthrax letters than explosive letters—although anthrax letters kill much fewer people than explosive letters. So, nonconventional limited attacks are the ultimate stage of modern terrorism—within the same rules of the game of modern terrorism—but unlimited nonconventional attacks are part of a new ballgame. The organizations that are launching these types of attacks are not necessarily interested in creating fear and anxiety but mainly in killing as many people as possible. If they have a problem with the Americans, they can nuke the Americans; if they have a problem with the Jews, they can have a biological attack in Israel. I do believe that this division, this classification between limited and unlimited attacks, helps us understand the probability of those types of attacks. Not every terrorist organization will necessarily launch an unlimited nonconventional attack even if they have the capability to do so, while most of the terrorist organizations that are active today in the international arena would not hesitate to use limited nonconventional attacks, which are still in the rules of the game for modern terrorism.

**You have made a distinction between “rational fear” and “irrational fear,” wherein irrational fear is characterized as**

**a fear that bears no relation to the actual statistical probability of being killed or injured in a terror attack. How can policymakers and everyday citizens draw the line between realistic safety precautions and unfounded anxiety?**

First of all, what I have emphasized is that each and every one of us has a personal “red line.” Beneath this “red line,” we have rational fear that is proportional to the level of the threat; on top of this red line, we are behaving in an unproportional level to the threat—this is anxiety. It’s very difficult to decide where this red line is crossed. It depends on our personal characteristics, our personal experiences in life, our culture, and our exposure to different forms of terrorism. So there are many factors actually being taken under consideration, but I believe that once you teach the people the difference between rational fear and irrational anxiety, it will be easier for them to define whether they have crossed the red line or not. They must judge, in the most objective way they can, what the real level of the threat is and how they can deal with it. Let me give you an example from a lecture I gave to a Jewish community in New York during the wave of violence between 2000 and 2005. At the end of the lecture, an old couple came up to me with tears in their eyes and said, “We have family and friends in Israel, we love Israel, and we would love to visit Israel. We’ve become very old, and this may be our last chance to visit. But everyone says, ‘Oh, it’s so dangerous to come to Israel.’ You are a counterterrorism expert—what do you say? Is it dangerous or not to visit Israel at this time?” And I was looking very sadly into their eyes when I said, “Anyone who tells you that Israel is a very dangerous place is definitely right; Israel is a very dangerous place—you know why? Because the Israelis are bad drivers!”

In fact, if you count the numbers of victims of terrorism and injuries from terrorism in Israel, there are approximately several dozen casualties per year from terrorist attacks. The peak year was 2002, when we had 300 people who died from terrorist attacks. Now, I’m not underestimating this sum; in a small population like Israel, this is really a big sum of casualties. In that year, we also had approximately 2000 injuries, which is an enormous sum. But every year—not in the peak year—we have 600 people who die in car accidents in Israel and approximately 20,000 who are injured in car accidents. I can assure you that there is not one person on Earth who is afraid to come to Israel because he is afraid to be injured or killed in a car accident. Many are afraid to come to visit Israel because they will be hurt in a terrorist attack. This is an irrational behavior. This is an irrational calculation. That’s the way that one should judge the probabilities of threats of terrorism.

**How do terrorist organizations conduct psychological warfare? To what extent do such organizations influence the public through direct communication?**

Well, it depends from organization to organization, but in general,



I would say that almost all terrorist organizations are using psychological warfare in order to multiply the effects of their attacks. The attack itself has almost no meaning; only the translation of the attack does. Accompanying the attack with a psychological campaign actually amplifies the attack itself and creates fear in society, which is a necessary factor for terrorists to achieve their political and ultimate goals. Let me give you a quick example: in Israel, in 2001, we had a suicide attack on a discotheque in Tel Aviv called the Dolphinarium discotheque. Many youngsters were injured; more than a dozen were killed, and all of them were sons and daughters of

Russian immigrants to Israel. These students, almost all of whom came from the same high school, frequently came to this specific discotheque. My staff and I came to speak to the students after the event, and we found that they were terrified. Now, it's only natural to be afraid after such an incident, but we found that they were terrified because Hamas, which conducted the attacks, officially announced the attack was planned against this specific discotheque. Hamas claimed to know in advance that the discotheque was being used by Russian immigrants, and it declared that that from then on it would focus its attacks on Russian immigrants to Israel.

These claims only occurred after Hamas learned that the attack actually caused a huge number of casualties and deaths within the Russian immigrant population. Of course, this was a psychological campaign because Hamas didn't know that this would be the case. It had just learned from Israeli media that this was the outcome of the attack and decided to use that to stop immigration from Russia to Israel. Actually, in almost every video and videocassette that terrorist organizations are producing and manufacturing, there are many messages that they are sending directly and indirectly, which together create this international campaign. As for the websites, blogs, forums, and so forth, Professor Gabriel Weimann, who wrote an interesting book on terrorism and the Internet, refers to something which I find very interesting. He writes that many terrorist organizations, instead of following the new, modern trend of communication via mass media, which is broadcasting, are conducting narrow-casting. This means that they send concrete messages to concrete groups within society. They have concrete messages to kids in the websites, they have concrete messages to women, concrete messages to immigrants, and so on and so forth. So this is a very sophisticated, complex, efficient psychological war that they conduct.

**You have said that the media should “avoid broadcasting tapes made by terror organizations and interviews with**



*Hazardous-material experts enter the Hart Building of the U.S. Senate after an anthrax-laced letter was found. Ganor argues against excessive fear of anthrax and other “limited” attacks, saying, “An anthrax letter is not necessarily more dangerous than an explosive letter, but people are much more afraid of anthrax letters than explosive letters—although anthrax letters kill much fewer people than explosive letters.” (Stephen Jaffe/AFP/Getty Images)*

**individual terrorists.” How do you reconcile this restraint with media’s duty to inform the public?**

Well, I believe that we should not mix the duty of the media to inform the public and the duty of the media to not play into the hands and manipulation of the terrorists. In modern terrorism, the mass media is a crucial factor, and the whole plan of the terrorist attacks is designed to attract attention and to manipulate the media into transmitting the messages of the terrorists. Now, I'm not saying that the media should not cover terrorist attacks or give information that has been transmitted by terrorists, but I do believe that the media should not play into the hands of the terrorists. It might be easier to understand that if I just change the actors for a minute. Let's say that the media knows that there is a politician—a minister, for example, or a member of Parliament—who sends a videocassette to the media meant to brainwash the hearts and minds of the people. Would the media consider transmitting this? They wouldn't. They wouldn't want to play into the hands of this political manipulation. This is exactly what I would expect them to do in reference to terrorism. I would expect them to judge and to decide what can be transmitted and what cannot be transmitted. My recommendation would be; don't transmit anything that the terrorists produced themselves. If they have a message to the public, if you think it's an important message and that it's your responsibility to give this information to the public, then give it. But give a paraphrased message; don't give the terrorists a platform.

**You advocate undercutting support for terrorist organizations by creating an international fund similar to the Marshall Plan, which will educate and provide social services to Muslims. What has prevented governments from cooperating to implement such a strategy?**

Well, I think there are many, many reasons for this. The first reason is that the level of the threat of international terrorism, of global jihadist terrorism, until the last few years, was not considered as great of a danger as thought it was. Therefore, many states—the Western states, and even many Arab and Muslim states—turn a blind eye. They think that this is something that doesn't necessarily concern them; it's a problem, but it's not their problem. I met some people in Switzerland who referred to this problem as a problem of other people, not a Swiss problem, because they are neutral. Of course, there is no link of neutrality here when the opponent doesn't respect neutrality and when the opponent divides wars into two sections: either you're with us or against us, either you're an infidel or a believer. Some Australians who I met before the Bali bombings said, "Yes, I know it's a problem, but you know, it's not our problem, it's not our concern. We're so different from all of them." "Different" had a meaning when war was won or lost by deploying armies, by deploying battalions with armored cars and so on and so forth. But when the war is being conducted by suicide attackers, there is no meaningful "difference." I think that there is no Australian today who believes that he or she is secure from this phenomenon.

So the first problem was the lack of acknowledgement by states that they are really a part of the problem—that they are suffering from the problem or might suffer from it in the future. The second problem is in Arab and Muslim states, which are the key factor in culturing this process of radicalization in the Muslim world; some of them were, and some of them still are, corrupt. You can create this Marshall Plan and give the funds that are needed to confront the Islamic radicalization process within those societies, but in some cases it might end up in the corrupted control of those regimes. This is a concrete problem that needs to be solved. I would say mainly that states needed a wake-up call. Of course, the wake-up call was 9/11 and what came after 9/11, but I personally feel as if I am serving as the wake-up call on a one-to-one basis with military commanders, decision-makers, and members of Parliament, and so on and so forth. It's a process, and I believe at the end of the day, this is the only way to counter this dangerous trend of Islamic radicalization. I'm optimistic because I believe at the end of the day, states will adopt this or another solution and will enhance international

cooperation.

**Is fighting the threat of global terror compatible with the defense of liberal, democratic values—especially with regards to the protection of human rights?**


I wrote extensively on this in my Ph.D. dissertation. The title of the dissertation is *Israeli Counterterrorism Strategy: Efficiency versus Liberal Democratic Values*. Now, like it or not, there is a contradiction between the two sides. One should acknowledge the fact that efficient counterterrorism hurts some liberal democratic values. You can be most effective in counterterrorism if you are a dictatorship. You can be the most liberal and democratic and guard all of the liberal democratic values if you don't suffer from terrorism and you don't want to take part in the international campaign against terrorism. But most states today are not at those two ends, and therefore they acknowledge that they

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*“Many human rights activists worldwide are trying to present it as if it is a black and white issue, but it’s not. It is a complicated question.”*


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need to sacrifice some liberal democratic values in order to gain some efficiency in counterterrorism. The whole question is a question of balance. The whole question is a question of finding the golden bridge in which you still guard the essence of liberal democratic values and you don't play into the hands of the terrorists and eventually surrender to the terrorists. A few years ago, I met a good friend of mine, Professor Irwin Cotler, who was until recently, the Minister of Justice in Canada. I met him 20 years ago, when he was a professor of human rights law at McGill University in Canada. When I met him then, he was telling me, "You know, I am a counterter-

rorist, and I am a human rights activist. And the reason is that I support the most important right of every person on Earth—the right to live." And that is how I refer to myself as well as anyone who is engaged in counterterrorism. Those people are actually human rights activists, because they are trying to support and protect the most important right of any human being, the right to live. Now, to do that, you cannot destroy rights of others; you cannot threaten rights of others. Again, the question is a question of balance. To be complete, if I were to be persuaded that in order to defend the lives of many people, in a very concrete way, I need to create some inconvenience to some other people, I would not hesitate to do so. If I would know that in order to save the lives of the general people, I would need to risk the lives of others or hurt their rights by torturing them and so forth, I would definitely hesitate and probably would refrain from doing that. But the question is a question of balance. Many human rights activists worldwide are trying to present it as if it is a black and white issue, but it's not. It is a complicated question. The only way for all of us to find solutions to these complicated questions is to work together. 

# Extremism's Deep Pockets

## *The Growing Challenge of Fighting Terrorist Financing*



**By Michael Jacobson**

*Michael Jacobson, a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy, is author of The West at War: U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts, Post-September 11. Previously, he served as a senior advisor in the Treasury Department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.*

The United States and its allies have made considerable progress in tackling terrorist financing since 9/11—one of the few areas of success in the global counterterrorism efforts. Serious challenges have emerged, however, which could threaten the record to date. As governments have cracked down on terrorist financing, the growing number of terrorist cells and organizations have found new ways to raise, store, and move funds. Keeping pace with these rapid changes is an uphill struggle for government bureaucracies. International cooperation on these issues also continues to decrease as 9/11 grows more distant. Additionally, in spite of some positive steps taken by the Persian Gulf countries, the region remains a key source of terrorist funds, and European efforts in this area are still uneven. Addressing all of these issues will be essential for continued success in combating terrorist financing.

### **A Successful Approach**

Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government has used an aggressive, multifaceted strategy to combat terrorist financing. The Treasury Department has used its enforcement powers to freeze the assets of terrorist financiers and support networks. Since 9/11, Treasury has publicly designated approximately 500 individuals and entities as terrorists, associating them with a wide range of terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Justice Department has used the “material support” statute to prosecute numerous individuals and entities for supporting terrorist organizations.

The U.S. has also—as the 9/11 Commission recommended—engaged in “vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing.” Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the U.S. Department of Treasury emphasized that “counterterrorism officials place a heavy

premium on financial intelligence” in part because “money trails don’t lie.”

Other countries have taken similar steps to improve their counterterrorist financing capabilities. In early 2007, for example, the British government unveiled a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorist financing and money laundering. The strategy provided their government with additional tools to crack down effectively on terrorist financing. This included the establishment of a “Terrorist Asset Freezing Unit” within the U.K.’s ministry of finance to work closely with British law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Additionally, the U.K. could now use classified information in the asset freezing process for the first time.

The U.S. and the U.K. have hardly been alone in giving their finance ministries greater responsibilities in this area. In the wake of 9/11 the G7 finance ministers released an action plan to combat the finance of terrorism. The finance ministers committed their governments to implementing the various relevant U.N. resolutions, to establishing financial intelligence units, and to pressing financial supervisors and regulators to ensure that terrorists are not abusing the private sector. Soon after, the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors issued their own action plan on terrorist financing because of their determination to “deny terrorists and their associates access to, or use of, our financial system, and to stop abuse of informal banking networks.”

Many countries have also passed legislation criminalizing terrorist financing and developed systems to freeze terrorists’ assets. The European Union, for example, established two terrorist lists—one for Al-Qaeda/Taliban members and one for other terrorist organizations. All 27 European countries are mandated to freeze the assets of designated entities.

Two international organizations—the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—deserve considerable credit for the scale of the global response since 9/11. In

fact, the U.N. first took on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban before 9/11, passing resolution 1267 in 1999 to pressure the Taliban to evict Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. While the Taliban resisted, the fact that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were already blacklisted certainly helped the U.S. build international support quickly after 9/11. By late 2003, almost 300 Al-Qaeda and Taliban members and entities were on the U.N.'s "1267 list." All U.N. members were required to freeze the financial assets and restrict the travel and arms trade of designated entities.

The U.N. also passed Resolution 1373 in late September 2001, creating a Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) and calling on all countries to improve their capabilities to combat terrorist financing. The international community heeded the UN's call. By early 2004, 117 countries had ratified the U.N.'s Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing—up from four on 9/11.

FATF, a relatively obscure Paris-based organization, which seeks to set global standards on combating money laundering and terrorism financing, has also played an important role. Launched by the G7 in 1989, FATF includes 34 member countries. In response to the September 11 attacks, FATF added combating terror financing to its mission in October 2001 and put out nine broad "special recommendations" in this area. Requirements include criminalizing terrorism financing, developing a system of freezing terrorist assets, and adequately overseeing nonprofit organizations and the informal financial sector, among other measures.

With so many countries taking action, it is hardly surprising that there have been some concrete results. For example, in a letter intercepted by the U.S. government in late 2005, Al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri asked then-Al-Qaeda in Iraq chief Abu Musab al Zarqawi for \$100,000, noting that "many lines [of support] had been cut off."

Financial intelligence, according to Treasury officials, has also played an important role in individual operations, such as the investigation that led to the capture of Hambali, Jemaah Islamiya's operations chief who masterminded the Bali bombings in 2002. Additionally, four different terrorist attacks abroad have been disrupted, according to the FBI, based in part on their investigations of the financial activities of terrorist supporters in the U.S.

The CIA's former Deputy Director, John McLaughlin, testified that the government's success in this area was at-

tributable to the "relentless grinding away at other essential components of the terrorist networks—the couriers, the facilitators, the fundraisers, the safehouse keepers, the technicians."

### International Support Diminishing

Continued success in combating terrorist financing, however, is far from guaranteed. One key reason is that there are limits to what the U.S. can accomplish unilaterally in this arena, and as a recent National Intelligence Estimate noted, international cooperation is likely to wane as 9/11 grows more distant.

The United Nations—an organization potentially well positioned to improve worldwide capabilities and to foster international cooperation—has seen its counterterrorism role greatly diminished since 2004. The independent group responsible for monitoring compliance with the UN resolutions was fired and replaced with a team with far less autonomy, the number of entities added to the terrorist list has slowed, and countries have tired of the UN's reporting requirements.

In terms of specific regions, while countries in the Persian Gulf have taken some steps, the area is still an important source of terrorist funds. Saudi Arabia remains a particular challenge. In a June 2007 speech, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson cautioned that although the Saudis are "very effective at dealing with terrorists within the kingdom," they "need



*A Pakistani Army soldier stands near an artillery gun used against pro-Taliban militants on base at Kabal, Dec. 8, 2007. The base is located in the Swat valley of northwestern Pakistan—a region that serves as a major safe haven for Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces to raise funds, communicate, plan, recruit and train. (John Moore/Getty Images)*

to do a better job holding accountable people who finance terrorism around the world.” Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey issued a harsher assessment in September 2007, remarking, “If I could somehow snap my fingers and cut off the funding from one country [for terrorism], it would be Saudi Arabia.” Levey also criticized the Saudis for failing to prosecute terrorist financiers, calling on the Saudis to treat the financing of terrorism as “real terrorism because it is.”

There are problems with Kuwait’s and the UAE’s efforts as well. A March 2007 State Department report noted that terrorist financing is still not a crime in Kuwait, despite the fact that such potential financing “through the misuse of charities continues to be a concern.” Additionally, while Kuwait has established a Financial Intelligence Unit—an agency responsible for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information about suspicious activity from the private sector—the agency does not measure up to the internationally accepted standard for such bodies.

The UAE, on the other hand, has never convicted anyone for terrorism financing or money laundering. This is quite problematic in a country where, as the State Department assesses, “the threats of money laundering and terrorism financing are particularly acute.”

Iran, which has been described by U.S. officials as the “central banker of terrorism,” remains the most serious problem. According to Treasury officials, Iran has a “nine digit line item” in its budget to support terrorism, sending hundreds of millions of dollars to terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The problems in tackling terrorist financing are not limited to the Persian Gulf, however. While individual European countries, such as the U.K., have made progress in tackling terrorist financing, the EU’s efforts remain uneven. For example, while the EU is able to effectively target and freeze the assets of entities associated with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, it has been far less successful in its efforts to designate other terrorist groups. Under the EU system, blacklisting terrorists who are not affiliated with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban requires the unanimity of all 27 member states. This unanimity requirement has prevented the Europeans from taking action against important terrorist organizations. The E.U., for instance, has not designated Hezbollah due to French-led opposition, and until 2003 only Hamas’ military wing was on the list.

### Evolution in Terrorist Financing

The terrorist threat today is a far different one than the U.S. and its allies faced on 9/11. While Al-Qaeda itself remains a formidable opponent—particularly with its recent resurgence in Northwest Pakistan—its affiliates and home-grown cells pose a growing threat as well. For example, the National Counterterrorism Center determined that there were

almost 300 different groups involved in terrorist attacks in 2006—most of them Sunni. In fact, according to State, the terrorist threat has been transformed to the point that it now is a “form of global insurgency.”

As the terrorist threat has evolved, how terrorist groups raise, store, and move funds has changed as well—often in ways which have hindered the governments’ efforts. For example, a 2006 U.S. government report assessed that “groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to obtain logistical and financial support.” The report noted that technology and globalization have also enabled small groups of alienated people not only to connect but to raise resources for attacks without need for an established terrorist organization.

These terrorist cells and organizations are also increasingly using cash couriers and bulk cash smuggling to transfer funds. Although less efficient, it is more difficult for law enforcement to track. Trying to urge the Gulf countries, in particular, to regulate cash couriers has been an uphill struggle, in a region where carrying bulk cash is a common practice. Even where regulations have been put in place, the implementation has often been inadequate.


The terrorist groups also still have a variety of safe havens throughout the world, where they can raise funds, communicate, plan, recruit, and train in relative security. Most notable, from the U.S. perspective, is Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which was transformed into an Al-Qaeda/Taliban safe haven in late 2001. In Africa the Trans-Sahara and Somalia are safe havens for Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, while East Asia is a comfortable operating environment for Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf Group. Hezbollah and Hamas have been able to exploit the loosely governed Tri-Border region in Latin America, where they conduct illicit activity in order to raise funds for their organizations. Finally, according to the U.S. government, terrorists now view Iraq as a “potential safe haven and are attempting to make it a reality.”

### Staying on Course

Despite its success in this arena, the U.S. and its allies, given these challenges, cannot afford to grow complacent. Terrorist groups will continue to adapt the way they raise and move funds as they deem necessary to evade governmental scrutiny. Governments must closely monitor evolving trends in terrorist financing and develop effective strategies to respond quickly. Combating terrorist financing must also remain an important component of every government’s overarching counterterrorism strategy, and maintaining international focus and cooperation on this issue is also essential. While these are difficult challenges, if the U.S. and its allies are unsuccessful in this regard, their efforts to fight terrorist financing will no longer stand out as one of the counterterrorism success stories. **P**

# A Diplomat's Assessment

An interview with Dennis Ross



Conducted by Avi Kupfer

*Ambassador Dennis Ross is a diplomat and scholar who has been at the forefront of the United States's efforts in the Middle East Peace Process for over twelve years. Throughout the more than 20 years he spent in government, Ross served as the Special Middle East coordinator under President Bill Clinton, Director of Policy Planning under President George H.W. Bush, and Director of Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council staff, as well as Deputy Director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment under President Ronald Reagan. Currently, Ross is The Washington Institute's Counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow.*

**From your experience of over twenty years as a diplomat, how would you characterize the approach each administration took regarding the threat of terrorism? Did you find any significant differences in policy formulation towards Islamic extremism?**

The same basic approach was probably adopted by all of them in the sense that terror was seen as a security problem and an intelligence problem. The focus was very much on working with others in the international community intelligence establishment to maximize what we knew about threatening groups, to try to limiting their movements, and to provide counters to them. We tried to make it difficult for them to have mobility; we tried to identify who the main operatives were and then act accordingly. I think there was probably a lot more continuity there than change from administration to administration. Terrorism was seen as a threat, but, obviously, it was not seen in quite the same way as it came to be seen after 9/11.

**You wrote in a 2005 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The war on terrorism may be global, but its roots are [in the Middle East]." After your extensive career as an expert diplomat in the region, what do you see as the roots of terrorism?**

Terrorism's roots seem to be concentrated in the Middle East, most dramatically among different kinds of what may be described as "radical Islamists" now. Why does it have its roots there? It is partly out of a sense of grievance, partly out of a sense of ideology rooted in the extortion of faith in Islam where

you have those who have found a way to distort it for their own purposes. You have conflicts in the Middle East that have created a certain context, but historically you have states that have supported it, not only against Israel but against each other. It was not unusual at all in the past for different Arab regimes to use different terror groups as threats against their neighbor, as ways to subvert their neighbors, as ways to persevere their own strength, and as ways to coerce their neighbors. There really is a legacy here, but it has taken on a new path with radical Islamists who are a threat to the existing state structure.

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***"It's not in Israel's interests or the American interest to see a total collapse of the private sector within Gaza. On the other hand you cannot let Hamas off the hook."***

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Syria is perhaps the most prolific state sponsor of terrorism. The country gives Hezbollah a substantial amount of financial, weapons, political, and organizational aid and provides material support and a safe haven to several Palestinian rejectionist groups. In 2005 you wrote that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad "must carry out a strategic shift to survive." Do you see such a shift as a real possibility under the Baath Party's regime? Can the United States play any significant role in persuading Syria to abandon the terrorist groups that it has supported to this point?

The Syrians would have to make a strategic transformation—basically make a strategic U-turn. They have to change their orientation away from Iran and stop using Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad as tools. I would say that there is some potential because they don't necessarily have an ideology that creates a marriage with Iran, but they see a certain benefit by having an association. The question is if it is possible to wean them away.



*Young protestors hold up pictures of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah during a march for Al-Quds day at Yarmouk refugee camp, outside Damascus. Syria's continual monetary and structural support for Hamas concern Washington policymakers who see Syria as a key link for creating a lasting peace in the region. (Getty Images)*

That would partly be a function of approaching the Syrians with what I would describe as a 'stick-and-carrot approach.' They have to see that their current posture endorses a cost that they measure as a cost and a price that they measure as a price. Today they don't really see the cost. They see political threats from the U.S., but they don't see much consequence. If the U.S. could more clearly concentrate the Syrian mind on what it is they stand to lose and then ensure them what they have to gain, then you might have a chance to get the Syrians to change their behavior. However, at this juncture, it doesn't look like there is any current prospect of chance. But I wouldn't rule out the possibility that if you constructed an approach in which there was a combination of serious penalties and some inducements that might you might have that chance.

**Many militant Islamic organizations support terrorism while maintaining political-humanitarian wings. As the United States openly asserts that it will not negotiate with terrorists, how must it, or any government for that matter, confront the military wings of Hamas, Hezbollah, or Fatah? Do you think a viable political relationship exists between the U.S. and political organizations with ties to terrorism?**

No I don't—if these are the groups you're talking about. They're all political movements with militias. They use terror as a fundamental part of the way that they operate. They need to understand that the world doesn't adjust to them; they have to adjust to the world. If they think that they don't have to change who they are, then they won't change. The key is to understand

that many of these groups have real credos, have real belief systems. It is not just an instrumental posture that they have. If you're going to try to affect the behavior of Hamas, Hamas has to understand that they have to make some choices. One of the problems with those who say we should deal with Hamas is that if you deal with Hamas, you undercut the non-Hamas Palestinians who might believe in coexistence. One of the challenges is to recognize that for groups like Hamas, recognition is a huge payoff. To give them a huge payoff without doing anything to change behavior will only cement the way that they operate now. It will convince them that they are right to behave the way they do. They want to create a sense of inevitability about their agenda, and what you want to show is that

there is no inevitability in their agenda. The only inevitability is that they won't succeed—especially for a group like Hamas that has presumption and a self-perception that it has as connection to the society as a whole. If they were to lose the prospect of those connections, then you would likely see a potential for some adjustment in their behavior or at least the likelihood of some splitting in Hamas.

**Hezbollah holds more than 10 percent of the seats in Lebanon's Parliament and is seen by many of the world's governments as an integral part of the country's social and political structure. Since the U.S. holds a markedly different view regarding the Hezbollah's role in Lebanon, to what extent should it take into account the opinions of the rest of the world when making policy towards the organization?**

I think that even with Hezbollah, which does have a base in the political system because they use elections, we're dealing with radical Islamists who are not all the same. Hezbollah and Hamas, even though they are Shi'ite and Sunni, have similar strategies in terms of pursuing a political strategy while never giving up their militias. They use their militias as a lever against the existing government. This is especially true of what Hezbollah now does with the Lebanese government. Our approach has to be one in which we don't make adjustments to them as long as they are such strong believers in the use of terror. There are a lot of people who like to say that we should approach Hezbollah and Hamas the way that the British approached Sinn Fein and the IRA in the end. What's interesting is that in the case of Sinn Fein, they committed to outright political process in the image of the principle of decommissioning their weapons. I would say to those who believe we should deal similarly with Hamas and Hezbollah—let them adopt the same posture that Sinn Fein was prepared to adopt, and then you can respond to them the same way.

**The European Union continues to resist calls from the U.S. and Israel to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Do you see the potential for a change in Europe's policy in the near future?**

I do not think that they're going to change their posture, but just because they have a particular posture does not mean we have to accept it. The fact of the matter is that you work with them any way that you can. They don't treat Hezbollah as a normal political actor either; it's not as if they treat them the same as they do all other Lebanese political actors. Even if they don't have the exact same posture we have, at least they have a posture that is not one that treats Hezbollah like normal political actors, which they are not. I would add that if we began to accommodate Hezbollah, then you would see even greater accommodation on the part of the European Union rather than less.

**Fatah is increasingly regarded as the most moderate and diplomatically accessible Palestinian authority. Many experts are optimistic about the prospects for crafting a peace agreement between Fatah and Israel. Can Mahmoud Abbas negotiate a lasting peace with Israel without first severing Fatah's financial and organizational ties to Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, its right-wing, militant factions?**

I think that Abbas can negotiate such an agreement, but he won't be able to implement one. There comes a point where even Fatah itself will have to make a distinctive choice about who are its people and what is their purpose. The leadership of Fatah, in this case Abu Mazen, has made a commitment to coexist that they genuinely believe. Abu Mazen has to be able to deliver on that, and he will argue that he has a pathway for resolving Palestinian national aspirations. The burden will continue to be on the Fatah leadership to act upon whatever has been negotiated and whatever agreements have been made.

**In a June 2007 article you wrote that "Israel needs to coordinate with [those in Fatah] who are committed to coexistence and who seek to improve the day-to-day realities for Palestinians." However, recent studies by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research have found that support for violent attacks against Israeli targets does not decrease among individuals with higher education and living standards within the West Bank and Gaza; in fact, support for such attacks often increases with these variables. In light of this, what effect do you think that social and economic improvements in the West Bank can have on political change?**


I think the way to look at this is that there is no guarantee that social and economic changes will produce the outcomes that you want but there is almost a guarantee that if you don't change it for the better, then there's no prospect of change. It's not a case

that the socioeconomic realities determine whether you can end terror, but one thing's for sure: there's no possibility of changing things if you can't improve the Palestinian stake in what is a prospect. The key point to recognize here is that no political process will be credible if you don't produce at the same time some changes in the day-to-day realities. If there are no changes in the day-to-day realities, no one is going to particularly believe what you accomplish on the political front.

**After the recent collapse of a sewage reservoir in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli government denied official requests to bring certain reconstruction materials into Gaza, as the materials could be used to launch rockets into Israel. In dealing with this hostile, yet extremely dependent territory, how should Israel balance its commitments to humanitarian support for Gaza's citizens with the protection of its own people?**

It must strike a balance for its own reason and also to demonstrate to the world that it will not contribute to humanitarian disaster even while it must protect its own people. There must be ways to contend with an issue like sewage. If you create a health hazard, that's not something so easy for Israel to recover from. I would say that they must find a way to strike a balance. One way, of course, is to use plastic piping, which could not be used as a source as a Qassam rocket launcher. There are times when you must be creative, but for Israel's own sake, it must find a way to strike that balance.


**Can such a policy of balancing be effective in the long term, and if not, how should Israel proceed in its relationship with the Gaza Strip?**

The key is going to be whether you are able to work out arrangements with Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority or not. They cannot affect Gaza today. If an agreement were possible in the near future, they would have no way of implementing it within Gaza. What they want to do is to create legitimacy for their position and show that Hamas offers nothing for the future of the Palestinians. You're trying to construct that kind of an approach without creating such a disaster in Gaza that you lose any base to make changes. It's not in Israel's interests or the American interest to see a total collapse of the private sector within Gaza. On the other hand, you cannot let Hamas off the hook. So here again, you're trying to strike a balance not only in the near term but also with an eye towards the strategic interests of the time. Ultimately it's in Israel's interest for the Palestinians who coexist not to be the ones who reject their existence and who are interested in turning Gaza into a platform for attacks against Israel. There's no simple answer here, but the balancing must not only be in terms of the humanitarian issues that have to be addressed, but the balancing must also look towards the longer term. 



# Terrorism in Western China?

An Interview with Rohan Gunaratna



Conducted by Matthew Andrews

Prepared by Maggie Goodlander and Rebeca Yergin

Rohan Gunaratna, the Head of International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, is an expert on Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Asia. His acclaimed books include *Inside Al-Qaeda: The Global Network of Terror*, *Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response* and *The Changing Face of Terrorism*.

In the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto's assassination in Pakistan and continued casualties in Iraq, the conflicts that draw less international attention lose their salience in the eyes of government and media officials. Among them is the struggle between the Han Chinese and the Turkic-Muslim Uighurs of Western China's Xinjiang province, a conflict that challenges the international community's ability to define and counter the threat of global terrorism.

While the Uighurs only constitute eight and a half million out of China's population of over 1.3 billion people—a number that pales in comparison to the 1.2 billion Han Chinese inhabiting the country—the Uighurs do make up the majority in Xinjiang. This crucial province contains 16% of China's landmass, large oil, and natural gas reserves, in addition to 80% of the reserves of coal, gold, jade, and precious metals.

Although competition for Xinjiang's valuable resources is potentially one of the great sources for conflict in the region, the problem transcends natural resources.

The Chinese government's restrictive religious policies in Xinjiang and tensions between groups in the province add to the problem. In response to grievances against the Chinese government, a minority of Uighurs formed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), dedicated to secession from China and to the formation of an independent Islamic state. Since the 1990's, it has engaged in a series of violent incidents inside China to achieve its goal of nationhood. After September 11th, the United States, in conjunction with the United Nations, designated the ETIM as a terrorist organization, although the issue remains contentious.

On one side, Uighur groups and opponents of Chinese policy claim that the Chinese government conflates Uighur movements seeking religious rights with jihadist terrorism; they argue that Islam is the only similarity between Uighurs and radical jihadists. On the

other side of the debate are those who claim that Uighur movements, specifically the ETIM, are developing closer links with Al-Qaeda in hopes of linking struggles in Xinjiang with global jihadist movements. In this interview, Dr. Gunaratna sides with the latter assessment; Gunaratna argues that the Chinese government and the international community must take definite action against what he deems the growth of terrorism in Western China.

**What is the history of Uighur groups in China? How were they incorporated into the Chinese state?**

The Uighurs are a part of the People's Republic of China.

But certainly, they are in a distinct geographic region, and the Han Chinese have established a very significant presence in Xinjiang where most of the Uighurs live. Both the Han and the Uighur and many other ethnic minorities live in peace there. They have always been a part of China in modern times. In history, they have been distinct and separated. They became incorporated because they largely settled in territory adjacent to the Han population. Over the 2,000

years, the Uighurs and the Han Chinese have had a close relationship. For example, one of the imperial concubines was a Uighur woman. The relationship was not just among commoners but among the imperial court as well.

**What is the motivating force behind Uighur separatism?**

Ethnic and religious conflicts are the most dominant forms of conflict. China is no exception. A minority of the

**“Ethnic and religious conflicts are the most dominant forms of conflict. China is no exception.”**



operating in 2003—by the Pakistani forces. There have been a number of ETIM members arrested in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They are working very close with Al-Qaeda. Abu Zabeda, the operations chief for Al-Qaeda, met with Uighur radical groups entering Pakistan. The relationship between the two is very strong.

**What threat does continued Uighur radicalization pose for the Chinese government?**

It poses a very significant threat. We have seen that when the East Turkestan Islamic Movement trains in Al-Qaeda camps it becomes very much like Al-Qaeda. Certainly, the Al-Qaeda spirit and ideology would be represented and manifested operationally in China in the coming years. We have seen the more recent training conducted in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan that training conducted includes suicide bombing. It is very likely that ETIM members will conduct suicide attacks in China in the future.

**Does Uighur radicalism pose a threat to the United States?**


The East Turkestan Islamic Movement would be able to attack U.S. targets inside of China, but most likely, it won't attack them in the near future. There is a very strong lobbying group in Washington, D.C. that would lose credibility. But, certainly, the ETIM doesn't like China or the United States.

**A recent report by Human Rights Watch argued that the Chinese government represses a broad spectrum of Uighur religious practices, ranging from the types of Quran that can be used to what imams may preach. Uighur groups often speak out against Chinese policies that they believe constitute human rights violations. How do you evaluate these claims, and what, if anything, can be done to reform China's policies towards Uighur groups?**

I think that the Chinese are doing all the right things that the Americans are not doing. They must regulate the imams, have proper schools for them. They monitor them

because there are some imams that preach Hitler. There are some Qurans that have been issued by the Saudis to attack infidels. I think that Human Rights Watch has no understanding of security and that the United States should learn a lot from China.

**Uighur groups are present among the many terrorist organizations that find safe havens in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. How should China respond to these cells within Pakistan? What role should the U.S. play?**


Chinese have a very strong and very close cooperation with Pakistan. American and Pakistani relationships have gone up and down with the political currents. The Pakistanis have been very distrustful of the Americans because, for example, during the Soviet Era the Americans supported Pakistan very closely. But, after the Soviet period, we saw that America decided it wanted to have an embargo against the Pakistanis. After 9/11 the United States again very closely supported Pakistan. In the case of China and Pakistan they have had a very good relationship regardless of the political currents. Their relationship is very strong. I think the Chinese should continue to work with the Pakistanis to fight extremism and terrorism in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. 



*Muslim Uighurs pray during Ramadan in October 2006, in Xinjiang province. While Human Rights Watch argued that the Chinese government represses a broad spectrum of Uighur religious practices, Gunaratna maintains that the Chinese Government should regulate Imams who preach Hitler and Qurans that have been issued by groups that encourage terrorist attacks. (Frederic J. Brown/AFP/Getty Images)*

# The Price of Modernity

*Technology and terror in the 21st century*



**By Martin Shubik**

*Martin Shubik is the Seymour Knox Professor Emeritus of Mathematical Institutional Economics at Yale University with special interests in economic warfare, behavior under risk, and theory of money and financial institutions.*

**T**errorism has many forms and is here to stay. The dangers from terrorism are part of the price we pay for living in a world with modern communication networks and mass-murder technology available to small groups. Frequently, it is difficult to define a terrorist as distinguishable from a patriot, a disgruntled minority, a religious fanatic, a tribal supporter, an anarchist, and, a political opportunist, or even a criminal or psychotic.

Of the dozens of definitions for terrorism today, one that follows from the United Nations' definition reads:

*Terrorism is any violent action intended to cause death, serious bodily harm, or severe economic hardship to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.*

Again, the group may purport to be fighting for a nationalist cause, a religious cause, an independence movement, international unity, or many other reasons. It is important to remember that one individual's terrorist group may be regarded as a group of freedom fighters by someone else.

...

In a world connected by the Internet, modern democracies have to re-examine the basic liberties and democratic rights they seek to defend, and they must adjust their socio-psychological views considerably. Public demagogues have access to a new and more powerful instant misinformation industry that is growing increasingly adept at the techniques of manipulating public fear and anger. Without the defense of our freedoms, any advice concerning the specifics of defense

against terrorism has little hope for success.

The "counterterrorism and spread democracy" enterprises have been a boon to the Bush administration. They have served as the stick and the carrot. Any red-blooded American with a heart will support our troops in a war against terror and a war for democratic freedom. The disconnect between the jingoistic rhetoric and reality has rarely been bigger. We created a civil war in Iraq; we helped make it safe for terrorists, and now we continue to do so.

The United States' policy of invading Iraq unilaterally instead of inspecting (even using military force to do so) under the United Nations mandate both damaged our international reputation and created far more terrorism than it destroyed. However evil of a dictator Saddam Hussein was, he was anti-Al-Qaeda and essentially secular. The United States managed to create its own terrorist threat in Iraq.

Many politicians mouth phrases such as, "We are here until we achieve victory, establish true democracy, and eliminate the terrorist threat." They have treated these three points with the lack of insight and understanding of a petulant child, a simpleton, or a populist manipulative

scoundrel willing to play on the fears and misinformation of the population.

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The concept of victory against the terrorists has never been defined. We are a third party interfering in a civil war where the definition of terrorist depends on who is shooting at us today. Under the pose of standing up for democracy, this administration has attempted to weaken our own Constitution.

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**“ It is important to remember that one individual's terrorist group may be regarded as a group of freedom fighters by someone else. ”**

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*President George W. Bush shakes hands with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf after a joint press conference in the East Room of the White House in 2006. Shubik writes that in the Bush Administration's zeal to bring democracy to the world, it has bolstered Musharraf's regime, yet it has not done enough to control the internal problems confronting Pakistan and its border regions. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)*

George W. Bush has been the best ally that Osama bin Laden ever had. Without his help the life expectancy of an Al-Qaeda operative in Iraq would have been of the order of a few months. Not content with his aid to bin Laden, he has also been able to show considerable aid to the Iranian theocratic administration, both in helping them keep down the essentially pro-American and pro-modernizing middle classes, while opening up possibilities for Iranian influence in Iraq that were unthinkable under Saddam Hussein.

Not content with these achievements, the Bush Administration has skillfully misanalyzed the problems and dangers of the Kurdish-Turkish relationship, failing to learn anything from history and jeopardizing our relationship with a much needed ally in the Middle East.

Under the guise of our support for the democratic forces of the world, the United States has managed to support a Saudi Arabian regime that encompasses a blend of a medieval kingdom with a playboy sector. This is the artificial country created by the British and French—with the blessings of the Allies after World War I—that has not merely supplied a major

number of the active terrorists on September 11, 2001, but has been the home of the Wahabi sect of religious fanatics whose actions do damage to one of the world's great religions.

In the administration's zeal to bring democracy to the world, the regime of General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan has been bolstered while it shows little sensitivity to the considerably different problems of controlling the tribal areas on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the internal problems confronting Pakistan as a whole.

...

Planning, organization, and logistics are handmaidens to clear political thought, resolve, and morale; unfortunately, they are not substitutes. All the monetary resources in the world cannot replace a determined focus devoted to a clear political objective.

The rhetoric declaring that "we will root out every terrorist, everywhere" detracts from establishing the requisite political environment. This type of speech combined with the liberal use of ill-defined slogans such as "victory," flag-wrapping orations on bringing democracy to the developing world, and sermons on protecting the "homeland" from terror attacks trade on fear.

From a political point of view, it is easier to incite emotion than it is to carry out an effective anti-terrorist program. The goals of hunting down every individual terrorist and achieving "victory" over all terrorism provide neither a realistic nor cost-effective strategy. Their advocacy makes for good, simplistic, populist, political speeches but can easily provoke public fears while providing terrorist groups the publicity on which they thrive.

We must accept a realistic level of terrorist casualties in much the same way as we accept automobile casualties: they are unpleasant facts of modern life in which the cost to the public in terms of both individual freedom and public resources, of the further reduction of casualties becomes too high.

...

When viewing the daily newspapers, the average American could believe that there exist currently (at least) two types of ideological war: one, a new Jihad which calls for conversion, taxation, or death of the infidels (taxation is already satisfied in the form of oil revenues), and the other is the United States' crusade to bring democracy to all countries in the world. Depending upon one's viewpoint, either of these goals could appear admirable.

A more prosaic view is that the ordinary citizen is interested in neither. An individual in any society would like to be able



*A still picture of Osama Bin Laden appears on Al-Jazeera Nov. 29, 2007. Shubik maintains George Bush is the best ally Osama bin Laden has ever had because the former has allowed for a greater life expectancy for Al-Qaeda in Iraq. (AFP/Getty Images)*

to walk down the street without fear of being shot or having one's home or place of work demolished by car bombs, suicide bombers, or other devices of terror.

A modicum of political and economic analysis shows that even if a zero level of terrorism were feasible, the political price in terms of erosion of civil liberties and economic cost is so high that our society should not be willing to pay it.


...

I suggest the appropriate goals for the United States are:

Educate the country on the understanding of the existence of a socially and economically acceptable level of terrorism using analogies with other forms of death.

Address the problems of national systems defense. Identify and improve the protection of vulnerable systems in our society, such as our energy, financial, health and food delivery systems that are targets for major disruptions. Plan to limit the expected damage to a socially and economically acceptable level and to aim for realistic public awareness and acceptance of these defense needs at the level of acceptance of the need for a fire department.

Concentrate on an efficient and morale-building post-attack recovery from any terrorist activity.

The existence of new and dangerous forms of terrorism is a permanent fact of the one world of global communication and lethality of small groups. Al-Qaeda is merely one of the many armed dissident groups we face. Victory against terror is a slogan for the cynical or the demagogue to mislead the public. Victory, in fact, means reasonable identification of the many different terrorist groups and balanced activity both in attacking their numbers and being prepared to recover with speed and high morale from the damage that they will do. 

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
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# The Odd Republican Out

An interview with Ron Paul



Conducted by Sam Gensburg

*Congressman Ron Paul (R-TX) is a physician and a 2008 U.S. presidential candidate. After graduating from Duke University School of Medicine in 1961, Paul became a U.S. Air Force flight surgeon, serving outside the Vietnam War zone. Paul later entered politics and has represented Texas districts in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1976 to 1977, 1979 to 1985, and 1997 to present. He entered the 1988 presidential election running as the Libertarian nominee while remaining a registered Republican, and he placed a distant third.*

Mr. Paul, you've introduced yourself as the "champion of the Constitution," and you are characterized as almost exclusively in favor of small government on virtually every issue. What is the proper role of the federal government?

What the Founding Fathers intended: the federal government should operate to protect the lives, liberties, and properties of American citizens. I believe the federal government should operate in accordance with what Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers it to do—nothing more and nothing less.

You are currently running for President of the United States. In your view, what are the most pressing issues facing our nation and why?

The war in Iraq is the single most important issue facing Americans today with broad foreign and domestic policy implications. With our nation over \$9 trillion in debt, and the cost of continued war expected to clear \$2.4 trillion, the war's drain on the economy is felt most by the poor and the middle class. Thus, stabilizing and stimulating the economy is also important. This requires massive cutbacks in government spending coupled with tax cuts and deregulation of industry. Furthermore, the devaluation of the dollar needs to be remedied by preventing the government from printing money out of thin air, which makes every dollar in American pockets less valuable.

Terrorism is another key issue that America faces today. What are the fundamental causes of terrorism and what can the United States do to combat this problem at its roots?

In a way, the fear of indefinable terrorism is based on our inability to admit the truth about why there is a desire among a small number of angry radical Islamic individuals to kill Americans. It's certainly not entirely because they are jealous of our wealth and freedoms.

We fail to realize that the extremists, willing to sacrifice their own lives to kill their enemies, do so out of a sense of weakness and desperation over real and perceived attacks on their way of life, their religion, their country, and their natural resources. Without the conventional diplomatic or military means to retaliate against these attacks, coupled with the unwillingness of their own government to address the issue, they resort to the desperation tactic of suicide terrorism. Their anger toward their own

governments, which they believe are co-conspirators with the American government, is equal to or greater than that directed toward us.

By following a foreign policy of non-interventionism and encouraging free trade, discussion, and travel with all nations, we will go a long way to discouraging terrorism.

The proper focus should be on identifying those responsible and using limited military force to bring them to justice. We should arrest or kill the perpetrators abroad, use

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**“Stabilizing and stimulating the economy is also important. This requires massive cutbacks in government spending coupled with tax cuts and deregulation of industry.”**

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our armed forces more wisely to defend our borders, and reform immigration laws to keep terrorists out. There is also a powerful constitutional tool that the president can use to bring terrorists to justice. Congress can issue letters of marque against terrorists and their property that authorize the president to name private sources who can capture or kill our enemies. This method works in conjunction with our military efforts, creating an incentive for people on the ground close to Osama Bin Laden to kill or capture him and his associates. Letters of marque are especially suited to the current War on Terrorism, which will be fought against individuals who can melt into the civilian population or hide in remote areas. The goal is to avail ourselves of the intelligence of private parties, who may stand a better chance of finding Bin Laden than we do through a conventional military invasion.



*An uphill climb: Paul lags in the polls, but he has a small, loyal group of followers and has done quite well raising money online. This has led some to speculate that he will pursue a third-party run. (Scott Olson/Getty Images)*

**If you are elected President of the United States, how would you change President Bush's strategy in Iraq?**

I would withdraw immediately from Iraq.

**Given that you support an elimination of the income tax, how do you believe the federal government should raise revenue? Would this shift the overall tax burden to those who are less able to pay?**

Over 50 percent of federal government revenue comes from sources other than the income tax. In fact, the majority of revenue is gleaned from constitutional sources, such as corporate taxes, excise taxes, and fees. Federal government expenditures have ballooned over the course of the Bush presidency. We could successfully scale that back and enjoy the same amount of big government spending that we had less than a decade ago, without revenues from individual income taxes. Furthermore, when we change our interventionist foreign policy, we will save hundreds of billions, even trillions, of dollars from being spent overseas. This is the end goal; it would enable us to quickly pay off our foreign debt, restore American prosperity, and make April 15 just another normal day.

**What is your stance on outsourcing American jobs**

**overseas? Should the United States government take measures to prevent this current trend? If not, what would you say to those who lose their jobs due to outsourcing?**

Outsourcing is a result of too much federal involvement, not too little. It's a result of bad domestic economic policy. The government should create economic incentives to keep jobs in America, like cutting taxes, eliminating the Overseas Investment Protection Corporation, and setting in place a sound currency. With these steps, we can begin to be competitive again, but it will be a difficult process.

**You are often criticized for your desire to downsize the Federal Government. For instance, how would you change the role of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)? Can we trust corporations with self-regulation of upholding safety standards?**

I want to reform the FDA to make it easier to make new and alternative medicines that are already being used safely in other countries available to Americans. I also want to preserve health freedom and the First Amendment rights of dietary supplement companies, which are currently censored by the FDA from revealing certain truthful health claims. If given the opportunity to operate within a true free market, competing corporations would want to employ the best



practices to gain the most consumers, and could be trusted more with self-regulation of safety standards.

**As president, what will be your China policy? Specifically, what is your stance on subpar exports and the undercutting of American prices?**

First, we should remove our trade subsidies with China. Very few people realize that China is one of the biggest beneficiaries of American taxpayer subsidies and that this directly impacts China's role in the global economy. We should eliminate the \$4 billion subsidy our nation quietly gives China through the U.S. government's Export-Import Bank, and when we cease to subsidize their economy, we should see fewer subpar exports infiltrating the American economy and see less undercutting of American prices.

**How would the federal government support a monetary system based on hard currency and where would it acquire the resources to do so?**

It will be difficult and require several steps to set us on the path to sound currency, but the first and most immediate step would be to legalize gold and silver as legal tender and remove the sales tax on them so that notes backed by hard money can compete on a level playing field with fiat Federal Reserve notes.

**If you are elected president, what will you do about the rising prices of gasoline?**

The federal government has misled us into thinking that oil was cheap. For years it kept prices at the pump artificially low by saddling taxpayers with the costs of corporate subsidies and oil-driven foreign entanglements, and we made rational choices, albeit with false information, that have led to our oil-dependent economy.

We can, however, make strides to convert to an alternative energy-driven economy. By repealing all government subsidies and policies that artificially lower the price of fossil fuels, we could open a true free market in energy. When access to Middle Eastern oil is no longer a central component of our foreign policy, my administration will provide new incentives for private investors to devote more resources into alternative energies, such as ethanol, and for consumers to voluntarily seek out opportunities to use them. As president, I would fight to end oil subsidies, to stop giving preferential treatment to Big Energy lobbies,

and to stop abusing our military whose lives are risked to fill corporate wallets.

**In the past, you have come out against affirmative action. However, if you look at schools like UC Berkeley that have stopped using affirmative action, you see a serious racial imbalance emerging. Do you see this trend as a problem, and if so, what would you do about it? If not, is eliminating affirmative action unfair to the student groups that are adversely affected?**

First, I do not support any government action that strips citizens of their own individual integrity, and this includes affirmative action. The federal government most divides us when it classifies us by race, class, religion, and gender, and government-administered affirmative action is no exception. When the government comes to think

it can best decide who succeeds and who fails—whether by taxes, restrictive regulations, corporate subsidies, welfare programs, or other racial determinants—it breeds hostility and suspicion in others and does not achieve true tolerance and acceptance. Racism is an ugly form of collectivism, as it views humans strictly as members of groups rather than as individuals. I propose, as Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. did, that we judge and reward individuals not on the color of their skin or gender or ethnicity but by their individual achievement and strength of character. Anything but this is a problem—for both sides affected.

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***“As President, I would fight to end oil subsidies, to stop giving preferential treatment to Big Energy lobbies, and to stop abusing our military, whose lives are risked to fill corporate wallets.”***

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**What are your chances of winning the 2008 Presidential Election? Where do you think the biggest challenges lie in achieving your goal?**

I think the chances are a lot stronger now than they were two months ago, and I think the odds are higher every day that I could win it. I'm humbled by the outpouring of support that's rising steadily each day, especially among college students at Yale and nationwide. Just a few weeks ago, over 2,000 students at the University of Michigan came out for a rally, and thousands of students are actively campaigning on their campuses, but it's important that with the primaries approaching that everyone translates their support into votes by registering with their state's Republican Party to vote in the primaries! **P**

*Editor's Note: This interview was conducted by email in Nov. 2007*

# A Call to Action

An interview with David Halperin



Conducted by Matthew Ellison

*David Halperin is Senior Vice President at the Center for American Progress and the Director of Campus Progress, the Center's dynamic effort to strengthen progressive voices on college and university campuses nationwide and empower new generations of leaders.*

According to your official biography, you are the Director of Campus Progress, the Center for American Progress's dynamic effort to strengthen progressive voices on college and university campuses nationwide and empower new generations of leaders. How do you go about doing this?

We think the most important thing is to give young people support for projects that they're interested in and that they started. Every aspect of what we do has a local dimension as well as a national one. Our programs are in activism, journalism, and events. In each of those we support local work, student campaigns on issues that are local to their campuses or their communities, student publications on more than 50 campuses already, and events that students themselves devise and want to run. We also do a lot at the national level on issues that we think are important to young people nationwide, but the most important thing is to invest in the things that young people themselves are starting.

As you know, young voters vote in much smaller numbers than older voters. Do you think more young people will vote in 2008?

All the research shows that young people voted in greater numbers in 2004 and 2006 than they had in past elections in recent decades. Research and new surveys suggest that young people will continue that trend and increase turnout because I think the younger generation is particularly engaged and

because they see how much is at stake in this election.

An issue that affects a lot of college students who want to vote, especially at Yale, is where to vote. Do you think students should register to vote at home or at school?

I think that's really a personal choice for students. States and localities should make it easy and attractive for citizens and people in their communities to vote rather than putting up

barriers and worrying about who is going to vote and whether this or that person in power is going to get outvoted.

Politically, how do you think Yale is different now than it was when you were a student here in the 1980s?

I think that political activism and political engagement come and go. I was a student when Ronald Reagan was president and you saw, sort of shockingly, for the first time a vocal and rather well-organized group of campus conservatives. That was something that really made its mark. I don't think that their numbers were that great. I think students even then tilted strongly toward the progressive side, but

conservatives invested in campuses and helped those conservative students that were there to have the tools they needed to make their voices heard. That's something that progressives had not done, and that's what we're trying to do with Campus Progress and some of the partner organizations we work with make a much stronger effort to take those students who are interested in progressive politics and the progressive agenda and give them more resources and tools and connections so

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*“I think something that young voters and young people do like about Barack Obama is the sense that he's genuine, that he's telling you the truth.”*

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*A rare sight: Though not as critical of college students' political activism as Thomas Friedman, Halperin wishes more young people would take to the streets to protest government policies. (Getty Images)*

they can get things done more effectively.

**In October, *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman praised the optimism and idealism of young people but criticized our lack of radicalism and political engagement. Friedman writes: "Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy didn't change the world by asking people to join their Facebook crusades or download their platforms. Activism can only be uploaded, the old-fashioned way – by young voters speaking truth to power, face to face, in big numbers, on campuses or the Washington Mall. Virtual politics is just that – virtual." Do you think this is an accurate portrayal of college students, and how can it, or for that matter, should it, be changed?**

I do agree that I would love to see more students making their voices heard in public, especially on issues like the Iraq War, which has been an outrage for four years now, a totally misguided policy that has weakened our national security—a huge mistake by the president. Where was the outrage? Where's the outrage on over the denials and inaction that have characterized policy on global warming? Where's the outrage over handing all the money in the treasury to rich people who don't need the money while working people are struggling to feed their families? I would like to see more public engagement and more protesting in front of congressional offices. But I do think that Mr. Friedman is wrong to just sniff at the more sophisticated organizing and networking that go on because

I believe those things can have an effect. Some of the new student organizing is more corporate. Instead of just throwing stones or taking over a building, they start a nonprofit organization and name themselves and their friends to the board; it looks more corporate, but some of that stuff may work. It may work on Sudan; it may work on global warming. That kind of organizing is okay with me so long as the people are committed and actually achieve some results. I'm less concerned with the form of it than with whether it delivers, and I think we ought to give those kinds of activists and organizing a chance as well.

**Are there any issues that you think are not being discussed enough in the presidential campaign that are of particular importance to young voters?**

I think the overall issue of young people's economics—whether you're going to be the first generation in many generations to not do as well as your parents—is important. More than half of college students move back into their parents' houses after they graduate. Whether you can afford your own place and whether you can afford to get married have become serious concerns. The fact that states have cut money for educational aid and that the federal government (until recently with historic legislation that was just passed) had been cutting more from educational aid made it more likely that family income was a key determining factor in whether you could go to college. The availability of health care is another key issue.

The country is moving in the wrong direction economically, and that will affect young people whether they graduate from Yale or don't go to college at all; that is a big issue that ought to be addressed more. We found, truthfully, that it's hard to get young people activated and mobilized on the issue of college affordability, I think in part because either their parents are paying or they're borrowing the money to pay back later and don't think about it. If we could organize a group of people in their twenties, those are the people whose bills have come due for paying for their education, and they're the ones who I think could have a bigger impact. There are a bunch of issues I think of, and the war is not expressed strongly enough as an issue that has destroyed our budget, distorted our foreign policy, and weakened us in the fight against terrorism. That's one that ought to be emphasized more and does affect young people because you'll be

paying for that war for the rest of your lives, as well as the issues of global warming and energy independence. This is a campaign where the issues are still yet to be defined. I think the most important issues for me are whether the country is making itself safer and helping to build peace in the world or making things more dangerous for our people and everybody else and whether we are building an economy where there is opportunity for people to succeed and that could allow our country to continue providing economic leadership for our people and for the world.

**Barack Obama's Facebook profile has over 250,000 supporters, while Hillary Clinton is a distant second with just over 77,000. While this is admittedly a crude polling device, it is clear that young voters strongly support Obama. Why do you think this is?**

I think Obama is young, or the youngest. I like to think he's young because he's not much older than me. I think it's because he has a new approach, which does, to some extent, look beyond partisanship and more toward an independent view of things. I just think he brings a sort of vitality and energy. I worked for Howard Dean's campaign in 2004, a very different candidate from Obama, but he appealed to a lot of young people as well. The thing, to me, and Governor Dean has remarked on this too, that people like the most is a certain sense of realness, that the candidate is genuine and appears to be standing up for what he believes in. There are going to be exceptions to that, but I think something that young voters and young people do like about Barack Obama is the sense that he's genuine, that he's telling you the truth. But a lot of other people are inspired by Hillary Clinton and her lifelong commitment to the rights of women and families and her serious concern with all the issues and her mastery of the issues, and so I think there are plenty of young people for her as well as for John Edwards and other candidates.

**How would you rate the presidential campaigns in targeting the youth vote?**


Emily Hawkins, who worked for Campus Progress for me until recently, is Hillary Clinton's Youth Outreach Director, so I rate her very highly because she's terrific. Hans Reimer, who worked at Rock the Vote, is directing the effort for Obama, and he's also very good, as are the people for John Edwards as well and people for the other campaigns. They are making more of an effort this time than in the past because they realize that with the election this close, you can say that the youth voters turn out in smaller numbers, but they're growing as a bloc, and anything you can do to find an advantage anywhere could end up affecting the outcome in both the primary and the general election. So I do see them making a much more serious effort. I think efforts that they and other groups like

Rock the Vote are making to get more young people to be a factor in the Iowa caucuses, which have traditionally not been something that young people have participated in, are particularly interesting. I think that can be a really interesting factor come January when people caucus in Iowa.

**You were a speechwriter for Howard Dean during the 2004 campaign. Based on that experience, what advice would you have for the 2008 candidates?**


There were certain things in the Dean campaign that we didn't do well. We didn't anticipate that when Governor Dean said on a Canadian television show that the Midwest caucuses were dominated by special interests it would not resonate well in Iowa. We didn't do well in realizing that when you send people from out-of-state to meet face-to-face with Iowans, they should have a better sense of what people in Iowa are concerned about. There wasn't the connection there that there should have been. I still learned that you can get a lot of attention for a campaign if your candidate really is on a mission, really believes in change, and really talks about his experience coming from outside D.C., and not being wed to the business-as-usual, special interest world of Washington. I think, in the end, people weren't comfortable with Governor Dean as a package, but they would have preferred that outsider candidate. Again and again, you look at who's elected president: it's not the senator from Washington who learns to speak like a senator, it's the governor who has run something and seems to bring newness. The thing that people rejected again and again is Washington, so as much as I love the candidates for president running this time, I do think that both parties ought to think about that historical experience. We've had one sitting senator elected president in a hundred years, and that was John F. Kennedy.

**I'm going to put you on the spot here. Who do you think the nominees from both parties will be, and who do you think will win the general election?**

If I had to predict today, I would predict Hillary Clinton and Rudolph Giuliani and that Giuliani would win the election. But I hope to learn a lot in the next few months, and I think we'll see some surprises. I thought Mitt Romney actually had the better chance than Giuliani, but I changed my mind about that. I do think Obama is the only one who really can give Hillary Clinton a fight and potentially could win. Giuliani's a tough opponent. I used to think Giuliani had no chance, but the more I go to bars and sit on airplanes and meet people, the more I see that people think of him as a tough fighter who will do what's necessary and all that kind of stuff. I think personally he would be a rather divisive figure who wouldn't do well for the country, but I see a lot of reasons that he's gathering strength. 

# The Fluid Republican Race

Looking back on the 2008 primary



By John Fortier

*John Fortier is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and studies politics, the presidency, continuity of government, elections, the electoral college, election reform, and presidential succession and disability. Fortier is the executive director of the Continuity of Government Commission, and is a weekly columnist for The Hill.*

*Editor's Note: This article was written in December 2007.*

The presidential primaries have often had surprising twists and turns and occasionally produced unexpected nominees, but even by historical standards, this year's Republican contest is particularly fluid.

Consider the race as it stands. The frontrunner in the national polls, Rudy Giuliani, holds positions on social issues that are anathema to much of the Republican base. The frontrunner for most of the year in the all-important initial contests in Iowa and New Hampshire, Mitt Romney, polls only fourth nationally. The man who jumped into the race late to fill the perceived need for a conservative champion, Fred Thompson, sees his standing in the national polls slipping and does not lead in any of the early states. Then there is the former frontrunner, John McCain, who is now relegated to running a shoestring campaign but who still has a national presence and strength in New Hampshire. Finally, what looked to be only a four-man race has expanded to five, as Mike Huckabee has caught fire in Iowa, polling first or a close second to Mitt Romney in recent polls and steadily gaining support as the date approaches. And that is just the first tier. Even the second tier has intriguing candidates such as former libertarian and iconoclast Ron Paul and the strong foe of illegal immigration Tom Tancredo.

It is not the size of the field that is so remarkable, but rather the numerous scenarios that could arise in a several week period of primaries in January and February.

Remember that one year ago, John McCain was sitting on top of the world. He seemed to have successfully combined his maverick persona from the 2000 campaign with new support from conservatives, Bush supporters, and evangelicals. Before the 2006 midterm elections, McCain looked like he might face a strong conservative challenge from George Allen or Bill Frist. But the 2006 election loss vanquished Allen, and Frist chose not to run. Mc-

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**“With the race being led first by McCain and then by Giuliani, a consistent theme through the beginning of the year was the need for an authentic conservative candidate.”**

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Cain had also spent the previous six years shoring up his support with the Republican base: he campaigned with Bush and many Republican congressional candidates, he was one of the few positive Republican forces in the campaign of 2006, and he reconciled with Jerry Falwell. McCain also looked like a good bet to beat Hillary Clinton. Matchup polls showed McCain with a lead over Clinton, whose high negatives McCain could exploit. He was not only seen as the strongest Republican candidate, but he also did not look too bad to conservatives, especially by comparison to his rivals. Rudy Giuliani was a social moderate who was unlikely to appeal to the conservative base. Mitt Romney was not well known, and to the extent that he reached the national conversation, the question was about which Romney to expect -- the liberal Massachusetts Republican or the conservative Mormon from Utah. Finally, McCain had assembled an impressive team of fundraisers, campaign operatives and policy advisers. A maverick hero with a compelling story, the best alternative for conservatives, the best organized candidate, and the man who could

beat Hillary Clinton seemed like the obvious choice for Republicans.

But in the first few months of 2007, McCain's formidable armor began to crack. The first and most surprising turn for McCain was President Bush's announcement of his surge strategy. While McCain had supported Bush in a number of ways, he had also been a critic of the Bush Iraq war strategy from the right. McCain had long complained about Rumsfeld's plan for a small footprint in Iraq. McCain was for more boots on the ground. While the war as a whole had become unpopular with the American people, McCain's position had credibility and was politically palatable because McCain implicitly admitted some of the war's failures and as a military hero held out the promise that he would have done it better and might be able to turn it around if put in charge. When Bush announced the surge, McCain was quick to support the President, but it did not help him. Now McCain was tied to an unpopular president on the issue that was his Achilles heel. The maverick, independent McCain was harder to spot. Other Republican candidates also supported the surge and made McCain less distinctive.

McCain also joined President Bush on the issue of immigration, which deeply divides the Republican Party. For this alliance with Bush, McCain paid a double price. Again he was connected too closely to Bush, this time on an issue that irked the conservative base. And he reminded conservatives that he was a maverick and often willing to stick it to Republicans and work with Democrats and independents.

Finally, McCain failed to live up to his frontrunner status in the very conventional playing field of raising money. He hired the best and biggest staff and had a campaign plan to raise and spend substantial amounts of money. But the dollars did not come in. And McCain's new image as the stodgy, establishment frontrunner did not mesh well with the fun-loving, bus-riding, straight-talking outsider from 2000.

As McCain declined in the polls, a funny thing happened: Rudy Giuliani retained his popularity and became the frontrunner by default. Giuliani had always polled well, but many suspected that his high standing was ephemeral. Giuliani had high name recognition and was well regarded for his leadership in New York City after 9/11. The suspicion was that his popularity would drop as he jumped into the race and was subject to criticism and as the Republican base realized that he was not with them on abortion, gun rights, and civil unions. But Giuliani did not lose much in the polls, and he has been left standing as the Republican

frontrunner since the spring of 2007.

Giuliani's social liberalism has been balanced somewhat by two other factors that give him some appeal to conservatives. He is overwhelmingly viewed by Republicans as the candidate most able to beat Hillary Clinton or other Democrats. And he is seen as a tough candidate who is loyal to the Republican Party and who will fight to the end to beat the Democratic nominee. On the issue of party loyalty, he is the flip side of John McCain. John McCain's positions on key social issues are reliably conservative. He is pro-life, supports gun rights, opposes gay marriage, and has been a longtime opponent of earmarks and wasteful spending. Despite these issue positions, conservatives have criticized his loyalty to the Republican Party for his championing of maverick causes such as campaign finance reform and immigration.

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*“Giuliani, on the other hand, fails the conservative litmus test but emphasizes how he fights for the party.”*

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Giuliani, on the other hand, fails the conservative litmus test but emphasizes how he fights for the party. One of his best stump speech themes is that he has fought liberals in the belly of the beast, New York City. He went into the most liberal city in the United States and battled all of the left wing crazies that most conservative primary voters cannot even imagine. His fighter personality serves him in a number of ways. He is seen as the candidate who would fight the criminals, fight the terrorists, and fight the Democrats.

With the race being led first by McCain and then by Giuliani, a consistent theme through the beginning of the year was the need for an authentic conservative candidate. It just did not feel right to many conservatives that the race was dominated by a moderate, a maverick, and a man who wasn't sure if he was a moderate or a conservative. Conservative discontent was also fueled by an overall drop in Republican fortunes. At the end of 2006 and start of 2007, generic polls between Republicans and Democrats did not favor the GOP. When asked to choose between two unnamed candidates of the major parties, poll respondents chose Democrats by ten percentage points or more. While the overall political climate favored Democrats, Republicans could derive some comfort from the fact that their leading candidates led Hillary Clinton and other Democrats in individual matchup polls. The explanation was that through some combination of the electoral strength of McCain and Giuliani and the high negatives and other weaknesses of Hillary Clinton, Republicans would be able to overcome a bad political climate and win the presidency. These hopeful numbers in the matchup polls began to fade in the early spring of 2007. Even Giuliani, who was viewed as the most electable,



*A Pack of Elephants: There is no clear frontrunner in the Republican race, and the top tier is five deep. (Eric Thayer/Getty Images)*

lost to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats in head to head match-up polls (on average, Giuliani lost to Clinton by small margins in most polls).

With no true conservative in the race and the electability of Republicans in doubt, there was a hope for a new, more conservative, more electable candidate to enter the race. Republicans were looking for the ghost of Ronald Reagan to rescue them from their predicament.

Efforts to fill this conservative void came from both inside and outside the campaign. From within the race, Mitt Romney sought to be the conservative alternative. He disavowed a number of the more socially liberal stances he had taken when he ran for office in Massachusetts. He raised the most money in the first quarter of 2007 and has added funds from his substantial personal fortune to his campaign coffers. And he concentrated his efforts in key early states. To emerge as the conservative candidate, he needed to overcome his past moderate record in Massachusetts. He also had to deal with an issue that had not come up before in presidential campaigns: whether Americans would vote for a Mormon for president. While the number of Americans who say that they would not vote for a woman or an African American have over the years dropped to very low levels, significant numbers showed reservations about Mormonism. Especially troublesome for Romney was the prospect some conservative evangelical Christians would look not favorably on his religion even if they agreed with him on key social issues.

While Romney was shoring up his conservative credentials in the race, many were looking for Fred Thompson


to join the race. Thompson was seen as a telegenic conservative who could shake up the race. He would also be the only candidate in the top tier to hail from the South, the core region of the Republican party. Conservatives hoped that Thompson could come into the race and become the immediate alternative to Giuliani. The height of the Thompson fervor was the beginning of 2007, and many anticipated a July 4th entry into the race. But the Thompson campaign dawdled, postponing his announcement. In the meantime, he was hit by negative stories questioning his conservative credentials, reveal-

ing his lobbying activities, and reporting the disarray on his campaign staff. When he finally announced his candidacy in September, he did enjoy some initial success in the polls. He polled ahead of McCain and Romney but clearly behind Giuliani. But since his entry, his fortunes have declined. He is regularly panned by Washington and campaign insiders as a bad candidate, who either does not have the fire in his belly to win or has a poorly run, disorganized campaign. Thompson's national poll numbers still show him ahead of McCain and Romney, but they have dropped. Even more troubling is Thompson's seeming inability to compete in early states: he is far back in Iowa and New Hampshire and even trails in South Carolina, in the region he was supposed to dominate.

The fifth candidate who now has to be considered in the top tier is Mike Huckabee. He has been in the race from the beginning but was not taken very seriously until recently. His genuine, everyman persona, his ability to speak to evangelical Christians, and his debate performances have raised his profile in the race. By the summer, all of the other candidates were talking about how much they liked Huckabee and pundits speculated that he would make a good vice presidential nominee. He would make an especially good pair with Giuliani, who needs someone with conservative credentials to balance his moderate Republicanism. But what has vaulted Huckabee into the top tier is his rise in the polls in Iowa. Without the campaign funds of his rivals, he rose to second place in the Iowa polls, and recently has vaulted into first.

Even with all of these candidates, there are a couple of simple storylines for how the campaign might play out. In a nutshell, Giuliani is the frontrunner, and he can win as long as the conservative vote does not unite around one of his opponents.

Romney and Thompson have for some time been the two candidates who might be able to fill that conservative role. If one triumphs over the other, then there might be a consensus conservative candidate who can beat Giuliani. Over the summer, the hopes of conservatives were pinned on Thompson, but this fall the more likely uniter of the conservatives is Romney. Some of Romney's success comes from Thompson's lackluster campaign, but he also has the funds to compete and could win Iowa and New Hampshire. If he were to win clear victories in Iowa and New Hampshire, he would likely effectively kill Fred Thompson's campaign.



He would also put Giuliani on the defensive because he would be the clear consensus conservative choice. Giuliani, recognizing this possibility, is scrambling to get a win or at least score a close second place in New Hampshire, so that he can stay viable until early February when he can compete in states more favorable to him.

But this simple narrative is complicated by a few new wrinkles in the campaign. Romney's strength in Iowa has been strong and building for months. He has spent time and money in the state, built a top notch organization and run many ads. The rise of Mike Huckabee is, however, a great threat to Romney. If Huckabee wins Iowa or even finishes a close second to Romney, he will step on Romney's headline. He will derail Romney's case for being the conservative alternative to Giuliani. Giuliani will gladly accept this result as it will maintain the status quo with Giuliani in the lead and no strong conservative to beat him.

Also consider the role of John McCain. McCain is far from his days as the front runner in the race. But after his fall, he reorganized his campaign, emphasized his frugality and has tried to reclaim his maverick status. McCain is still an authentic hero, who can speak directly from his incredible life on matters of national security. While overall public opinion is still deeply skeptical about the war in Iraq, there is no doubt that Bush's surge has had strong positive effects in Iraq. McCain speaks compellingly about the surge, its importance, and the sacrifice that is sometimes needed in protecting our nation. His defense of the surge is one that is hard to impeach given the great personal sacrifice that McCain made for his nation.


McCain still sits in third or fourth place in national polls

*A Surge to the Top: If there is momentum in the race at this point, according to Fortier, it is with Huckabee. (Eric Thayer/Getty Images)*

and third in New Hampshire, but he trails Giuliani by only a hair in the Granite State. If McCain is able to beat out Giuliani in New Hampshire, he can make the case that he is the less conservative alternative to Romney.

To add to all of these scenarios, Ron Paul has a committed band of supporters and the potential for a libertarian appeal in New Hampshire, not to win, but to take away votes from others. Also, Paul or Tancredo or some anti-immigration or religious right candidate might choose to run as a third party candidate down the line, especially if the moderate Giuliani gets the nomination.


The final, less than likely, but still possible scenario is that the early primaries are so muddled that no one gets a clear majority. A large majority of delegates are selected on February 5th. If we see Huckabee winning in Iowa, Romney in New Hampshire, Thompson in South Carolina, and Giuliani in Nevada and Florida, then it is likely that there will be only a plurality winner on February 5th and that no one will get an outright majority of delegates. That situation could be resolved by some deal among the candidates before the convention, or in the extreme case, we might go to the St. Paul and have to decide the nomination on the floor of the convention.

The central storyline that either Giuliani or a conservative alternative such as Romney will win the race still has some truth to it, but the possibilities for twists and turns in the Republican nomination are endless. 



# First in the South

An interview with Joe Erwin



Conducted by Matthew Ellison

*Joe Erwin served as Chairman of the South Carolina Democratic Party from 2003 to 2007 and is considering a run for governor in 2010. He is the founder of Erwin-Penland Advertising, one of the largest marketing firms in the Southeast. After this interview was conducted, he announced his support for Barack Obama's presidential campaign.*

**As the first primary in the South, South Carolina has a clearly disproportionate influence on who the nominees of both parties will be. What about South Carolina should allow it to have this privilege?**

Several factors. Number one is we offer a much more representative demographic profile of America than Iowa or New Hampshire. When the candidates come to South Carolina, they'll be in front of an audience that on the Democratic primary side will be about 50% African-American; the state population is about 30% African-American. So that's one thing, just demographics. If you look at some of the other factors, South Carolina has three very distinct regions. You've got a very fast-growing successful urban corridor in Greenville/Spartanburg, home of modern manufacturing, low unemployment, and one of the healthiest, most robust economies in the country. Down along the coast, you've got high-end retirement communities with a lot of migration of people down from Rust Belt states that are really changing that part of South Carolina in a different way. In the Midlands, you've got the University of South Carolina, the largest institution in the state, and a large military presence throughout the Midlands at Fort Jackson and in Sumter. So you've got these different areas within a very small state that challenge the candidates to speak to a wide range of issues and not just one or two because they're less homogenous than the populations of the other early states. You've also

got in what is now the infamous I-95 corridor, often called now the Corridor of Shame, this significant band of poverty in rural areas that have lost so many jobs to China and other foreign countries, particularly in Asia, in manufacturing and textiles. The economy is so challenged there that candidates are going to be asked completely different questions than they would be asked in a place where the economy is so healthy like up here in the Greenville/Spartanburg corridor. It's those reasons that make South Carolina more represent-

ative of the totality of the range of people, experiences, challenges throughout America. That's why South Carolina is relevant and a harbinger of what the candidates will face around the country.

**South Carolina's governor, two senators, and all but one statewide officeholder are Republicans. What, if anything, can South Carolina Democrats do to win statewide?**

Recruit great candidates. Over time, know that things change. We've seen nationally that conditions change, momentum swings. We are already starting to see the pendulum perhaps beginning to swing back

toward voters in this state being open-minded to Democrats. It's been a long trend of growth for the Republican Party here, and I congratulate the Republicans here. They started small more than a quarter-century ago to build a party that was organized, focused on recruiting, raising money, and winning elections. Now, as Democrats, number one, we

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***“If I see that I can make a difference through leadership, through bringing the parties together and solving problems or creating great opportunities for South Carolina, then I may make a run.”***


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have to believe we can win. And if you believe you can win, you've got to put your best foot forward with outstanding candidates who can appeal to a wide range of voters, specifically in that middle ground, people that are not so much lined up with one party or the other. For example, as much as Republicans have done so well and have dominated many elections on the statewide level, here's a point to consider: if you talk to any political scientist or you just look at the numbers of primary voters, what you find is that about 25 percent

of voters in this state will say that they're Democrats. If you ask how many of them would identify themselves as Republican voters, the number is probably 35 percent. So that's a big differential, and it's tough to make up; when you put that "D" beside your name, you're minus ten.

But here's the reason for hope: that means there's 40 percent of people in this state who don't identify themselves as being a member or activist of either party, so if we have messages that can reach out to those people who are not about politics but are concerned about government that works for them or about government that's not too big, then we have a chance to win. And we're starting to see that in races around the state, and I'm optimistic that we'll have more and more Democrats getting elected to office, and not just for the sake of Democrats winning; that's not important. What I think is important—and the reason I served as chair of the state Democratic Party for four years (two terms) during some pretty tough times, most people would say, being very much an underdog—is that we need to raise the debate. If one party dominates everything for too long, we don't get good government. There is a truism, and it's an old quote: "Absolute power corrupts absolutely." And when one party, either one, has too much power, it's not good for voters, it's not good for taxpayers, it's not good for kids, it's not good for anybody. So what we've worked at as Democrats is to raise the level of debate, to become more competitive. It's not an overnight process, but we're making headway, and voters are starting to pay attention.

**How would you rate Howard Dean's tenure as Chairman**



*Marching in Lockstep? President Bush, shown here speaking at Fort Jackson in Columbia, South Carolina, carried the state easily in 2000 and 2004. (Paul J. Richards/AFP/Getty Images)*

#### **of the Democratic National Committee (DNC)?**

I think Howard's done a terrific job. What I appreciate about Howard is that rather than invest all of the DNC capital in political consultants—and that's often where the DNC resources have gone: inside-the-beltway political consultants—Howard has been more about growing the party around the country at the local level, in neighborhoods. His 50-State Strategy of using money raised by the DNC to put field staff in each and every state party organization has been very helpful in South Carolina, giving us people on the ground, political operatives, mainly young, who would go out and do that toiling, that day-to-day work of reaching out to voters and taking the party to the people. I give Howard a lot of credit for that, and I think it's going to pay dividends for years to come.

**Some people worry that a relatively liberal presidential nominee will hurt Democrats on the rest of the ballot in states like South Carolina. Of Barack Obama's impact on down ballot races, South Carolina State Senator Robert Ford, himself an African-American, said, "Every Democrat running on that ticket next year would lose - because he's black and he's top of the ticket. We'd lose the House and the Senate and the governors and everything." Of Hillary Clinton, who**

**Ford endorsed, and her impact on down ballot races, Indiana Democratic State Rep. Dave Crooks said, "She would be a drag." Do you worry that if one of these two is the presidential nominee it would be harder for other Democrats to win in South Carolina in 2008?**

That's hard to predict. Robert's a friend of mine, but I don't agree with his statements at all, and with regard to Hillary, I think either one of those two or anybody on the Democratic side is going to get a great look from voters across America who are just ready for change and ready for somebody who has proven leadership skills and has demonstrated that he or she can work well with other members of the Senate or people in the other party, whether they're Republicans or Democrats.


Those two examples, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, are two people that we have seen, who have offered proof positive that they are capable of reaching out and building coalitions and not building walls, which has been the problem I think that a lot of people have found with the Bush Administration, whether it's the president himself or some of the people in his administration. To the specifics of your question, I think it is fair to say that in some places, whether it's Hillary or whether it's Barack, where they're not as well known, not as much appreciated, it may make it harder for us to win local races with one of them as the nominee. For example, we saw in the last cycle when John Edwards, a South Carolina native, was on the ballot and actually won the South Carolina Democratic primary, he brought with him a whole new wave of excitement in South Carolina among Democrats and Independents—and this is the important thing: Independents voted in record numbers in the Democratic primary because they were attracted to what they saw as this fairly moderate, charismatic candidate who was one of their own. In Hillary, we've got somebody who is not from the South, who's originally from Chicago, and is tied to some of the perceived baggage of the Clinton Administration, and so yes, you're going to hear some people talk about how that makes it tough. But you know, to me, that's excuse-making. Whoever the nominee is, there will be opportunities for South Carolina Democrats to work well with the national party, with the nominee, and be successful because ultimately, if we have a Democrat in the White House, then there are more and more opportunities for party-building at the state level. We need not fear one of our own being elected; we need to embrace one of our own being elected.

**Will we see you on a statewide ballot in the future?**

I don't know. I've made it clear that I'll consider elective office. I've never offered before. But my years as party chair opened my eyes to a range of opportunities, and also, frankly, problems that I'm now more acutely aware of

around the state. I have a great passion for service. I think it's a very high calling; I was raised that way. My mom and my dad, before he died when I was a young boy, taught me to believe that public service is a very, very high calling, so I've never forgotten those lessons, and now that I've had a very successful business career, it has allowed me to consider that I could offer for elective office, and I may do it. I'm going to look at a possible gubernatorial bid for 2010, and I'm starting some of the early work to assess whether or not it might be appropriate for me to run for that. That decision comes sometime within the next year. I'm not one of those people who has to have that for ego. I know a lot of people, and I've been around a lot of politicians all my life, and I love so many of them, and some of them frustrate me, but I don't have to have it for ego, it doesn't define me. But what my final assessment will be is if I see that I can make a difference through leadership, through bringing the parties together and solving problems or creating great opportunities for South Carolina, then I may make a run.

**I'm going to put you on the spot. Who do you think will win the South Carolina Democratic primary, and who do you think the nominee will be?**

I'm not going to answer. Sorry. I don't have a crystal ball. You read these polls, you've got to be very careful. I'm almost amused when I hear pundits say right now, you know, this candidate's got a 12-point lead, so it looks like he or she is going to win in Iowa or New Hampshire or South Carolina or anywhere else. You look at history, especially in Iowa and New Hampshire, those polls can flip in 48 hours. I think even though we're starting to be in the countdown of weeks, not months, to these early primaries, we still have to be cognizant of the fact that momentum is a very powerful part of politics. Any candidate who starts building momentum over the next several weeks can come from second or third and win an early state or two, and if you win one early state or two, then that bounce in momentum that we've seen can create trajectory that can carry you to the nomination. Or, conversely, if you unexpectedly lose and have negative momentum, you can go from being the runaway favorite to yesterday's news. So I don't know who's going to win. I think the campaigns are all doing some good work, they're using a lot of new strategies beyond just television and retail door-to-door politics. We're seeing great use of YouTube and the Internet in ways that will change campaigns. We're seeing campaigns in South Carolina with field forces the size of which I've never seen before in Barack Obama's case. We don't know how much of a difference those things may make down the home stretch. I think perhaps they can be very significant. You can try and put me on the spot, but I'll just plead blissful ignorance and say let's just wait and see what happens. 

# Gender & Politics

## *Underrepresentation and its Discontents*



**By Frances Rosenbluth**

*Frances Rosenbluth, a professor of Political Science at Yale, is a comparative political economist with a special interest in Japan. Her current work focuses on the electoral microfoundations of different forms of capitalism, and on the politics of gender inequality.*

Females are strikingly underrepresented in the world's legislatures, though the variation among rich democracies is enormous, ranging from 9% in Japan and 14% in the U.S. at the low end, to near parity in Sweden at the high end. If politicians' accountability to voters were perfect, female political representation would not matter, since politicians would aim to construct and implement policies that the electorate favors. Political accountability aside, the fact that female representation is substantially below parity is enough to raise suspicions that competition is not on an even playing field.

This article addresses three related questions: Why are women underrepresented in most countries? What accounts for the vast difference in female representation across countries? Finally, what difference does female political representation make to policies that women care about?

### **Why Are Women Underrepresented Almost Everywhere?**

In democracies around the world, women turn out in elections in numbers comparable to or only slightly lower than those of men. There is some evidence that female interest in politics is dampened by the scarcity of women in positions of political leadership with whom they can relate.<sup>1</sup> So this suggests a vicious cycle, but it doesn't explain why females are not elected to office in the first place. Is it a demand-side problem, in which there is lower voter demand for female candidates, or a supply-side one in which females are not running for office?

The answer is not as simple as one might think. There is

evidence from the U.S. and U.K., for example, that women who run for office in contested elections—that is, where there is not a powerful incumbent protecting his home turf—get roughly the same proportion of votes as male candidates.<sup>2</sup> So gender discrimination does not seem to capture the whole story. Kenworthy and Malami have argued that there is a supply-side bottleneck in the sense that relevant political experience is managerial and professional work, and everywhere in the world there are fewer women than men in these sorts of jobs.<sup>3</sup> While Kenworthy and Malami's data provide compelling

evidence of a supply side effect, the broad-strokes picture leaves some jarring anomalies, including the U.S. case. There are more professional women—by which they mean lawyers, educators, journalists, and business professionals—in the U.S. than in any other country in the world. And yet, female political representation in the U.S. is notoriously low. To get at this simple question of generalized female underrepresentation, it will be helpful to see what accounts for the variation across countries.

### **What Accounts for Cross-National Variation?**

The scholarly consensus is that electoral rules matter for female representation, and that specifically, proportional representation (PR) systems are friendlier to successful female candidacy than district systems. (Proportional representation refers to electoral rules—typical in European countries—in which voters choose among party lists, and parties get legislative seats in proportion to their votes. In single-member-district systems such as the U.S. and the U.K., the candidate with

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**“All else equal, female representation is higher in countries where electoral competition is between parties rather than between individuals.”**

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Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) (right) and Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) (left) walk with First Lady Laura Bush. Only 16 of the 100 U.S. Senators are women. (Getty Images)

contested on a common party platform, as in PR systems, the reputation of the party and the strength of its platform take on greater importance than the popularity or pledges of the individual candidate. Seniority, and other ways to access money, are less valuable assets in strong party systems than in systems where politicians must ensure a personal following that extends beyond partisan loyalties. This may go a long way in explaining why female political representation in the U.S. is lower than theories based on voter demand or candidate supply would suggest. All else equal, female representation is higher in countries where elec-

toral competition is between parties rather than between individuals.

the most votes wins the seat.) In Japan, for example, 6.3% of the parliamentarians elected from single member districts are females, compared to 13.3% elected from party lists on proportional representation ballots. Though 13.3% is still low by world standards, it is double the district line up returned by the same voters in the same election. Clearly, cultural preferences leave substantial variation unexplained.

### What Difference Does Female Political Representation Make for Policy Outcomes?

A first cut statistical analysis of the relationship between female political representation and things many women care about, such as equal access to work opportunities, in fact shows no connection. With the exception of Scandinavia, to which we will return, women score higher on female labor force participation rates, proportion of women in professional careers, and gender wage parity in the very district-based political systems in which female political representation is stunted. What accounts for this paradox?

Exactly how proportional representation rules help the cause of female candidates is only dimly understood, but the reason seems to be something like this. The demand for female representation is powerfully shaped by how effective political party leaders and voters expect female candidates will act. Even in the absence of discriminatory social norms, electoral systems that place a premium on seniority, career continuity, and individual clout hurt the electoral chances of female candidates in a way that centralized party systems do not. Why females do more poorly in district systems than in PR systems is related to a phenomenon economists Jacob Mincer and Solomon Polachek noticed in labor markets: when labor productivity rests on skills that are acquired through long-term skill acquisition, workers who interrupt their careers (such as for child rearing or other family work) are less valuable to their employers.<sup>4</sup> The implication of their work is that the actuarial difference in leave rates taken by females compared to males can generate "statistical discrimination" where otherwise negative stereotypes did not exist.


The answer runs through the same labor market logic that helped to explain why seniority hurts female candidates in single member district systems. In European PR systems, labor is relatively well protected because labor parties are recurring players in coalition governments. (In single-member district systems, labor is never a majority by itself so its interests are compromised with other voters' interests in search of an electoral majority.) Employers in PR systems therefore invest in employees' skills acquisition to make the best of politically-mandated long tenure. As long as women are relatively more likely than men to interrupt their careers to raise children or take care of the elderly, females are a poor employment investment. The paradox of European welfare states, at least for women, is that jobs are more secure but women are not wanted for those jobs. As a result, female labor force participation rates, female wages, and female advancement tend to be lower in welfare states than in Anglo-American *laissez-faire*

Where party leadership is centralized and elections are

economies where men and women are of equal investment value because no one is expected to stay working for long.<sup>5</sup> The exception is Scandinavian states, where women do poorly in the private sector but are hired in large numbers by the public sector where their extra cost—including the famously generous parental leave—is covered by taxpayers.

### Conclusions

Women voters, particularly working women, have distinct interests from men because, as default caregivers, women have to worry about balancing the demands of family and career in ways that rarely concern men. The “gender voting gap,” or the degree to which females vote to the left of males, has grown in tandem with female labor force participation, doubtless because females value the services and socialization of family work provided by parties on the left.<sup>6</sup> In single-member district systems such as the U.S., the gender voting gap exists but has not translated into high levels of female political representation because women achieve many of their goals directly in the labor market. Women in PR systems have greater difficulty accessing the labor market but are more successful, thanks to centralized parties, in getting females elected. It remains to be seen if female representatives in PR systems can effectively tackle the labor market obstacles that confront women there. And while working women in single member district systems may enjoy relatively equal labor market access, intra-gender wage inequality is a large cost borne by women at the bottom of the income distribution.

The bottom line for the presidential election of 2008: Hillary can win. She has built an enormous store of political capital, and American voters are not as anti-female as the numbers suggest. But don't count on many women to replicate her success. Politics will not become as much a woman's job as a man's until changing diapers becomes as much a man's job as a woman's. 

<sup>1</sup> Kay Lehman Schlozman, Nancy Burns, and Sidney Verba. 1999. “What Happened at Work Today? A Multistage Model of Gender, Employment, and Political Participation,” *Journal of Politics* 61, 1: 29-53.

<sup>2</sup> Eric Smith and Richard Fox. 2001. “The Electoral Fortunes of Female Candidates for Congress,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 54, 1: 201-225 and Fiona MacKay. 2004. “Gender and Political Representation in the UK: The State of the Discipline,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6, 1: 101-122.

<sup>3</sup> Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami. 1999. “Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis,” *Social Forces* 78:235-68.

<sup>4</sup> Jacob Mincer. 1958. “Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution,” *Journal of Political Economy* 66, 4: 281-302 and Solomon Polachek. 1981. “Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in Occupational Structure,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 63, 1: 60-69.

<sup>5</sup> Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2001. “social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State,” in *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, ed., Peter Hall and David Soskice. Oxford: Oxford University Press and Iversen, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. “The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross National Variation in Household Bargaining and the Gender Voting Gap,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, 1: 1-19.

<sup>6</sup> Justin Wolfers. 2001. “Comment on Edlund and Pande,” Paper presented at the Wallis Conference on Political Economy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, September 29.

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
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# Iraqi Resettlement

## Why Congress Will Act



By David A. Weinberg

*David A. Weinberg is pursuing his doctorate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is an affiliate of the Institute's Security Studies Program. He previously served as a Democratic Professional Staff Member for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, chaired by Representative Tom Lantos. This piece was previously published in the November edition of the University of Denver's Human Rights and Human Welfare in response to the October edition of the Roundtable on Iraqi refugees in the same publication.*

I would like to commend Human Rights and Human Welfare for their recent roundtable on the Iraqi refugee crisis. The roundtable rightly draws attention to the United States government's woefully inadequate efforts thus far to address a major humanitarian crisis of its own making.

However, I do not agree with Professor Daniel Whelan's assessment of "why Congress won't act" on Iraqi resettlement. Dr. Whelan argues that the new Congress appears reluctant to resettle a reasonable number of Iraqi refugees in danger because Democrats fear that doing so would precipitate Iraqi state failure by means of "brain drain." Instead, I would argue that Congress has been slow to act because of mitigating institutional and political factors.

Anecdotally, it is worth noting that I have met the brave Iraqi journalist Nour al-Khal and her remarkable American patron Lisa Ramaci-Vincent mentioned in the article by Joseph Huff-Hannon to which the HRHW Roundtable was responding. When Ms. al-Khal was finally admitted to the United States soon after the article was published, the two of them spoke at a Congressional staff briefing, which I organized while working as a foreign policy staffer on Capitol Hill this past year.

This incident is illustrative of a broader point—the reason Congress has yet to act on the Iraqi refugee crisis is not out of some illusion that by plugging Iraq's "brain drain" the country can somehow be packed back together.

Indeed, there is a growing understanding on Capitol Hill of the dire urgency and humanitarian import of the Iraqi refugee crisis, and many Democratic members of Congress ran their campaigns in 2006 on the premise that the battle for a stable Iraq has already been lost.

Rather, the immediate challenge has been a matter of workload. When the Democrats assumed control of Congress at the start of 2007, all energy in the field of foreign

policy was focused on trying to convince the President to change his overall Iraq strategy. Additionally, a panoply of other foreign policy issues, such as the Iranian nuclear question, made pressing demands on the remaining time and attention of the Democratic leadership. Thus, even though the new Congress was from its start more ideologically responsive to addressing the Iraqi refugee crisis than the Republican-dominated one that preceded it, it took until midway through the year before Iraqi refugee issues began to be addressed in earnest.

Those observing Congress finally witnessed a flurry of activity in May and June as Representative Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), Representative

Gary Ackerman (D-NY), and Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) all introduced comprehensive Iraq refugee bills within a matter of weeks (Professor Susan Waltz briefly cited Kennedy's Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act in her Roundtable contribution). Consequently, Senator Kennedy succeeded in tacking a modified version of his proposal as an amendment onto the Defense Authorization Act that passed the

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**“While it is regretful that Congressional wheels may at times turn slowly, it is not unreasonable to expect ground-breaking legislation to assist and resettle Iraqi refugees before the year’s end.”**

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Senate on the October 1. This means that the Kennedy program will be debated when the House and Senate go to conference to reconcile their versions of the Authorization Act, after which the conference's final document will go to the House and Senate floors for a quick up-or-down vote. It is also worth noting that the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), was somewhat ahead of this curve, calling for the assistance and resettlement of Iraqi refugees in a segment of his Iraq Reconstruction Improvement Act introduced in late March.



*A moving problem: These Iraqis are returning to their homes from exile in Damascus, but many Iraqis remain refugees in other Middle Eastern countries. Weinberg calls for Congress to address humanitarian concerns involving Iraqi refugees. (Getty Images)*


The Kennedy proposal is by no means perfect. The senator was compelled to drop a number of important provisions from the bill, including scaling down the number of special immigrant visas from 15,000 per year—as Rep. Blumenauer had called for—to 5,000 and dropping a waiver provision on “material support” so that his Republican counterparts would agree not to obstruct his bill at the committee level.

However, the bill remains an enormous step forward from current U.S. policy on Iraqi refugees. As is, the Kennedy amendment would open to Iraqis the “priority two” category for humanitarian refugees under threat for their association with the United States; it would also make those Iraqis who have loyally served the Coalition effort either in the direct employ of the U.S. or through an affiliated contractor eligible for the special immigrant visas mentioned above. Finally, it would instruct the federal government to set up in-country refugee processing facilities to allow Iraqis under imminent threat to immediately seek asylum straight from Iraq instead of risking life-and-limb to get to Jordan in hopes of being processed there.

There are a number of other potential measures that policymakers would do well to consider. For example, the bill could grant Iraqis temporary protected status, which would prevent those already in the United States who have overstayed their visas from being forcibly deported to a war

zone. The NGO community would be very happy to see the material support provisions put back into Kennedy's bill and his lesser requirement of 5,000 special immigrant visas back up to 15,000.


The bill could also call for the Administration to submit a comprehensive diplomatic strategy to address the crisis, including negotiating memoranda of understanding with host countries to leverage U.S. assistance into guarantees that they will treat refugees in accordance with established international standards of human rights. Such a strategy could also entail soliciting matching donations from European countries and oil-rich Gulf states, which thus far have largely opted-out of this crisis on the mistaken premise that the displacement of millions of Iraqis from their homes is somehow the United States' problem alone.

While it is regretful that Congressional wheels may at times turn slowly, it is not unreasonable to expect groundbreaking legislation to assist and resettle Iraqi refugees before the year's end. Then all eyes will be on the executive branch and the international community, in hopes that they match the dire nature of this crisis with the humanitarian response that is required. It is already too late for many unfortunate Iraqis; let us not sit idly on our hands while others perish. 



# Reconsidering America's Interest

An interview with John Mearsheimer



Conducted by Christopher Gombeski

*John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. Professor Mearsheimer has written extensively about security issues and international politics more generally. His recent books include *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* and *The Israel Lobby*, co-authored by Stephen Walt.*

Your latest book *The Israel Lobby* delves into a very controversial subject: the United States' relationship with Israel. You wrote in the book that your purpose in writing it was "to foster a more clear-eyed and candid discussion of this subject." Do you think that has happened since its publication?

No. For sure, there has been more critical discussion of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and the Israel Lobby's role in the formulation of U.S. Middle East policy since the article was published. But I don't think there has been a substantial increase in quality of the discussion. Much of it has been highly emotional and not terribly useful. What is necessary is for more Americans to be able to argue—without being personally attacked—that U.S. policy toward Israel is flawed and that it's not in the American national interest nor Israel's interest. Once that happens, then we can say that we are having an open and serious debate.

Steve Walt and I wrote the book because we thought as more people became aware of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and its consequences, they would put pressure on policymakers and elected politicians to change that policy and make it smarter and more in the American national interest. In other words, our hope was that if we could just get people talking critically about Israeli policy, the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and the role of the Lobby, it would become apparent that one of the principal reasons the United States is in so much trouble in the Middle East is because of the power of the Lobby. Of course, that is why the Lobby has gone to such lengths to marginalize us and discourage people from reading our book.

How would you characterize the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel?

The "special relationship" has two aspects. First of all, the United States gives Israel a huge amount of economic and military aid, defends it diplomatically in the United Nations, and comes to its aid during crises and wars. Second, we give that aid unconditionally. No matter what Israel does, it continues to get American aid and diplomatic support. In other words, even if Israel

does things that are against American policy, like building settlements in the occupied territories, the aid continues to flow largely unabated. Consider that it's been official U.S. policy since 1967 to oppose settlement-building in the occupied territories. Yet no president has been able to cut American aid to Israel in any meaningful way, even though Israel has built settlements over that 40-year time span.

Why has Israel now become, as you term it, a "strategic liability" for the United States?

You can make the argument that Israel was a strategic asset during the Cold War because it played a role in defeating Soviet client states like Egypt and Syria. But with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, it's very difficult to argue that Israel is a strategic asset. Indeed, it appears that Israel is now a strategic liability, in large part because its policies in the occupied territories are helping fuel America's terrorism problem. It is clear from the work of the 9/11 Commission that one of the main reasons—but not the only reason—Osama bin Laden attacked the United States was

***“It appears that Israel is now a strategic liability, in large part because its policies in the occupied territories are helping fuel America's terrorism problem.”***

because of America's support of Israel's brutal policies against the Palestinians. It is also worth noting that the 9/11 Commission reported that Khalid Sheik Muhammed, who it describes as the principal architect of the attacks, was motivated by his "violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel."

**What precisely is the "Israel Lobby," and who forms a part of it?**

The Israel Lobby is a loose coalition of individuals and groups that works actively and openly to push U.S. Middle East policy in a pro-Israel direction. We go to great lengths to emphasize that it is not a cabal or a conspiracy. The Lobby is an interest group, like other interest groups in the United States such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), the farm lobby, the Cuban lobby, and the American Association of Retired People (AARP), just to name a few. The Israel Lobby is an interest group that is operating in a rich American tradition. We also emphasize that it is wrong to call it the Jewish Lobby, because not all Jews are part of the lobby, and there are non-Jews in it. Let me unpack this a bit more. It is quite clear from surveys of the American Jewish community that about one-third of American Jews do not feel any meaningful attachment to Israel, and thus could hardly be considered a part of the lobby. Furthermore, non-Jewish groups like the Christian Zionists belong to the lobby. And, although we consider the neoconservatives to be part of the lobby, a number of them are not Jewish. John Bolton and James Woolsey are two prominent examples.

**Journalist Michael Massing argued in an article for the *American Prospect* that though lobbying groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Presidents Conference "have kept the United States from taking steps that many believe are essential if peace is ever to come to the region," he nevertheless believes that even without the Lobby's influence, American support of Israel would continue unimpeded because of clear ideological and moral reasons. What is your assessment of this quote?**

Steve Walt and I believe that the United States should be committed for moral reasons to the survival of Israel and should come to its aid if its survival is threatened. We believe that commitment would exist in the absence of the lobby, so that is not a terribly controversial issue. The key question is whether the special relationship would exist in the absence of the lobby. In other words, is there a powerful moral imperative for existing U.S. policy toward Israel that enjoys overwhelming support among the American people? We argue that there is not and that there is also no strategic rationale that can explain U.S. policy. The influence of the lobby explains in large part why the United States has a special relationship with Israel.

**You noted that America had a sound, strategic rationale to support Israel in the past, especially during the Cold War when America provided Israel with economic, diplomatic, and military aid in order to contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Since then, you argue that America has continued to treat Israel as a nation of strategic importance when it is in actuality no longer so important to America's strategic interests. How could the Israel lobby have become powerful enough to influence America's foreign policy in this way?**

Interest group politics has been at the heart of the American political system since this country's founding, and there have always been powerful interest groups that punch above their weight. It is clear that lobbies or interest groups that are well-organized, well-funded, dedicated to a particular policy, and work feverishly to promote that policy can influence the American policy-making process in profound ways. Just look at the NRA. If you were to query the American public, you would find much support for having serious gun control legislation. But we do little to control guns in this country, in large part because of the power of the NRA, which is a relatively small interest group. Steve Walt and I think that the policies the NRA promotes are not in the American national interest, and that it would be good for the country if we had stronger gun-control laws. None of this is to say that the NRA is acting in illegitimate ways, because it is not.

The Israel Lobby is a similar case. As with the NRA, a relatively small number of individuals and groups acting in legitimate ways are able to influence policy in ways that we believe are not in the American national interest. All of this points out that in the American political system small interest groups can have a profound influence on the policy-making process. There is nothing illegitimate or unlawful with such behavior; it is simply how American politics works. In essence, the Israel Lobby is a good, old-fashioned interest group operating in a rich American tradition. There is, however, one form of behavior that some groups in the lobby engage in that is antithetical to the way we are supposed to do business in the United States and that is the frequently used tactics of smearing critics of the U.S.-Israel relationship and trying to prevent them from voicing their views.

Let me say a few more words about why I think that the policies the Lobby promotes are neither in America's nor Israel's national interest. As I noted, Israel's building of settlements in the occupied territories since 1967 has not been good for the United States, because it helps fuel our terrorism problem. But colonizing the West Bank is not in Israel's long-term interest either. By continuing to build settlements, Israel is rapidly reaching the point where it will be impossible to create a viable Palestinian state. Instead, there is going to be a "Greater Israel," which means that Israel will end up controlling the West Bank and Gaza and the millions of Palestinians who live there. They will be confined to a few isolated enclaves and treated harshly by Israel. "Greater Israel" will effectively be an apartheid state,



*An Israeli flag flies above the Israeli settlement Ariel in the West Bank. It has long been "official US policy since 1967 to oppose settlement-building in the occupied territories." (Uriel Sinai/Getty Images)*

which is certainly not in Israel's interest. Israel would be much better off today if the United States had long ago put pressure on it to stop building settlements and allowed for the creation of a real Palestinian state. But that did not happen because the Lobby has long made it impossible for any U.S. president to put meaningful pressure on Israel to stop colonizing the occupied territories.

**Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in the *New York Times* in September that "the two most critical issues to Israel and the lobby—arms sales to Arab states and the question of a Palestinian state—[are] matters on which the American position has consistently run counter" to the preferred policies of the Israel lobby. Are these areas where the Lobby has consistently failed to get its way?**

For starters, we do not argue that the Lobby is all-powerful. We acknowledge that the Lobby occasionally loses a fight in Washington, but not often and less and less over time. Nevertheless, Gelb is wrong in both cases. With regard to a Palestinian state, there are groups and individuals in the Lobby who favor a two-state solution, but there are also groups opposed. The key point, however, is that Israel is unwilling to give the Palestinians a viable state, and the differences within the Lobby on this issue notwithstanding, it backs Israel. In contrast to the position of Israel and the Lobby, both the Clinton and the Bush administrations have been committed to creating a viable Palestinian state.

In practice, however, neither administration has been able to put pressure on Israel to achieve that goal, mainly because of the Lobby. In essence, America's preferred policy on a Palestinian state has been trumped by the Lobby's preferred policy.

However, Israel and the Lobby did oppose two previous arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The latter case, which involved the sale of Advanced Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to the Saudis, is the more famous of the two. The deal went through Congress, despite huge opposition from the Lobby, which illustrates my point that the Lobby is not all-powerful. But there are two key points about this case, which we talk about in the book, that should be kept in mind. First, the Reagan administration made a Herculean effort and barely won. Second, no administration since then has tried to sell arms to Saudi Arabia in the face of Israeli opposition because they all understood that it would be almost impossible to get that agreement through Congress. The reason that President Bush is now able to sell arms to the Saudis is because Israel supports that decision, and, therefore, the Lobby will ultimately go along with the sale.

**You and Professor Walt find no compelling moral or strategic reason for American's "special relationship" with Israel to persist unaltered, and you attribute the fact that the relationship has remained unchanged to the influence of the Israel Lobby. Do officials within the administration and in Congress still find the arguments for Israel's strategic importance to be persuasive?**

To be clear, Steve Walt and I are not arguing that the United States should abandon Israel. Instead, we maintain that the United States should abandon its "special relationship" with Israel and treat it as a normal country. We should treat Israel the way we treat other democracies, like Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and India. That is to say, when Israel acts in ways that are consistent with the American national interest, Washington should support it. But when Israel pursues policies that are not consistent with US interests, we should distance ourselves from Israel and use our considerable leverage to get it to change its behavior, the way we would try to change the behavior of any country we thought was acting in ways that were harmful to our interests.

Turning to your question, I am sure that there are a good number of people in Congress who believe there is a compelling moral or strategic basis for the "special relationship." I am also sure that there are many people on Capitol Hill who do not believe that there is a sound rationale for the "special relationship," but support it because they fear the Lobby and the price that they would pay if they vote against aid to Israel. Steve Walt and I have discovered from our travels around the country and from our voluminous correspondence with individuals who have read our work on the Lobby—including many from inside the Beltway—that there is a great deal of support for our views across the country. However, very few people are willing to stand

up in public and defend us or criticize the U.S.-Israel relationship, and that is especially true in Washington.

**You wrote in your 2006 article in the *London Review of Books* that Israel and the Lobby have had some influence in shaping US policy toward Iran but also acknowledge that “the U.S. has its own reasons for keeping Iran from going nuclear.” What has been the result of the U.S.-Israeli relationship on U.S. policy toward Iran?**

We argue that even if Israel did not exist, the United States would still be deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear program, just as Washington was concerned when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. The United States is opposed to nuclear proliferation and has worked hard since 1945 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Of course, that is a smart policy. So we don't need Israel to explain why the United States is concerned about Iran's nuclear program.

But Israel and the Lobby have had a significant effect on how the United States deals with Iran. The United States has had terrible relations with Iran since 1979, in part because of the infamous Hostage Crisis and events surrounding the Iranian Revolution. During the 1990s and early 2000s, however, Iran went to considerable lengths to try to improve its relationship with the United States. But Israel and its American supporters worked hard to stymie those efforts at rapprochement. Both Israel and the Lobby were deeply committed to making sure that Tehran and Washington remained bitter enemies, and they were successful. Furthermore, the principal reason that the United States is countenancing using military force against Iran to stop its nuclear program is pressure from Israel and the lobby. We argue that in the absence of pressure from Israel and the Lobby, there would be little interest in Washington in starting a war against Iran. If you look around the world, Israel is the only country pushing the Bush administration to use force against Iran. And, inside the United States, it is mainly individuals and groups inside the lobby who are pushing hard for striking Iran's nuclear facilities. We believe that attacking Iran would be a huge strategic blunder.

**You maintain that the Iraq War was “motivated at least in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure,” but you dismiss some of the arguments heard most often in the build-up to the war, most strikingly the promise of Iraqi oil reserves. Why do you believe oil played no part in policymakers' decision to go to war?**

There is hardly any evidence that oil was the reason that the United States went to war against Iraq in March 2003. The oil companies were certainly not pushing for war. Indeed, the oil companies wanted to cut deals with Saddam Hussein and help him exploit his oil resources so that they could make money. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the oil-producing states

were pushing for war, with the exception of Kuwait, which Saddam invaded in August 1990. But Kuwait was not pushing hard for war, and there is no evidence that the other oil-producing states were bent on war. So I don't see how one could make the case based on the available evidence that oil was the main driving force behind this war. In fact, I think that if the oil companies and the oil-producing states were driving U.S. Middle East policy, we would not have invaded Iraq. I also think we probably would not have had sanctions against Iraq in the decade before the war.

**What would a tougher U.S. policy toward Israel accomplish?**

There are two important conflicts involving Israel that the United States should try to help settle. The first is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Washington should put significant pressure on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and allow for the creation of a viable Palestinian state there and in Gaza. Second, the United States should put pressure on Israel to establish peaceful relations with Syria. In fact, Syria and Israel almost reached a peace agreement in 2000, when the Israelis, not the Syrians, walked away from the deal, which was straightforward. The Israelis would return the Golan Heights to Syria; in exchange the Syrians would stop supporting terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel. That deal remains the only basis for shutting down the Israel-Syria conflict. But the Israelis won't agree to it, because they are unwilling to exchange land for peace. The same is true with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, these two conflicts are going to fester for a long time, which will be to the detriment of both Israel and the United States, not to mention the Palestinians, who are suffering greatly at the hands of Israel. Therefore, the United States should put significant pressure on Israel to reach peace agreements with Syria and the Palestinians.

**What should be the United States' role in the Middle East in the future?**

The United States should act as an offshore balancer. It should remove virtually all of its ground forces and most of its air forces from the region and station them offshore. It should depend in large part on countries in the region to check potential aggressors. And the United States should only intervene militarily when it appears that local actors cannot contain an especially powerful state. With regard to Israel, the United States should remain committed to its survival. Fortunately, Israel's survival is not threatened today, and it is not likely to be anytime soon. This is good news for Israel and its American supporters. Of course, Israel would be even more secure if the United States could use the leverage at its disposal to push Israel to end its conflicts with the Palestinians and the Syrians. The Lobby, however, makes that impossible. **P**

# The Duty of Global Leadership

An Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski



Conducted by Harry Greene

*Zbigniew Brzezinski is a counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board. He is also the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was National Security Advisor to President Carter. His many books include *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower* and *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*.*

President Bush has been adamant that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, but while you have acknowledged that it is possible that Iran may be “seeking weapons or positioning themselves to have them,” you noted in an interview with CNN in September that “we have very scant evidence to support that.” Absent proof-positive of Iran’s intentions with their uranium enrichment program, what should be the United States’ plan of action?

I think the United States has legitimate concerns that the Iranians may be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and may be positioning themselves to have them. Therefore, negotiating with Iran on this subject is perfectly appropriate and a legitimate undertaking for the United States to pursue. However, we cannot entirely ignore the fact that the Iranians have been publicly declaring that, one, they are not seeking to have nuclear weapons, two, that they do not want to have nuclear weapons, three, that their religion forbids them to have nuclear weapons. These assertions may be false, but they at least provide the basis for serious discussion, which we could initiate simply by indicating to them that we entertain suspicions as to their veracity, but that we would like to explore with them ways in which we could be reassured that what they are saying is actually true. I want to emphasize here that what they are saying is the very opposite of what the North Koreans have been saying. The North Koreans have said openly that they are seeking nuclear weapons, that they want nuclear weapons, at one point they even said they have nuclear weapons. In that sense, the Iranian problem is somewhat easier to tackle through serious negotiations, but I do want to emphasize that

these negotiations have to be pursued in a way that encourages all sides to find a constructive outcome.

In an op-ed in the *Los Angeles Times* from February 2007, you wrote that America’s best course of action was to “reaffirm explicitly and unambiguously its determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably short period of time.” How would the insurgency and the Iraqi government respond to the setting of such a firm timetable for withdrawal?

I have also and subsequent to that, in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested that the best way actually to proceed, if we made the determination to leave, the best way to proceed would be to then, one, to engage all Iraqi leaders, all those within the Green Zone but also those on the outside, including some with whom we do not talk, about a serious dialogue designed to jointly—and I emphasize the word jointly—set the date for America’s departure. I think that engaging the Iraqi leaders would certainly concentrate their minds on what has to follow after we leave. It would help us to identify those Iraqi leaders who would be prepared to stand on their own feet after we leave and those Iraqi leaders who

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*“The world is now too complex, too volatile, for it to be subordinated to the will of a single very dominant power.”*

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would pack their bags and leave the moment we leave, and that we would be in a better position to make a joint determination as to approximately when our disengagement should take place. Secondly, once it was known in the region that we were acting in the foregoing fashion, and that we had indicated a desire to leave within a reasonable period of time, we would then be able more effectively to convene a regional conference of all of Iraq’s neighbors regarding the steps needed to stabilize Iraq



*Iraqi men and women protest outside the American-patrolled Green Zone in Baghdad. (Sabah Arar/AFP/Getty Images)*

after we have left, to the extent that some external assistance might be needed. We could also engage in such a conference perhaps some other Muslim states such as Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria, which might be in position to offer some peacekeeping forces if they were necessary. Last but not least, we could also fashion in the context of that two-pronged effort, some understandings, perhaps even regarding where some residual American presence might be needed for international reasons, for example in Kurdistan, as a way of reassuring not only the Kurds, but also the Turks and the Iranians, that Kurdistan will not be the source of major regional instability and new ethnic conflicts. In brief, once we are serious about leaving, there is still a major agenda to be pursued in order to make that departure effective and viable.

**The conventional wisdom says that Senator Barack Obama has little foreign-policy experience when compared to rival Senator Hillary Clinton. I presume that you have a different view of things, since you have endorsed Senator Obama for president?**

First of all, you know there is the problem as to what ‘experience’ really means. I do not see in Mrs. Clinton’s vitae much evidence of presidential experience. Your being the spouse of a president doesn’t mean that you have had actual experience in dealing with complicated international issues. Imagine if in the elections in 1960, the subsequently elected President John F. Kennedy, at the time a young senator from Massachusetts, was running against Mamie Eisenhower: would someone seriously claim that Mamie Eisenhower had more relevant “experience”

to be president than John F. Kennedy? In brief, experience is not a very helpful term. What is important is some evidence of an instinctive grasp of what is historically important and what the foregoing implies for the kind of a role that America should be playing in the world. My view is that the United States has greatly handicapped itself over the last eight years, and that a very significant change in America’s global posture is needed if America is to regain credibility, legitimacy, and the ability effectively to lead. I think Obama has demonstrated by what he says and by his reactions particularly to

the Iraq War that he has that instinctive grasp of history.

**In your latest book *Second Chance*, you argued that the world is undergoing a “global political awakening,” the central challenge of which is “the worldwide yearning for human dignity.” What, more specifically, is this “global political awakening,” and what are its policy implications?**

Its policy implications are that, first of all, for the first time in human history, humankind is really politically activated. That activation expresses itself in a variety of ways, some of them conflicting, some of them quite violent. In any case, what it means is that humanity can no longer be managed by a few leading states or dominated by a single empire. The world is now too complex, too volatile, for it to be subordinated to the will of a single very dominant power. That in turn implies a need for a much more historically sensitive stewardship of American foreign policy. It means that America has to have the ability to relate effectively to the conflicting aspirations that the politically awakened humanity now articulates and seeks. It has to be able to show both empathy and sympathy for those vast majorities of people in the world who are relatively deprived and in some cases absolutely deprived of the basic requirements of a decent life. That kind of an image, that kind of response to the new global realities can best come from someone who in some ways symbolizes them himself, and that is an additional reason why I support Obama.

**In *Second Chance*, you also wrote that America’s leaders at the end of the Cold War squandered an historic opportunity to practice global leadership and reshape the world when America was, in your words, “globally admired” and “faced no peer, no rival, no threat.” Was it inevitable that America**

would fall from this vaunted position, given that, as you wrote elsewhere, “in the long run, global politics are bound to become increasingly uncongenial to the concentration of hegemonic power in the hands of a single state”?

No, I don't think it was inevitable, and I certainly do not wish to suggest in my book that it was inevitable. Unfortunately it did happen, and it seems to me that one could engage in counterfactual historical analysis by pointing out what the alternatives at a given stage actually were. I tried to do that to some extent in my book where I assessed consecutively the performance of Bush I's presidency, then of Clinton's presidency, and then of Bush II's presidency, and my assessment regrettably—and I really do say regrettably—is a very critical one. I think we have failed to take advantage of the opportunity that we had as of 1990.




*Russian-made tanks parade through the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2006 to mark the anniversary of the Mujahideen victory over the Soviet Union. The United States outfitted the Mujahideen rebels with covert aid to combat the Soviet invasion. (Shah Marai/AFP/Getty Images)*

**John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue in their book *The Israel Lobby* that a group of powerful interest groups have discouraged U.S. policymakers from casting an critical eye on America's Israel policy, a point that you felt was “food for thought,” according to an article you wrote in *Foreign Policy* in August 2006. Are you satisfied with their conclusion that the Israel lobby has had this kind of effect on American foreign policy, as well as their larger point that Israel today is of declining strategic value for the United States?**

I reviewed their article when it first appeared; I have not read the entire book. My view then and now is that the discussion of the so-called “hyphenated” lobbies, or foreign lobbies, in the shaping of American foreign policy, is a perfectly legitimate subject. In my own experience in the White House, I have no doubt that a number of such lobbies do play an important role in articulating their specific positions and in gaining support particularly in Congress for them, and I would certainly list among them the Israel Lobby, the Cuban Lobby, the Armenian Lobby, the Greek Lobby, and before long I'm convinced we're going to have a Hindu Lobby, a Chinese Lobby, perhaps an emerging Russian Lobby. So I think there is nothing wrong with raising the issue nor with discussing it. Their argument that the Israel Lobby has impeded peaceful solutions in the Middle East, I think, has some merit, especially since the most active Israel Lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), is actually quite sympathetic to the more right-wing and more

expansionist elements in the Israeli party politic. There isn't really a more liberal and more peace-oriented Israeli alternative insofar as the lobbies in the United States are concerned. So I think it's a perfectly legitimate issue to discuss, and it should be discussed without abuse and without immediately charging the people who have raised the issue with being anti-Semitic. I think that is a form of McCarthyism, which simply is not compatible with serious dialogue on a really complicated issue.

**In 1979, you advised President Carter to grant covert aid to the Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Do you regret any part of this affair today?**

Not at all. If we hadn't done it, can you imagine what the situation would be like that we might be facing in that part of the world today? First of all, we wouldn't have any Afghans who would be on our side; fortunately, a great many still are, that's why there is an Afghan government in Kabul. So, first of all, that's a factor. Second of all, if the Soviet Union had prevailed, we might still have a Soviet Union, which was then actively engaged in supporting terrorism and maintaining terrorist training camps arrayed against us. So I really fail to understand the meaning of the question as to having regrets. I don't regret what transpired in the Soviet Union afterwards, and I certainly don't regret having more Muslims on our side rather than having fewer Muslims on our side. 

# Flexing Military Muscle

An interview with Robert Kaplan

Conducted by David Wheelock

**Robert Kaplan** is a journalist who has written extensively on international and military affairs. His books include *Balkan Ghosts*, *The Coming Anarchy*, and *Imperial Grunts*. Currently an editor at the *Atlantic Monthly*, he is also a visiting professor at the United States Naval Academy, where he is conducting research for a book on the Navy.

**You have observed American military campaigns from the ground level in both Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years. How do you evaluate our success in Iraq at the moment?**

I think over the last nine months or so, we have made measurable, demonstrable progress in Iraq. The question is how significant it is, and we won't find that out until we start withdrawing our troops. The cities seem to be stabilizing and modernizing, and in the northern half of the country there seems to be very little violence. It's the areas in the southeast and the south that are really problematic. Keep in mind, we're not going to withdraw from Iraq anytime soon; we're just going to draw down our forces by about 30,000 or so, probably in 2008.

**American forces in Iraq are forced to rely upon counter-insurgency tactics to a much greater degree than in the past. Does this style of warfare represent the future of U.S. military tactics for armed conflict?**

I'm not sure that it's the future. Remember, we don't have one future; we have several futures. Certainly there will be other instances in which we will apply the doctrines of counter-insurgency and nation-building, but perhaps we're also going to be fighting highly technical wars with our air force and navy.

**Will we then see a transformation in American military strategy?**

I don't know if our strategy will be transformed, but our air

force and navy will simply continue to hold their ability to hit targets in rogue states like Iran. I'm not predicting a war with Iran, but there may be certain campaigns that will just involve sending missiles onto shore from the sea and from the air. My point is this: Don't assume that the next wars are going to be like this one. They could be very different, and differently fought.

**As the 21st century unfolds, which branch of the U.S. military do you think will be most essential for maintaining the projection of American power?**

*“In your lifetime the unipolar system is going to move toward a more multipolar system. I can't see the United States retaining its position of dominance to this degree in the future.”*

Well, that kind of projection happens through all of our services. You can't really distinguish among them. But what the navy brings to the table is the ability for forward deployment without a debate in Congress and without any kind of national debate at all. You can pull an aircraft carrier strike group in international waters close to Iran, and there's no debate in Congress; but if you move tens of thousands of army troops on the ground, then you need a national debate. The navy is able to get closer to conflict zones.

**You have suggested that the number of ships in the U.S. Navy will decline in the years to come. What implications might this decline have for the international order?**

First off, the navy claims that the number isn't going to be





*USS Lake Erie, a guided missile cruiser, arrives in Niigata, Japan in late 2004. Long symbolic of America's global projection of power, such ships may decline in number as the Navy reduces its overall fleet strength in the coming years. (Jiji Press/AFP/Getty Images)*

declining, but the Congressional Research Service and others show a slightly different story. The “glass-is-half-full” argument from the Navy is that our navy is still better than the rest of the world’s navies combined. The “glass-is-half-empty” argument is that we’ve gone down from about 600 ships to now about 274 ships. We need more ships, and it’s unclear that we’re going to get them. I think that certainly in your lifetime the presently unipolar system is going to move toward a more multipolar system. I can’t see the United States retaining its position of dominance to this degree in the future.

#### **Who would be the challengers to that dominance?**

I think there will be a multiplicity of challengers. It might be China, the European Union, India, along with some other Asian countries. But it clearly won’t be the United States all alone any longer.

**Do you think that America’s ideological commitment to spreading democracy around the world will increasingly draw the U.S. into friction with more authoritarian-style regimes like China?**

I’m not sure that we will necessarily be drawn into friction. If we’re smart, we will draw China in rather than gang up against it.

China may not be a democracy right now, but it’s sort of a benign dictatorship, and it’s likely to become more democratic as the years go along.

**Why will it become more democratic? Will economic liberalization guarantee political liberalization?**

Yes, I think it is related. I think the more the Chinese economy develops, the harder it is for the current Chinese system of government to retain this level of authoritarianism.

**Would you think, then, that the increasing economic interdependency between the U.S. and China might act to**


**discourage any violent power struggles between the two nations?**

I hope so, and I think there’s a good bet on that. It’s a fairly reasonable argument to pursue—that we’re so interlocked together that there will be this economic cushion against any really bad policy battles.

**Does India have the potential to become a serious world power? How do you think the U.S. should approach its rising status in world affairs?**


India’s navy is growing, and its economy is growing as well. What that means to me is that militarily, India will play a larger role in the twenty-first century, particularly in the Indian Ocean—everywhere from East Africa to Indonesia. Much of the importance of the Indian Ocean has to do with securing routes of trade. I think India’s interests are fairly legitimate. As are China’s, by the way. There’s no reason why we should come into conflict with these countries. If we’re smart, we’ll leverage them. We don’t have any ideological conflict with India. We have differences with China—their system is certainly not like ours—but it’s not as if we’re dealing with a rogue regime or anything.

**What do you make of President Bush’s efforts to establish warmer diplomatic ties with India in recent years—such as his signing of a nuclear pact in 2006?**

I think that’s part of Bush’s grand strategy, actually—to leverage India and Japan slightly against China. 

# A Soft Power Outage

An interview with Joseph Nye



Conducted by Christopher Gombeski

*Joseph S. Nye Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor and former dean at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, is also the Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. In 2004, he published *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*; *Understanding International Conflict* (5th edition); and *The Power Game: A Washington Novel*.*

Just recently Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes resigned. Now, at the end of her tenure, the Pew Research Center reports that favorable views of the United States are still far from encouraging: 21 percent in Egypt, 15 percent in Pakistan, and 9 percent in Turkey. Is this a sign that public diplomacy cannot do all that much?

Well, I think that public relations and public diplomacy can only do a limited amount of good. The old saying in advertising is that even the best advertising can't sell a defective product, and when you look at public opinion polls, the reason for the loss of soft power of the United States is the unattractiveness of our policies. I think that Karen Hughes had a difficult job in selling a flawed product.

**If American domestic policies are central to maintaining and acquiring soft power, that begs the question, to what extent should the U.S. allow its desire for international approval to determine its own policies and law?**

American desire for international approval should never be the only factor in determining our policies. If there's something we think is absolutely right, we can't change our policy just because it's unpopular internationally. On the other hand, there are times we are doing something that is not right, where international approval might give us a clue about the need for change. This, for example, was the case in the 1950s, when President Eisenhower realized that American policies of segregation were basically hurting our standing in the independent countries of Africa, and therefore it was important to begin processes of change.

**The United States has long remained one of Israel's principal backers. For many Muslims, American support for**

**Israel, more than any other policy, has proved the most damaging to the United States' image. What can the United States do to salvage its standing in the Muslim world?**

I think the United States needs to do two things to improve its standing in the Muslim world. One is to find some form of political solution in Iraq, and to be seen as trying to make progress on the Israel-Palestine issue. Those seem to be the two dominant issues in the Muslim world.

**The Iraq War was first a hard power military victory for the United States and since then has become a source of tremendous soft power losses. In 2004, you wrote that it was unclear if those hard-power gains had been exceeded by the war's costs to America's soft power. What's your assessment of the situation today? And what should then be America's approach in Iraq for the near future?**

I think it is now clear that the costs greatly exceeded the benefits. According to the president, the War in Iraq was part of the larger War on Terror. According to British and American intelligence estimates, the War in Iraq has actually increased the number of terrorists. So I think you can make the argument that we were set back in larger objectives by the tactics we took. Now, we're faced with a situation that has no good answers, and we should be trying to set a goal of getting out in terms of which would leave the least damage done to the region and to our interests in the region as a whole.

**You wrote in the *Taipei Times* in October 2007 that even the United Nations' "closest friends admit that its large size, rigid regional blocs, formal diplomatic procedures, and cumbersome bureaucracy often impede consensus." How do you overcome such problems?**



*Coordination problems in a body as large as the United Nations make "other instruments to supplement the UN" worth considering. (Don Emmert/AFP/Getty Images)*

The UN remains the only universal organization and that is important for legitimacy, but in terms of getting things done it's often useful to turn to other instruments to supplement the UN. For example, the idea that I find attractive is one that has been suggested by former Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada, which is to establish a Group of 15—the current Group of Eight augmented by countries like China, India, Russia, South Africa, and others—to represent close to 70-75 percent of world product and could begin to initiate action like dealing with global climate change and other issues.

**There has been a lot of worry over the possibility that the relationship between the United States and Europe will become more and more strained because of differences over the conduct of the War on Terror. But you've written that you "do not believe that a lasting rift looms" between the United States and Europe. What makes their cooperation likely?**

We have already seen in the form of the new Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in France and the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel in Germany that countries which are highly critical of the United States and of our actions in Iraq, realize that in the longer and larger picture, the close transatlantic relations remain crucial to dealing with major problems. So the evidence is beginning to come in that while Iraq was damaging to the soft power of the United States in Europe, we will be able to recover just as we did in the period after the Vietnam War, when we were also unpopular.

**You've written that America needs to become "a smarter superpower." What would that require?**

On Nov. 6, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington issued a report called *Smart Power* that was the work of a bipartisan commission which former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and I co-chaired. It argued that we needed to find ways to define our hard and soft power instruments more successfully if we are to become a smart power. In that report, we have a number of specific recommendations of how we can go about that, including using international institutions more effectively, putting development—particularly public health issues—as a higher priority on our agenda, increasing exchanges as a way of improving the quality of our public diplomacy, and reorganizing a number of government agencies to make us better able to integrate the different dimensions of our toolkit of power instruments.

**President Bush has said of Iran, "We've sanctioned ourselves out of influence." You note in your book *Soft Power* that "Europe has significant trade ties with Iran and considerably more applicable soft power influence than the U.S." Yet a third round of sanctions against Iran seems imminent. Was soft power here simply inadequate? Or did Europe fail to wield it successfully to rein in Iran and avoid the use of coercive measures?<sup>1</sup>**

In dealing with Iran, soft power is not likely to be sufficient. It's going to require a combination of hard power, particularly sanctions, and the soft power of diplomacy, which offers the prospect of a more interesting future to the Iranians. So in some ways the answer to our current problems with Iran is that we need both bigger carrots and bigger sticks.

**In Latin America, the rise of left-leaning politicians in various countries—the so-called "pink tide"—and Hugo Chavez's growing power have raised some alarm among policymakers who fear that the U.S. might be losing influence in the region. Are their fears justified?**

The United States still has a degree of attractiveness in parts of Latin America. The danger would be to exaggerate the importance of people like Chavez or Evo Morales of Bolivia. If we dramatize them, we actually help them. There are countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Chile where we still have chances to show that we can be a force that improves development, improves the prospects of those countries, where we can basically demonstrate the positive role the United States can play. **P**

<sup>1</sup> *Editor's Note: This interview was conducted before the release of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate Report assessing Iran's nuclear program.*

# Pakistan's False Alternatives

## *The Irreducible Complexities of Pakistani Politics*

By Faisal Devji

*Faisal Devji is Associate Professor of History at the New School in New York. He has held faculty positions at Yale University and the University of Chicago, where he also received his PhD in Intellectual History. Devji's most recent book is Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. He is interested in the political thought of modern Islam as well as in the transformation of liberal categories and democratic practice in South Asia. His broader concerns are with ethics and violence in a globalized world.*

*Editor's Note: This piece was written before the assassination of former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto.*

**D**istinctions between civilian and military rule, secular and religious authority, or democratic and dictatorial power cannot describe politics in Pakistan today. The most egregious instance of this is the fact that a secular leader like Pervez Musharraf occupied until recently both the civilian position of President and the military one of Chief of Army Staff in an Islamic republic largely administered by British law. Rather than being anomalous, however, I want to argue that the interchangeable nature of such categories extends deep into Pakistani society and is not limited to Musharraf's changing role. If anything the President-General's ambiguous status does nothing more than reflect the wider uncertainty of constitutional categories in the country as a whole.

Pervez Musharraf came to power in a bloodless coup, with wide support from Pakistan's middle class and secular elite, promising to ensure the state's transparency and accountability as well as to secure law and order. While these are claims made by all military dictators, Musharraf, who in his early days referred to himself by the corporate title of Chief Executive, succeeded in attaching a civilian front to his administration by leaving the press free, advancing economic liberalization, and placing technocrats in high government positions. This civilian image was so successful that his imposition of emergency rule in November 2007 came as a shock—giving the absurd impression that Mush-

arraf had displaced a civilian government with a military one.

In fact he had mounted a coup against himself. But declaring an emergency is the function of a civilian government, and in doing so Musharraf was following the precedent set by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. Like Musharraf, Mrs. Gandhi had attributed the need for an emergency to a meddling judiciary as well as to the threat of militancy and mass protest. Again like Musharraf, she had imprisoned the same kinds of people: political opponents, professionals, and civil society activists. By following this Indian model, Pakistan confused more

**“ Military rule in Pakistan represents the takeover of the state by a corporation that claims to defend the people from bad government. ”**

than its civilian and military functions, having in this case departed from its own history of coups to latch onto a rival's past. Whether he is the general declaring an emergency or the president holding elections, Musharraf is only being true to the civilian role he has always cultivated.

### **Militarism in the Market**

The army can hardly be defined as a purely military body because it happens also to be the largest stakeholder in the country's economy, running companies with no connection to national security, providing medical, educational, and welfare services and owning large tracts of land. Of course many armies provide for their servicemen in these ways, but the sheer scale of the profit-making enterprises the Pakistani army possesses makes it a private player in the market as much as a public body. Indeed, the army's military role can be seen merely as one part of its business empire, which

is not surprising given its direct descent from the forces of the East India Company. It is in this context that we should view the military scientist A.Q. Khan's extraordinary trade in bomb-making plans and materials until he was placed under house arrest last year.

Military rule in Pakistan represents the takeover of the state by a corporation that claims to defend the people from bad government. In this sense it is neither a public nor a private body, neither civilian nor military, but a bizarre hybrid distantly related to the Soviet or Chinese communist parties, which also claimed to represent civil society against the state while running both the state and the economy. Whatever its claims, however, the army's formerly solid base among its recruits from the northern Punjab and North-West Frontier Province has recently begun to break down, with soldiers refusing to fire on fellow citizens and surrendering to militants rather than confronting them. This is a situation the army has never before experienced and signals a looming crisis in its constitution.

### Expatriate Politicians

Until she returned from Dubai in order to work out a power sharing deal with Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto was one of the three most important Pakistani politicians in exile—the others being the Pakistan Muslim League's Nawaz Sharif in Riyadh and the Mutahhida Qaumi Movement's Altaf Hussain in London. But these leaders were much more than mere exiles, having left their country to join a transnational elite based partially or wholly outside Pakistan. Together these absentee landlords safeguard their property by preventing the emergence of rivals and replacements alike, thus consigning Pakistani politics to enforced immaturity. Such exiles can then vie for American support and be parachuted back into Pakistan to take the reins of government, all of them, Musharraf included, being friends of the U.S. and enemies of each other.

Benazir Bhutto arrived in Pakistan anointed by the U.S. as its future prime minister, her chief rival Nawaz Sharif having been unceremoniously deported to Saudi Arabia when he had first tried to return. There was no semblance of democratic legitimacy in Bhutto's homecoming, which was the result of an arrangement between Musharraf, the Americans, and herself. Yet at the same time that the U.S. was trying to broker a power-sharing deal that would bring an exiled leader to power in Pakistan, it was doing the opposite in Bangladesh. There the Americans wanted to send two dysfunctional but elected leaders into exile, to be replaced by a Musharraf-style chief executive promising a fresh start with new political stock.




*Amidst increasing pressure, the return of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has forced President Pervez Musharraf to consider a power-sharing deal. (John Moore/Getty Images)*

### The Professionals in Revolt

While the options facing Musharraf, Bhutto, and Sharif are entirely predictable and their actions scripted in advance, the unexpected rebellion of Pakistan's judiciary, together with street protests by lawyers and other civil society actors have introduced an element of unpredictability to the situation. Like its army, Pakistan's judiciary cannot be seen simply as a branch of the state, not least because it hasn't played this role for a long time, being for much of its history entirely at the disposal of the general or prime minister in power. Moreover, the development of a parallel system of Islamic law outside its purview, incomplete though this might be, has pushed the judiciary even further from its constitutional role to make it into another kind of civil society actor.

Having written the agreements and compromises be-



*Devotees pray at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, the site of a violent confrontation between Islamic extremists and security forces in July 2007. (Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty Images)*

tween civilian and military rulers in a state with no effective constitution or rule of law, this judiciary and the legal class as a whole have become fixers and middlemen whose revolt comes from outside the state rather than within it. This is why both the army and political parties like Ms. Bhutto's are colluding to appropriate or destroy such judicial activism, which has already wrecked the power sharing deal that the U.S. had brokered between them and made possible the return of Nawaz Sharif. But in doing so, they will destroy the only functioning organ of Pakistan's body politic: a civil society that appears to have grown in the absence of a state rather than as its complement.

### Post-Political Islam

The final pieces in Pakistan's political jigsaw puzzle are the Islamists, who occupy a wide variety of positions from Leninist political parties to social movements and militant outfits. Secular and civilian governments have been as eager to nurture the radicals among them as military and religious ones. Probably the first prime minister to encourage the Islamists was the landlord-socialist Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose equally secular daughter Benazir went

on to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban. The fact that she was a Shia woman seems not to have deterred either the sectarian or the misogynist in Mullah Omar of the Taliban, to say nothing of deterring Benazir Bhutto herself.

Both military and civilian leaders in Pakistan continue to rely upon Islamist groups, offering financial inducements and political opportunities to turn one against another in sectarian squabbles, intimidate

rivals in government, and serve as the militant arm of foreign policy in India and Afghanistan. Of course these Islamists are by no means creations of the state, but it is possible to say that they have been radicalized by it. It is probably also the case that Islamists achieve more power under military than civilian rule, since the army requires organizations in civil society they can depend upon in the absence of electoral support. Musharraf, for example, allowed some of these groups to form a political alliance and take control of a province by banning Pakistan's legitimate political parties.

Incidents such as the bloody standoff in July 2007 between the previously acquiescent clerics of Islamabad's Red Mosque and the government demonstrate the fragmentation of the alliance between some Islamists and the state. But more important is the fact that the mosque's clerics and students had abandoned the old language of Muslim politics, dominated as this was by demands for an Islamic state and constitution, to focus instead on the civil society concerns of transparency and accountability.

By making Islam's claim on the state a nominal rather than political one, these men and women were only joining, in their own way, the discordant but dynamic process by which Pakistan's peculiar civil society is coming out from its stunted state. ■

**“Both military and civilian leaders in Pakistan continue to rely upon Islamist groups, offering financial inducements and political opportunities to turn one against another.”**

# The Rise & Fall of Hyperpowers

An interview with Amy Chua



Conducted by Jin Gon Park

*Amy Chua is the John M. Duff, Jr. Professor of Law at Yale Law School. She came to Yale in 2001 after teaching at Duke and serving as a visiting professor at Columbia, Stanford, and NYU. Her expertise is in international business transactions, law and development, ethnic conflict, and globalization and the law. Her recent books include Day of Empire and World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability. Professor Chua has an A.B. and a J.D. from Harvard University.*

**In your latest book *Day of Empire*, you argue that the rise of world-dominant powers, or “hyperpowers,” has much to do with the extent of that nation’s “strategic tolerance.” What makes this so?**

I say that tolerance is indispensable if you want to be a world-dominant power. The reason for this is simple: if you want to be world-dominant, not just regionally or locally dominant, you have to be at the very cutting edge of the world’s technological and economic frontier. There’s no other way you can have the best nuclear weapons or be at the cutting edge of military power if you are not the most advanced technologically. The reason tolerance is important is that at any given historical moment, the world’s best human capital—whether it be the smartest people, the most creative, the most driven, whether some intelligence or strength or know-how—is never, ever going to be found within any one ethnic group or one religious group. So, in order to pull away from all of its rivals on a global scale, a society has to really be able to access the world’s best and brightest, regardless of ethnicity or religion.

**What is the connection between a hyperpower’s decline and its “strategic tolerance”?**

On the decline side, my thesis is not that tolerance always causes decline. What I’m saying is that the fall of hyperpowers is often very closely correlated with a return to intolerance and xenophobia, but you can’t always tell whether the hyperpower is already in decline and this persecution and intolerance is a byproduct, or whether it is because

they turn to intolerance that they began to decline. Often, both are true.

Now, the connection is that I say that every hyperpower in history has faced the same problem that as they get bigger and bigger, they extend their power to include more and more diverse people. They all face the problem that I call “glue,” which is how to generate good will and cooperation and, ideally, loyalty among those foreign peoples that you conquer or dominate. Take, for instance, Achaemenid Persia; they conquered the Greeks and the Egyptians and the Mesopotamians, but under Persian rule, Greeks still felt Greek, Egyptians still felt like Egyptians.

They didn’t identify with the Persian Empire. They didn’t feel Persian. So, very quickly the Empire was torn apart by internal division. So there was nothing to hold it together but military might. Only Rome was able to solve this problem, because Rome was able to extend citizenship to elites in Scotland, Spain, and West Africa. The United States can’t do that, because we’re a democratic hyperpower. As a

**“Democracy isn’t something that you can just plug in like a lightbulb.”**

democracy, the United States doesn’t want to make foreign populations our citizens. Nobody is talking about turning the people of Iraq into U.S. citizens. We don’t want to annex Iraq. We don’t want the people of Fallujah and Baghdad voting in the next United States presidential election. The problem for America externally is how we can generate ties and connections to all the people around the world we’re dominating when we can’t give them citizenship. People in Bolivia and Morocco feel dominated by the United States, because we have military bases everywhere and such enormous economic leverage. So we dominate them, but they don’t feel any loyalty to us.

Though the raising of armies was central to previous hyperpowers, you argue that for the United States to maintain its status as hegemon, it should shy away from militarism. Why?

Today, as a democratic hyperpower, we are very limited in what we can do. So a lot of people say, "Oh, we can't even control Baghdad." The truth is that the U.S. has the military power to level Baghdad in one day; we could just nuke it. But as a democracy, we can't do that. In-

stead, we have to protect civilians. When Rome conquered Romania, it looted exactly a million pounds of silver. The United States can't just go and take Iraq's oil. Right now, being militaristic doesn't have the same upside that it used to have. Instead, we just get all this anti-Americanism. People had thought that because of markets and democracy, McDonald's and Coca-Cola spreading, that would turn foreign populations into wanting American leadership. But that's just a non-sequitur and not true. Wearing a Yankees baseball cap and drinking a Coca-Cola does not turn a Palestinian into an American. They are not U.S. citizens, so it's counterproductive to be militaristic. We can't give them any benefits, and we suffer this enormous cost of global resentment.

**You have said that a turn against immigration might dry up the vast amount of "immigrant labor and talent [that] has propelled U.S. growth and influence, from westward expansion in the 19th century, to industrial explosion and victory in the 20th century atomic race, to today's staggering preeminence in the digital age." Though the United States does turn away a great pool of foreign talent, could its deficiency in some areas be made up for with a strong push toward homegrown education in those areas?**

You can definitely do that, and that's fine. But the only way you can stay a hyperpower is by getting the best advice of the whole world. The best talent and drive is never going to be found in one location. We would lose our competitive edge to a country that could pull in those people. So



*The sun shines on a newly constructed metal fence running along the U.S.-Mexico border outside of San Luis, Arizona, one of a flurry of new border fences across the American southwest erected to hinder border crossers. Amy Chua warns that anti-immigrant measures such as these may herald America's fall from hyperpower status. (David McNew/Getty Images)*

you have to be able to pull in the best and brightest if you want to be a hyperpower, but it may not be a good thing for the U.S. to be a hyperpower. Maybe some people don't feel we need to be. That's what a lot of Europeans say: "Who needs to be a hyperpower?" Scandinavian countries say they don't want to be an immigrant society, we just want to have good human rights and be wealthy. My book doesn't say that it's necessarily great to be a hyperpower. It just says that if you want to be a hyperpower, there is no other way except through immigration. I just mean by having a relatively open immigration policy that is able to pull in the best and the brightest. Right now, there will be one really brilliant mathematician in Nepal, who would want to come here. The smartest still want to come here.

**China has become an economic powerhouse while maintaining a relatively homogeneous society. What do you make of its rapid rise to power?**

I don't think China can be a hyperpower because it is a quintessentially ethnically defined country; it's not an immigrant nation. You still just don't see large numbers of talented American and European engineers wanting to become Chinese citizens. But you still do see a large number



of talented Chinese wanting to become American citizens. I think China could easily continue to grow and grow and be a superpower. If China gets strong enough, even if it's not a hyperpower, the U.S. could fall from its hyperpower status. You'd be back in a multipolar world. And I think that's completely likely. I don't say for sure, because China has a lot of problems that people underestimate. For one, very few people attend high school. If you just go into the rural areas, it's still really a developing country.

**What are the prospects of an American decline? And what would such a fall mean for the United States?**

For me, it's an interesting case. I almost think of the United States as an accidental hyperpower. It became a hyperpower not through militarism and conquest

and imperialism—though of course we do have episodes of militarism in our history—but the real secret to our success has been that we've always been a magnet for the world's most driven and enterprising and talented. I hope the U.S. doesn't fall from its hyperpower status, because if the U.S. does become an intolerant, xenophobic society, we will cease to be a country that can pull in the world's best and brightest. There are some signs of that. It's harder and harder to get visas for skilled people from foreign countries, and they're starting to go elsewhere. It's so unique and rare the formula America has for all the mistakes we've made in the past five years. We have an ethnically and religiously neutral political identity. So to be American, you can be Jewish-American, Muslim-American, Catholic-American; you can be Korean-American, Chinese-American, Moroccan-American. And people all feel American. That's this very unusual internal glue. I think it's been a great success story. If we take a turn to intolerance, we can lose all that. And that would be absolutely terrible. Of course, the U.S. can decline for lots of reasons. Bad foreign policy, poor leadership, corruption, external attack. There are many different reasons for decline, and we have lots to worry about. I think our post-9/11 policies have been really quite disastrous. We've squandered a lot of good will and wasted a lot of money. Anti-Americanism is if anything stronger than it had been before. Interestingly, when a country is in decline, you often see people get fearful and paranoid and insecure. Decline is often accompanied by a turn toward xenophobia. I hope that that's not what we're seeing now. There are signs of it,

but we've always had bursts of xenophobia throughout our history, first against the Italians, against the Jews, against the Polish, and we've always been able to overcome it. I think it's really important that everyone has to be able to speak English and participate in the political system. You can be bilingual, but you've got to be able to speak English so that we don't get the problem they have in Europe of these enclaves that don't have any connection to each other. I think it's really important that we share common values—U.S. Constitutional values—and speak a common language.

**In your first book, *World on Fire*, you write of the danger in exporting free market democracy to developing nations, as it may lead to ethnic conflict. What societies are most at risk?**

*“When a country is in decline, you often see people get fearful and paranoid and insecure. Decline is often accompanied by a turn toward xenophobia. I hope that that's not what we're seeing now.”*

My thesis is specifically about what I call “market-dominant minorities,” like the Chinese in Indonesia, where the rich are not just rich but belong to a different ethnic group. If you democratize very quickly in those places with market-dominant minorities, you're very likely to get bad outcomes. In Indonesia, the Chinese controlled three percent of the population in the 1990s, and overnight democratization was accompanied by all these calls for confiscation of Chinese assets. Five thousand shops owned by Chinese were burned or looted. It's kind of like Hamas getting elected in the Palestine Authority. Majority rule doesn't always bring good things.

I'm a very pro-market and pro-democracy person. My thesis is that you really have to understand the countries you're trying to marketize and democratize. Look at Iraq. If you look at the afterword to the paperback edition of *World on Fire*, you'll see that I made all these predictions, and they all came true. You've got this deep, sectarian division—60 percent Shi'ites, who have long been oppressed—and if you have rapid democratization, they are going to call for Shi'ites to take back the country. That's exactly what happened. There are all these demagogues who are very anti-American. So, number one, you need to understand the ethnic and religious structures of these developing countries. And democracy isn't something that you can just plug in like a lightbulb. You can't just ship out ballot boxes. The genocidal killer Slobodan Milosevic was elected in free and fair elections in Serbia. Elections are not the answer to everything. And the same goes

for the stock exchange. Some people thought we could airlift the stock exchange into Tanzania. That doesn't do the trick. You need institutions to back up the market.

**Are outside actors always in the driver's seat? That is, can they always affect the outcome when those pushing for democracy in another nation are the people themselves?**

I think that lots of times democratization comes from the bottom up. That's of course true. The U.S. tends to not like democracy when it takes the form of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. That was definitely a democratic election that the United States didn't like. Whether it is more U.S.-driven or bottom-up, I don't know, but you can look at one example. The United States has definitely played a huge role in removing Saddam Hussein from Iraq. For better or for worse, that sort of democratization is something we've brought about. I do think that in the 80s and 90s, the U.S. was very influential in trying to promote the ideals of democracies and supporting democratic groups. I don't know how much was indigenous or how much came from the United States. The rhetoric was definitely completely supporting democratization, not realizing that it doesn't always bring pro-market, pro-U.S. results. I think Hamas is another great example. That Hamas was just recently democratically elected in the Palestine authority; I think Americans were shocked by that.

**You make the case that introducing democracy to a nation before it has shaped institutions to uphold the rule of law is a dangerous move to make. Other political scientists have argued that the history of Western democracies suggests that the two go hand-in-hand—that is, simultaneous rather than sequential development. What do you make of that?**

I think that in the history of Western democracies, there



*Indonesian rioters set fire to cars and Chinese shops in May of 1998, following the "overnight democratization" of the country, which empowered the majority Indonesian population to target the wealthy ethnic Chinese living there. As Chua explains, "Markets and democracy don't always go hand-in-hand." (Choo Youn-Kong/AFP/Getty Images)*

is a strong correlation between the two. My point is that people make a big mistake when they assume democracy is a panacea for all countries because in developing countries markets and democracy don't always go hand-in-hand. I think that democracy can't just be ballot boxes. You can't just have everybody vote. You've also got to be promoting constitutionalism and free speech and minority protections. Otherwise, you'll get a situation like in Indonesia, where overnight empowerment of the majority led them to nationalize and confiscate all the Chinese assets. Lots of the Chinese just fled the country, taking with them about \$40-100 million. That's what put that country into a massive depression.

That's a perfect case of democratization not going hand-in-hand with markets. A majority of Indonesians wanted an anti-market backlash, because the Chinese were the ones benefiting from the market. They wanted to go back to a people's economy. Hugo Chavez is another example of democracy being anti-market. There are so many examples these days that it's not even controversial. **P**

**“It's harder and harder to get visas for skilled people from foreign countries, and they're starting to go elsewhere.”**

# The Global Pollution Lobby

## *A Roadblock in the Path towards Corporate Greening*

By Avi Kupfer

*Avi Kupfer is a sophomore in Pierson College. He serves as Managing Editor of The Politic.*

As the public continually becomes more aware of the environmental impacts of various business practices, many corporations are beginning to realize the economic benefits of “going green.” However, as a select few corporate leaders begin to examine the effects of their own business practices on the environment, many of their peers devote an incredible amount of time and money to influencing environmental policy in the opposite direction. Within the United States, and even on the greater world stage, corporations and the Political Action Committees (PACs) who represent them play a large role in the mapping of environmental policy. Although some image-conscious businesses are beginning to adapt to an environmentally conscious consumer market, as long as national and international environmental policy is significantly influenced by polluting corporations, the movement towards commercial “greening” will remain underdeveloped.

Many conservation efforts are beginning to focus on a group that is the direct cause of some of the worst global environmental degradation: transnational corporations. These efforts focus on the understanding that any change within the corporate world will be made out of self-interest and directed at increasing capital gains. Many companies are making a concerted effort to appear environmentally friendly as the commercial value of words such as “sustainable,” “pesticide-free,” and “free-range” has increased drastically. Wal-Mart is beginning to purchase trucks that can drive more miles per gallon of gasoline than its previous fleet. Coca-Cola introduced a campaign to preserve the world’s fresh water supplies not only to improve their image to consumers but because of the understanding that

dwindling fresh water resources in the future will harm Coca-Cola production.<sup>1</sup>

These examples represent the progress of corporations cognizant of the future of marketing in an environmentally conscious world. Although their importance must not be downplayed or marginalized, such examples are a very small step forward in the face of the continued power and financial capability of a global corporate lobbyist community that wishes to block pro-environment policy while weakening already existing environmental legislation and mandates.

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*“Many of the laws concerning the corporate-environment relationship have been crafted by those congresspeople who are monetarily indebted to the pollution lobby.”*

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Before focusing on the power of anti-environment corporations, it is important to discuss the existing environmental checks placed on businesses. In the United States and Canada, recent policy efforts aimed at corporate environmental practices have focused on increased transparency. Recent legislative strides include laws that require firms to make pollution releases and transfers available to the public in these countries.<sup>2</sup> On the international level, the 2002 International Environmental Policy Summit in Johannesburg released the most progressive global policy recommendations focused on the corporate world’s relationship to the environment. At the summit, international development organizations helped to

establish checks that require companies to report the full extent of their impact on the environment in order to grant full public access to relevant documents with the hope that corporations will take the negative environmental impact of their actions into account when making business decisions.<sup>3</sup> Environmental policy which focuses on corporate transparency is not the only form of progressive legislation in the area of the business-environment relationship.

Self-policing has become a popular legislative method of encouraging companies to self-police environmental standards. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Self-Policing Policy waives or reduces penalties when regulated businesses voluntarily discover, disclose, and correct environmental violations. A 2006 study of 551 companies that disclosed at least one environmental violation between October of 1998 and September of 2000 found that EPA inspections fail to encourage companies to take up self-policing and that the agency can do little to increase self-policing of environmental violations.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Voluntary Environmental Programs (VEPs) promise to provide firms and facilities additional flexibility in managing their environmental affairs in order to increase internal efficiencies and improve public image. However, a survey of 61 program managers of VEPs found that some stakeholders have a disproportionate level of influence in designing VEPs. Therefore, many corporations are able to minimize the environmental impact of participation in VEPs while simultaneously maximizing the program's benefit to their public image.<sup>5</sup> Clearly, self-policing, a policy system that has been flaunted as a progressive movement towards environmentally-friendly corporate decision-making, has major flaws.

There has been great success in the movement towards "corporate greening." Self-motivated business reforms as well as policy-focused transparency and the creation of

VEPs are important strides. However, commercial "greening" remains grossly underdeveloped due to the corporate hold over both national and international environmental policy. Although companies and PACs do not always directly shape legislation, businesses intent on rolling back environmental laws give more in congressional campaign donations than any other cluster of interest groups. Polluter PACs contributed \$46 million to U.S. representatives between 1993 and 1996. More specifically, \$13 million went to representatives who voted for the Dirty Water Act in the 104th Congress, which would have drastically lowered pollution standards and opened half of the nation's remaining wetlands to development. Contributions totaling \$11.4 million went to 209 congresspeople who voted in favor of 17 riders aimed at limiting the EPA's ability to implement and enforce environmental laws.<sup>6</sup> The monetary dedication of corporations that are intent on deregulating potentially environmentally harmful business practices has had a huge impact on Congressional legislation.

Those congresspeople who are monetarily indebted to the pollution lobby have crafted many of the laws concerning the corporate-environment relationship. Although Congress delegates the authority to create many important environmental rules and regulation to the EPA, interest groups have been able to extend their influence into this sphere through the biased information that they

offer to Congress about the relative cost and effectiveness of regulations as well as scientific and technological concerns due to increasing environmental protection.<sup>7</sup> The EPA recently altered its Extremely Hazardous Substance List, removing phosphorous pentoxide, diethylcarbamazine, fenitrothion, and tellurium from the list. Similarly, the Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines established a program that in 1994 created compliance standards for automobile



*Signs warn the public to stay out of the water in an area harboring high bacteria levels near a drain at Will Rogers State Beach on Aug. 7, 2007 in Pacific Palisades, northwest of Los Angeles, Calif. Pollution at the nation's 3,500 ocean, lake, and bay beaches caused more than 25,000 closing or swimming advisory days last year, 28 percent more than in 2005, and the highest number in the 17 years that records have been kept. (David McNew/Getty Images)*

tailpipes in an attempt to standardize light-duty vehicles. It only subjected companies to the standards of the control once they had opted into the program.<sup>8</sup> These two pieces of legislation are just two of the most well-known examples of the many U.S. environmental laws that the pollution lobby has manipulated.



Vehicles drive past the Temple of Heaven in a smoggy Beijing. As China plans to introduce tougher car-emission standards before the 2008 Olympics, the U.S. automobile industry has successfully lobbied to limit the increase of national emissions standards. (Feng Li/Getty Images)

Corporate influence on environmental policy is not only a reality in the U.S., but it also affects global conservation efforts. At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, commonly referred to as the Rio Earth Summit, 1,000 transnational corporations met with 100 heads of state and argued that poor environmental behavior was a thing of the past because they could afford to develop new technologies and could establish them abroad.<sup>9</sup> However, this progressive policy statement has largely been ignored in the 15 years since the summit. Some firms have actively lobbied at the international level to allow for the continued generation of hazardous waste. Transnational corporations have also influenced international environmental policy by taking an active role in creating lackadaisical rules under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.<sup>10</sup>

These corporations often shape the ways in which

governments participate in international environmental regulation. President George W. Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change even before the Summit began and has refused to negotiate any new binding multilateral agreement, ensuring that no new compulsory policy would emerge from the conference. Additionally, the Bush Administration has weakened existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) by pushing for their subordination to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.<sup>11</sup> In effect, this has relegated international environmental policy to a position of inferiority below the Bush Administration's ultimate dedication to trade.

Incredible revolutionary strides are being made in the area of corporate "greening." Businesses that are conscious of the importance of environmentally friendly models and legislators who understand the necessity of regulating the relationship between corporations and the environment are making important advances in adapting business to the needs of a natural environment that continually suffers from anthropogenic changes. However, these largely publicized steps forward are miniscule compared to the influence of the national and international pollution lobby. Until environmental policy is freed from the monetary sway of the business world, the progression of corporate "greening" will remain stunted at best. **P**

<sup>1</sup> Chertou, Marian. "Government and Corporate Responsibility." *The Greening of Yale and Beyond*. Battell Chapel, New Haven. 18 Oct. 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Clapp, Jennifer. "Cleaning Up Their Act." *Forum for Applied Research & Public Policy* 16.4 (2002): 28-33

<sup>3</sup> Jubasz, Antonia. "Where Corporations Fear to Tread." *Tikkun* 17.6 (2002): 33-36

<sup>4</sup> Siretesky, Paul B. "Corporate Self-Policing and the Environment." *Criminology*. 44.3 (2006): 671-708

<sup>5</sup> Carmin, JoAnn. "Stakeholder Involvement in the Design of U.S. Voluntary Environmental Programs: Does Sponsorship Matter." *Policy Studies*. 31.4 (2003) 527-543

<sup>6</sup> Bergman, B.J. "Good Buy, 104th Congress." *Sierra*. 81.6 (1996) 59

<sup>7</sup> Kamieniecki, Sheldon. "Navigating the Maze." *Environment* 48.5 (2006) 8-20

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Clapp, Jennifer. "Cleaning Up Their Act." *Forum for Applied Research & Public Policy* 16.4 (2002): 28-33

<sup>10</sup> Clapp, Jennifer. "Cleaning Up Their Act." *Forum for Applied Research & Public Policy* 16.4 (2002): 28-33

<sup>11</sup> Jubasz, Antonia. "Where Corporations Fear to Tread." *Tikkun* 17.6 (2002): 33-36

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
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